Description of Case 

Despite its recent history of relatively free, fair, and peaceful elections, the 2008 presidential contest in Ghana presented a significant risk of sparking armed conflict. This was particularly true in the troubled Northern Region, where changes in government had a direct impact on ongoing chieftaincy disputes such as that over the throne of the Kingdom of Dagbon. In the run-up to the election, violence marred the voter registration process in Northern Region, where supporters of the two main political parties were found to be acquiring weapons in preparation for conflict and street clashes began to occur with increasing frequency.[1] With polling indicating that the margin of victory would be razor thin and much to win (or lose) from the contest, particularly with regard to tit-for-tat corruption prosecutions of outgoing government ministers and the windfall of oil revenue from freshly opened offshore fields at stake, tensions grew. Furthermore, events in Kenya and Zimbabwe that took place just months before demonstrated that a vigorous and potentially violent reaction to suspected foul play could prove beneficial should a power-sharing arrangement result from any election-related crises. In the days before the population went to the polls, residents of Northern Region fearing an armed conflict would ensure formed self-defence units.[2] The first round of voting went ahead amidst a large security operation involving 36,000 personnel, armoured vehicles, and 10,000 additional troops in reserve, but was inconclusive, leading to a second round.[3] A worsening security situation saw attempts to storm the electoral commission office and the suspension of polls in Tain election district.[4]

Faced with the challenge of ensuring a peaceful outcome from this uncertain situation, government agencies, local people and organisations, international observers, and Ghana’s nascent peace infrastructure worked tirelessly. Their efforts were coordinated by the National Elections Security Task Force. While the military and police provided a strong and visible deterrent in 1,399 pre-determined violence prone areas, civil society groups (ranging from churches to trade unions) organised peace marches and dialogue fora, and international observation missions surveyed and verified the electoral process as far as their resources allowed.[5] Thus, when the final ballots were being counted, public debate remained focussed on safeguarding the peace in Ghana. The electoral commission also played a pivotal role by not bowing to pressure from any quarter and ensuring that both candidates were kept apprised of the situation until the result was declared on 3 January 2009.[6] Thanks to this wide-ranging effort, armed conflict was prevented in Ghana. 

[1] Jesse Salah Ovadia. “Stepping Back from the Brink: A Review of the 2008 Ghanaian Election from the Capital of the Northern Region.” Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2. (2011) pp.323-5

[2] Ibid. p.331

[3] Staff and agencies. “Police gear up to prevent election violence.” IRIN News. (21 November 2008) Available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/81613/ghana-police-gear-prevent-election-violence (Accessed 7/12/2021)

[4] Kathrin Meissner. “Elections and Conflict in Ghana.” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung International Policy Analysis. (2010) p.2

[5] Staff and agencies. “Police gear up to prevent election violence.”

[6] Meissner. “Elections and Conflict in Ghana.” p.8-9

Description of Case 

The Kingdom of Dagbon exists within the contemporary borders of Ghana, the constitution of which enshrines the role of traditional chieftains and kings in society. The state remains the primary political unit in Ghana, with the chieftains and kings fulfilling ceremonial roles along with some duties concerning local government, development, conflict resolution, and security.[1] Leadership of the Kingdom of Dagbon was historically rotated between two families, leaving plenty of scope for disputes and clashes between rival claimants to emerge. Indeed, the risk that such a dispute could trigger a wider conflict was recognised by the Government of Ghana as early as 1972. However, various investigations and legal rulings failed to resolve the crisis at the heart of the Kingdom of Dagbon and contributed to a growing sense of confusion and uncertainty over the issue of succession.[2] By the 1990s, a host of unresolved disputes between the families sharing the throne had accumulated, ranging from the burial rights of deceased kings to the legitimacy of the incumbent. In 2000, these issues became conflated with politics as the rival families supported opposing platforms during elections. This situation came to a head in March 2002 amidst a dispute over a festival. An attack on a member of one royal family preceded widespread clashes over several days until, on 25 March 2002, the incumbent king was executed along with around 25 supporters in the royal palace.[3] This unprecedented event threatened to escalate into a war for the throne that could have devastated northern Ghana.

