Description of Case 

In January 2002, a month after the Malino Declaration ended the fighting in Central Sulawesi, over 4,000 Indonesian troops and police were stationed in Poso and Morowali districts. The extent of this deployment meant that, initially at least, there was one member of the government security forces for every 100 residents in the area.[1] These personnel served to prevent disputes from escalating into violence, provided security to the local population (although some human rights abuses were recorded), and began disarming the various armed groups that had emerged around Poso since 1998. Despite these efforts, a major threat to the fragile peace resurfaced after troop numbers were drawn down in July 2002. A series of bombings preceded a planned attack on a predominantly Christian town in Poso in August, while the two commissions established to oversee the implementation of the Malino Declaration began their first evaluations, costing the lives of 13 people and threatening to reignite the conflict.[2] In the wake of the October 2002 bombings in Bali, the Indonesian security forces stepped up their campaign in Central Sulawesi, utilising anti-terrorism laws to track down and arrest those responsible for the post-Malino attacks with demonstrable results. Combined with the ongoing disarmament campaign, this served to end much of the intercommunal violence in Poso and brought stability to the area after four years of uncertainty.

The 2005 election for local governor and deputy governor positions constituted the first major test of the peace being built in Central Sulawesi after the Malino Declaration. At a series of meetings between Christian and Muslim leaders and the provincial branch of the Indonesian electoral commission prior to the contest, all parties agreed to pursue peaceful campaigns. In addition, an informal agreement was reached by which all parties agreed to ensure that every slate of candidates on the ballot was composed of a Christian and a Muslim, guaranteeing a de facto consociational power-sharing arrangement regardless of the outcome of the election.[3] These efforts were matched by civil society groups, which hosted regular public meetings and interreligious fora. Despite some tense moments amid widespread protests, the election went ahead peacefully.[4] In January 2007, Indonesian security forces arrested several key terrorist leaders and uncovered hidden caches of arms and explosives in Poso. This action brought about ‘a stark and immediate improvement in security in Poso’ and significantly minimised the risk of a conflict relapse.[5]

[1] McRae. A Few Poorly Organised Men. p.110

[2] Ibid. p.116

[3] Graham Brown & Rachael Diprose. “Bare-Chested Politics in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia: The Dynamics of Local Elections in a ‘Post’-Conflict Region.” CRISE Working Paper, No. 37. (2007) p.10

[4] Ibid. p.16

[5] McRae. A Few Poorly Organised Men. pp.129-30

Description of Case 

Prior to the signing of the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding which ended the armed conflict in Aceh, the EU dispatched the Initial Monitoring Presence (IMP) of 82 unarmed observers to Indonesia. These observers were therefore ready to get to work the moment the agreement was signed on 15 August 2005, preparing the ground for the arrival of the 227-strong Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) the following month.[1] The AMM was a unique operation, representing a fully integrated initiative carried out jointly by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the EU. The monitoring teams were intentionally multinational and included personnel who had served in the short-lived 2002 monitoring mission deployed by the governments of Thailand and the Philippines. In addition to verifying disarmament and facilitating confidence-building measures, the AMM also chaired the Commission on Security Arrangements, which brought the parties together on a weekly basis to discuss and resolve issues at AMM headquarters. This mechanism has been described as the driving force behind the peace process, with the Commission playing an important role in ensuring that decisions on disarmament, the relocation of Indonesian military personnel, and the provision of economic assistance packages were understood by and consented to by all parties involved.[2]

By the end of 2005, the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) had been completely disarmed and its militant wing was formally disbanded. Aside from a relatively small residual force agreed to during the peace process, Indonesian troops had also withdrawn from the region under AMM supervision.[3] Although initially mandated to only operate until 2006 (the original March deadline was extended to September), the AMM remained in Aceh until 2012. During this period, it played an important role in mediating talks between the former belligerents regarding the implementation of new laws (such as the Special Autonomy Law for Aceh) and the conduct of elections. This sustained presence combined with the AMM policy of “proactive monitoring” to help ensure that renewed conflict did not erupt in Aceh. Its mission complete, the AMM was formally withdrawn on 28 May 2012.[4]

