Description of Case 

The 1993 Mudug Peace Agreement and the formation of Puntland in 1998 brought peace to the region, effectively cutting off Puntland and Somaliland from the war-torn southern and central regions of Somalia and providing a framework for managing conflict within those polities. However, where Somaliland enjoyed a linear progression to relative stability and prosperity, the peace in Puntland had to be painstakingly maintained. The delegates who established Puntland in 1998 had agreed that elections should be held within three years. Provisions for the contest were not made, and when the deadline passed rival SSPF leaders fought for power. The conflict raged throughout 2002, until the leaders were persuaded to enter into dialogue by prominent clan elders in early 2003. Formal talks were held in May, culminating in the Puntland Peace Agreement.[1] In 2004, disputes between rival clans in Somaliland and Puntland threatened to sour relations between the two polities, however this was averted thanks to another successful mediation by prominent elders. A similar conflict threatened the key city of Galkayo in 2005, but this was also resolved by local elders, who were able to broker the Ramada Peace Agreement.[2] Time and again, local elders employing traditional methods of peacemaking were able to end conflicts across the region before they escalated, providing the nascent institutions of Puntland with the time they needed to mature.

In January 2005, Puntland witnessed its first peaceful transition of power as the incumbent president gave way to the winning candidate following an election. While this contest only took place within parliament (the population did not vote), it set in motion a series of developments that have maintained peace and stability across Puntland. Trade agreements were negotiated with the United Arab Emirates, bringing investment and prosperity, while a reformist candidate who won the 2009 election strengthened the judiciary and police, established a transparent public finance system, and drafted a new constitution which would introduce multi-party democracy to Puntland.[3] In 2012, after another conference of 478 delegates from across the polity approved the draft, the new constitution was promulgated, and five political parties registered with the newly established Puntland Electoral Commission – prior to this, political parties were banned in Puntland.[4] These developments took place while conflict continued to rage across much of the rest of Somalia; a fate that would have befallen Puntland were it not for local peacemaking and statebuilding efforts. 

[1] IRIN News. “Puntland opponents sign peace deal.” The New Humanitarian. (19 May 2003) Available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/43810/somalia-puntland-opponents-sign-peace-deal (Accessed 28/10/2021)

[2] Ramada Peace Agreement, 2005. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/1852/Ramada%20Peace%20Agreement (Accessed 28/10/2021)

[3] Ahmed Abbas Ahmed & Ruben Zamora. “Puntland constitutional review process.” Accord, Vol. 21. (2010) pp.91-3

[4] Interpeace. “A historic moment: Puntland’s constitution now ratified.” Interpeace News. (20 April 2012) Available at: https://www.interpeace.org/2012/04/a-historic-moment-puntland-s-constitution-now-ratified/ (Accessed 28/10/2021)

Description of Case 

The Townsville Peace Agreement prevented an armed conflict and created a framework for comprehensive reforms aimed at alleviating some of the problems that brought Solomon Islands so close to war in 1999. Implementing such reforms posed a significant challenge for the fragile state of Solomon Islands, particularly given the uncertainty that followed the crisis and coup d’état.[1] A key provision of the Agreement called for the integration of 200 demobilised combatants into the police force. By the end of 2001, over 2,000 new “special constables” were on the police payroll, the majority of whom came from the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF).[2] Combined with police involvement in the 2000 coup, this left the security services in Solomon Islands as a politicised (and armed) institution. Furthermore, elections scheduled for the end of 2001 threatened to spark another crisis. Thus, while fighting had been avoided, there was every likelihood that the Solomon Islands peace process could be derailed.