The immediate threat of violence was minimised by the rapid (within hours) deployment of military and police units to the region by the Government of Ghana and the declaration of a state of emergency.[4] The following month, an independent committee – the Wuaku Commission – was established to investigate the attack and recommend what action should be taken. This body was later supported by a UN committee after a request from the Ghanaian government.[5] In 2003, the Government of Ghana established the Committee of Eminent Chiefs led by the Asantehene (the traditional ruler of the Ashanti) with support from the UN Development Programme to resolve the crisis. In 2006, the belligerents signed a roadmap to peace developed by this committee, allowing a regent to be appointed to the throne and some royal funerals to be held.[6] Approximately 40 people were eventually arrested for the attack in 2010, limiting the risk of a conflict relapse. After no less than 60 rounds of talks, the Eminent Chiefs finally mediated a peaceful resolution to the dispute in 2018.[7] This deal was presented to the Government of Ghana the following year and a new king was duly enskinned.

[1] Abdul Karim Issifu. “An Analysis of Conflicts in Ghana: The Case of Dagbon Chieftaincy.” The Journal of Pan African Studies, Vol. 8, No. 6. (2015) pp.28-9

[2] Ken Ahorsu & Boni Yao Gebe. “Governance and Security in Ghana: The Dagbon Chieftain Crisis.” SIPRI/OSI African Security and Governance Project. (2011) pp.15-6

[3] Edward Salifu Mahama & Felix T. Longi. “Conflicts in Northern Ghana: Search for Solutions, Stakeholders and Way Forward.” Ghana Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1. (2013) p.121

[4] Ahorsu & Gebe. “Governance and Security in Ghana.” p.20

[5] Staff and agencies. “Mission attempts to ease Dagbon crisis.” IRIN News. (2002) Available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/203057 (Accessed 7/12/2021)

[6] Issifu. “An Analysis of Conflicts in Ghana.” pp.35-6

[7] Staff and agencies. “Otumfuo settles Andani, Abudu rift in Dagbon crisis.” GhanaWeb. (19 November 2018) Available at: https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Otumfuo-settles-Andani-Abudu-rift-in-Dagbon-crisis-701993 (Accessed 7/12/2021)

Description of Case 

Macedonia was one of six republics within the federal framework of socialist Yugoslavia. In 1991, Slovenia and Croatia (two of the other republics), fell into armed conflict as their respective administrations attempted to guide them towards statehood. When the Macedonian population voted for independence in a September 1991 referendum, many observers feared another armed conflict would ensue, either with Belgrade or among the diverse Macedonian population.[1] Although the Yugoslav National Army withdrew peacefully in February 1992, later that year the leadership of the nascent Macedonian state requested that the UN send observers to monitor events. Peacekeepers already deployed to the region as part of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) entered Macedonian territory in December 1992 and were quickly reinforced with 500 American troops.[2] The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe also established the Spillover Mission to Skopje and tasked it with maintaining peace in the area.[3]

Tensions between the government and parts of Macedonia’s Albanian community escalated in 1992 following an unofficial referendum on increased autonomy for a predominantly Albanian part of the country. The result (a large majority in favour) was dismissed by the government in Skopje.[4] As a similar turn of events had preceded every other conflict in former Yugoslavia, Macedonia became the focus of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel. After conducting 11 fact-finding missions, he recommended that the government introduce Albanian-language education, hold a nationwide census, progress towards ethnic representation in state institutions, and strengthen an advisory body tasked with proposing solutions to problems among Macedonia’s communities, the Council for Inter-Ethnic Relations.[5] In addition to suggesting policy, van der Stoel also helped mediate discussions between the Macedonian government and Albanian leaders, ultimately resolving a potentially violent conflict peacefully. On 13 March 1995, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), representing the first deployment of its kind, was established to replace UNPROFOR.[6] UNPREDEP remain in Macedonia until 1999.

