Better Evidence Project

Description of Case 

After committing so many resources to ending the armed conflicts and pervasive instability that plagued the Northern Region between 1994 and 2002, the regional government established the Northern Region Peace Advisory Council (NRPAC) in 2003 and tasked it with coordinating the efforts of government and civil society groups (such as the NGO Consortium established in response to the Guinea Fowl War and traditional chieftains such as the Asantehene) as they worked to prevent armed conflict and mediate a peaceful resolution to disputes.[1] NRPAC is formed of 24 members appointed by the regional government. The composition reflects a spectrum of religious groups, political parties, traditional elders, chieftains, representatives of women and youth groups, as well as police and security personnel.[2] In 2006, with assistance from the UN Development Programme, the Ghanaian Ministry of the Interior embarked on a project to expand the peace infrastructure emerging in the Northern Region to the entire country, with peace advisory councils at the district, regional, and national level serving to monitor, prevent, and resolve armed conflicts across Ghana.[3] These councils are supported by Peace Promotion Officers, who are appointed from shortlists drawn up by regional governments, and a Peacebuilding Support Unit within the Ministry of Interior.[4] This framework emerged under the policy umbrella of the National Architecture for Peace in Ghana, but was a painstaking process involving the creation and harmonisation of 212 district peace councils and 10 regional bodies.[5] 2011 represents a major milestone in the construction process, when the National Peace Council Act was approved by the Ghanaian parliament, formalising the growing role of this peace infrastructure in managing armed conflict.[6]

Since its creation, the Ghanaian peace infrastructure has helped resolve the Dagbon crisis, worked to ensure peaceful resolutions to chieftaincy disputes in Upper West Region, and mediated an end to an ongoing low-intensity conflict between the Alavanyo and Nkonya in Volta Region.[7] In addition, the National Peace Council has helped to prevent electoral violence in Ghana, with both the 2008 and 2012 contests representing serious risks of sparking armed conflict. These relatively high-level initiatives are supported by nationwide efforts to strengthen the voices of women and youth campaigning for peace, build the capacity of local people and organisations to manage conflict, and introduce guidelines for political media coverage.[8]

[1] Vincent Verzat. “Infrastructures for Peace: A Grass-roots Way To Do State-Building?” Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series No. 10. (2014) p.4

[2] Rashid Draman, Janet Adama Mohammed, & Peter Woodrow. The Conflict Prevention and Resolution Portfolio of UNDP Ghana: Evaluation Report. (Cambridge, MA: CDA, 2009) p.17

[3] Ulrike Hopp-Nishanka. “Giving Peace an Address? Reflections on the Potential and Challenges of Creating Peace Infrastructures.” In Barbara Unger, Stina Lundström, Katrin Planta, & Beatrix Austin, eds. Peace Infrastructures: Assessing Concept and Practice. (Berlin: Berghof, 2013) p.7

[4] Hopp-Nishanka. “Giving Peace an Address?” p.13

[5] William Awinador-Kanyirige. “Ghana’s National Peace Council.” Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect Policy Brief. (2014) p.5

[6] National Peace Council. The National Peace Council Act, 2011. (NPC, 2021) Available at: https://www.peacecouncil.gov.gh/the-national-peace-council-act-2011/ (Accessed 7/12/2021)

[7] Draman, Mohammed, & Woodrow. The Conflict Prevention and Resolution Portfolio of UNDP Ghana. pp.27-30

[8] Ibid. pp.21-4

Description of Case 

“Boendoe” is the fictional name for an area in which a peacebuilding network have successfully reduced armed conflict. However, owing to the politically sensitive climate of the country in question, scholarship on the area employs the Boendoe pseudonym. The Network, formed of 18 civil society organisations, was established in 2013 and coordinates the actions of individuals across the country. It works at the provincial level or below due to the political context in which it operates, however it is at this level that it has had a significant impact. Its primary function is to collate reports from its citizen reporters, vetted individuals who are trusted to convey information about a conflict, atrocity, or human rights abuse.^[1] This data is aggregated and mapped, providing a vital insight into conflict in the society. The Network’s findings are then circulated to international actors. This system of early warning, it argues, facilitates early response, thereby resolving disputes before they escalate into armed conflict.^[2] When appropriate, the Network employs the expertise and resources of its members to undertake activities such as human rights monitoring or dialogue and cooperation projects, preventing or resolving many conflicts at the community level.^[3]

