Better Evidence Project

Description of Case 

China and the Soviet Union shared a 4,300km border, much of which had been negotiated in the nineteenth century by the Russian Empire and had never been properly demarcated. Although the two states shared relatively cordial relations after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, geopolitical and ideological differences quickly soured this relationship. Beginning in the 1950s, this rivalry manifested itself in a series of increasingly deadly border clashes that culminated in March 1969 when, after Chinese troops ambushed a Soviet patrol on Zhenbao/Damansky Island in the Ussuri/Wusuli River. In response, the Soviets launched a major counterattack using heavy weapons which it claimed cost the lives of over 800 Chinese troops.[1] Further fighting took place when Soviet troops attempted to recover equipment lost in the assault.[2] In August 1969, Soviet troops ambushed a Chinese patrol in another part of the frontier, while artillery barrages continued for weeks at various points on the border, highlighting the potential for the conflict to spread.[3] With 34 Soviet and 59 Chinese divisions deployed along the border, agreements in place to allow Soviet forces to use Mongolian territory, and both states transporting nuclear weapons to the region, this Sino-Soviet border conflict represented one of the most dangerous moments of the Cold War.[4] Following the conflict, the border continued to be highly militarised and the potential of a similar incident sparking an unprecedented interstate conflict remained a constant danger.

Bilateral talks were held in September-October 1969 but ultimately failed to produce a resolution to the dispute. Indeed, military preparations continued apace after the negotiations and the border was closed entirely until 1982, when it was opened to low levels of trade. However, considerable military forces continued to be stationed on either side of the border and without a formal agreement in place, the risk of war remained a constant threat. In 1986, with the war in Afghanistan draining resources, Soviet leaders sought a resolution to the dispute with China and initial talks about the border began alongside incremental troop withdrawals from the frontier by both armed forces. Joint boundary commissions were put to work to demarcate the border, and on 16 May 1991 the Sino-Soviet Border Agreement was signed, settling the eastern section of the border.[5] The western portion was resolved in 1994, and the remaining points of contention were addressed in 2005 during negotiations in Vladivostok. In 2008, the entire border was formally agreed at a ceremony in Beijing.[6] These efforts have greatly reduced the risk of a potentially devastating interstate conflict.

[1] Benjamin Brimelow. “A bloody battle over a tiny island raised fears that China and the Soviets would start World War III.” Business Insider. (10 March 2021) Available at: https://www.businessinsider.com/fighting-over-dispute-border-island-risked-chinese-soviet-nuclear-war-2021-3?r=US&IR=T (Accessed 30/11/2021)

[2] Neville Maxwell. “How the Sino-Russian boundary conflict was finally settled: From Nerchinsk 1689 to Vladivostok 2005 via Zhenbao Island 1969.” Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2. (2007) p.248

[3] Ibid. p.249

[4] Thomas W. Robinson. The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes. (RAND, 1970) pp.35.8

[5] Agreement on the Eastern Section of the Boundary between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People’s Republic of China (1991 Sino-Soviet Border Agreement), 1991. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1740 (Accessed 30/11/2021)

[6] Reuters Staff. “China signs border demarcation pact with Russia.” Reuters. (31 July 2008) Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-russia-border-idUKPEK29238620080721 (Accessed 30/11/2021)

