Better Evidence Project

Description of Case 

In 1974, the government of newly independent Guinea-Bissau sought to confirm their international borders to facilitate trade and economic development. Like in most African states, these were inherited from the former colonial power – in this case, Portugal. A point of contention emerged with neighbouring Senegal concerning potentially rich offshore resources. This was compounded by alleged Bissau-Guinean support for armed opposition groups in the Senegalese region of Casamance, which is located directly across the border. Bilateral negotiations over the border began in 1977 but were ultimately fruitless, leading the Senegalese and Bissau-Guinean governments to refer the case to an independent arbitration tribunal in 1985.[1] When the findings of the tribunal were rejected by the Government of Guinea-Bissau in 1989, the case was referred to the ICJ. In April 1990, while the case was being assessed in The Hague, Senegalese troops and military aircraft were spotted operating in Bissau-Guinean territory. The following month, Bissau-Guinean forces clashed with Senegalese troops, leaving 17 soldiers dead.[2] With the dispute becoming increasingly militarised and armed forces lining up against each other along the border, the prospect of an interstate conflict was significant.

Fearing that the crisis could rapidly escalate into a major war, the Government of France invited ministers from both states to Paris for emergency talks on 23 May 1990.[3] This meeting served to immediately defuse tensions, and the following day Guinea-Bissau and Senegal withdrew their armed forces from their mutual border to minimise the risk of future clashes. On 12 November 1991, the ICJ issued its judgement on the dispute, dismissing Guinea-Bissau’s appeal and affirming Senegal’s sovereignty over the disputed maritime territory. This time, the findings were accepted by both parties. Since the settlement, bilateral ties have improved and the states now cooperate in several fields, including the development of maritime resources. While the land border remains a cause of tension given relatively frequent incursions by Senegalese forces pursuing militants from Casamance (including in 2000 and 2009), improved ties between the two governments and the mechanisms established to resolve the maritime boundary dispute (such as a joint border commission) have prevented any major escalation.[4]

[1] Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood. “The Guinea-Bissau – Senegal maritime boundary dispute” Marine Policy, Vol. 61, No. 1. (2015) p.286

[2] AP News. “Senegal, Guinea Bissau Agree to Pull Back Troops in Dispute.” AP News. (24 May 1990) Available at: https://apnews.com/article/b54afe1f80c0bc585c51ea797e43a16b (Accessed 25/10/2021)

[3] UK Parliament. “Senegal/Guinea Bissau Dispute.” Hansard: House of Lords, Vol. 520. (1990) Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1990-06-12/debates/d1bccdba-220f-4376-bfcf-d1f876f4635a/SenegalGuineaBissauDispute (Accessed 25/10/2021)

[4] Reuters Staff. “Senegal, Bissau deny border dispute.” Reuters. (24 October 2009) Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-bissau-senegal-border-idAFJOE59N02U20091024 (Accessed 25/10/2021)

Description of Case 

The border between Burundi and Tanzania has represented a source of conflict for decades, with hundreds of thousands of Burundian refugees crossing into Tanzania during periods of unrest and rebel forces using Tanzanian territory to stage attacks on the Burundian administration.[1] In 1997, the armed forces of each state engaged each other along the frontier in a series of clashes that cost the lives of dozens of people.[2] The announcement that President Pierre Nkurunziza would run for an unconstitutional third term in 2015 sparked unrest across Burundi, driving over 400,000 people from their homes, half of whom fled across the border to Tanzania.[3] The persistence and sheer scale of cross-border displacement represents a source of contention between the governments of each state and has a profound impact on the livelihoods of the population living near the border.[4] A key concern highlighted by the UN was the potential for refugees returning to Burundi to ‘risk aggravating existing tensions and causing renewed violence in a country where the rule of law and the judicial system are considerably weakened,’ particularly when much of the land in Burundi is contested.[5]

Recognising the potential for conflict, the UN Peacebuilding Fund developed a project to build peace and stability in the area in 2017. Based on input from UN Development Programme, the International Organisation for Migration, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and the UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes, the project aimed to mitigate conflict and instability associated with forced displacement and provide protection for displaced persons.[6] The focus of the project was to build the capacity of border officials from both states in areas such as protective border management and human rights. In addition, joint trainings were carried out with officials from both states to improve cooperation. The project also worked with displaced persons, returnees, and host communities to ensure socio-economic opportunities were available for all, and embedded conflict resolution mechanisms (alternative dispute resolution, paralegal, mediation, counselling, and referral services) to ensure disputes within and between the communities remained peaceful.[7] An independent evaluation found the conflict prevention aspects of the project to be the most successful and recommends its expansion.[8]