Over a period of two years, 5,597 reports were filed by the Network’s citizen reporters and verified by its members. The reports have been hailed as highly valuable by international organisations, directly informing policy discussions in the European Parliament, for example. Another vital role that the Network fills is during the frequent media blackouts experienced in Boendoe. In one such blackout that was imposed during an election, the Network provided intelligence about a conflict that was escalating much more quickly than international observers expected, expediting a rapid response. During these periods, the Network also serves as a key source of information to the general public, who can be warned of nearby violence or informed of atrocities carried out in secret.^[4] Underlying all the work of the Network is the shared goal of building a more cohesive and peaceful society in a place with a recent history marred by division and armed conflict. By mobilising their resources and working together, members of the Network have maximised their impact and reduced armed conflict.

[1] Kiely Barnard-Webster. ‘Strength is from a union: working together you go far’: Understanding Collective Impact Using an Analytical Framework. (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2018) p.10

[2] Ibid. pp.11-12

[3] Phil Vernon. Local peacebuilding: What works and why. (Peace Direct & Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2019) p.42

[4] Barnard-Webster. ‘Strength is from a union.’ pp.16-17

Description of Case 

The 2015 presidential election placed armed conflict across Nigeria firmly at the fore of domestic politics. Following the successes in mediating a series of peace declarations in states across Nigeria’s Middle Belt in 2013-2016, the regional administrations of three federal states (Plateau, Kaduna, and Adamawa) elected to establish agencies to support the ongoing peace processes and consolidate the peace that was being forged. In February 2016, the governor of Plateau State created the Plateau State Peace Building Agency (PPBA) and tasked it with promoting a culture of peace and harmonious coexistence for the diverse population on the Plateau.[1] Working directly with the governor and state cabinet, the PPBA informs policy in addition to running programmes across the state. These include an initiative to work with traditional elders to set up peace committees in each of Plateau State’s 17 districts, hosting ongoing consultations and stakeholder fora, as well as collaborating with civil society and non-governmental organisations to mediate peaceful resolutions of conflicts. The PPBA is largely focused on managing farmer-pastoralist conflicts but contributed to ensuring the 2019 elections went ahead peacefully on the Plateau.[2] In November 2017, the Kaduna State Peace Commission (KSPC) was created with the same mandate as the PPBA but enjoys a position that is more independent from government than its counterpart.[3] In its first year, the KSPC intervened in ten different conflicts (with some support from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue) and began establishing peace committees in 21 of the states’ 23 districts.[4] The following year, this model was again replicated in Adamawara State and strengthened in 2020.

These state-level efforts to reduce armed conflict in Nigeria’s Middle Belt emerged from the governing administrations of each state. However, funding is limited to the salaries and running costs of the organisations. As a result, financial contributions and the delegation of expertise from organisations including the German development agency (GIZ), Ford Foundation, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Search for Common Ground, and the United States Institute for Peace continue to play a vital role in building capacity, improving practice, and facilitating interventions.[5] While the situation in Nigeria remains complex (with particular regard to the anti-grazing laws and Boko Haram insurgency), these initiatives have reduced armed conflict and ensured peaceful elections in this historically conflict-prone region in 2019.[6]

[1] Plateau Peace Building Agency. About Us. (PPBA, 2021) Available at: https://www.plateaupeacebuilding.org/index.html (Accessed 6/12/2021)

[2] Darren Kew. “Nigeria’s State Peacebuilding Institutions: Early Success and Continuing Challenges.” USIP Special Report, No. 496. (2021) p.7

[3] Kaduna State Peace Commission. Who We Are. (KSPC, 2021) Available at: https://kadunapeacecommission.org/ (Accessed 6/12/2021)

[4] Kew. “Nigeria’s State Peacebuilding Institutions.” p.11

[5] Ibid.