Description of Case 

Although the territory of Saudi Arabia was never colonised by European powers, all its neighbouring states were. As a result, the contemporary international borders are the result of colonial era treaties drawn up in the 1920s and revised in later decades. The Saudi border with Qatar (a British protectorate from 1916 until 1971) was partially demarcated in 1965, but 20km of territory remained disputed. The situation was further complicated by a series of highly contested treaties in the 1970s in which the United Arab Emirates had ceded territory to Saudi Arabia, including land bordering Qatar. In 1990, the Saudis asserted their authority over the territory for the first time by closing the historic road between Abu Dhabi and Qatar and building some guard posts in the area. On 31 September 1992, Qatari and Saudi troops clashed at Qatar’s al-Khofous Border Crossing, leaving three dead. The following day, the Government of Qatar suspended the 1965 agreement with Saudi Arabia, leaving the entire frontier between the two countries as contested – and already militarised – territory. Just hours after the Qatari declaration, Saudi troops launched an attack on the border post.[1] The Qatari troops stationed there had been ordered to hold fire, preventing further bloodshed, but the crisis threatened to escalate into a much larger conflict on 4 October when the Qatari government issued a protest memorandum describing the incident as an unjustified military attack.[2] In the context of ongoing rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia on a host of issues at the time, the prospect of further armed clashes on the border sparking an interstate conflict was reasonably high.[3]

Qatar boycotted the Gulf Cooperation Council in response to the crisis and its threat of withdrawal prevented the organisation from being able to serve as effective mediator. Fortunately, the Government of Egypt made noteworthy progress in its efforts to contain the crisis. Following a series of talks, the Qatari and Saudi governments agreed to form a technical committee to delineate the border, with Egypt serving as the guarantor of the committee’s findings.[4] The dispute became militarised again in 1994, with five skirmishes taking place along the border just as the committee was supposed to begin its work.[5] This delayed, but did not halt progress, and after agreeing to the findings of the committee in 1999, a formal agreement was signed in Doha on 21 March 2001.[6] In 2008, the two countries restored diplomatic relations and the following year signed a border agreement at UN Headquarters in New York, providing a symbolic final resolution of the issue.[7]

[1] Associated Press. “2^nd Saudi Border Clash Reported.” The Washington Post. (1/10/1992) Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/10/02/2nd-saudi-border-clash-reported/c50bc249-a594-4466-bf39-e07cdff44a34/ (Accessed 17/11/2021)

[2] Associated Press. “Qatar Demand Saudis Leave a Disputed Post.” The New York Times. (4 October 1992) Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/04/world/qatar-demand-saudis-leave-a-disputed-post.html (Accessed 17/11/2021)

[3] Gwenn Okruhlik & Patrick Conge. “The Politics of Border Disputes: On the Arabian Peninsula.” International Journal, Vol. 54, No. 2. (1999) p.236

[4] Ibid.

[5] Yoel Guzansky. “Lines Drawn in the Sand: Territorial Disputes and GCC Unity.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 70, No. 4. (2016) p.551

[6] Associated Press. “Saudi and Qatar End 35-Year Border Dispute, Sign Accord.” Al-Bawaba. (21 March 2001) Available at: https://www.albawaba.com/news/saudi-and-qatar-end-35-year-border-dispute-sign-accord (Accessed 17/11/2021)

[7] Guzansky. “Lines Drawn in the Sand.” p.550

Description of Case 

The Hanish Islands are an archipelago in the Red Sea located between Eritrea and Yemen. During the colonial period, the Italian and British governments failed to definitively settle the boundaries between their respective colonies, and this situation did not improve when Ethiopia and North Yemen governed the land on either side of the Islands. The dispute remained largely dormant until Yemeni unification and Eritrean independence (1990 and 1991, respectively), when both administrations sought to settle their borders and raise revenue. In 1995, Yemen granted a tourism license to develop diving on the islands, sending 200 soldiers to guard the construction site on the largest island in the archipelago (Greater Hanish), while Eritrea signed a contract for oil exploration in the maritime area around the Islands and issued an ultimatum of 11 November for the Yemeni troops to withdraw. After ministerial talks took place in October and 25 detained Yemeni fishermen were released by Eritrean authorities, the dispute appeared to be nearing a diplomatic resolution.[1] However, when the Eritrean armed forces found the Yemeni positions on Greater Hanish still occupied on 15 December, they launched an offensive. The fighting continued for 3 days, when telephone negotiations between both presidents resulted in a ceasefire at midnight on 17 December. The battle was already over when the deadline hit, leaving a total of 18 dead and 213 captured Yemeni soldiers and civilians.[2] The prisoners were released three days later.

