Better Evidence Project

Description of Case 

Both the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the UN had deployed personnel to Liberia during the war in an effort to contain the violence and expedite an end to the conflict. Although those operations ultimately failed, the talks that took place in Ghana during the summer of 2003 provided renewed impetus for a fresh multilateral deployment if an agreement was found. On 1 August 2003, weeks before the Accra Agreement was signed, the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), to prepare the ground for the arrival of a UN mission.[1] Two months later, following the conclusion of the negotiations in Accra, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) took over from ECOMIL. The Mission was reinforced until 2005, when the number of personnel peaked at 15,000 peacekeepers and 1,100 police.[2] 

Liberia was left devastated by 14 years of armed conflict. Its national infrastructure and state institutions had been destroyed and thousands of combatants remained scattered across the country, weapons in hand. These challenges only served to magnify the task of ensuring the fragile peace that had been negotiated in Accra did not fail as a dozen previous agreements had. Thus, upon its deployment, UNMIL’s priorities were managing the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration process, training the newly established police force, providing border security, building the capacity of other state institutions, and repairing infrastructure to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid.[3] Between December 2003 and November 2004, UNMIL disarmed more than 100,000 former combatants.[4] In January 2004, UN Police launched a training programme for the Liberian National Police and helped to re-open the national training academy. The first class of 127 police cadets graduated from the programme within a year.[5] In October 2005, presidential and legislative elections went ahead with the support of UNMIL in a safe and secure environment. In 2006, work began on building a new military for Liberia, with UNMIL providing support to the process alongside the US.[6] In February 2018, UNMIL withdrew from Liberia, leaving a small contingent of ECOWAS personnel and a UN Peacebuilding office in the country to monitor events.[7] This sustained effort helped to prevent a conflict relapse in Liberia.

[1] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1497. (2003) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1497 (Accessed 25/10/2020)

[2] Short & Lauenstein. Peace and Conflict Since 1991. p.119

[3] UNMIL. UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia – Mandate. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://unmil.unmissions.org/mandate (Accessed 25/10/2020)

[4] Wolf-Christian Paes. “The Challenges of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Liberia.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 12, No. 2. (2005) p.253; Peace Accords Matrix. Accra Peace Agreement. (Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 2020) Available at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/accra-peace-agreement#easy-footnote-bottom-1-18679 (Accessed 25/10/2020)

[5] United Nations Mission in Liberia. The Story of UNMIL. (New York: UN, 2018)

[6] David C. Gompert, Olga Oliker, Brooke Stearns, Keith Crane, & K. Jack Riley. Making Liberia Safe: Transformation of the National Security Sector. (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007)

[7] Daniel Forti & Lesley Connolly. The Mission is Gone, but the UN is Staying: Liberia’s Peacekeeping Transition. (International Peace Institute, 2018)

Description of Case 

Adadda is an area of prime grazing land that straddles the border of Ethiopia and the Somali Federal Republic of Puntland that has historically been shared between local clans. During the dry months between January and April, when both pasture and water become scarce, low-intensity conflicts between rival groups of pastoralists are common. State collapse, the widespread conflicts that continue to affect the region, and increasing environmental degradation served to hamstring traditional methods of mediation and resolution while also exacerbating the intensity of these conflicts. Efforts to resolve particularly substantial conflicts in 1985, 1997, and 2001 failed due to these factors, and fighting over scarce resources in Adadda during the dry season continued.[1] The significance of these conflicts was compounded by the cross-border nature of the fighting, with clan militias engaging each other over an internationally recognised border. Thus, the fighting between armed pastoralist groups in Adadda ran the risk of sparking a major confrontation between Ethiopia and Somalia in addition to representing a pervasive conflict that defied resolution for decades.