[6] Darren Kew. “How to calm violent crises? Nigeria has an idea.” USIP Analysis and Commentary. (4 June 2021) Available at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/06/how-calm-violent-crises-nigeria-has-idea (Accessed 6/12/2021)

Description of Case 

Following the success of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee in Wajir, local governments established similar organisations in collaboration with civil society groups across northern Kenya. Recognising the need for an institutional framework to coordinate and consolidate the various initiatives, the Government of Kenya established the National Steering Council (NSC) as an interdepartmental government agency in 2001. The 2007-2008 electoral violence revealed that the parts of Kenya with functional peace committees experienced considerably less conflict than those areas where no such infrastructure was in place. In response, the Kenyan government established another agency, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission, and expanded the committees (sometimes referred to as Nakuru Peace Committees) and structures to 150 new Kenyan districts, with an initial focus on the Rift Valley – a region that experienced the most upheaval in 2007-2008.[1] In 2011, the NSC published a revised conflict management policy which outlined a comprehensive infrastructure for reducing armed in Kenya with plans for a National Peace Council supported by a permanent secretariat that would coordinate the efforts of regional and county-level peace councils, local peace committees, and a mediation support unit. These organisations were tasked with hosting peace fora, maintaining peace committees, liaising with the media, conducting conflict analysis, and supporting the National Conflict Early Warning and Response platform.[2] Parts of this infrastructure was already in place in some areas of the country and was developed in others, but it was not until 2015 that the Kenyan parliament formally adopted the NSC’s conflict management policy.[3]

The emergence of the national peace infrastructure in Kenya has met with demonstrable success. A 2010 referendum and the 2013 elections went ahead peacefully, with UN Development Programme assessments highlighting the contributions of the local peace committees.[4] In addition to reducing electoral violence, the peace infrastructure also prevents and ends relatively low-intensity conflicts between communities in Kenya: In 2011, the Mabanga Peace Conference resulted in a comprehensive peace agreement between the Babukusu, Iteso, and Sabaot in Bungoma; the following year, peace was made between the Agikuyu and Kalenjin; in 2016, the Nanyuki Peace Agreement was mediated between the Aulian and Borana in Isiolo County; and in 2018, talks in Nakuru resulted in a peace agreement between the Luo and Nandi.[5]

[1] National Cohesion and Integration Commission. Footprints of Peace: Consolidating National Cohesion in a Devolved Kenya, 2014-2018. (NCIC, 2018) pp.1-2

[2] National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management. Our Work: National Peace Coordination. (NSC, 2021) Available at: https://www.nscpeace.go.ke/work/national-peace-coordination (Accessed 23/11/2021)

[3] Maria Osula. “Finally! A peace policy for Kenya.” Saferworld Comment and Analysis. (4 November 2015) Available at: https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/174-finally-a-peace-policy-for-kenya (Accessed 23/11/2021)

[4] John Makokha & Grace Miano. UNDP CPAP Outcome Evaluation 2012: Ken Outcome 49 – Effectiveness of Emergency Response and Early Recovery. (UNDP, 2012) p.29

[5] Mabanga Peace Accord, 2011. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1947/Mabanga%20Peace%20Accord (Accessed 23/11/2021); Nakuru County Peace Accord, 2012. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/785/Nakuru%20County%20Peace%20Accord (Accessed 23/11/2021); Nanyuki Peace Agreement between the Aulian Community of Garissa County and Borana Community of Isiolo County, 2016. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1920/ (Accessed 23/11/2021); Resolutions of the Nakuru Peace Agreement between the Luo and Nandi Communities of Kisumu and Nandi Counties attended by National and County Government Officials held at Water Buck Hotel, Nakuru, 2018. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/2101

(Accessed 23/11/2021)

