Better Evidence Project

Description of Case 

In December 2017, The Gambia held a presidential election. The incumbent, President Yahya Jammeh, had been in power since 1994, led a repressive regime, and had refused the presence of international monitors at the polls. Thus, the unexpected announcement from the Gambian Electoral Commission that the opposition candidate had won the contest caught many observers off guard. Even more surprising was the conciliatory tone initially offered by Jammeh, who congratulated his rival, Adama Barrow.[1] Within a week, however, Jammeh deployed troops on the streets and claimed irregularities in the vote-counting process meant that fresh elections should be held. Fearing armed conflict or a brutal crackdown, Barrow, along with tens of thousands of other Gambian citizens, fled to neighbouring Senegal.

The international community, led by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), was quick to condemn Jammeh’s actions and called for the restoration of constitutional rule. The UN Special Representative for West Africa and the presidents of Liberia, Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone visited Jammeh, imploring him to give up the presidency. Jammeh’s refusal to cede power led ECOWAS to gather troops on the border and prepare for a military intervention once his mandate ended.[2] The EU provided initial funds for the operation via its Early Response Mechanism and has continued supporting ECOWAS efforts in The Gambia.[3] In the meantime, Barrow was inaugurated in the Gambian Embassy in Senegal on 19 January 2017 and, on the same day, the UN Security Council approved ECOWAS intervention to enforce the decision of the Gambian people.[4] The ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia made clear its intention to enter the country the moment Jammeh’s term in the presidency ended, however such action was avoided when he finally agreed to leave the country.[5] In 2018, the African Union Technical Support to The Gambia mission was established to support the stabilisation process and advise the Gambian government on the rule of law, democracy, transitional justice, and Security Sector Reform.[6] Diplomatic pressure and threat of military intervention helped to ensure a peaceful transfer of power and maintain stability in The Gambia.

[1] Christof Harmann. “ECOWAS and the Restoration of Democracy in The Gambia.” Africa Spectrum, Vol. 52, No. 1. (2017) pp.86-7

[2] Ruth Maclean. “Gambia crisis: Senegal troops poised at border as Jammeh mandate ends.” The Guardian. (2017) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/19/senegal-troops-poised-at-the-gambia-border-as-jammeh-mandate-ends (Accessed 11/11/2020)

[3] Africa-EU Partnership. Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG). (EU, 2019) Available at: https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/projects/mission-gambia-ecomig (Accessed 11/11/2020)

[4] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2337. (UN, 2017) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2337 (Accessed 11/11/2020)

[5] Ruth Maclean. “Yahya Jammeh leaves the Gambia after 22 years of rule.” The Guardian. (2017) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/21/anxious-gambians-await-former-president-yahya-jammeh-departure (Accessed 11/11/2020)

[6] Chido Mutangadura. “Will The Gambia be a turning point for AU peace efforts?” Institute for Security Studies. (2019) Available at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/will-the-gambia-be-a-turning-point-for-au-peace-efforts (Accessed 12/11/2020)

Description of Case 

On 18 April 1996, soldiers of the Central African armed forces staged a mutiny in protest against poor living conditions, the dismissal of the army chief of staff, and unpaid wages. More mutinies took place in May and November.[1] Increasingly frequent clashes and a deteriorating security situation was met with the deployment of 1,500 French troops in support of the government. Although this operation did protect key infrastructure, French involvement inspired demonstrations and protests, further destabilising the situation.[2] Additional mutinies took place in November 1996, leading to more clashes with French troops. In response, the domestic political opposition together with a former prime minister approached delegates at the France and Africa summit in Ouagadougou on 4-6 December 1996 for help. The summit concluded with an agreement that the leaders of Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, and Mali would travel to Bangui to negotiate a truce with the mutineers. This effort produced a ceasefire and created the framework for a peaceful resolution of the crisis to be negotiated. Talks were held the following year, with a weeklong conference taking place between 11 and 18 January encompassing opposition parties and civil society setting out various political and economic reforms, as well as the reorganisation of the armed forces.[3] On 25 January, these commitments were affirmed alongside an agreement to end hostilities in the Bangui Accords, which also established an international committee to oversee implementation.[4]

With support from the Government of France, the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Accords (Mission de surveillance des accords de Bangui, MISAB) was stood up on 31 January to replace French forces, which were withdrawn. Composed of 800 troops and led by a Gabonese general, MISAB was mandated to verify compliance with the Accords and begin a disarmament campaign.[5] MISAB clashed with mutinying Central African troops several times before a ceasefire was negotiated on 28 June 1997. This ended the conflict (which cost the lives of around 1,000 people) and created the framework for the Bangui Accords to be implemented.[6] On 27 March 1998, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (Mission des Nations Unies dans la Republique Centrafricaine, MINURCA) replaced MISAB.[7] These efforts helped to prevent further conflict in the Central African Republic until they were withdrawn in 2000. Within a year of the withdrawal, after almost four years of peace, more Central African troops mutinied, and the conflict resumed.[8]

[1] Moussounga Itsouhou Mbadinga. “The Inter-African mission to monitor the implementation of the Bangui agreements (MISAB).” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 8, No. 4. (2001) p.22

[2] Howard W. French. “Anger at French Troops Grows in Central Africa.” The New York Times. (24 May 1996) Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/24/world/anger-at-french-troops-grows-in-central-africa.html (Accessed 9/12/2021)

[3] Preliminary Agreement on National Reconciliation Pact, 1997. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/24/burkina-faso-coup-rise-and-fall-of-what-you-need-to-know (Accessed 9/12/2021)

[4] Bangui Accords, 1997. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/carbanguiaccords97 (Accessed 9/12/2021)

[5] Mandate of the Inter-African Force to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements, 1997. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/carinterafricanforce97 (Accessed 9/12/2021)

[6] Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management Project. Central African Republic (1960-present). (DADM, 2021) Available at: https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/central-african-republic-1960-present/ (Accessed 9/12/2021)

[7] UN Peacekeeping. Central African Republic – MINURCA Background. (UN, 2001) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/minurcaB.htm (Accessed 9/12/2021)

[8] Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management Project. Central African Republic (1960-present).