[1] Peter Feith. “The Aceh Peace Process: Nothing Less than Success.” US Institute of Peace. (2007) pp.3-4

[2] John Quigley. “Enhancing South-East Asia’s Security: The Aceh Monitoring Mission.” in Sebastian Bersick, et al, eds. Multiregionalism and Multilateralism: Asian-European Relations in a Global Context. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006) pp.67-8

[3] EU Council Secretariat. Background: EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) – ACEH/07. (EU Commission, 2006) p.2

[4] Staff and agencies. “Editorial: Thank you, EU.” The Jakarta Post. (28 May 2012) Available at: https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/05/28/editorial-thank-you-eu.html (Accessed 25/01/2022)

Description of Case 

The March 1994 Timetable Agreement called for the deployment of a UN mission to support the ongoing peace process in Guatemala.[1] Six months later, the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), which was initially an unarmed mission composed of 250 human rights monitors, indigenous specialists, and police, deployed to Guatemala.[2] Following the negotiation of the Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire in December 1996, a small contingent of 155 unarmed military observers were attached to MINUGUA and tasked with monitoring the ceasefire, separating combatants, and disarming URNG troops. These tasks were completed efficiently, with the entire URNG demobilisation process being completed in just 18 days.[3]

Despite some initial successes, the peace process in Guatemala faced a growing number of obstacles. For the most part, these were the result of domestic political opposition to the implementation of reforms stipulated in various peace agreements. Changes to the Guatemalan legal system and security sector, for example, were hindered by institutional resistance. Similarly, constitutional reform was derailed and ultimately rejected in a May 1999 referendum in which just 18 percent of the population participated.[4] The failure to implement important provisions of previous accords undermined the peace process and threatened to renew the conflict.[5] The general election held later that year remained peaceful, thanks in part to the deployment of Organisation of American States and EU observers, however it resulted in a hard-line political party (led by a former general who had previously taken power in a coup d’état) which was strongly opposed to the peace process coming to power.[6] One of the new government’s first actions was to begin a ‘comprehensive remilitarization of the state,’ bringing Guatemala even closer to conflict relapse.[7] Fortunately, the ongoing efforts of MINUGUA (particularly its human rights component) helped to maintain a degree of stability until the government was replaced by a moderate party in the 2003 elections.[8] When MINUGUA formally closed in December 2004, implementation of the peace agreements was back on track and the Guatemalan military had been halved in size and placed under civilian control.[9] MINUGUA helped to reduce political violence, build stability, and ultimately prevent a return to war in Guatemala.

[1] Agreement on a Timetable for Negotiations of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Guatemala, 1994. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/guatemala-timetablenegotiations94 (Accessed 18/11/2020)

[2] UN Peacekeeping. Guatemala – MINUGUA: Background. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/minuguabackgr.html (Accessed 11/11/2020)

[3] William Stanley. Enabling Peace in Guatemala: The Story of MINUGUA. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2013) p.142

[4] Mireya Navarro. “Guatemalans Deny Changes For Indians And the Army.” The New York Times. (1999) Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/17/world/guatemalans-deny-changes-for-indians-and-the-army.html (Accessed 18/11/2020)

[5] Stanley. Enabling Peace in Guatemala. p.186

[6] “Report of the Electoral Observation Mission to Guatemala 1999 Elections.” CP/doc. 3356/00. (OAS Permanent Council, 2000)

[7] Stanley. Enabling Peace in Guatemala. p.224

[8] BBC. “Guatemala general beaten in poll.” BBC News. (2003) Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3256721.stm (Accessed 18/11/2020)

[9] Ibid. pp.262-4

Description of Case 

The first UN presence in El Salvador came in January 1990 with the opening of the regional office of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). Much of ONUCA’s focus, however, was on monitoring interstate borders in the region rather than managing the war in El Salvador.[1] In May 1991, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL), which had been mandated by the human rights agreement signed in Costa Rica the previous year.[2] In July, ONUSAL established offices across the country and became the first UN mission to focus on the investigation of alleged human rights abuses.[3]