[1] Alice Ackermann. “Managing Conflicts Non-Violently Through Preventive Action: The Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1. (1999) p.1

[2] UN Peacekeeping. Introduction to UNPREDEP. (UN, 1999) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unpred_b.htm (Accessed 14/10/2020)

[3] OSCE. Mandate of the Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje. (OSCE, 1992) Available at: https://www.osce.org/skopje/42366 (Accessed 14/10/2020)

[4] Přemysl Rosůlek. “Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia (1991-2001): Could the attempt to create a Multiethnic Society Succeed?” Perspectives Review of International Affairs, No. 17. (2002) p.44

[5] Max van der Stoel. Peace and Stability through Human and Minority Rights: Speeches by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Hamburg: Nomos, 1999) p.103

[6] UNPREDEP. UNPREDEP Mission Profile. (UN Peacekeeping, 1999) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unpred_p.htm (Accessed 14/10/2020)

Description of Case 

In 2001, Macedonia once again stood at the precipice of armed conflict. Beginning in February, an ethnic Albanian separatist movement known as the National Liberation Army (NLA) began attacking government security forces near the Kosovan border. After a relatively brief clash around the town of Tetovo, the fighting halted for a month, before erupting at a much greater scale in May.[i] As much of the NLA’s personnel and equipment was travelling across the mountainous border with Kosovo, the crisis presented a very real possibly of escalating into a much larger regional conflict.

The first step to resolving the crisis was (once again) taken by Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities Max Van der Stoel, who issued repeated early warnings of the potential for conflict.[ii] As a result, European leaders invited the Macedonian president to a conference in Stockholm in March 2001 to discuss the crisis. Efforts to pressure the government to find a peaceful solution were undermined by the inability of Macedonian political parties to form a stable national governing coalition. By chance, Paddy Ashdown (British politician and future High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina) was already in the region and quickly moved to assess the situation. After meeting with the NLA leadership, he began conveying their demands to the European leaders gathered in Stockholm.[iii] With dialogue started, a range of international organisations and national governments moved to resolve the crisis. EU officials in Kosovo gathered statements from local leaders condemning the violence before travelling to Skopje and convincing the Macedonian parliament to resume talks. In June, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) approved the deployment of 3,000 troops to oversee the de-escalation process in the case that a deal was struck.[iv] NATO Secretary-General George Robertson then mediated negotiations alongside representatives of the EU and the Government of the USA.[v] The negotiations culminated with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement on 13 August 2001.[vi] The Agreement stipulated a range of reforms that were aimed at making Macedonia a more inclusive place to live for its ethnic Albanian population. NATO troops disarmed the NLA personnel, the OSCE helped to strengthen existing peace infrastructure such as the Committees for Inter-Community Relations, and the EU approved funding for a range of development projects.[vii] Once again, war in Macedonia was prevented.

[i] BBC. “Macedonia fights on two fronts.” BBC News. (2001) Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1346587.stm (Accessed 14/10/2020)

[ii] Nyheim. Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse. p.58

[iii] Paddy Ashdown. Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21^st Century. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007) pp.154-8

[iv] Staff and agencies. “More Macedonia violence as Nato troops arrive.” The Guardian. (2001) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/aug/20/balkans2 (Accessed 14/10/2020)

[v] Ashdown. Swords and Ploughshares. p.158

[vi] Framework Agreement (Ohrid Agreement), 2001. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/fyrom-ohridagreement2001 (Accessed 14/10/2020)

[vii] OSCE. OSCE Mission to Skopje: Mandate. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: https://www.osce.org/mission-to-skopje/mandate (Accessed 14/10/2020)