In 2007, the construction of wells in a prohibited area sparked another confrontation. The rival groups raised their militia on either side of the Ethiopia-Somalia border and began fighting each other. Initial efforts to stop the conflict were led by local traditional and religious leaders. In contrast to previous flare-ups of fighting where state structures were absent for all intents and purposes, these interventions were supported by the administrations of Ethiopia, Puntland, and Somalia. The fighting between the pastoralist groups was ended immediately when 65 troops of the Puntland armed forces were deployed in an interpositionary location (essentially on the border with Ethiopia) between the militias.[2] The cessation of hostilities was followed by the creation of a mediation committee comprising traditional and religious leaders, ministers of the Puntland administration, as well as representatives of the belligerent parties. The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, which was reliant on support from Ethiopia at this time, put considerable pressure on the leadership of Puntland to resolve the conflict quickly. After several rounds of talks, the parties came to an accord and signed the Burtinle Peace Agreement on 8 May 2007.[3] The talks established Puntland as the guarantor of peace in the area, provided for reparations, and created a buffer zone between the rival groups to prevent a conflict relapse. Implementation was overseen by a joint committee.

[1] Johnson, ed. The Puntland Experience. pp.58-9

[2] Ibid. pp.59-60

[3] Burtinle Peace Agreement, 2007. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/lview/1853/Burtinle%20Peace%20Agreement (Accessed 1/11/2021)

Description of Case 

When the 2008 elections were held in Zimbabwe, the country was suffering from a decade-long economic crisis, food and fuel shortages, and a cholera epidemic.[1] President Robert Mugabe, who had been in power since 1980, was facing growing opposition; his proposed constitutional amendments had been resoundingly defeated in a referendum, while the violent conduct of his administration was met with condemnation at home and abroad.[2] The opposition won the parliamentary contest, but the first round of the presidential election proved inconclusive, leading to a run-off. As the Zimbabwean people waited to return to the polls, security services and militias loyal to Mugabe launched a brutal crackdown.[3] As the polls drew nearer, Mugabe openly threatened widespread violence should he lose the election. His rhetoric was given an extra sting when British intelligence discovered a major arms shipment en route to Harare from China.[4] While the opposition movement maintained a peaceful campaign, it too began organising militias and preparing for a violent resolution of the conflict.[5] Thus, Zimbabwe stood at the precipice of a major civil war.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) convened an extraordinary summit in response to the escalating crisis, attended by opposition candidates and officials from Mugabe’s government, which culminated with a joint statement calling for the elections to go ahead peacefully.[6] This was followed by a visit to Zimbabwe by President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, who served as the official mediator of the SADC for the conflict in Zimbabwe.[7] After weeks of negotiations mediated by Mbeki, the parties signed the Global Political Agreement, which expressed the shared commitment to the prevention of violence and established a Government of National Unity (GNU) in which Mugabe retained the presidency and the opposition candidate became prime minister.[8] The African Union backed the Agreement, viewing the transitional administration as an effective means of containing the conflict until fresh elections (mandated in the Agreement) could be held in a free and fair environment monitored by international observers.[9] In February 2009, the GNU came to power and managed to curtail some of the worst hardships affecting the Zimbabwean population.[10] Although tensions remained high in Zimbabwe, the timely diplomatic intervention prevented the outbreak of war in 2008.

[1] Human Rights Watch. Zimbabwe: Events of 2008. (HRW, 2009) Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2009/country-chapters/zimbabwe#206466 (Accessed 25/11/2020)

[2] Bryan Sims. Zimbabwe: a conflict history. (Peace Insight, 2015) Available at: https://www.peaceinsight.org/blog/2015/08/zimbabwe-conflict-history/ (Accessed 25/11/2020)

[3] Chris McGreal. “This is no election. This is a brutal war.” The Guardian. (2008) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1 (Accessed 25/11/2020)

[4] Obonye Jonas, David Mandiyanike, & Zibani Maundeni. “Botswana and Pivotal Deterrance in the Zimbabwe 2008 Political Crisis.” The Open Political Science Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1. (2013) p.2

[5] Ibid. p.3

[6] IRIN News. “SADC disappoints civil society.” The New Humanitarian. (2008) Available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2008/04/14 (Accessed 25/11/2020)

[7] James Sturcke. “Mbeki visits Zimbabwe in mediator role.” The Guardian. (2008) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/18/zimbabwe.southafrica (Accessed 25/11/2020)