Description of Case 

​At the height of the Second Congo War, most of the country was divided into three areas controlled by the governments of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Uganda. As the peace process started showing signs of progress and personnel of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo, MONUC) began deploying, the presence of uninvited foreign troops on Congolese soil came under increasing scrutiny by institutions such as the International Court of Justice. The province of Ituri, on the border of Uganda, was the scene of considerable fighting during the war but was ultimately under the control of the Ugandan government by the end of the conflict. In 2002, during talks hosted by the Government of Angola, the Ugandan and Congolese administrations negotiated a plan for the withdrawal of all Ugandan forces from DRC and formally normalised relations as part of the Luanda Agreement.[1] The plan included provisions for the creation of an Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC). Composed of local citizens, MONUC, representatives of the international community, and the governments of DRC and Uganda, the IPC developed a roadmap for peace and laid the foundations for an interim administration to be established in Ituri following the Ugandan withdrawal.[2] However, rather than restoring stability, the departure of 7,000 Ugandan troops on 6 May 2003 opened the door to an eruption of violence between the various militias operating in the province over control of key towns such as Bunia. DRC security forces were unable to assert control of the area, and a lone battalion of Uruguayan MONUC personnel could not protect the thousands of civilians fleeing the violence.[3] In addition to the dangers posed by conflict, the crisis threatened to spark a major humanitarian disaster in a region already devastated by conflict and famine.

In response to the worsening situation, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for a rapid intervention to protect civilians in Ituri until MONUC forces in the area could be reinforced later that year. Just seven days later, the first soldiers of a force composed mostly of French troops (90 percent) supported by other (mostly) European states landed in Bunia as part of the EU’s Operation Artemis.[4] This mission succeeded in restoring security to the town and preventing a wider conflict from taking place in Ituri after the Ugandan withdrawal, provided protection and aid to tens of thousands of refugees, and offered a vital window for the overstretched MONUC to gather its strength.[5] In September 2003, Artemis was withdrawn, and the UN assumed responsibility for security in Bunia and Ituri. The intervention did not end armed conflict in Eastern DRC, but it did prevent a major conflict from erupting.

[1] Agreement between the DRC and Uganda on withdrawal of Ugandan Troops, Cooperation and Normalization of Relations between the two countries (Luanda Agreement), 2002. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-luandaagreement2002 (Accessed 05/01/2022)

[2] Kees Homan. “Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo.” in European Commission. Faster and More United? The Debate About Europe’s Crisis Response Capacity. (Brussels: EC, 2007) p.151

[3] Ståle Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay, & Catriona Mace. “Operation Artemis: the shape of things to come?” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 3. (2004) pp.511-2

[4] Ibid. pp.516-7

[5] Homan. “Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo.” p.3

Description of Case 

The State of Israel was proclaimed in May 1948 following the end of the British Mandate in Palestine. Within a day, a coalition of Arab states launched an offensive, sparking a relatively brief armed conflict.[1] Further wars took place in the ensuing decades, culminating in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (sometimes known as the Yom Kippur War). Within weeks, the UN Security Council mediated a ceasefire and deployed United Nations Emergency Force II to separate Israeli forces from their Egyptian counterparts along the Suez Canal, stabilising the situation on that front.[2] In March 1974, the US Government led a diplomatic initiative which culminated with the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces.[3] The UN moved to support the peace process, establishing the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the same day that the agreement was signed.[4] The 1,250 peacekeepers of the Force were tasked with verifying compliance with the terms of the ceasefire, particularly in the contested area of the Golan Heights. They were supported in this task by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), which had been operating in the region since 1948.[5]

After successfully facilitating the withdrawal of armed forces from the buffer zone, UNDOF mapped the frontlines and established the 80x10km Area of Separation. UN Observers monitor the Area and conduct regular inspections of armed forces near the border, sharing their findings with the Israeli and Syrian governments. UNDOF also serves to facilitate dialogue, ensuring that minor disputes are not escalated.[6] Between 1974 and 2012, UNDOF helped to ensure that there was not a single armed escalation in the Area of Separation. Since the current armed conflict in Syria began in 2011, the situation on the Syrian side of the Area has become highly volatile. A host of contributing states withdrew their troops from UNDOF, which verged on the brink of collapse until over 500 Fijian soldiers joined the Force in 2013.[7] Despite facing some serious challenges, such as attacks and kidnappings carried out by armed groups in Syria on peacekeepers, UNDOF remains in place, helping to prevent renewed interstate conflict between Israel and Syria.[8]