Following the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accords, ONUSAL’s mandate was expanded to include verifying the ceasefire, separating the former belligerents, re-establishing government control in former areas of conflict, and removing land mines.[4] The UN effort in this regard was highly successful, and not a single violation of the ceasefire was reported.[5] With the initial phase of El Salvador’s post-conflict transition complete, ONUSAL’s mandate was further extended to include maintaining law and order, strengthening domestic institutions such as the Salvadorian police and judiciary, and monitoring elections.[6] The peacekeepers in El Salvador were the first to be given such a task. Beginning in 1993, ONSUAL also began preparatory work for the restoration of democracy in El Salvador. This entailed identifying how many Salvadorian citizens were not registered to vote and ensuring that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal of El Salvador was carrying out its duties effectively.[7] In 1994, ONUSAL’s efforts to strengthen the Salvadorian state received support from the UN Development Programme, which provided expertise and guidance on reintegration programmes and electoral reform.[8] ONUSAL kept working to build peace in El Salvador until May 1995, when it was withdrawn and replaced with a small political mission tasked with verifying the peace process and providing good offices. The new mission, the United Nations Mission in El Salvador, remained in the country for a year.[9] Although Salvadorian society continues to face many challenges, it has been spared from war since 1992.

[1] UN Peacekeeping. United Nations Observer Group in Central America: ONUCA. Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onuca.htm (Accessed: 13/10/2020)

[2] UN Peacekeeping. United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador: ONUSAL. Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onusalbackgr2.html#one (Accessed 13/10/2020)

[3] Tommie Sue Montgomery. “Getting to Peace in El Salvador: The Roles of the United Nations Secretariat and ONUSAL.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 4. (1995) p.150

[4] Ibid. p.141

[5] Susan Burgerman. “Building the Peace by Mandating Reform: United Nations-Mediated Human Rights Agreements in El Salvador and Guatemala.” Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 27, No. 3. (2000) p.71

[6] Holiday & Stanley. “Building the Peace.” p.416

[7] Montgomery. “Getting to Peace in El Salvador.” p.153

[8] Bugerman. “Building the Peace by Mandating Reform.” p.71

[9] UN Peacekeeping. El Salvador – ONUSAL: Background. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onusalbackgr2.html (Accessed 13/10/2020)

Description of Case 

Engagement by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) with the situation in Comoros brought an end to the armed conflict, however Comorian politics remained divided, and the elections scheduled for April 2002 threatened to spark renewed conflict. To maintain stability, the OAU Observer Mission to Comoros (OMIC) was redeployed in December 2001 and reinforced in March 2002.[1] The elections went ahead peacefully, although low turnout and allegations of fraud did little to stabilise the situation.[2] Yet another effort to stabilise Comoros took place in December 2003, this time through negotiations held under the auspices of the newly established African Union (AU). The talks culminated with an agreement which outlined a schedule for legislative elections in 2004 and a presidential contest in 2006.[3] The AU established the Military Observer Mission in the Comoros (MIOC) in March 2004 to monitor events and provide security for the 2004 polls, which went ahead peacefully.[4] 

The presidential elections were viewed as being much more likely to inspire violence, leading the AU to mandate a much larger peacekeeping mission, the African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros (AMISEC), to maintain stability. The predominantly South African operation oversaw a peaceful election, and Comoros appeared to be emerging from the crisis.[5] A final round of elections for the positions of Chief Executive of each island, scheduled for May 2007, represented the final challenge before the chronically unstable archipelago completed a full election cycle peacefully. Unfortunately, the leader of the island of Anjouan refused to step down at the end of his term, threatening conflict. In response, the African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES) was dispatched in May 2007 with support from the Government of France and the Arab League.[6] Although the elections went ahead peacefully enough elsewhere, Anjouan remained outside of the control of the Comorian administration. Following appeals from the Government of Comoros, the AU launched Operation Democracy in Comoros in March 2008, deploying thousands of troops to remove the renegade leader.[7] This was achieved relatively peacefully, constitutional order was restored, and the following year the AU hosted a fresh round of negotiations to clarify the political structure of Comoros, culminating with another agreement in June 2010.[8] Despite the ongoing instability, a conflict relapse was prevented.