[1] Howard Wolpe. “Making Peace After Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process.” Peaceworks, No. 70. (2011) p.21

[2] Moyiga Nduru. “BURUNDI-TANZANIA: Border Clash.” Inter Press Service. (1997) Available at: http://www.ipsnews.net/1997/10/burundi-tanzania-border-clash/ (Accessed 24/11/2020)

[3] Christian Bugnion de Moreta. Final Independent Evaluation of the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) project entitled: Preventing conflict and building peace through addressing the drivers of conflict and instability associated with forced displacement between Burundi and Tanzania. (UNDP, 2019) p.10

[4] Jaclynn Ashly. “Burundian refugees fear a hostile Tanzania.” New Frame. (2020) Available at: https://www.newframe.com/burundian-refugees-fear-a-hostile-tanzania/ (Accessed 24/11/2020)

[5] UN Peacebuilding Support Office. Preventing conflict and building peace through addressing the drivers of conflict and instability associated with forced displacement between Burundi and Tanzania. (UN, 2018) Available at: https://open.undp.org/projects/00109331 (Accessed 24/11/2020)

[6] UNDP. Preventing Conflict And Building Peace. (UNDP, 2020) Available at: https://open.undp.org/projects/00109331 (Accessed 24/11/2020)

[7] UN Peacebuilding Support Office. Preventing conflict and building peace through addressing the drivers of conflict and instability associated with forced displacement between Burundi and Tanzania. pp.46-7

[8] Christian Bugnion de Moreta. Final Independent Evaluation of the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) project entitled: Preventing conflict and building peace through addressing the drivers of conflict and instability associated with forced displacement between Burundi and Tanzania. p.32

Description of Case 

The eruption of renewed armed conflict in Mali in 2012, the subsequent collapse of state authority over parts of the country, and the preponderance of small arms in the region led to the emergence of a broad spectrum of armed groups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Some were radical Islamic groups with ties to international networks, some were the various predominantly Tuareg factions of the Azawad independence movement, while others still were local self-defence militias established by communities at risk.[1] In the context of pervasive instability, many of these armed groups made use of the porous and unsecured borders to their advantage. Radical Islamic groups, for example, used rear bases in territory they controlled in Mali to launch attacks against the Nigerien armed forces. In response, desperate politicians have armed and empowered a growing number of militia groups, who in turn often develop predatory behaviour, preying on local populations and employing violence to extract benefits from the government.[2] This cycle left local communities mired in violence, hindered the delivery of basic services, and placed increasing pressure on resources in this frontier region. Although the national governments of all three states currently coordinate their efforts and enjoy good relations, the sheer scale of cross-border violence poses a constant risk of an incident triggering a severe diplomatic incident, or even an interstate conflict should the administration of one state or another change significantly.

Recognising the risks that pervasive border instability represented, the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger invited the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) to help them reduce conflict and tension in the region on the border of the three countries in 2017. The following year, HD put in motion a tripartite mediation process involving armed groups that had not yet signed up to the ongoing national peace process embodied in the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (excluding radical Islamic groups), along with representatives from their communities of origin and officials from their respective states.[3] These efforts resulted in the signing of five peace agreements between communities in the area in 2018 and 2019, reducing the incidence of armed conflict in the area. In addition, HD continues to work with the state institutions of the three countries to ensure their conflict management efforts are harmonised and as effective as they can be.[4] The Government of France has dispersed over £55 million in emergency funds as part of the “Three Borders” project, which represents a concerted effort to improve access to water and other resources in the region.[5] Although Mali continues to face armed conflict, these efforts have helped to stabilise the frontier region between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

[1] UCDP. Mali. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/country/432 (Accessed 27/01/2022)

[2] International Crisis Group. “The Niger-Mali Border: Subordinating Military Action to a Political Strategy.” ICG Report, No. 261. (2018) Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/261-frontiere-niger-mali-mettre-loutil-militaire-au-service-dune-approche-politique (Accessed 27/01/2022)

[3] Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. “Mediation in the border regions of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.” Activities. (HD, 2022) Available at: https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/mediation-in-the-border-regions-of-mali-burkina-faso-and-niger/ (Accessed 27/01/2022)

[4] Ibid.