[8] Agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Formations, on Resolving the Challenges Facing Zimbabwe, 2008. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/zimbabwe-resolving-challenges2008 (Accessed 25/11/2020)

[9] Martin Revayi Rupiya. “A review of the African Union’s experience in facilitating peaceful power transfers: Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Libya and Sudan.” African Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 12, No. 2. (2012) Available at: https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/a-review-of-the-african-unions-experience-in-facilitating-peaceful-power-transfers-zimbabwe-ivory-coast-libya-and-sudan/ (Accessed 25/11/2020)

[10] Martha Mutisi. “Beyond the signature: Appraisal of the Zimbabwer Global Political Agreement (GPA) and Implications for Intervention.” ACCORD Policy and Practice Brief, No. 4. (2011) p.3

Description of Case 

The 2010 – 2011 Arab Spring originated in Tunisia, sparking a wave of change and upheaval that ultimately ended in conflict across much of the Middle East and North Africa. In Tunisia, the protests succeeded in forcing the country’s long-time ruler, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, to resign and heralded the introduction of multi-party elections. An interim government took power until elections could be organised, but popular protests continued throughout the year.[1] The October 2011 elections resulted in the formation of a minority government, however by May 2012 divisions between the Islamic and secular wings of Tunisian politics were escalating into limited armed clashes between paramilitary groups.[2] Renewed protests took place, with some calling for the ratification of a constitution while others demanded the introduction of religious laws. The demonstrations escalated to the verge of civil war following the assassination of a popular opposition leader in July 2013 in an attack attributed to the ruling party.[3]

Fearing an armed conflict, the leader of the Tunisian General Labour Union first called its 750,000 members to down tools in April 2013, bringing the country to a halt, before employing this tactic at key moments of tensions throughout the peace process.[4] While protests continued in some areas, the union leader met with representatives of the Tunisian bar association, the Human Rights League, and the president of the Tunisian Confederation of Industry. The four individuals resolved to establish the National Dialogue Quartet (NDQ) and work to mediate a peaceful resolution to the incipient conflict and establish constitutional rule to Tunisia. Its first promulgated a Road Map, calling for parliament to pass a constitution, schedule elections, and appoint a technocratic interim government.[5] The NDQ then held talks with a range of political parties, gathering enough support for a compromise constitution to be approved. Furthermore, the Quartet identified a suitable interim prime minister acceptable to all parties (an engineer new to politics). Parties from across the political spectrum adhered to the Road Map, and the elections were held in a peaceful environment in 2014.[6] The NDQ had forged a space for dialogue and then used it to skilfully mediate meaningful agreements which resolved the crisis and laid the framework for Tunisian democracy to take root. The NDQ was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts.[7]

[1] BBC. “Tunisia profile – Timeline.” BBC News. (2017) Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14107720 (Accessed 06/12/2020)

[2] Chris Stephen. “The Tunisia quartet: how an impossible alliance saved the country from collapse.” The Guardian. (2017) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/08/tunisia-quartet-arab-spring-islamist-nobel-peace-prize (Accessed 06/12/2020)

[3] BBC. “Tunisia political crisis deepens after assassination.” BBC News. (2013) Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21366235 (Accessed 06/12/2020)

[4] Stephen. “The Tunisia quartet.”

[5] Ibid.

[6] Hendrik Kraetzschmar. “How the Tunisian national dialogue saved a country from collapse.” The Conversation. (2015) Available at: https://theconversation.com/how-the-tunisian-national-dialogue-saved-a-country-from-collapse-48921 (Accessed 06/12/2020)

[7] The Nobel Prize. National Dialogue Quartet: Facts. (Nobel Prize, 2020) Available at: https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2015/tndq/history/ (Accessed 06/12/2020)

Description of Case 

In December 2017, The Gambia held a presidential election. The incumbent, President Yahya Jammeh, had been in power since 1994, led a repressive regime, and had refused the presence of international monitors at the polls. Thus, the unexpected announcement from the Gambian Electoral Commission that the opposition candidate had won the contest caught many observers off guard. Even more surprising was the conciliatory tone initially offered by Jammeh, who congratulated his rival, Adama Barrow.[1] Within a week, however, Jammeh deployed troops on the streets and claimed irregularities in the vote-counting process meant that fresh elections should be held. Fearing armed conflict or a brutal crackdown, Barrow, along with tens of thousands of other Gambian citizens, fled to neighbouring Senegal.