After the battle, the Arab League condemned Eritrea and urged its members to support Yemen’s claim to the Islands, sparking a brief war of words with the Organisation of African Unity. The discovery that some Israeli-made boats were used in the Eritrean offensive added another dimension to the dispute, leading to condemnations of the Eritrean government by a host of Arab states.[3] The belligerents received offers to mediate from the UN, Organisation of Islamic Conference, and several prominent regional powers, but, after diplomatic pressure from the UN Secretary-General, eventually accepted the offer of the French government in 1996. After months of talks, the parties agreed to refer the case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to judge the case and resolve it peacefully.[4] Tensions were heightened again in August 1996 after more military activity in the area, but on 3 October 1996 a formal peace agreement was signed in Paris. The arbiters came to their decision on 9 October 1998, awarding most of the islands to Yemen but guaranteeing Eritrean fishing rights in the area.[5] The armed conflict was over, the dispute was resolved, and the risk of a more severe interstate conflict was greatly reduced.

[1] Daniel Dzurek. “Eritrea-Yemen Dispute Over the Hanish Islands.” IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 1. (1996) p.72

[2] Jeffrey Lefebvre. “Red Sea Security and the Geopolitical-Economy of the Hanish Islands Dispute.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 3. (1998) p.369

[3] Ibid. p.377-8

[4] Yemen-Eritrea Arbitration Agreement, 1996. Available in: Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, Vol. 3, No. 1. (1996)

[5] Permanent Court of Arbitration. Case 81: Eritrea/Yemen – Sovereignty and Maritime Delimitation in the Red Sea. (PCA, 2021) Available at: https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/81/ (Accessed 19/11/2021)

Description of Case 

When Cameroon and Nigeria emerged as independent states in the 1960s, their mutual border remained largely unmarked and swathes of territory was claimed by the administrations of both states. During the 1980s, incidents on the border became increasingly violent, with clashes between soldiers taking place around Lake Chad and on the Bakassi Peninsula.[1] Located in the Niger Delta, the Peninsula had been governed by the British alongside much of the rest of what became Nigeria until 1913, when it was ceded to the German colony of Kamerun. The details of this exchange formed the basis of the competing contemporary claims on the territory. A 1961 plebiscite resulted in the area becoming part of Cameroon, however the discovery of oil and gas fields around the Bakassi Peninsula in the 1990s provided motivation for both states to claim the territory.[2] In 1993, another border clash led the Government of Nigeria (which had come to power in a coup d’état just a month earlier) to abrogate all previous agreements and march thousands of troops into the Peninsula.[3]

Rather than responding with force to the incursion on its territory, the Government of Cameroon filed a case with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1994.[4] The conflict, however, continued at a low intensity and the likelihood of escalation remained high regardless of developments in The Hague. To contain the crisis, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) mediated negotiations between the parties, and separate talks were later hosted by the governments of Togo and Gabon. In September 2002, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the Government of France sponsored talks in Paris, where both parties formally committed to respecting the judgement of the ICJ.[5] This round of talks also resulted in the UN forming a joint Cameroonian-Nigerian commission, which resolved several disputes (such as that concerning the territory around Lake Chad) but failed to address Bakassi.[6] In its judgement the following month, the ICJ granted sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon and ordered the removal of all Nigerian personnel from the area.[7] Continued Nigerian recalcitrance to withdraw led to another flare up of tensions in June 2005, leading to yet another round of negotiations hosted by the UN.[8] These talks culminated in June 2006 with the Greentree Agreement and the withdrawal of Nigerian troops from the area two months later.[9] Thanks to the efforts of the OAU, UN, and ICJ, an interstate conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria was avoided.