The challenge of maintaining peace on Solomon Islands first fell to the International Peace Monitoring Team and Peace Monitoring Council. Alongside a host of international election observers, these organisations helped to ensure that the December 2001 elections went ahead peacefully.[3] A more significant challenge proved to be disarmament, which was carried out amidst a backdrop of frequent clashes between and within the various militias on Guadalcanal. However, by working with communities and religious groups, thousands of potential combatants had disarmed by July 2002.[4] Such efforts ultimately proved to have little effect on the situation and Solomon Islands continued to stand on the precipice of armed conflict, leading the newly elected government to formally request international assistance through the mechanisms of the Pacific Islands Forum in July 2003.[5] Within days, the first personnel of the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) arrived in Solomon Islands and established security across the country.[6] Unusually for a peacekeeping mission, the police component led the operation, with the military playing a supporting role.[7] RAMSI remained in place until 2017, helping to foster stability, disarm militias, build effective state institutions (including the police force), and preventing outbreaks of electoral violence in 2006 from escalating into armed conflict.[8] 

[1] Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka. “A Weak State and the Solomon Islands Peace Process.” Pacific Islands Development Series, No. 14. (2002) p.3

[2] John Braithwaite et al. Pillars and Shadows: Statebuilding as Peacebuilding in Solomon Islands. (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2010) p.38

[3] International Republican Institute. Solomon Islands Parliamentary Election: Observer Mission Report. (Washington, DC: International Republican Institute, 2001)  

[4] Braithwaite et al. Pillars and Shadows. p.39

[5] RAMSI. About RAMSI. (The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, 2020) Available at: https://www.ramsi.org/about/ (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[6] Julein Barbara. “Antipodean Statebuilding: The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands and Australian Intervention in the South Pacific.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol. 2, No. 2. (2008) p.124

[7] Australian Civil-Military Centre. Partnering for Peace. p.28

[8] Roderick Brazier. “What Has RAMSI Achieved?” Australian Institute of International Affairs. (2017) Available at: https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/what-has-ramsi-achieved/ (Accessed 01/12/2020)

Description of Case 

Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993, and although the 1000km border between them was already defined by colonial era treaties, it was yet to be demarcated. The governments in both countries were former wartime allies, but relations soon deteriorated and, in late 1997, several armed clashes occurred on the border.^[1] A joint Border Commission was established to investigate the dispute, however only one meeting was held before relations soured further. In May 1998, Eritrean forces occupied the disputed territory, sparking an armed conflict.[2] The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) acted quickly to try and bring the belligerents to the negotiating table, presenting an initiative developed by the Rwandan and US governments. The Government of Eritrea rejected the proposal, and, in response, the Ethiopian military launched a large offensive against the Eritrean positions in February 1999. In a change of tack, the Eritrean leadership accepted the OAU proposals, only for their Ethiopian counterparts to refuse to sign an article on technical arrangements in the proposal.^[3] The fighting continued, with Ethiopian forces launching additional large offensives in early 2000.

Indirect talks resumed in April 2000 with little progress, however once Ethiopian troops had struck deep into Eritrean territory, the belligerent parties gathered for talks in Algiers, Algeria. The negotiations culminated in June 2000 with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, which affirmed the disputed territory to be under Ethiopian administration, stipulated the withdrawal of Eritrean troops out of a 25km demilitarised zone, and called for a UN peacekeeping force to assist with implementation.^[4] In September 2000, the first of 4,200 peacekeepers of the United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) arrived to supervise withdrawals and monitor the demilitarised zone.^[5] With peacekeepers in place and their respective armies withdrawn from the demilitarised zone, the leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia met in Algiers to continue the peace talks.^[6] Building on previous proposals, the parties signed a formal peace treaty witnessed by the UN Secretary-General and representatives from the OAU, EU, and the governments of Algeria and the USA in December 2000, ending the armed conflict and placing responsibility for resolving the dispute in the hands of neutral commissions, including an Independent Boundary Commission established for the purpose at the Permanent Court of Arbitration.^[7] The UN Cartographic Section supported the work of the Commission, which issued its verdicts in April 2002.[8] The brutal war cost the lives of almost 100,000 people, however consistent efforts to facilitate dialogue and the deployment of UNMEE helped to bring the fighting to an end.