[1] Benny Morris. 1948. (Yale: Yale University Press, 2009)

[2] UN Peacekeeping. Middle East – UNEF II: Background. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unef2backgr1.html (Accessed 06/12/2020)

[3] Separation of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria, 1974. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/israelsyria-separationforces74 (Accessed 06/12/2020)

[4] UNDOF. Background. (UNDOF, 2020) Available at: https://undof.unmissions.org/background (Accessed 06/12/2020)

[5] United Nations. The Blue Helmets. p103

[6] Ibid. p.109

[7] UNDOF. A New Beginning: 40 years of peacekeeping, 1974 – 2014. (UNDOF, 2014) p.34

[8] BBC. “Golan Heights profile.” BBC News. (2019) Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14724842 (Accessed 06/12/2020)

Description of Case 

​After over three years of intense fighting, the Korean War came to an unofficial end on 27 July 1953 with the signing of the Agreement Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea. The Agreement stipulated the withdrawal of military forces from a demilitarised zone which was created as a buffer between North and South, dividing the peninsula in two. Although it ended the fighting and serves as the only legal instrument for the avoidance of renewed hostilities, the Agreement did not provide a resolution to the conflict. It did, however, establish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), an unarmed military observer mission, and the Military Armistice Committee (MAC), a ten-person committee of military personnel, to verify implementation and provide a mechanism for dialogue across the lines should the need arise.[1] Owing to the high levels of international involvement in the conflict, the NNSC was composed of four theoretically neutral nations selected by the belligerents: Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.[2] The MAC includes five representatives selected by the North and five from the South.

Between 1953 and 1956, hundreds of NNSC personnel verified compliance with the ceasefire and the demilitarised zone, monitored the rotation of units along the front line (passing such information to both sides as a confidence building measure), and inspected freight at ports of entry across the peninsula for arms shipments.[3] These activities helped to reduce tensions and lower the risk of armed conflict in the years immediately after the conflict. In 1956, inspection responsibilities were removed from the NNSC’s mandate, and the Commission was significantly reduced in size. Between 1953 and 1991, full meetings of the MAC were convened 459 times, while thousands more occurred among the lower ranks. These regular meetings helped to maintain dialogue between the belligerents and served as a mechanism for disputes to be discussed and resolved peacefully.[4] The transition of Czechoslovakia and Poland from communism at the end of the Cold War led North Korea to dismiss them as its representatives on the NNSC, forcing it to suspend most of its activities in February 1995. A small team has remained to gather and exchange intelligence, while meetings are occasionally held between the NNSC states.[5] The MAC continues to operate.

[1] Agreement Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea, 1953. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/koreadprk-militaryarmistice53 (Accessed 03/12/2020)

[2] Marek Hańderek. Documents Concerning the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. (North Korean Archives Project, 2020) Available at: https://northkoreanarchives.org/2018/12/05/documents-concerning-the-neutral-nations-supervisory-commission-in-korea-in-the-archive-of-the-institute-of-national-remembrance/# (Accessed 03/12/2020)

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ray Smith. Peacekeeping Without the Secretary-General: The Korean Armistice Arrangements. (Thesis presented in partial completion of the requirements of The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations, 2015) p.12

[5] Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. “2019 Joint Statement by Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission Member State.” Regeringskansliet. (2019) Available at: https://www.regeringen.se/uttalanden/2019/03/2019-joint-statement-by-neutral-nations-supervisory-commission-member-states/ (Accessed 03/12/2020)