The international community, led by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), was quick to condemn Jammeh’s actions and called for the restoration of constitutional rule. The UN Special Representative for West Africa and the presidents of Liberia, Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone visited Jammeh, imploring him to give up the presidency. Jammeh’s refusal to cede power led ECOWAS to gather troops on the border and prepare for a military intervention once his mandate ended.[2] The EU provided initial funds for the operation via its Early Response Mechanism and has continued supporting ECOWAS efforts in The Gambia.[3] In the meantime, Barrow was inaugurated in the Gambian Embassy in Senegal on 19 January 2017 and, on the same day, the UN Security Council approved ECOWAS intervention to enforce the decision of the Gambian people.[4] The ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia made clear its intention to enter the country the moment Jammeh’s term in the presidency ended, however such action was avoided when he finally agreed to leave the country.[5] In 2018, the African Union Technical Support to The Gambia mission was established to support the stabilisation process and advise the Gambian government on the rule of law, democracy, transitional justice, and Security Sector Reform.[6] Diplomatic pressure and threat of military intervention helped to ensure a peaceful transfer of power and maintain stability in The Gambia.

[1] Christof Harmann. “ECOWAS and the Restoration of Democracy in The Gambia.” Africa Spectrum, Vol. 52, No. 1. (2017) pp.86-7

[2] Ruth Maclean. “Gambia crisis: Senegal troops poised at border as Jammeh mandate ends.” The Guardian. (2017) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/19/senegal-troops-poised-at-the-gambia-border-as-jammeh-mandate-ends (Accessed 11/11/2020)

[3] Africa-EU Partnership. Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG). (EU, 2019) Available at: https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/projects/mission-gambia-ecomig (Accessed 11/11/2020)

[4] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2337. (UN, 2017) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2337 (Accessed 11/11/2020)

[5] Ruth Maclean. “Yahya Jammeh leaves the Gambia after 22 years of rule.” The Guardian. (2017) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/21/anxious-gambians-await-former-president-yahya-jammeh-departure (Accessed 11/11/2020)

[6] Chido Mutangadura. “Will The Gambia be a turning point for AU peace efforts?” Institute for Security Studies. (2019) Available at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/will-the-gambia-be-a-turning-point-for-au-peace-efforts (Accessed 12/11/2020)

Description of Case 

The Caspian Sea is a resource-rich body of inland water. Since 1994, when the Government of Azerbaijan signed the “contract of the century” with Western oil companies to exploit offshore oil fields, the five littoral states (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan) have issued competing territorial claims over much of the Sea. After years of diplomatic disputes, tensions came to a head in July 2001 when two BP geological survey ships working with the Azerbaijani government ventured into the Alov oilfield, which was claimed by Iran.[1] Iranian naval and aviation assets forced the ship back (without violence), before conducting some limited attacks on Azerbaijani marine boundary buoys and conducting sorties in Azerbaijani airspace. In response, the Azerbaijani military mobilised for war and the Government of Turkey, a close ally of Azerbaijan (and member of NATO) dispatched a contingent of its Air Force to Baku.[2] A bilateral summit held in September 2001 served to resolve the immediate crisis (which became known as the Alov Crisis) and prevent an armed conflict from erupting between Azerbaijan and Iran, but the issue of contested territory remained. In the aftermath of the dispute, Azerbaijan invested heavily in strengthening its military capacity with support from the governments of Israel and the USA. In 2003, these new capabilities were demonstrated in the Caspian Sea during exercises involving 1,200 marines and a range of ships, boats, and helicopters.[3] The Iranian government, for its part, also strengthened its military assets in the Sea along with every other littoral state.[4] Although war was avoided in 2001, there remained a severe risk of interstate conflict in the Caspian Sea following the Alov Crisis.[5]

The first Caspian Sea Littoral States Summit was held in 2002 in the wake of the Alov Crisis with the express intention of resolving the various territorial disputes and preventing armed conflict in the region. Although a final agreement on the status of the “inland water basin” was not reached until the fifth summit in 2018, this painstaking negotiation process served as an effective mechanism for minimising the chance of war and developing a lasting peace in the region. The final agreement represented a compromise, dividing the seabed between the littoral states while maintaining the surface as international waters.[6] Upon signing the 2018 agreement in Ataku, Kazakhstan, the leaders of all five littoral states declared the region to be a sea of peace and good neighbourliness.