[1] Alan Cowell. “In Crisis With Cameroon, Nigeria Turns Self-Critical.” The New York Times. (1981) Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/22/world/in-crisis-with-cameroon-nigeria-turns-self-critical.html (Accessed 17/11/2020)

[2] Francis Baye. “Implications of the Bakassi conflict resolution for Cameroon.” African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Vol. 20, No. 1. (2010) Available at: https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/implications-of-the-bakassi-conflict-resolution-for-cameroon/ (Accessed 17/11/2020); Obasesam Okoi. “Why Nations Fight: The Causes of the Nigeria-Cameroon Bakassi Peninsula Conflict.” African Security, Vol. 9, No. 1. (2016)

[3] Hilary V. Lukong. The Cameroon-Nigeria Border Dispute: Management and Resolution, 1981-2011. (Bamenda: Langaa, 2011) p.26

[4] ICJ. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening). (ICJ, 2020) Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/94 (Accessed 17/11/2020)

[5] UN. “Meeting with Annan, Cameroon and Nigeria agree to follow ICJ border decision.” UN News. (2002) Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2002/09/44422-meeting-annan-cameroon-and-nigeria-agree-follow-icj-border-decision (Accessed 17/11/2020)

[6] UNOWAS. The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission: A success in the resolution of boundary dispute. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://unowas.unmissions.org/cameroon-nigeria-mixed-commission-success-resolution-boundary-dispute (Accessed 17/11/2020)

[7] ICJ. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria.

[8] Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Cameroon – Nigeria. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/405 (Accessed 17/11/2020)

[9] Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria concerning the Modalities of Withdrawal and Transfer of Authority in the Bakassi Peninsula, 2006. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/240 (Accessed 17/11/2020)

Description of Case 

The border between modern-day Botswana and Namibia was established along the “main channels” of the rivers along the mutual frontier by an 1890 treaty between the UK and Germany, the respective colonial powers at the time.^[1] The ambiguity of this delineation has led the governments of both countries to issue competing claims on territory in the border rivers, with the Sedudu Islands representing a particularly contested prize. While the Islands themselves have some value as tourist destinations, the primary concern was the division of water reserves that legal jurisdiction over the territory would offer.^[2] Tensions between the administrations of each state were heightened when the Namibian government proposed building a 250km water pipeline from the Okavango River to feed its growing needs.^[3] Such a development would have potentially threatened the Okavango Delta in Botswana with desertification. In 1991, Botswana deployed troops to the region, and in 1993, soldiers from both countries exchanged fire in the area. In the ensuing years, both countries built up their military forces along the border. Tensions continued to rise in 1996, when Botswana acquired tanks and fighter-bombers and Namibia bought a large shipment of arms from Russia.^[4] Given the high numbers of military personnel in the region and the history of clashes along the border, the dispute ran the risk of sparking an interstate conflict and represented a pervasive threat to peace and stability in the region.  

The Government of Zimbabwe provided good offices to facilitate negotiations in 1996 which, although ultimately fruitless, inspired the Botswanan and Namibian governments of both states to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice.^[5] Judges at the Court considered the case until December 1999, when they ruled that the territory was lawfully that of Botswana, but both states should enjoy freedom of navigation on the river.^[6] Although this decision resolved the conflict, Botswanan and Namibian troops almost clashed in 2015.^[7] Recognising the continued risk posed by the frontier, the governments of both states invited the African Union to mediate the negotiation of a formal boundary treaty in 2016 to not only reduce the likelihood of such clashes, but to also facilitate movement and trade. The African Union Border Programme advised the process. On 6 February 2018, representatives from both states signed the Boundary Treaty in the Namibian capital, Windhoek.[8]

 [1] Salman M. A. Salman. “International Rivers as Boundaries: The Dispute over Kasikili/Seduku Island and the Decision of the International Court of Justice.” Water International, Vol. 25, No. 4. (2000) p.582

[2] C.J.B. Le Roux. “The Botswana-Namibia Boundary Dispute in the Caprivi: To what extent does Botswana’s Arms Procurement Program represent a drift towards Military Confrontation in the Region?” Scientia Militaia, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1. (1999)