Description of Case 

Mudug is an administrative region of Somalia located in the centre of the country, separating Puntland and Somaliland from Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia. This position makes it a vital crossroads for trade within Somalia (particularly to the northern ports on the Gulf of Aden) and with neighbouring Ethiopia. As such, armed conflict in Mudug has severe humanitarian implications for the entire region. After the fall of the regime in 1991, the city of Galkayo (the capital of Mudug) was attacked by troops of a faction of the United Somali Congress (USC), one of the powerful armed groups that had driven Barre from Mogadishu. Over 500 people were killed, with many more wounded or captured, in this act of ‘clan cleansing.’[1] The following year, as the various armed groups in Somalia consolidated their respective territorial strongholds, Mudug became the frontline between the USC and the SSDF. Frequent clashes occurred throughout 1992 (despite the short-lived UN-mediated ceasefire negotiated that year), stifling trade and the movement of aid.[2]

It was not until 1993, following extensive negotiations in Addis Ababa between the various armed factions in Somalia, that the prospect of stopping the fighting in Mudug was considered. Talks between the leaders of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front and the USC faction operating in Mudug (who had, incidentally, shared a prison cell during the Barre regime and knew each other well) along with 227 delegates from the relevant clans began on 28 May 1993, and culminated on the 3 June with the signing of the Mudug Peace Agreement. The agreement contained an immediate ceasefire, provisions for reparations and disarmament and demobilisation of some forces, stipulated the withdrawal of armed forces to a 70km buffer zone, and also established a technical committee composed of the signatories to monitor implementation and administer diyah payments.[3] Unusually, it also contended that any future fighting should avoid towns and tarmac roads, indicating a level of flexibility but also a shared understanding of the unique importance of Mudug. While many aspects of the agreement were not maintained for long, the signatories did not relapse into a major conflict and the de facto line of separation established in 1993 continues to be respected (for the most part) and has helped to shelter northern Somalia from conflict for almost three decades. In 2007, local and international NGOs campaigned to consolidate the 1993 agreement and maintain peace in Mudug with noteworthy success.[4]

[1] Lidwien Kapteijns. “Clan Cleasing in Somalia: The Ruinous Turn of 1991 (2013) interview with Reinventing Peace.” World Peace Foundation. (2013) Available at: https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2013/10/17/clan-cleansing-in-somalia-the-ruinous-turn-of-1991-2013/ (Accessed 29/10/2021)

[2] UCDP. SSDF – USC/SNA. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/nonstate/5444 (Accessed 29/10/2021)

[3] Mudug Peace Agreement, 1993. Available in: Ralph Johnstone, ed. Peacemaking at the Crossroads: Consolidation of the 1993 Mudug Peace Agreement. (Interpeace, 2006) pp.30-1

[4] Johnstone, ed. Peacemaking at the Crossroads. p.25

Description of Case 

After a lengthy armed struggle to throw off colonial rule, Angola descended into war just months after becoming independent from Portugal in 1974. Two armed groups, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) fought each other for control of the country, with the former receiving extensive assistance from Cuba and the Soviet Union and the latter being supported by South Africa and the USA. This devastating conflict raged until 1988, when a ceasefire set the scene for the withdrawal of foreign troops the following year.[1] Representatives of the MPLA and UNITA then attended talks in Zaire in 1989, before entering into an 18-month period of negotiations supported by the UN and the governments of the USA and USSR in Portugal in 1990. These talks culminated with the 1991 Bicesse Peace Agreement, which established a fresh ceasefire, set the framework for the creation of an integrated national army, scheduled elections to take place within 16 months of the signing of the agreement, and called for an extremely limited peacekeeping mission (the United Nations Angola Verification Mission, UNAVEM) to monitor implementation.[2]

The election resulted in a victory for the MPLA. UNITA disputed the result, reformed their armed forces (which had disarmed much less than the MPLA’s), and launched a blistering offensive. By the beginning of 1993, UNITA held 75 per cent of the country. In May 1993, the US government withdrew its support for UNITA and recognised the embattled MPLA administration. Combined with losses on the battlefield, this forced UNITA leaders back to the negotiating table. On 20 November 1994, talks in Zambia supported by Portugal, the UN, and the USA culminated with the signing of the Lusaka Protocol.[3] This agreement established power-sharing mechanisms, again attempted to disarm or integrate combatants, and again included the deployment of a severely under-strength peacekeeping mission. The agreements signed in Bicesse and Lusaka succeeded in stopping the war for approximately five years but failed to create the framework for a lasting peace to develop in Angola.

[1] UCDP. Government of Angola – UNITA. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/714 (Accessed 26/10/2021)

[2] Peace Accords for Angola (Bicesse Accords), 1991. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/node/143 (Accessed 26/10/2021); Virginia Page Fortna. “A Lost Chance for Peace: The Bicesse Accords in Angola.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2003) p.74

[3] Lusaka Protocol, 1994. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/node/145 (Accessed 26/10/2021)