[1] Shannon O’Lear. “Resources and Conflict in the Caspian Sea.” Geopolitics, Vol. 9, No. 1. (2004) p.161

[2] Musa Qasimli. “Caspian Sea Dispute.” in Ali Askerov et al, eds. Post-Soviet Conflicts: The Thirty Years’ Crisis. (Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, 2020) pp.247-8

[3] Anar M. Valiyev. “Azerbaijan-Iran Relations: Quo Vadis, Baku?” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, No. 244. (2012) p.4

[4] O’Lear. “Resources and Conflict in the Caspian Sea.” pp.177-8

[5] Nicola Contessi. “Traditional Security in Eurasia: The Caspian Caught Between Militarisation and Diplomacy.” The RUSI Journal, Vol. 160, No. 2. (2015) pp.50-1

[6] International Institute for Strategic Studies. “The Caspian Sea Treaty.” Strategic Comments, Vol. 24, No. 9. (2018) p.i

Description of Case 

The peace process in South Africa following the end of apartheid created the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) in December 1993 as a temporary political arrangement to formally end the armed conflict between the African National Congress (ANC) and what remained of the minority regime. The TEC was tasked with governing the South Africa until a national government could be formed after elections scheduled for April 1994. With ongoing clashes taking place in KawZulu-Natal between ANC cadres and supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the continued presence of hard-line elements of the old regime (particularly in the security services), and the return to South Africa of many ANC personnel formerly based outside the country, the elections promised to take place in a potentially volatile environment which could trigger renewed conflict. Faced with ongoing political violence and the prospect of a war which could have dwarfed anything seen in post-colonial South Africa to date, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) requested that the UN Security Council establish an observation mission to report on the transition from apartheid and investigate scenes of violence and conflict.

The United Nations Observer Mission to South Africa (UNOMSA) was established in 1992 and began deploying its first personnel on 13 September 1992. The Commonwealth, EU, and OAU were all invited to contribute their own observers by the UN, and on the ground observers from all four intergovernmental organisations worked in joint teams and coordinated their approach. In October 1992, the observers began monitoring the conduct of the police and investigate alleged atrocities after the ANC withdrew from the peace process following a massacre of ANC supporters by the security services.[1] Negotiations resumed in April 1993, with UNOMSA facilitating dialogue with the goal of bringing as many parties as possible into the peace process.[2] By December 1993, 100 international observers were working across South Africa and reporting to a spectrum of international organisations and governments. Alongside ongoing dialogue facilitated by local people and organisations and the work of South African institutions such as the National Peace Committee, this ongoing international presence helped to keep the peace process on track, however the upcoming elections represented a major concern. As a result, the Commonwealth, EU, OAU, and UN deployed a total of 3,000 monitors to oversee the contest, verify its integrity, and prevent any outbreaks of electoral violence from sparking an armed conflict.[3] This deployment allowed the South African people to go to the polls in a relatively free, fair, and safe environment, where they elected Nelson Mandela to lead the county. UNOMSA was terminated on 27 June 1994, its mission complete. The ANC formally disbanded its armed forces in December 1994, marking the completion of South Africa’s relatively peaceful transition to democracy.[4]

[1] Muna Ndulo. “United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA): Security Council Resolutions 772 (1992) and 894 (1994) and the South African Transition: Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping.” Cornell Law Faculty Publications, No. 61. (1995) pp.214-6

[2] Ibid. p.222-3

[3] UN. “United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA).” UN Archives and Management Section. (UN, 2022) Available at: https://search.archives.un.org/united-nations-observer-mission-in-south-africa-unomsa (Accessed 25/01/2022)