[3] The Economist. “Thirst: Botswana and Namibia.” The Economist. (1997) Available at: https://www.economist.com/international/1997/07/03/thirst (Accessed 05/11/2020)

[4] The Independent. “Botswana’s army chief defends purchase of tanks and combat aircraft.” The Independent. (1996) Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/botswanas-army-chief-defends-purchase-of-tanks-and-combat-aircraft-1338858.html (Accessed 05/11/2020)

[5] Salman. “International Rivers as Boundaries.” p.582

[6] ICJ. Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia): Overview of the Case. (ICJ, 1999) Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/98 (Accessed 05/11/2020)

[7] Online Editor. “Botswana, Namibia soldiers nearly clash at border.” Sunday Standard. (2015) Available at: https://www.sundaystandard.info/botswana-namibia-soldiers-nearly-clash-at-border/ (Accessed 05/11/2020)

[8] African Union. “The AU congratulates the Republic of Botswana and the Republic of Namibia on the signing of their Boundary Treaty.” News. (2018) Available at: https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-au-congratulates-the-republic-of-botswana-and-the-republic-of-namibia-on-the-signing-of-their-boundary-treaty (Accessed 05/11/2020)

Description of Case 

The 700km Honduras-Nicaragua land border has been a source of dispute since the end of Spanish colonial rule in the 1820s. Although several wars have taken place between the two states, many of the disputes have been settled by international arbitration. Indeed, various resolutions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and before that, the King of Spain, had resolved several areas of contention, but the maritime boundary remained a major point of contention. In 1999, the Honduran parliament ratified a 1985 treaty with Colombia which implicitly recognised Colombian sovereignty over maritime territory claimed by Nicaragua. Almost immediately, the Nicaraguan government raised a case with the ICJ regarding the delimitation of its maritime border with Honduras.[1] With the dispute escalating, the governments of Honduras and Nicaragua requested that the Organisation of American States (OAS) hold a special session to address the crisis.

In response to the dispute, the OAS dispatched a Special Representative to mediate negotiations between the two governments. The talks resulted in a series of agreements to ensure peaceful relations, culminating in March 2000 with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding, which noted that the two countries should restrict military activities along the border and conducting joint maritime patrols.[2] In February 2001, tensions were heightened again amidst claims of violations of the measures outlined in the Memorandum. The OAS once again hosted talks, and the agreement that was reached included an invitation for technical experts and observers from the international community to monitor the border. In June 2001, the OAS formed a small Observer Mission with staff from its secretariat and military personnel from Argentina and Brazil. The Mission, which was entirely financed by the Fund for Peace, verified both the land and maritime border, providing assurances to both sides and encouraging cooperation between them. At a ceremony at OAS headquarters in December 2001, representatives of both governments signed additional agreements aimed at improving relations between them.[3] In October 2007, the ICJ concluded its investigation, and its findings were accepted by both parties, bringing a peaceful end to the dispute.[4]  

[1] ICJ. Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras). (ICJ, 2020) Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/120 (Accessed 09/11/2020)

[2] OAS. Agreements. (OAS Peace Fund, 2020) Available at: https://www.oea.org/sap/peacefund/agreements/ (Accessed 09/11/2020)

[3] OAS. Peace Fund – Honduras and Nicaragua. (OAS Peace Fund, 2009) Available at: http://www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/hondurasandnicaragua/ (Accessed 09/11/2020)

[4] ICJ. Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea.