Description of Case 

The collection of islands in the Pacific known as New Caledonia was part of the French Empire until 1946, when it became a French Overseas Territory. Divisions between the indigenous Kanak population and European and Polynesian settlers have been a feature of New Caledonian politics since the colonial period, with several Kanak rebellions taking place over the years. In 1984, a coalition of pro-independence Kanak political parties formed the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste, FLNKS) and launched an insurgency against French security services with the goal of achieving independence. Within weeks, they had gained control of many towns and established a parallel administration.[1] The conflict was marked by clashes between militias, assassinations, and hostage-taking, culminating with the 1988 hostage incident at Ouvéa Cave, in which four gendarmes and over twenty FLNKS personnel were killed.[2]

The 1988 Matignon Agreements ended the fighting before it could escalate. Mediated by the Government of France and signed by FLNKS and “loyalist” political parties, the Agreements provided for a gradual transition to independence.[3] It was an interim solution, with a referendum scheduled for 1998 providing a deadline for the parties to the conflict to find some consensus.[4] Although the process outlined in Matignon calmed the conflict, many issues remained unresolved. Kanak support for the peace process was mixed, with many political parties maintaining militias and hard-line elements within them advocating a return to armed struggle.[5] Talks held between the New Caledonian political parties in the early 1990s culminated with an agreement to postpone the 1998 referendum and manage the transition within the framework of the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation. This allowed the negotiation of a transition to independence based on consensus and delayed the potentially volatile referendum.[6] The agreement was formalised on 5 May 1998 by the Nouméa Accord, which was signed by the main New Caledonian political parties (including the FLNKS) and the Government of France.[7] The Accords also introduced a provincial government and a special status for the territory, created a parallel New Caledonian citizenship for residents, scheduled several referenda, and established a Comité des signataires to monitor implementation. In the ensuing decades, the UN Special Commission has monitored the process, directly supporting the New Caledonians to achieve self-determination peacefully.[8] 

[1] David Robie. “Flashback to Kanaky in the 1980s – ‘Blood on their banner’.” Asia Pacific Report. (2018) Available at: https://asiapacificreport.nz/2018/11/01/flashback-to-kanaky-in-the-1980s-blood-on-their-banner/ (Accessed 10/12/2020)

[2] Steven Greenhouse. “17 Die as French Free Hostages in New Caledonia.” The New York Times. (1988) Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1988/05/06/world/17-die-as-french-free-hostages-in-new-caledonia.html (Accessed 10/12/2020)

[3] Jon Fraenkel. “Introduction: The Long-run Impact of New Caledonia’s Noumea Accord.” The Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 54, No. 2. (2019) p.200

[4] Stephen Henningham. “The Uneasy Peace: New Caledonia’s Matignon Accords at Mid-Term.” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 4. (2019) p.519

[5] Ibid. p.532

[6] Nic MacLellan. “The Noumea Accord and Decolonisation in New Caledonia.” The Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 34, No. 3. (1999) p.245

[7] L’accord de Nouméa, 1998. Available at: https://outre-mer.gouv.fr/laccord-de-noumea (Accessed 10/12/2020)

[8] UN. “Referendum on Status of New Caledonia ‘Important Step’ Forward in Decolonization Process, Secretary-General Says as Special Committee Begins Annual Session.” UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, SG/SM/19467-GA/COL/3329. (2019) Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sgsm19467.doc.htm (Accessed 10/12/2020)

Description of Case 

In 1990, the people of Estonia voted in the first free elections in the country since 1938. A major issue facing the new government was the plight of the non-Estonian minorities (most of whom were Russian) in Estonia, who constituted over a third of the total population. Initially, the Estonian government considered granting citizenship to all residents in the country. However, following a referendum in March 1991 (in which the Estonian population chose independence) and the attempted coup in Moscow in August, the administration introduced much more stringent conditions.[1] The potential fallout from the dispute was exacerbated by the Russian government’s refusal to withdraw military personnel from Estonia until the non-Estonian population was granted citizenship. Foreseeing the problems that could arise from these developments, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) established a Mission in Estonia in February 1993.[2] In June 1993, another discriminatory law was discussed in the Estonian parliament and in response, Russian communities in Estonia organised referenda on increased autonomy, while the Russian government cut gas supplies and warned that it would intervene if necessary.[3]