[4] Mac Maharaj. “The ANC and South Africa’s Negotiated Transition to Democracy and Peace.” Berghof Transitions Series, No. 2. (2008) p.23

Description of Case 

In 1999, the small Pacific state of Solomon Islands stood at the precipice of an armed conflict which threatened to engulf the largest island in the country, Guadalcanal. In January 1999, the Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly issued a declaration reiterating decade-old demands for increased autonomy and land reform. A few months later, an armed group formed of local Guale people known as the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) launched a series of attacks against migrant populations from other islands in the Solomons, displacing 35,000 people.[1] The international effort to prevent an armed conflict was initially led by the Commonwealth, which dispatched the former prime minister of Fiji to mediate negotiations.[2] After three days of talks, the IFM signed the Honiara Peace Accord with the Government of Solomon Islands on 28 June 1999, and a month later the parties negotiated the Panatina Agreement.[3] The agreements addressed many of the concerns of the Guale people and established peace between the IFM and the government. By the end of the year, however, a rival militia (the Malaita Eagle Force, MEF) emerged from the displaced population in the capital city, Honiara. MEF fostered close links with the Solomon Islands security forces and, in June 2000, seized power in a coup d’état and took control of the city.[4]

The MEF was party to neither the Honiara or Panatina Agreement, and its seizure of power threatened to undo the peace process. A ceasefire between the IFM and MEF signed aboard an Australian Navy ship in August 2000 provided a window for the Government of Australia to fly 130 delegates from across Solomon Islands society to Australia for negotiations. The talks culminated on 15 October 2000 with the signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement, a comprehensive accord which provided a framework for extensive reforms as well as an end to the nascent conflict.[5] The Agreement also called for the establishment of the International Peace Monitoring Team and the local Peace Monitoring Council to oversee its implementation.[6] Although Solomon Islands was left in an extremely fragile condition by the crisis, an armed conflict was prevented thanks to the diplomatic and mediation efforts of the Commonwealth and the governments of Australia and New Zealand. 

[1] Matthew G. Allen. “Land, Identity and Conflict on Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands.” Australian Geographer, Vol. 43, No. 2. (2012) p.166

[2] BBC. “Peace deal in Solomon Islands.” BBC News. (1999) Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/379965.stm (Accessed 23/11/2020)

[3] Honiara Peace Accord, 1999. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/solomonislands-honiara-accord99 (Accessed 23/11/2020)

[4] Derek McDougall. “Intervention in Solomon Islands.” The Round Table, Vol. 93, No. 374. (2004) p.215

[5] Townsville Peace Agreement, 2000. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/solomonislands-townsville-agreement2000 (Accessed 23/11/2020)

[6] McDougall. “Intervention in Solomon Islands.” p.216

Description of Case 

São Tomé and Príncipe became independent from Portugal in 1975, enjoying a relatively peaceful transition to self-rule. The country’s first elections were held in 1991 in a free and fair environment, although a short-lived coup d’état in 1995 highlighted the potential for the Santomean military to destabilise politics.[1] The discovery of offshore oil fields in the seas around São Tomé and Príncipe in 2000 presented a potential boost for the Santomean economy, but also served to raise the stakes in politics.[2] Ongoing disputes between the prime minister and president over constitutional reform culminated with the latter dissolving parliament in January 2003. Violent protests against the government broke out in April and, by July, threatened to overthrow the government.[3] Further complexity was added to the crisis by the return of Santomean veterans of South Africa’s infamous Buffalo Battalion to the country after serving for decades as mercenaries. On 16 July 2003, a group of these veterans launched a coup d’état with the support of around half of São Tomé and Príncipe’s small army. Once in power, the military junta was reinforced by additional Buffalo Battalion veterans who returned to São Tomé and Príncipe in its wake.[4] Although the coup had taken place without loss of life, São Tomé and Príncipe faced armed conflict between the military junta and forces loyal to the deposed administration.[5]