[1] World Peace Foundation. “Comoros Short Brief.” pp.2-3

[2] Simon Massey & Bruce Baker. “Comoros: External Involvement in a Small Island State.” Chatham House Programme Paper AFP 2009/1. (2009) p.14

[3] Accord sur les dispositions transitoires aux Comores (Accord de Maroni), 2003. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/comoros-accordmaroni2003 (Accessed 02/12/2020)

[4] World Peace Foundation. “Comoros Short Brief.” p.3

[5] Global Peace Operations Review. “Comoros.” Mission Notes, No. 4.5. (2007) p.2

[6] World Peace Foundation. “Comoros Short Brief.” p.3

[7] Bruce Baker. “Comoros: The Search for Viability.” Civil Wars, Vol. 11, No. 3. (2009); Ahmed Ali Amir Moroni. “African Union troops quell Comoros rebellion.” The Guardian. (2008) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/26/1 (Accessed 02/12/2020)

[8] Accord pour la gestion de la période intérimaire, 2010. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/comoros-accordgestioninterimaire2010 (Accessed 02/12/2020)

Description of Case 

The Peace Agreement signed in Paris called for a transitional international administration to govern Cambodia until the appropriate national authorities could be established. Immediately after the ceremony in Paris, the United Nations Advance Mission to Cambodia (UNAMIC) was dispatched to the region to prevent a conflict relapse until a more robust presence arrived.[1] In February 1992, the UN Security Council approved the formation of United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and charged it with maintaining law and order, administering the country, repatriating refugees, rebuilding destroyed infrastructure, organising nationwide elections, monitoring the military situation, and ultimately preventing renewed war in Cambodia.[2] The complexity of these tasks was compounded by consistent efforts of Khmer Rouge leaders to derail the peace process by renouncing the ceasefire, refusing to disarm, and boycotting elections.[3]

UNTAC’s first tasks were monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces to Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, beginning the process of clearing landmines from across the Cambodian landscape, and beginning the process of refugee return.[4] By July 1993, UNTAC had successfully repatriated 350,000 refugees and repaired key infrastructure across the country, however as preparations for the scheduled May 1993 elections proceeded, problems with the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration process threatened to ignite a conflict.[5] The Khmer Rouge refused to participate in the disarmament process, leading the other armed groups to reduce their own participation for strategic reasons. Thus, just 25 percent of the total number of troops scheduled for disarmament in June 1992 handed over their weapons to UNTAC.[6] Further security issues provided additional challenges, however UNTAC was ultimately able to navigate a relatively peaceful post-conflict transition in Cambodia and, after successfully holding elections and overseeing the Cambodian Constituent Assembly adopt a new constitution in September 1993, the Mission was withdrawn.[7] A small UN Military Liaison Team remained in Phnom Penh to report on developments in Cambodia. Although Cambodia’s post-war transition was later marred by a coup d’état and an outbreak political violence in 1997, stability was restored, and the country was spared from relapsing back into armed conflict.[8] 

[1] United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia. Mandate. (UN Peacekeeping, 2003) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamic.htm (Accessed 01/11/2020)

[2] United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. Mandate. (UN Peacekeeping, 2003) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/untacmandate.html (Accessed 01/11/2020)

[3] David Ashley. “Between war and peace: Cambodia 1991-1998.” in Dylan Hendrickson, ed. Safeguarding Peace: Cambodia’s Constitutional Challenge. (London: Conciliation Resources, 1998) pp.22-3

[4] Ibid.

[5] Trevor Findlay. “Cambodia: the Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC.” Sipri Research Report, No. 9. (1995) pp.103-4 Available at: https://www.sipri.org/publications/1995/cambodia-legacy-and-lessons-untac (Accessed 01/11/2020)

[6] UN Peacekeeping. Cambodia – UNTAC.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ashley. “Between war and peace.” pp.28-9

Description of Case 

Established in 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) revived aspects of international law that had lain dormant since the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals that were convened after the Second World War. Over 24 years, 161 people were indicted for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, crimes against humanity, and genocide.[1] This figure included the first serving head of state in history to be indicted, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, as well as the wartime political and military leadership of a range of armed forces which fought during the collapse of Yugoslavia. The ICTY found that the armed conflicts across the Western Balkans during the 1990s were the result of a planned and systematic campaign orchestrated by a joint criminal enterprise. The enterprise, the tribunals concluded, was effectively controlled or substantially influenced by Milošević and encompassed individuals across former Yugoslavia.[2] In addition, some Croat leaders were found guilty of taking part in a separate joint criminal enterprise to persecute Bosnian Muslims during the war.[3]   