[1] UCDP. Eritrea – Ethiopia. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/409 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[2] Terrence Lyons. “The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict and the Search for Peace in the Horn of Africa.” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 36, No. 120. (2009) p.168

[3] International Crisis Group. “Ethiopia and Eritrea: Preventing War.” Africa Report, No. 101. (2005) p.2

[4] Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea, 2000. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/eritreaethiopia-cessationhostilities2000 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[5] UNMEE. Background. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://unmee.unmissions.org/background (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[6] International Crisis Group. “Ethiopia and Eritrea.” p.3

[7] Agreement between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2000. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/eritreaethiopia-agreement2000 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[8] Permanent Court of Arbitration. Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission. (PCA, 2022) Available at: https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/99/ (Accessed 17/01/2022)

Description of Case 

The German colony of South West Africa was occupied by the British colony of South Africa during the First World War. A League of Nations mandate conferred legitimacy on South African administration of the Territory; however, this became increasingly tenuous during the period of de-colonisation. In the 1960s, the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) launched an armed struggle for independence and adopted the name “Namibia” for the country they were fighting for. The Government of South Africa had other plans, seeking instead to incorporate South West Africa as a fifth province.[1] The 1978 Settlement Proposal, developed by the UN Security Council, outlined a framework for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, by which the UN would supervise elections in Namibia and South Africa would withdraw its forces from the area.[2] Before the Proposal could be implemented, SWAPO became embroiled in the conflict in neighbouring Angola (which also involved South Africa), stalling the peace process.[3]

In 1988, two major peace agreements ended international involvement in the armed conflict in Angola and Namibia, removing the key barrier to implementing the 1978 Proposal.[4] The negotiations also facilitated a ceasefire between the belligerents in Namibia, which in turn aided the deployment of United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) personnel in April 1989.[5] The arrival of the peacekeepers coincided with movements of large numbers of SWAPO troops and equipment into Namibia from Angola, leading the South African administration to warn of renewed conflict unless the UN resolved the crisis. In response, UNTAG facilitated dialogue between the parties while the UN Secretary-General urged both sides to calm the situation. The international mediation effort culminated with the Mount Etjo Declaration, which reaffirmed the commitment of all sides and observers to the peace process.[6] With renewed conflict averted, UNTAG returned its focus to supervising Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration programmes and the withdrawal of South African troops, monitoring police conduct, assisting with the return of 43,000 refugees, and preparing for the election.[7] The Namibian people went to the polls in November 1989 in a peaceful environment, and in March 1990 the elected Constituent Assembly promulgated a constitution. UNTAG handed over responsibility to the new administration and withdrew, its mission complete.

[1] UCDP. South Africa: Namibia. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/298 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[2] Security Council Resolution 435 (1978): Namibia, 1978. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/namibia-resolution435 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[3] UCDP. South Africa: Namibia.

[4] Agreement among the People’s Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa (Tripartite Agreement), 1988. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/angola-tripartite-agreement88 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[5] UN Peacekeeping. Namibia – UNTAG: Background. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/untagFT.htm (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[6] Mount Etjo Declaration, 1989. Available at: https://search.archives.un.org/agreements-mount-etjo-declaration-9-4-1989 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[7] UN Peacekeeping. Namibia – UNTAG: Background.

Description of Case 

Fifteen sovereign states emerged from the Soviet Union between March 1990 and December 1991. Although relatively minor armed conflicts erupted in a handful of these states following independence, the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself took place peacefully. This ‘enigma’ of history, in which an empire dissolved peacefully ‘near the close of a century filled with violence and following over four decades of East-West confrontation,’ has been the subject of historical scrutiny for decades.[1] Arguably the most important contributing factor to the peaceful end of the Soviet Union was the foresight and actions of its last General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, who ensured that once the collapse began, armed force was not used to try and prevent it.[2] In 1990, Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his actions to bring a peaceful end to the Cold War.[3] The following year, he survived an attempted coup d’état by military hardliners and continued his efforts to prevent war.