The international effort to prevent armed conflict and restore constitutional rule began the day after the coup, when American and Portuguese diplomats met representatives of the military junta.[6] Meanwhile, a host of national governments and regional institutions condemned the coup and discussed the possibility of a military intervention. After three days of talks, the junta agreed a Memorandum of Understanding with the diplomats, establishing the framework for a negotiated settlement. Further talks were hosted by the governments of Nigeria, the USA, Portugal, South Africa (at the request of the Buffalo Battalion veterans), as well as the Community of Portuguese Language Countries and the Economic Community of Central African States..[7] After negotiating the restoration of constitutional rule in return for amnesty for the coup plotters, the mediators presented the deal to the ousted Santomean president, who returned to the islands accompanied by the President of Nigeria.[8] This timely diplomatic intervention prevented the outbreak of armed conflict in São Tomé and Príncipe.

[1] Gerhard Seibert. “São Tomé e Príncipe: Military Coup as a Lesson?” Lusotopie. (1996)

[2] Rory Carroll. “Troops seize power in oil rush.” The Guardian. (2003) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jul/17/oil.business (Accessed 13/12/2020)

[3] Gerhard Seibert. “Coup d’état in São Tomé e Príncipe: Domestic causes, the role of oil and former

‘Buffalo’ Battalion soldiers.” Institute for Security Studies Paper, No. 81. (2003) p.2

[4] Ibid. p.5

[5] BBC. “’Junta’ declared in Sao Tome.” BBC News. (2003) Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3070355.stm (Accessed 13/12/2020)

[6] Gerhard Seibert. “The Bloodless Coup of July 2003 in São Tomé e Príncipe.” Lusotopie, Vol. 10. (2003) p.252

[7] Seibert. “Coup d’état in São Tomé e Príncipe.” p.6

[8] Seibert. “The Bloodless Coup of July 2003 in São Tomé e Príncipe.” p.255

Description of Case 

As the Soviet Union collapsed and much of the Caucasus descended into war, the diverse and economically poor Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Dagestan appeared at risk of following the path of its neighbours. Like all parts of the Caucasus, the population of Dagestan was affected by the withdrawal (and partial disintegration) of Soviet armed forces in the region and the return of populations, such as Chechens, who had been deported to central Asia in 1944. With over 30 recognised national groups within its borders (including Russians, Chechens, Lezgins, all of whom could seek unity with fraternal populations outside the republic) and a plurality of confessional outlooks within a society awash with small arms, Dagestan was viewed by outside observers as an area at great risk of armed conflict, particularly after the wars in nearby Abkhazia, Chechnya, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh erupted in the early 1990s.[1]

In contrast to most of the other political units established in the Caucasus during the Soviet period, the structures of government in Dagestan remained in place after 1991 and became the nucleus of the post-communist administration. Indeed, there was widespread support from across Dagestani society for the carefully balanced consociational political system that had developed over the centuries and eventually became formalised within the Soviet constitutional framework of the republic. This was manifested in three separate referenda on the shape of post-Soviet Dagestan’s political administration and the mobilisation of multiethnic Dagestani self-defence units in opposition to incursions by Chechen militants in 1999.[2] This system emerged from the djamaat; a traditional method of political organisation focused on territory rather than kinship which created administrative bodies that were inherently multiethnic. The Soviets institutionalised this practice, ensuring that power was always shared among the many groups in Dagestan. The 1994 Dagestan Constitution enshrined these consociational arrangements, with overlapping legislative bodies ensuring that, at the least, the major ethnic groups in the republic were represented in government. In practical terms, this framework makes it very difficult for political platforms premised on ethnic exclusivity to succeed and means that Dagestani leaders are forced to build their political support base on a multiplicity of ethnic groups.[3] By maintaining these mechanisms during times of great uncertainty, the people of Dagestan helped to prevent armed conflict in their republic.

[1] Christoph Zürcher. The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus. (New York, 2007) p.186

[2] Robert Ware & Enver Kisriev. “Ethnic Parity and Democratic Pluralism in Dagestan: A Consociational Approach.” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 1. (2001) pp.111;

[3] Ware & Kisriev. “Ethnic Parity and Democratic Pluralism in Dagestan.” pp.111-2; UCDP. Russia (Soviet Union) : Dagestan. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/414 (Accessed 11/11/2021)