Faced with an escalating crisis that could easily have spiralled into armed conflict, the Estonian government invited the CSCE to assess the crisis and mediate a peaceful resolution. The recently appointed CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, was immediately dispatched to Estonia. The following day, he issued a series of recommendations to improve the legal status of the non-Estonian population, which itself helped to calm the crisis.[4] In the ensuing weeks, he engaged in extensive shuttle diplomacy between the Estonian government and the Russian communities, convincing the former to allow the referenda to go ahead on the condition that they remained symbolic, and the latter to state their respect for the territorial integrity of Estonia.[5] Although many issues remained, the threat of armed conflict had been defused. Meanwhile, the OSCE Mission (renamed from CSCE in 1994) worked with both parties to maintain stability, verifying the withdrawal of Russian troops and providing language training to the Russian population.[6] Despite some tense moments in 1994-1996, the presence of the OSCE (and later, the EU) helped to ensure that any disputes remained in the political sphere.[7]

[1] Sergey Khrychikov & Hugh Miall. “Conflict Prevention in Estonia: The Role of the Electoral System.” Security Dialogue, Vol. 33, No. 2. (2002) p.193

[2] OSCE. OSCE Mission to Estonia (closed). (OSCE, 2020) Available at: https://www.osce.org/estonia-closed (Accessed 23/11/2020)

[3] Celestine Bohen. “Russia Cuts Gas Supply To Estonia in a Protest.” The New York Times. (1993) Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/26/world/russia-cuts-gas-supply-to-estonia-in-a-protest.html (Accessed 23/11/2020)

[4] Max van der Stoel (Wolfgang Zellner & Falk Lange, eds). Peace and Stability through Human and Minority Rights: Speeches by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1999) p.102

[5] Hanne-Margaret Birckenbach. “Half Full or Half Empty? The OSCE Mission to Estonia and its Balance Sheet, 1993 – 1999.” European Centre for Minority Issues Working Paper, No. 6. (2000) p.42

[6] Rob Zaagman. “Conflict Prevention in the Baltic States: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.” European Centre for Minority Issues Monograph, No. 1. (1999) p.19

[7] M. Merrick Yamamoto. OSCE Principles in Practice: Testing Their Effect on Security Through the Work of Max van der Stoel, First High Commissioner on National Minorities 1993–2001. (Maryland: University of Marland, 2017) p.63

Description of Case 

The July 2006 general election in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) posed a wide range of challenges to peace in the country. A democratic contest had not been held in DRC since 1965, leaving electoral processes and infrastructure untested, and the sheer number of armed groups that had emerged over the preceding decade posed a major threat to the peaceful conduct and outcome of the elections. The elections themselves were the result of the 2002 Pretoria Agreement, which called for the establishment of a transitional Congolese government for a period of 24 months until an elected administration could be installed in Kinshasa.[1] During this period, the international community maintained the Committee in Support of the Transition (Comité International d’Accompagnement de la Transition, CIAT) as a mechanism to support the peace process and the creation of a new Congolese administration. The EU was the main donor and helped to establish five new institutions (including the electoral commission, a media oversight body, and an anti-corruption organisation) in preparation for the general elections in addition to its ongoing efforts to strengthen and professionalise Congolese police and security forces.[2] Despite these efforts, the UN Security Council still judged the risk of electoral violence and armed conflict to be severe. As a result, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo, MONUC) was significantly reinforced (from 5,537 personnel to over 16,000) and the EU was asked to send additional support in December 2005.[3] After months of deliberations, the EU Council approved another European mission to DRC, the European Union Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR RD Congo), to support MONUC during the election process.[4] A total of 2,300 European troops (43 percent German, 33 percent French, with smaller contributions from 17 other nations) deployed to DRC prior to the elections.[5] These forces were supplemented by 1,700 international and 35,000 Congolese election observers who worked to preserve the integrity of the contest.