Description of Case 

The accords signed in Brasilia and Montevideo in 1995 stopped the fighting between Ecuador and Peru, yet several fatal clashes occurred in the ensuing months and the territorial dispute remained unresolved. The accords did, however, establish mechanisms to prevent a return to conflict until a political solution to the dispute could be found. The Military Observer Mission for Ecuador and Peru (MOMEP) was the product of the Itamaraty Declaration and could have been on the ground immediately thanks to the logistical capabilities of the US military, which led the operation. However, breaches of the ceasefire delayed the arrival of the 112 observers from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the USA until 12 March 1995.[1] MOMEP worked to verify compliance with the ceasefire, monitoring the withdrawal of 3,000 Ecuadorian and 2,000 Peruvian combatants through difficult jungle terrain. MOMEP also facilitated the negotiations which concluded with the establishment of the demilitarised zone stipulated in the Itamaraty Declaration on 1 August 1995.[2] Implementation was largely successful; however, the dispute did threaten to escalate again when both states invested heavily in strengthening their armed forces, increasing tensions in the region.[3] MOMEP remained in place until May 1997, during which time it continued to verify the ceasefire and hold meetings and joint patrols with personnel from both countries.[4]

While MOMEP addressed the military aspects of consolidating the peace, representatives from the Guarantors mediated negotiations between the belligerents. In November 1997, the parties agreed to a timetable for further talks and, in January 1998, established four binational commissions to develop solutions to the main impasses in the peace process, including the demarcation of the border.[5] By May, most of the issues had been resolved according to the recommendations of the commissions, allowing the leaders of Ecuador and Peru to sign the Presidential Act of Brasilia .[6] The Act included a legal declaration to reject the use of war and violence against each other and formally resolved the long-standing territorial dispute. One point of contention regarding navigation rights on the Amazon remained unresolved, but both governments committed to addressing it peacefully.

[1] Kevin M. Higgins. Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP): Doing A Lot With a Little. (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 1999) p.8

[2] Joseph L. Homza. “Special Operators: A Key Ingredient for Successful Peacekeeping Operations Management.” Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol. 12, No. 1. (2004) pp.101-2

[3] Simms. “Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution.” p.13-4

[4] Higgins. Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP). pp.9-10

[5] Simms. “Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution.” pp.15-6

[6] Presidential Act of Brasilia, 1998. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/ecuadorperu-actbrasilia98 (Accessed 03/12/2020)

Description of Case 

The mediation services and peacekeeping mission provided by the Government of Qatar served to prevent an outbreak of armed conflict following the clashes on the Djibouti-Eritrea border in 2008. Despite the imposition of sanctions on the Government of Eritrea in 2009, the conflict remained unresolved and highly militarised, with both countries maintaining large military forces in the area. During the 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis, the governments of both Djibouti and Eritrea backed the decision to isolate the Gulf state in solidarity with powerful regional actors, most notably Saudi Arabia. In response, Qatar withdrew its peacekeeping force from the disputed territory after seven years of operating.[1] Eritrean armed forces returned to the contested area almost immediately, bringing the former belligerents back to the verge of war.[2]

The African Union (AU) immediately called for calm and dispatched a fact-finding mission to the area to discover what was happening but refused to deploy a peacekeeping mission, as requested by the Government of Djibouti.[3] The dispute remained unresolved and a potential source of armed conflict until the 8 June 2018, when the leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia met to resolve their own long-standing territorial dispute. In addition to formally ending the dispute and normalising relations between their two countries, the meeting sparked a rapprochement with other governments in the region. The Government of Somalia soon reconciled its own differences with the Eritrean leadership, sending a delegation along with the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia (the Joint High-Level Committee) to Djibouti in September 2018. The Committee was tasked with opening a new era of cooperation in the Horn of Africa by resolving the dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea. After initial talks, the governments of the three states signed the Djibouti Agreement, formally entering a period of cooperation.[4] The following week, representatives from across the Horn of Africa were invited to the Saudi Arabian city of Jeddah to formalise their commitments to peace.[5] On 16 September, the Eritrean and Ethiopian leaders signed their deal. The following day, the Government of Saudi Arabia hosted the first face-to-face meeting between the Djiboutian and Eritrean leaders in over a decade.[6] These efforts have greatly reduced the risk of interstate conflict not just between Djibouti and Eritrea, but across the entire Horn of Africa.