[5] Agence Française de Développement. Emergency Development Programme: “Three Borders” Project in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. (Paris: AFD, 2019) pp.1-2

Description of Case 

The Ethiopian-Kenyan frontier is a sparsely populated and remote region, historically home to a mix of nomadic pastoralist populations (such as the Turkana and Dassenach) for whom the international border traditionally meant little. This ambiguity made the region a strategically important location for troops of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) as they conducted their insurgency against Ethiopian security forces. This led to multiple clashes inside Kenyan territory, including incidents that led to the deaths of Kenyan civilians.[1] This pattern of violence took place alongside ongoing low-intensity conflicts between the local population over livestock, pasture, and water. Over 100 people were killed in such disputes between 2002 and 2004. Further clashes took place in 2010 and 2011, with a particularly bad clash taking place on 1 May 2011 when around 30 Turkana from Kenya were killed by some Dassenach after entering Ethiopia to trade at a market.[2] This led to retaliatory attacks, and people who happened to be on the wrong side of the border (around 70 in total) were taken hostage by both communities.[3] The crisis posed a major threat of escalating into a major conflict between the two peoples and threatened to sour bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Kenya, while the pervasive instability in the frontier region represented a constant source of low-intensity armed conflict.

The 2011 crisis was defused by local government and civil society organisations on both sides of the border. Ethiopian militia and police escorted the Turkana still in the country back to Kenya, local peace committees and NGOs organised a forum for dialogue between the two groups, and the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) units of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development within each country organised a conference with local stakeholders on the incident.[4] This calmed the immediate situation while bilateral ministerial meetings and CEWARN initiatives worked to develop a lasting solution to the instability along the frontier. This resulted in the creation of a bilateral cross-border programme aimed at strengthening local capacity to prevent conflict and promote sustainable peace. In practical terms, these measures established peace committees including members from both communities, strengthened capacity of local administrations, and increased border patrols. In 2018, the EU and UN began supporting the initiative.[5] When the area was hit by devastating floods in 2020, the two communities negotiated a resource-sharing agreement through the mechanism of the peace committees rather than engage in violent competition for resources, as they had when facing previous crises.[6]

[1] BBC. “The Somali connection.” BBC News. (23 July 1999) Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1999/07/99/battle_in_the_horn/399898.stm (Accessed 18/11/2021)

[2] Alex Thurston. “Turkana-Merille Fighting: A Deadly Cycle in Kenya and Ethiopia.” Sahel Blog. (6 May 2011) Available at: https://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2011/05/06/turkana-merille-fighting-a-deadly-cycle-in-kenya-and-ethiopia/ (Accessed 18/11/2021)

[3] Fromothermedia. “Ethio-Kenyan border: Turkana, Dassenech/Merille Fighting.” Horn Affairs. (15 May 2011) Available at: https://hornaffairs.com/2011/05/15/ethio-kenyan-border-turkana-dassenechmerille-fighting/ (Accessed 18/11/2021)

[4] Ibid.

[5] UNDP Kenya. “Cross-Border Cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in the Marsabit-Moyale Cluster.” UNDP Kenya Projects. (UN, 2021) Available at: https://www.ke.undp.org/content/kenya/en/home/projects/cross-border-cooperation-between-ethiopia-and-kenya-for-conflict.html (Accessed 18/11/2021)

[6] Pact. “‘We have to feel our neighbors’ pain’: On the Kenya-Ethiopia border, feuding groups unite after crisis.” Pactworld Features. (23 November 2020) Available at: https://www.pactworld.org/features/%E2%80%98we-have-feel-our-neighbors%E2%80%99-pain%E2%80%99-kenya-ethiopia-border-feuding-groups-unite-after-crisis (Accessed 18/11/2021)

Description of Case 

In November 2010, after the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire had subsided for several years, the country witnessed an eruption of conflict following a contested presidential election. By April 2011, over 150,000 refugees had crossed over the border into Liberia, which itself was recovering from the terrible conflict that had ended there less than a decade before.[1] This placed great strain on local Liberian communities, particularly regarding food security. With both states weakened by war, displaced populations sheltering in the borderlands, and the proliferation of small arms across the region, it was not long until armed groups (many of which formed from demobilised soldiers from the wars on both sides of the border) began emerging to take advantage of the situation. Beginning in July 2011, towns on either side of the border were looted and the armed groups fought amongst themselves over control of gold and diamond mines in the area.[2] In one such outbreak of violence in June 2012, seven Nigerian peacekeepers and a dozen civilians were killed.[3] These clashes not only significantly worsened the plight of both the local and refugee populations, but also presented a major risk of breeding another powerful armed opposition group from displaced individuals (as had happened in so many unstable borderlands in West Africa) or even sparking clashes between Liberian and Ivorian security personnel as they sought to establish authority in the area.