The first round of elections proceeded peacefully but failed to provide an outright winner. In the aftermath, allegations of fraud and outbreaks of violence between political constituencies threatened to spark another armed conflict in DRC. In Kinshasa, Congolese troops clashed with armed opposition supporters in a confrontation that required the intervention of MONUC and EUFOR to contain it.[6] These efforts were successful, and the final result was announced in November 2006 before being confirmed by the Supreme Court, marking the completion of the first peaceful election in DRC in over four decades.

[1] Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Pretoria Agreement), 2002. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-agreementontransition2002 (Accessed 05/01/2022)

[2] Kris Berwouts. Congo’s Violent Peace: Conflict and Struggle Since the Great African War. (Zed Books: London, 2017) p.48

[3] United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. MONUC Facts and Figures. (UN Peacekeeping, 2021) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/monuc/facts.shtml (Accessed 05/01/2022)

[4] Helmut Fritsch. EUFOR RD Congo: A Misunderstood Operation? (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University, 2008) p.33

[5] Ibid. p.43

[6] Hans Hoebeke. “The EU and “Conflict Peacebuilding” in the DRC.” Studia Diplomatica, Vol. 60, No. 1. (2007) p.46

Description of Case 

In October 2014, the president of Burkina Faso announced his intention to amend the constitution and stand for a third term as president. In response, protesters took to the streets of Ouagadougou and stormed the National Assembly amidst violent scenes in which at least one person was killed. The same day, the military staged a coup d’état and subsequently became the target of more demonstrations.[1] Although a transitional government including civilians was appointed following widespread international condemnation of the coup and weeks of negotiations mediated by the African Union (AU) Special Envoy (a former Togolese prime minister), bringing a degree of stability and the promise of fresh elections in October 2015, the crisis at the heart of Burkinabe politics was not resolved.[2] On 16 September 2015, less than a month before the scheduled elections, the interim president, prime minister, and two other ministers were apprehended by troops of the presidential guard – a powerful, autonomous military force built to protect and serve the ousted authoritarian leader. A panel of eminent personalities (military officers, former presidents, and clergy) attempted to mediate a peaceful resolution with the leaders of the presidential guard to no avail, and the following morning those leaders announced a coup d’état and the formation of a military council to rule the country.[3] Ouagadougou once again became the scene of violent protests, and within days the regular armed forces of Burkina Faso were in position around the city, ready to remove the military council from power and dismantle the presidential guard by force if necessary.[4]

The initial international response to the coup was unforgiving, with the AU immediately calling for the restoration of constitutional rule, suspending Burkina Faso’s membership, and describing the military council as terrorists.[5] The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) dispatched a mediation team on 18 September which, after talks with a range of relevant parties, published a 13-point draft agreement which offered amnesty and concessions to the perpetrators of the coup. This proposal was rejected by much of the Burkinabe population (and by ECOWAS in the end), who continued demonstrating against the coup and mobilising in support of the regular armed forces. The effort to prevent war was taken up at this stage by the Mogho Naaba (King of the Mossis), a highly influential Burkinabe traditional leader, who facilitated and mediated negotiations which culminated with the surrender of the military council and presidential guard, averting an armed conflict in Burkina Faso.[6]

[1] Naila Salihu. “Bukrina Faso: An Unforeseen Crisis?” ACCORD Conflict Trends, No. 3. (2015) Available at: https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/burkina-faso/ (Accessed 9/12/2021)

[2] Abdoul Karim Saidou. “’We have chased Blaise, so nobody can resist us’: Civil Society and the politics of ECOWAS intervention in Burkina Faso.” South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 1. (2018) pp.43-4