The work of the ICTY helped to prevent conflict relapse in the Western Balkans in several ways. Most directly, this was done by removing powerful political figures suspected of war crimes from office. If such individuals attempted to go into hiding, they were hunted down by the special forces of a range of states (predominantly, the UK and Poland) who were contributing to the post-conflict peacekeeping presence in the Western Balkans and arrested.[4] This process served to remove most hard-liners who may have risked a return to war from society, allowing the post-conflict transition to begin. In the long term, by identifying the individuals responsible for the crimes of the 1990s, the ICTY also helped to prevent communities from being labelled as collectively responsible for wartime atrocities and demonstrated that even the most powerful elites in the region could not act with impunity. The trials themselves also represent a comprehensive historical record of events based on considerable documentation and hundreds of witness testimonies. This record helps to dispel myths, particularly when, in 1999, the Tribunal’s Outreach Programme began providing lectures at schools and public events across the region, as well as producing films and other media.[5]  After 10,800 days of hearings and ninety guilty verdicts, the ICTY was formally dissolved in 2017.[6]

Following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995, a host of international organisations deployed troops and civilian personnel to Bosnia and Herzegovina with the express intention of preventing renewed war. The European Community maintained its wartime monitoring mission (the European Community Monitoring Mission) into the post-war period as an early warning system for potential conflict across the region. After being renamed the European Union Monitoring Mission in 2000, the unarmed observers continued operating in the region until 2007.[7] The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe also opened offices in every Balkan state in the aftermath of the armed conflict. Its personnel were tasked with helping to maintain peace and stability, particularly during elections, and worked with host governments on democratisation, improving human rights, and protecting minority groups.[8]

In the largest peacetime deployment of armed forces since the end of the Second World War, 60,000 NATO troops moved into Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately after the war ended. The Implementation Force was mandated to assist the former combatants with implementing various terms of the Agreement and ultimately be in a position to prevent further conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[9] In 1996, the mission was renamed Stabilisation Force, and in 2004, the European Union took responsibility for mission and renamed it the European Union Force (EUFOR) Operation Althea.[10] These peacekeeping missions separated the belligerents, monitored implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, conducted inspections of the three armies left in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, hunted suspects for the ICTY, and serve as an ongoing presence in the country until the present day. The comprehensive and coordinated range of international efforts helped to prevent a conflict relapse in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Peace Agreement ended the war.  

[1] ICTY. About the ICTY. (ICTY, 2020) Available at: https://www.icty.org/en/about (Accessed 27/10/2020)

[2] ICTY. Slobodan Milošević Trial – the Prosecution’s case. (ICTY, 2020) Available at: https://www.icty.org/en/content/slobodan-milo%C5%A1evi%C4%87-trial-prosecutions-case (Accessed 27/10/2020)

[3] ICTY. Statement of the Office of the Prosecutor in relation to the judgement in the case Prosecutor vs. Jadranko Prlić et al. (ICTY, 2020) Available at: https://www.icty.org/en/press/statement-of-the-office-of-the-prosecutor-in-relation-to-the-judgement-in-the-case-prosecutor (Accessed 13/12/2020)

[4] Julian Borger. “14 years a fugitive: the hunt for Ratko Mladić, the Butcher of Bosnia.” The Guardian. (2016) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/21/14-years-fugitive-hunt-for-ratko-mladic-butcher-of-bosnia (Accessed 13/12/2020)

[5] ICTY. Outreach Programme. (ICTY, 2002) Available at: https://www.icty.org/en/outreach/outreach-programme (Accessed 27/10/2020)

[6] Owen Bowcott. “Yugoslavia tribunal closes, leaving a powerful legacy of war crimes justice.” The Guardian. (2017) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/dec/20/former-yugoslavia-war-crimes-tribunal-leaves-powerful-legacy-milosevic-karadzic-mladic (Accessed 13/12/2020)