The international institutional framework in which the collapse took place was as equally important as the human factor. The European Community (EC) provided a clear and peaceful path forward, in which a divided Europe could plausibly become depolarised and ultimately united by a system of common values. In 1989, the EC signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union, and in February 1991, opened an office in Moscow to improve relations.[4] The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) became a key diplomatic player during the period, providing a platform for Soviet leaders to reach out to the West and serving as the primary international organisation working to maintain peace in post-Soviet Europe: CSCE Missions were deployed in every post-soviet state, providing international monitoring and advising governments on good governance, democratisation, and the rule of law.[5] Key groundwork for these processes had been laid during arms reduction negotiations. The British and US governments also offered further assurances regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, and German reunification.[6] Upon the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to improve relations and invite dialogue with post-soviet states.[7] These efforts combined to prevent armed conflict during the collapse of the Soviet Union.

[1] Jacques Levesque. The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe. (University of California Press, 1997); Jack F. Matlock, Jr. “Foreword.” In Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, & Vladislav Zubok. Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989. (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010) p.xxv

[2] Archie Brown. The Gorbachev Factor. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)

[3] The Nobel Prize. Mikhail Gorbachev. (Nobel Prize, 2020) Available at: https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1990/gorbachev/facts/ (Accessed 25/10/2020)

[4] Delegation of the European Union to Russia. About the European Union Delegation to the Russian Federation. (EEAS, 2020) Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/719/about-european-union-delegation-russian-federation_en (Accessed 25/10/2020)

[5] OSCE. Expansion of the CSCE/OSCE. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: https://www.osce.org/who/timeline/1990s/05 (Accessed 29/11/2020)

[6] Thomas Blanton. “U.S. Policy and the Revolutions of 1989.” in Savranskaya, Blanton, & Zubok. Masterpieces of History.

[7] NATO. A Short History of NATO. (NATO, 2020) Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/declassified_139339.htm (Accessed 25/10/2020)

Description of Case 

After seizing power in Chad in 1990, the administration of Idriss Déby was challenged by an array of armed opposition groups. In 1991-1995 and 1997-2002, these groups conducted an insurgency against Chadian security forces. Ongoing peace talks achieved a break in the fighting in 2002, but the conflict reignited in 2005. In this instance, the armed groups involved were linked to the conflict in the Darfur region of neighbouring Sudan.[1] On 18 December 2005, one of the rebel groups attacked Adré, a strategic border town that is considered vital for the defence of Chad against attacks from Sudan, forcing Chadian forces to withdraw. This not only constituted the beginning of another conflict but left a swathe of the frontier open to raiding by Janjaweed militias. In response, the Chadian government condemned their Sudanese counterparts for sponsoring the armed groups and began mobilising its military.[2] Human Rights Watch documented Sudanese troops operating alongside the Janjaweed militias, as well as the presence of Sudanese helicopter gunships and spotter aircraft in Chadian airspace.[3] Although the complex situation presented serious practical challenges to the conduct of any large military operations, Sudanese military forces had invaded and pillaged eastern Chad, bringing the two countries to the brink of a major interstate conflict.  

The international effort to end the conflict and prevent a much larger war began almost immediately, with the Government of Libya hosting peace talks less than two months after the first clashes. These negotiations culminated with the Tripoli Agreement on 6 February 2006, which called for the normalisation of relations, the end of state sponsorship of armed opposition groups, and the deployment of an African peace operation to monitor the border.[4] Despite this agreement, 2006 proved to be one of the bloodiest in Chadian history and the risk of a much larger war erupting remained.[5] The following year, further talks were hosted by the Government of Saudi Arabia, resulting in an agreement that reiterated many of the terms previously agreed in Tripoli.[6] In 2009, yet another round of negotiations hosted by the Senegalese government led to the signing of the Doha Agreement, which was witnessed by the Secretary-Generals of the UN and the Organisation of Islamic Conference.[7] Both Chad and Sudan continued to face armed conflict, but the Doha Agreement ended the proxy conflict between them and restored a degree of stability to the region. On 15 January 2010, bilateral relations were formally normalised with the signing of the Ndjamena Accord.[8]