[1] Reuters Staff. “Qatar withdraws troops from Djibouti-Eritrea border mission.” Reuters. (2017) Available at: https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-djibouti/qatar-withdraws-troops-from-djibouti-eritrea-border-mission-idUSKBN1950W5 (Accessed 10/12/2020)

[2] Aaron Maasho. “Djibouti, Eritrea in territorial dispute after Qatar peacekeepers leave.” Reuters. (2017) Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-djibouti-eritrea-border-idUSKBN1971JR (Accessed 10/12/2020)

[3] African Union. “AU Commission calls for Restraint on the Djibouti-Eritrea Border.” AU Press Release. (2017) Available at: https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/press-release-au-commission-calls-for-restraint-on-the-djibouti-eritrea-border (Accessed 10/12/2020)

[4] UN. “Horn of Africa: UN chief welcomes Djibouti agreement between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia.” UN News. (2018) Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1018811 (Accessed 10/12/2020)

[5] Fatah Arahman Youssef. “President of Djibouti: Saudi Arabia Helped Us Open a New Page with Eritrea.” Asharq Al-Awsat. (2018) Available at: https://english.aawsat.com//home/article/1406371/president-djibouti-saudi-arabia-helped-us-open-new-page-eritrea (Accessed 10/12/2020)

[6] Camille Lons. “Saudi Arabira and UAE Look to Africa.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2018) Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/77561 (Accessed 10/12/2020)

Description of Case 

The 1858 Treaty of Cañas-Jerez established the border between Costa Rica and Nicaragua as the San Juan River and provided stipulations for its use by both countries. However, differing interpretations of the Treaty have led to a series of disputes over territory along the border.[1] Following several relatively minor incidents, the dispute flared up again in 2010 when the Nicaraguan military began dredging the river (which the Costa Rican government claimed was altering the border and damaging Costa Rican territory) and stationing troops on territory claimed by Costa Rica. The Government of Nicaragua justified such actions with another reinterpretation of nineteenth century treaties and the fact that Google Maps listed the territory as Nicaraguan.[2] Although Costa Rica does not have a military, over 200 armed police were dispatched to the area in response to what the government called “an occupation.”[3] In this uncertain context, there was every likelihood that an armed conflict would erupt.

Fearing the crisis would escalate, the Organisation of American States (OAS) called for both countries to withdraw their security personnel from the area and open a dialogue. When the Government of Nicaragua refused to withdraw its troops from the area, the OAS Secretary-General travelled to Costa Rica and Nicaragua to investigate the dispute and pressure the parties to resolve it peacefully.[4] His visit was complemented by the promulgation of a formal OAS resolution requesting both countries withdraw armed personnel from the area and open a dialogue.[5] With the Nicaraguan Government still refusing to withdraw its troops (and challenging the OAS’s right to make such demands), the Costa Rican government raised another case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).[6] The immediate crisis was mitigated in March 2011, when the ICJ ruled that both countries must refrain from sending personnel to the area.[7] A more permanent resolution was issued in a 2018 ruling which judged much of the disputed territory to be Costa Rican (although a 3km strip of beach was awarded to Nicaragua), finalised the mutual maritime border, and stipulated that the Government of Nicaragua must pay compensation for environmental damage.[8] Thanks in part to the preventive diplomacy efforts of the OAS and the rulings of the ICJ, a potentially volatile territorial dispute was prevented from escalating into armed conflict.

[1] Carin Zissis & David Schreiner. “A River Runs through It: The Costa Rica-Nicaragua Dispute.” Americas Society: Council of the Americas. (2010) Available at: https://www.as-coa.org/articles/river-runs-through-it-costa-rica-nicaragua-dispute (Accessed 09/11/2020)

[2] Centre for Borders Research. “Boundary dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua involves Google maps.” Boundary news. (2010) Available at: https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news/?itemno=11048&rehref=%2Fibru%2Fnews%2F&resubj=Boundary+news+Headlines (Accessed 09/11/2020)

[3] Ibid.