Description of Case 

Although the Second Congo War was already one of the largest in history, the extent of foreign involvement and the frequency of direct confrontations between the armed forces of at least ten different states posed a major risk of inciting a much broader conflict. Furthermore, the armed conflicts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Rwanda that took place in the 1990s had created an extremely uncertain political and socio-economic climate (marked by the displacement of sizeable populations and the preponderance of armed groups in the area) in the Great Lakes which promised to continue destabilising the entire region. As a result, the UN Security Council called for an international conference on peace, security, democracy, and development in the Great Lakes region in 2000, as efforts to end the armed conflict in DRC began to gain some momentum. Later that year, the African Union (AU) and UN established a permanent secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya, to lay the groundwork for the conference. In 2004, a year after the Sun City Agreement ended the Second Congo War, the ICGLR hosted its first summit in Dar Es-Salaam, Tanzania. The talks culminated with the governments of Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia unanimously adopting the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration, which called for the transformation of the Great Lakes into a space of sustainable peace and democracy, on 20 November 2004.[1] In 2006, at the second ICGLR summit, representatives of the 11 member states signed the Pact on Security, Stability, and Development which, among other things, included a commitment to renounce the threat or use of force and resolve any disputes by peaceful means.[2]

With these provisions in place, the ICGLR Executive Secretariat was established in May 2007 and tasked with coordinating, facilitating, and monitoring the implementation of the agreements. Twice a year, the Secretariat hosts meetings of the Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee to discuss peace and security in the region. In addition, the leaders of each member state attend an ICGLR summit every two years and mechanisms are in place for extraordinary summits to held in emergencies to avert any crises.[3] These efforts coincided with a US initiative to improve relations and strengthen links between the armed forces of Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda with the goal of reducing cross-border militancy in the region.[4] Instability and armed conflict continue to plague the Great Lakes, but the prospect of interstate conflict has been greatly reduced by the ongoing work of the ICGLR.

[1] Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region, 2004. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/greatlakes-daressalaam-declaration2004 (Accessed 05/01/2022)

[2] Protocol of Non-agression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region, 2006. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/greatlakes-nonagression2006 (Accessed 05/01/2022)

[3] International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. ICGLR Overview: Who We Are. (ICGLR, 2021) Available at: https://www.icglr.org/index.php/en/background (Accessed 05/01/2022)

[4] Oxford Analytica. “Cross-Border Militancy Threatens Great Lakes.” Reliefweb. (4 September 2007) Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/cross-border-militancy-threatens-great-lakes-4-sept-2007 (Accessed 05/01/2022)

Description of Case 

The 110km border between Djibouti and Eritrea was ill-defined in the colonial treaties between France and Italy that established the territory of each state. When Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in the early 1990s, consolidating the country’s borders became a priority for the new administration. Djibouti and Eritrea almost went to war in 1996 over a territorial dispute, and relations worsened further during the 1998 – 2000 War between Eritrea and Ethiopia.[1] In February 2008, the Eritrean military began building up its forces along the disputed border and fortifying positions. The Djiboutian armed forces responded in kind, while the Government of France dispatched reinforcements to bases already established in Djibouti in support of the government there.[2] Tensions rose even further when the Government of Ethiopia pledged to use any means necessary to maintain its access to the Port of Djibouti.[3] In June, the desertion of some Eritrean soldiers, frequent skirmishing, and the destruction of an Eritrean gunboat marked further escalations of the conflict.[4] Thus, the dispute over a relatively minor peace of territory stood ready to spark an armed conflict between the huge Eritrean military and the Djiboutian armed forces (backed by France), with the Government of Ethiopia seemingly ready to join the fray.

Faced with a growing crisis, the Arab League dispatched a fact-finding mission in May 2008. The Government of Eritrea refused to cooperate, rejecting African Union and UN delegations in June as well.[5] The situation remained deadlocked for the rest of the year, prompting the UN Security Council to demand that the Eritrean military withdraw its forces from the disputed area in January 2009. Ongoing Eritrean recalcitrance kept tensions high until, in June 2010, the Government of Qatar succeeded in facilitating and mediating talks between the belligerents after prolonged shuttle diplomacy.[6] The talks concluded with the signing of an agreement which ended the conflict and established the Government of Qatar as the formal arbiter of the territorial dispute.[7] A boundary commission, led by the Qatari prime minister, was mandated to investigate and issue a verdict while 700 Qatari peacekeepers monitored compliance with the ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops from the disputed area.[8] The efforts of the Government of Qatar succeeded in preventing an interstate conflict and calmed a tense situation which threatened regional stability.