[1] UCDP. Chad. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/country/483 (Accessed 24/11/2021)

[2] Human Rights Watch. Darfur Bleeds: Recent Cross-Border Violence in Chad. (HRW, 2006) pp.5-7

[3] Ibid. p.11

[4] Tripoli Agreement to Settle the Dispute between the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Sudan, 2006. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/chad-sudan-tripoli-agreement2006 (Accessed 24/11/2021)

[5] UCDP. Chad: Government. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/288 (Accessed 24/11/2021)

[6] Accord bilatéral pour le développement et le renforcement des relations entre Soudan et Tchad (Accord de Riyadh), 2007. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/chadsudan-riyadhagreement2007 (Accessed 24/11/2021)

[7] Doha Agreement, 2009. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/chadsudan-dohaagreement2009 (Accessed 24/11/2021)

[8] Accord de Ndjamena sur la normalisation des relations entre le Tchad et le Soudan, 2010. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/chadsudan-ndjamenaagreement2010 (Accessed 24/11/2021)

Description of Case 

Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993, and although the 1000km border was already defined by colonial era treaties, it was yet to be demarcated. Although the governments in both countries were former wartime allies, relations soon deteriorated and, in late 1997, several armed clashes occurred on the border.^[1] A joint Border Commission was established to investigate the dispute, however only one meeting was held before relations soured further. In May 1998, Eritrean forces occupied the disputed territory, sparking an armed conflict.[2] The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) acted quickly to try and bring the belligerents to the negotiating table, presenting an initiative developed by the Rwandan and US governments. The Government of Eritrea rejected the proposal and, in response, the Ethiopian military launched a large offensive in February 1999. In a change of tack, the Eritrean leadership accepted the OAU proposals, only for their Ethiopian counterparts to refuse to sign an article on technical arrangements.^[3] The fighting continued, with Ethiopian forces launching additional large offensives in early 2000.

Indirect talks resumed in April 2000 with little progress, however once Ethiopian troops had struck deep into Eritrean territory, the parties gathered for talks in Algiers. The negotiations culminated in June 2000 with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, which affirmed the disputed territory to be under Ethiopian administration, stipulated the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from a 25km demilitarised zone, and called for a UN peacekeeping force to assist with implementation.^[4] In September 2000, the first of UNMEE’s 4,200 peacekeepers arrived to supervise the demilitarised zone.^[5] With peacekeepers in place and their respective armies withdrawn from the demilitarised zone, the leaders of both countries met in Algiers to continue the peace talks.^[6] Building on previous proposals, the parties signed a formal peace treaty witnessed by the UN Secretary-General, the OAU, EU, and the governments of Algeria and the USA in December 2000, ending the armed conflict and placing responsibility for resolving the territorial dispute in the hands of neutral commissions.^[7] The brutal war cost the lives of almost 100,000 people, however consistent efforts to facilitate dialogue and the deployment of UNMEE helped to bring the fighting to an end.

[1] UCDP. Eritrea – Ethiopia. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/409 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[2] Terrence Lyons. “The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict and the Search for Peace in the Horn of Africa.” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 36, No. 120. (2009) p.168

[3] International Crisis Group. “Ethiopia and Eritrea: Preventing War.” Africa Report, No. 101. (2005) p.2

[4] Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea, 2000. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/eritreaethiopia-cessationhostilities2000 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[5] UNMEE. Background. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://unmee.unmissions.org/background (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[6] International Crisis Group. “Ethiopia and Eritrea.” p.3

[7] Agreement between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2000. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/eritreaethiopia-agreement2000 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

Description of Case 

The frontier between Ecuador and Peru has been a source of conflict for centuries, with competing claims for territory along the border going back to the sixteenth century. An eruption of violence in 1941 was ended with the signing of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol.[1] The Protocol, mediated by the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the USA, established the four states as Guarantors. Efforts to implement the territorial provisions of the Protocol revealed cartographic errors which, the Government of Ecuador argued, nullified the agreement.[2] In 1981, another border clash led to an extensive military build-up in the region. Tensions increased until the end of 1994, when a fresh series of clashes occurred. In January 1995, Ecuadorian and Peruvian armed forces were deploying thousands of troops along with the full force of their air forces and navies against each other in an interstate conflict known as the Cenepa War.[3] Over 400 troops died in the fighting. 