[7] Netherlands Ministry of Defence. European Community Monitoring Mission – European Union Monitoring Mission (ECMM – EUMM): the Dutch contribution. (Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 2020) Available at: https://english.defensie.nl/topics/historical-missions/mission-overview/1991/european-community-monitoring-mission—european-union-monitoring-mission-ecmm—eumm/dutch-contribution (Accessed 27/10/2020)

[8] OSCE. Where we are. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: https://www.osce.org/where-we-are (Accessed 27/10/2020)

[9] General William W. Crouch. “IFOR becomes SFOR.” SFOR Informer Online. (1997) Available at: https://www.nato.int/sfor/historic-moments/ifor-to-sfor/ifor-sfor.htm (Accessed 27/10/2020)

[10] SFOR. SFOR Mission. (SFOR, 2003) Available at: https://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/mission.htm (Accessed 27/10/2020) EUFOR. About EUFOR. (2020) Available at: http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php/about-eufor/background (Accessed 27/10/2020)

Description of Case 

The First Gulf War ended following the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire by US-led coalition forces on 28 February 1991 after just 6 weeks of fighting. The coalition expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait and pursued them deep into Iraqi territory. On 15 March 1991, the authoritarian ruler of Kuwait was formally restored to power in an independent and sovereign Kuwait and the withdrawal of coalition forces gained pace. With the war over, the task of upholding the peace and preventing a renewed conflict was taken up by the UN Security Council in Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991.[1] Among its provisions, the resolution set the framework for a formal ceasefire and established the mechanisms for monitoring implementation, including the deployment of an unarmed UN observation mission, the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM). When the Iraqi administration accepted the terms of Resolution 687, the Security Council formally established UNIKOM with Resolution 689 on 9 April.[2] The first of UNIKOM’s authorised strength of 300 personnel arrived on 13 April and the mission was fully operational by 6 May.[3]

The key provision for preventing a conflict relapse was the demarcation of a demilitarised zone (DMZ) running 10km into Iraqi territory and 3km into Kuwait along the entire 200km border. Upon its arrival, UNIKOM was tasked with monitoring the withdrawal of all forces (including coalition) from the DMZ. Once this was complete, the UN observers took up positions across the DMZ to monitor the area. Following a series of incursions into the DMZ by Iraqi forces, the mandate of UNIKOM was expanded in 1993 to allow it to prevent such incursions by Security Council Resolution 806 and the mission was reinforced with over 3,000 troops.[4] This increased strength allowed UNIKOM to conduct a much wider range of patrols, establish more checkpoints, and offer protection to its isolated observers. This greatly stabilised the situation and created a window for the ongoing work of the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Commission to complete its work – which it did in February 1994. UNIKOM successfully navigated these challenges along with tense periods in November 1993 and October 1994 (when Iraq massed troops on the edge of the DMZ), preventing renewed war during the entire period it was operational.[5] Following the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, UNIKOM operations were suspended, and the mission was concluded entirely in October 2003.

[1] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 687. (3 April 1991) Available at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1991 (Accessed 1/11/2021)

[2] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 689. (9 April 1991) Available at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1991 (Accessed 1/11/2021)

[3] UN Peacekeeping. Iraq/Kuwait – UNIKOM – Background. (UN, 2021) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unikom/background.html (Accessed 1/11/2021)

[4] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 896. (5 February 1993) Available at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1993 (Accessed 1/11/2021)

[5] UN Peacekeeping. Iraq/Kuwait – UNIKOM – Background.

Description of Case 

The regime of Mobutu Sese Seko in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) came to a violent end in 1997. In the uncertain aftermath of his downfall, the Second Congo War erupted. The province of North Kivu, which is located on the international border with Uganda and Rwanda, has been at the heart of many of the conflicts that have plagued the DRC ever since. Indeed, the region served as the staging ground for rebel offensives against the forces of Mobutu and North Kivu was once again employed to launch attacks against the administration of his successor, Laurent-Désiré Kabila. In 1999, the main rebel group operating out of North Kivu, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie, RCD), splintered, dividing the province into two. This complex security situation was complicated further by the presence of smaller armed groups, ranging from Mai-Mai militias loosely affiliated to the government to exiled Hutu forces from Rwanda.[1] In this context, armed conflict was widespread. However, in the historic trading city of Butembo, religious leaders and the business community managed to forge an island of relative peace which not only helped to protect the local population, but also provided shelter for tens of thousands of displaced people.