[4] OAS. “OAS Secretary General to Travel to Costa Rica and Nicaragua to Facilitate Dialogue.” Press Release. (2010) Available at: https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-416/10 (Accessed 09/11/2020)

[5] The Economist Intelligence Unit. “The political scene: Costa Rica-Nicaragua border dispute intensifies.” The Economist. (2010) Available at: http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=547662039&Country=Costa%20Rica (Accessed 09/11/2020)

[6] ICJ. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua). (ICJ, 2020) Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/150 (Accessed 09/11/2020)

[7] Adam Williams. “International Court of Justice rules that Nicaraguan troops must leave Isla Calero.” The Tico Times. (2011) Available at: https://ticotimes.net/2011/03/08/international-court-of-justice-rules-that-nicaraguan-troops-must-leave-isla-calero (Accessed 09/11/2020)

[8] ICJ. Land Boundary in the Northern Part of Isla Portillos (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua). (ICJ, 2020) Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/165 (Accessed 09/11/2020)

Description of Case 

The Aouzou Strip is a piece of mineral-rich land along the Chadian-Libyan frontier in the Sahara Desert. Although a 1955 treaty between France and Libya had stipulated that the territory was a part of Chad, the rise of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya complicated the situation. He contested the validity of the treaty, citing an unratified agreement between fascist Italy and France which would have awarded the Strip to Libya. In 1973, amidst the chaos of the 1965 – 1979 Chadian Civil War, the Government of Libya annexed and occupied the Aouzou Strip.[1] By 1978, thousands of Libyan troops were fighting in support of Chadian rebels, leading the Government of Chad to bring the occupation of the Aouzou Strip to the UN Security Council alongside its protests concerning Libyan involvement in the war. With considerable French support, the Government of Chad eventually drove Libyan forces out of the country and began mounting operations in the Strip and the Libyan hinterland. The reversal of fortunes led to a ceasefire, mediated by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), in September 1987. Talks continued over the next two years, and although the belligerents failed to produce a bilateral solution to the territorial dispute, they did resolve to submit the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at OAU-mediated talks in Algiers.[2]

The ICJ delivered its judgement in February 1994, supporting Chad’s claim on the territory.[3] In the ensuing months, negotiations were held between the governments of Chad and Libya, culminating with a comprehensive agreement on Libyan withdrawal and the establishment of a joint commission to demarcate the border.[4] As the first Libyan personnel were leaving the Strip on 15 April 1994, a UN reconnaissance team arrived to survey conditions on the ground. Two weeks later, the United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG) was formally established to monitor and verify the Libyan withdrawal.[5] These tasks were carried out successfully, with the Libyan troops completing their withdrawal and formally handing over control of the Aouzou Strip to Chad at the end of May 1994. Its mandate complete, UNASOG was disbanded a week later.[6] The mediation of the OAU helped to end the conflict, the arbitration of the ICJ provided a permanent solution to the dispute, and UNASOG observers ensured that the transition went ahead peacefully.

[1] UCDP. Chad – Libya. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/361 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[2] Framework Agreement on the Peaceful Settlement of the Territorial Dispute between the Republic of Chad and the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 1989. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/chadlibyaframeworkagreement89 (Accessed 07/12/2020)

[3] ICJ. Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad): Overview of the Case. (ICJ, 2020) Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/83 (Accessed 07/12/2020)

[4] Agreement between Libya and Chad Concerning the Practical Modalities for the Implementation of the Judgment Delivered by the ICJ on 3 February 1994, 1994. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/chadlibyaimplementationicj94 (Accessed 07/12/2020)

[5] UN Peacekeeping. Aouzou Strip: Background. (UN, 2001) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unasogB.htm#Establishment (Accessed 07/12/2020)

[6] Ibid.