Efforts to prevent any further escalation began immediately, with the Guarantors of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol convening a meeting in Brasilia in January 1995. Following careful mediation by representatives of the Guarantors, the belligerents agreed to a ceasefire, a framework for further talks, and committed to finding a peaceful resolution to the territorial dispute.[4] The negotiations culminated with the signing of Itamaraty Declaration on 17 February 1995.[5] A predominantly military agreement, the Declaration contained stipulations about troop withdrawals and the establishment of a demilitarised zone which was to be verified by an international military observation mission. Another round of talks was held two weeks later in Uruguay, culminating in the Montevideo Declaration, where both sides reiterated their commitment to an immediate ceasefire and a peaceful resolution to the dispute, while the Guarantors agreed to deploy the observation mission.[6] Skirmishes along the border in March, May, and September 1995 threatened to derail the peace process entirely, however in February 1996, military officials from Ecuador and Peru met at the contested border (under supervision from international observers) while government representatives from each state met in Argentina, where they resolved to find a peaceful solution to conflict.[7] The interstate conflict between Ecuador and Peru was over.

[1] Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries between Peru and Ecuador (Rio Protocol), 1942. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/ecuadorperu-rioprotocol42 (Accessed 03/12/2020)

[2] UCDP. Ecuador – Peru. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/403 (Accessed 05/12/2020)

[3] Beth A. Simms. “Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution: The Case of Ecuador and Peru.” Peaceworks, No. 27. (1999) p.12

[4] Ronald Bruce St. John. “The Ecuador-Peru Boundary Dispute: The Road to Settlement.” Boundary & Territory Briefing, Vol. 3, No. 1. (1999) pp.34-5

[5] Declaración de paz de Itamaraty, 1995. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/ecuadorperu-itamaratydeclaration95 (Accessed 03/12/2020)

[6] Montevideo Declaration, 1995. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/eduador-peru-montevideo-declaration95 (Accessed 03/12/2020)

[7] Simms. “Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution.” pp.12-3

Description of Case 

During the colonial period, Sudan was governed by a joint Anglo-Egyptian administration as two separate regions: Southern Sudan and Northern Sudan. Upon independence in 1956, these regions were merged as the unified state of Sudan under a predominantly northern government. The country quickly fell into a long civil war mostly centred in the south. Although the First Civil War ended in 1972, another conflict erupted just over a decade later. The Second Civil War was fought between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), and although it again concerned power and control over the south, the conflict spread into northern regions such as Blue Nile and Kordofan. Peace talks held some promise of ending the conflict in the late 1980s, but the 1989 coup d’état which brought Omar al-Bashir to power ended this process.[1] Beginning in 1991, the SPLM began splintering, adding further layers of complexity to the conflict. Several efforts were made to end the war, with the Organisation of African Unity and the governments of Egypt, Libya, and the US all trying to forge a pathway to peace without success. This changed in 2002, when five weeks of talks held in Kenya under the auspices of IGAD resulted in the Machakos Protocol, in which the belligerents signed off on a mutually acceptable framework for further negotiations to take place and agreed, in principle, that a peaceful resolution of the war was desirable.[2]

Negotiations held in 2003 resulted in an agreement on security arrangements, such as an internationally monitored ceasefire that would come into force upon signing a future comprehensive peace agreement.[3] Progress increased in 2004, with further accords on sharing wealth and power and ending the conflicts in South Kordofan and around Abyei being approved. However, the war continued. This led the UN Security Council to hold a special session in November 2004, during which the delegates agreed to impose a deadline of the end of 2004 for a conclusive peace agreement.[4] The belligerents just met this deadline, agreeing to a permanent ceasefire and the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 31 December, before formally signing the accord in Nairobi on 9 January 2005.[5] This lengthy document established intricate mechanisms for sharing power and oil revenue and promised six years of autonomy for the south prior to a binding referendum on independence. Although many conflicts continued in Sudan, the 2005 agreement ended the 50-year confrontation between north and south.