The Catholic Church emerged as a key agent for peace in North Kivu in 1994, when the local bishop negotiated a truce between armed groups on the Ugandan border. When war broke out, the local clergy publicly denounced abuses committed by various armed groups, frequently met with political and military leaders, and played a key role in the establishment of Crisis Committees which, in the absence of state institutions, served to maintain public order, oversee the allocation of humanitarian assistance, and manage, as far as was possible, the armed conflicts in the area.[2] Meanwhile, business leaders used their collective bargaining power to extract concessions (such as ending the harassment of civilians) from the armed groups.[3] When prime agricultural land was fortified by armed groups in 2001, the local Bishop was able to extract a public apology for threatening the city’s food security and a withdrawal of the forces in question. In later years, the Bishop also mediated several ceasefires. Remarkably, these efforts succeeded in sparing the city from much of the violence plaguing the region and demonstrably mitigated the impact of armed conflict on civilians. While the rest of the DRC suffered famine and war, residents of Butembo built a hydro-electric dam, maintained relatively high standards of education and healthcare, and maintained law and order in their city.[4]

[1] Jason Stearns. “North Kivu: The Background to Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern Congo.” Rift Valley Institute Usalama Project. (2012) pp.32-3

[2] Mike Jobbins. “Community-Driven Civilian Protection in the DRC: Preventing Violence and Mitigating Harm.” Exploring Civilian Protection: Community Self-Protection Strategies, Brookings Institution Seminar. (2010) Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/events/exploring-civilian-protection-community-self-protection-strategies/ (Accessed 05/01/2022) p.10

[3] Ibid. pp.8-9

[4] Laura Seay. “Why one city in Congo is astonishingly stable and prosperous.” The Washington Post. (2015) Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/07/31/why-one-city-in-congo-is-astonishingly-stable-and-prosperous/ (Accessed 05/01/2022)

Description of Case 

The long-running conflict between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) had a major impact on the lives of everyday citizens who became caught up in the fighting. Many became the victim of atrocities by one side or the other or were simply caught in the crossfire of a conflict which raged for half a century. In the face of such violence, efforts both local and international made significant progress in limiting the impact of the armed conflict on civilians. In 1987, the Regional Corporation for the Defence of Human Rights (Corporación Regional para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, CREDHOS) began working to protect human rights in the city of Barrancabermeja. After beginning to investigate human rights violations and the murder of a local politician, many CREDHOS staff were killed in 1991 and 1992. A few years later, PBI established an office in Barrancabermeja and began accompanying CREDHOS activities.[1] Almost immediately, they were forced to activate their Emergency Response Network, which summoned the attention of several European states. By protecting groups that are campaigning for an end to the conflict, PBI helped to amplify the message of peace in Colombia while also helping to shrink the ‘impunity space’ in which people involved in the conflict could harm civilians.[2]

In 1996, the village of San Jose de Apartado and the surrounding area became embroiled in the ongoing armed conflict. In response, the Intercongregational Commission for Justice and Peace (one of the oldest Colombian human rights NGOs) organised a series of workshops that culminated with the formation of the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó on 23 March 1997.[3] The Community pledged not to participate in the conflict and served as a model for many other areas that were affected by the violence. While the Peace Communities have suffered many attacks over the years, they helped to reduce the impact of the armed conflict on innocent civilians. PBI has provided protective accompaniment to the Peace Community since 1997.  Although an armed conflict was neither prevented nor ended, the efforts helped to reduce the impact of the fighting on the Colombian population.

[1] Peace Brigades International. Regional Corporation for the Defence of Human Rights (CREDHOS). (2020) Available at: https://peacebrigades.org.uk/where-we-work/colombia/regional-corporation-for-the-defence-of-human-rights (Accessed 14/10/2020)

[2] Dylan Matthews. War Prevention Works: 50 stories of people resolving conflict. (Oxford Research Group, 2001) p.55

[3] Ibid. p.57