[3] Ibid. p.48

[4] Rakotomalala & Nadia Karoui. “The rise and fall of Burkina Faso’s coup: what you need to know.” The Guardian. (24 September 2015) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/24/burkina-faso-coup-rise-and-fall-of-what-you-need-to-know (Accessed 9/12/2021)

[5] Saidou. “’We have chased Blaise, so nobody can resist us’.” p.49

[6] Ibid. p.50

Description of Case 

The enrichment of uranium in Iranian territory has been a source of international tension and the subject of negotiations at the highest levels since the governments of Iran and the USA entered into a civil nuclear cooperation programme in 1957. Through the complexities of the Cold War, the Iranian Revolution, and the devastating Iran-Iraq War, the question of Iran’s nuclear capabilities – or more accurately, whether it should be allowed to develop them – has remained at the forefront of international relations.[1] The 2003 invasion of Iraq raised concerns among European leaders of a similar war with Iran. As a result, the governments of France, Germany, and the UK (the EU3) held talks with the Iranian administration.[2] Although dialogue continued, efforts to find a compromise failed, with proposals brought forward by the EU and the governments of Turkey and Russia being rejected by either the US or Iranian administrations. In 2006, the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) joined together in their diplomatic efforts with Iran regarding its nuclear programme. Little progress was made, however, and the discovery of underground nuclear facilities in Iran in 2009 raised the very real prospect of war, particularly after the Government of Israel threatened to bomb the location.[3]

The dispute remained unresolved until the Iranian people elected a moderate government in 2013. In September 2013, US President Barack Obama made the first contact between the leaders of Iran and the US since 1979. Two months later, the P5+1 and the Government of Iran reached an interim agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear programme, easing sanctions on Iran, and continuing dialogue.[4] A lengthy negotiation process showed signs of promise in April 2015, when a framework deal stipulating further limitations in exchange for sanctions-relief was announced.[5] A final round of talks between the P5+1 and the Government of Iran were held in Vienna in June 2015, continuing for 17 days and eventually culminating with the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on 14 July 2015.[6] The Plan represented a significant moment of reconciliation, easing tensions and building trust between the US and Iran, creating a framework for European states to engage with Iran, and ultimately reducing the likelihood of armed conflict. The presidency of Donald Trump threatened to undermine the process, however, the ‘strategic patience’ approach adopted by the Government of Iran with European persuasion has helped to maintain peace.[7]

[1] Seyed Hossein Mousavian & Mohammad Mehdi Mousavian. “Building on the Iran Nuclear Deal for International Peace and Security.” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Vol. 1, No. 1. (2018) pp.169-172

[2] Ian Traynor. “Tehran agrees to nuclear freeze.” The Guardian. (2004) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/08/politics.eu (Accessed 09/12/2020)

[3] Ian Traynor, Julian Borger, & Ewen MacAskill. “Obama condemns Iran over secret nuclear plant.” The Guardian. (2009) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/25/iran-secret-underground-nuclear-plant (Accessed 09/12/2020)

[4] Julian Borger & Saeed Kamali Dehghan. “Iran seals nuclear deal with west in return for sanctions relief.” The Guardian. (2013) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/iran-nuclear-deal-west-sanctions-relief (Accessed 09/12/2020)

[5] Julian Borger & Paul Lewis. “Iran nuclear deal: negotiators announce ‘framework’ agreement.” The Guardian. (2015) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/iran-nuclear-deal-negotiators-announce-framework-agreement (Accessed 09/12/2020)

[6] Kelsey Davenport. “The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action at a Glance.” Arms Control Association Fact Sheets & Briefs. (2020) Available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance (Accessed 09/12/2020)

[7] Vali Nasr. “Iran and the US: The Long and Arduous Diplomatic Road.” RUSI Commentary. (2020) Available at: https://rusi.org/commentary/iran-and-us-long-and-arduous-diplomatic-road (Accessed 09/12/2020)