[1] Richard Baltrop. “The Negotiation of Security Issues in Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement.” Negotiating Disarmament Country Study, Vol. 2. (2008) pp.16-7

[2] Machakos Protocol, 2002. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sudan-machakos-protocol2002 (Accessed 4/11/2021)

[3] Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period, 2003. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sudan-security-interim-period2003 (Accessed 4/11/2021)

[4] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1574. (UNSC, 2004) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1574 (Accessed 4/11/2021)

[5] Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/SPLA (with Annexes), 2005. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/node/1369 (Accessed 4/11/2021)

Description of Case 

As the Ugandan regime of Idi Amin (1971-79) collapsed, the remnants of his government and military retreated to bases in Sudan and Zaire. Over the course of the 1980s, they established a range of armed groups including the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), which was led by a former minister in Amin’s government. The UNRF insurgency earned its leadership a brief period in power as part of a military junta (1985-86). This administration, however, was quickly removed from power by Yoweri Museveni (who remains president today), and the UNRF fled once again over the border.[1] In 1994, the Government of Sudan seized key territory from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in southern Sudan and began helping the Ugandan exiles to launch a fresh insurgency. In 1995, the West Nile Bank Front began its operations against the administration in Kampala and was joined the following year by the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II). The UNRF II was dealt a major blow in the summer of 1997, when Sudanese government and UNRF II troops were defeated by SPLM troops, who captured the main base of operations used by pro-Amin Ugandan forces in Sudan. This severely weakened the various armed groups as military organisations and forced them to shelter behind the lines of Sudanese government security forces, thereby cutting off their access to Uganda entirely.[2] The losses in Sudan hampered the ability of groups such as UNRF II to pose a genuine military threat to the Government of Uganda, leading approximately 150 personnel to surrender to Ugandan local government officials following the defeats.[3] Despite these developments, a significant cohort of UNRF II personnel continued their insurgency.

In 1998, a local peace committee reached out to the UNRF II and opened a dialogue. These initial talks resulted in a ceasefire in early 1999. Combined with the passing of the 2000 Amnesty Act, which offered amnesty for Ugandans involved in ‘acts of a war-like nature’, this created a climate for more comprehensive negotiations to take place. These talks made slow progress until 19 April 2002, when the entire UNRF II organisation returned to northern Uganda from Sudan after losing the backing of Khartoum.[4] Under these new circumstances, the belligerents agreed to a formal ceasefire on 15 June.[5] The negotiations culminated on 24 December 2002 with an agreement allocating 10 government positions for the UNRF II leadership and 700 positions in the Ugandan military for their troops. The remainder disarmed within the framework a donor-backed Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration programme to become tobacco farmers.[6] These arrangements ended the conflict.

[1] UCDP. Government of Uganda – UNRF. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/682 (Accessed 22/11/2021)

[2] UCDP. Government of Uganda – UNRF II. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/691 (Accessed 22/11/2021)

[3] Anton Baaré. “Development Aid as Third-Party Intervention: A Case Study of the Uganda National Rescue Front II Peace Process.” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, Vol. 2, No. 1. (2004) p.23

[4] Ibid. p.27

[5] Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Uganda National Rescue Front II, 2002. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/uganda-agreement-UNRFII2002 (Accessed 22/11/2021)

[6] Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the National Rescue Front II (Yumbe Peace Agreement), 2002. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/uganda-yumbe-agreement2002 (Accessed 22/11/2021)