[1] UCDP. Djibouti – Eritrea. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/902 (Accessed 07/12/2020)

[2] Kevin Frank. “Ripeness and the 2008 Djibouti-Eritrea Border Dispute.” Northeast African Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1. (2015) pp.122-4

[3] Berouk Mesfin. “The Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute.” Institute for Security Studies Situation Report. (2008) p.7

[4] UCDP. Djibouti – Eritrea.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Frank. “Ripeness and the 2008 Djibouti-Eritrea Border Dispute.” pp.125-6

[7] Agreement between the State of Eritrea and the Republic of Djibouti, 2011. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/djiboutieritrea-agreement2010 (Accessed 07/12/2020)

[8] Somalilandpress. “Qatar to deploy troops to Djibouti and Eritrea.” Defence Web. (2010) Available at: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/logistics/qatar-to-deploy-troops-to-djibouti-and-eritrea/ (Accessed 07/12/2020)

Description of Case 

The dispute between the governments of Guatemala and Belize stemmed from opposing interpretations of an 1859 treaty signed by the Guatemalan administration and the UK, in which Guatemala recognised the sovereignty of British Honduras (as Belize was formerly known). In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Government of Guatemala argued that the British had reneged on certain clauses of the treaty, making it invalid, and therefore British Honduras was in fact a province of Guatemala.[1] Tensions flared many times in the ensuing decades, most notably in 1982, when Argentina and the UK went to war following the occupation of the Falkland Islands. In 1991, Guatemala formally recognised Belize and the two states established diplomatic relations. Three years later, British forces left Belize after a lengthy operation to protect the sovereignty of its former colony.[2] Seemingly resolved, the dispute escalated again in 1999 when the Government of Guatemala made fresh claims, based on historic treaties, on approximately half of Belizean territory. Hundreds of Guatemalan troops were deployed along the contested border, leading to several armed clashes between the armed forces of each state which brought them to the verge of war.[3]

In March 2000, the Organisation of American States (OAS) hosted representatives from Belize and Guatemala for negotiations in Washington, DC. In November, both sides signed the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures, which included the establishment of an “Adjacency Zone” which would separate the armed forces of each state by 2km.[4] In 2003, the Guatemalan and Belizean foreign ministers signed the Agreement to Establish a Transition Process and Confidence-Building Measures.[5] One such measure was the deployment of an OAS Office in the Adjacency Zone to oversee the implementation of confidence-building measures, monitor activities in the Zone, and facilitate dialogue.[6] In addition, a “Group of Friends” consisting of significant regional and international governments was formed to support the OAS effort to prevent an armed conflict. These mechanisms served to calm the immediate crisis and prevent a war. On 8 December 2008, both governments agreed to settle the dispute at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) should the populations of both states approve such a course in referenda. Despite some minor clashes, war was prevented, the border has remained peaceful since the OAS diplomatic intervention in 2000, and both populations approved taking the dispute to the ICJ in referenda held in 2018-2019.[7]

[1] P.K. Menon. “The Anglo-Guatemalan Territorial Dispute over the Colony of Belize (British Honduras).” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2. (1979)

[2] Ash Rossiter. “Getting out of Belize: Britain’s Intractable Military Exit from Central America.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 46, No. 4. (2018)

[3] Krista E. Wiegand. “Nationalist Discourse and Dmoestic Incentives to Prevent Settlement of the Territorial Dispute Between Guatemala and Belize.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 11, No. 3. (2005) p.374

[4] Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures between Belize and Guatemala, 2000. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/belizeguatemalaCBMs2000 (Accessed 29/11/2020)  

[5] OAS. Belize and Guatemala Process: 2000-Present. (OAS, 2019) Available at: http://www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/belizeandguatemala/ (Accessed 05/11/2020)  

[6] OAS Peace Fund. OAS Office in the Adjacency Zone. (OAS, 2009) Available at: http://www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/belizeandguatemala/AdjacencyZone.html (Accessed 05/11/2020)

[7] AP. “Guatemalan troops mass near Belize border after shooting incident.” The Guardian. (2016) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/22/guatemalan-troops-mass-belize-border-shooting-incident (Accessed 05/11/2020); OAS. Belize and Guatemala Process.