The UN peacekeeping missions in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia (the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire and the United Nations Mission in Liberia, respectively) played a vital role in offering security to the local population after 2011, although they could not prevent the raids entirely. With the withdrawal of both missions scheduled for June 2016, the governments of Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia held bilateral talks alongside a joint council of traditional elders from both countries in January of that year to address the issues on the border. Supported by various UN agencies, representatives from each state developed a joint approach to bringing stability to the area. This ranged from establishing more official crossing points and building infrastructure to manage the border to creating a shared technical committee and beginning joint security patrols.[4] This sustained effort demonstrably reduced armed conflict on the Côte d’Ivoire-Liberia border and strengthened ties between the two neighbouring states.[5] When a group of armed Liberians attacked a military base in Côte d’Ivoire in April 2021, both governments pledged to investigate the incident together and cooperate to maintain stability in the region in the face of such attacks.[6]

[1] Cecile Barriere & Patricia Gray. Cross Border Assessment between Liberia and Côte D’Ivoire: January and February 2012. (UNDP, 2012) p.1

[2] Ibid. p.2

[3] Conciliation Resources. Peace and security along the Ivorian-Liberian border: The local perspective. (London, 2014) p.4

[4] Raymond Onana. Cross-Border Cooperation Project Between Cote D’Ivoire and Liberia for Sustainable Peace and Social Cohesion. (UN Peacebuilding Fund, 2019) p.13

[5] Ibid. p.5

[6] Editorial Board. “Averting Regional Rebel Resurgence: A Must For Liberia, Ivory Coast.” Front Page Africa. (3 May 2021) Available at: https://frontpageafricaonline.com/front-slider/averting-regional-rebel-resurgence-a-must-for-liberia-ivory-coast/ (Accessed 5/11/2021)

Description of Case 

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) compromises eight states spanning the Nile Valley, African Great Lakes, and the Horn of Africa. Recognising the progress that was being made towards peace in the region and resolving to consolidate it, a 2000 IGAD summit culminated with a declaration which, among other things, established the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN).[1] With a secretariat based in Addis Ababa, CEWARN is a network of analysts, coordinators, and field monitors who synthesise extensive data collection and analysis with a custom-made analytical software tool. Much of its work is carried out in partnership with government agencies and civil society organisations. Once processed, its findings and recommendations are shared with relevant actors such as the governments of IGAD member states and the African Union Continental Early Warning System.[2] The establishment of CEWARN represents a major investment (supported by the EU, USAID, and several national governments) in early warning and early response to prevent violent conflict, one which has continued to grow and develop significantly over time.[3]

After first becoming operational in 2002, CEWARN focused on monitoring pastoral conflicts along the Kenya-Uganda and Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia borders.[4]  Its operations were credited with contributing to a significant reduction of armed conflict in those areas, such as in 2007 when a CEWARN Field Monitor successfully prevented 100 Pokot warriors in Kenya from launching a cross-border attack on Ugandan security forces.[5] In September 2012, the CEWARN Strategy Framework 2012-2019 was launched in Uganda, heralding a significant increase in the scope of the Mechanism’s operations.[6] These included employing its methodologies and tools to identify a much wider range of conflicts over a larger geographical area. New technological capabilities were added to CEWARN’s arsenal, including SMS-based field observation reports, crowd-sourced data, and geographic information mapping systems.[7] By 2016, CEWARN had established conflict response units and situation rooms in every IGAD member state and commanded the resources of a Rapid Response Fund to support communal peace dialogue and finance solutions to the underlying causes of conflicts, such as developing water access for pastoralists who were clashing over a limited supply.[8] CEWARN has contributed to a significant reduction in armed conflict in the Horn of Africa and represents an effective method of reducing violence.

[1] Khartoum Declaration, 2000. Available at: https://www.cewarn.org/index.php/about-cewarn (Accessed 03/12/2020)

[2] Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism. About CEWARN. (CEWARN, 2020) Available at: https://www.cewarn.org/index.php/about-cewarn (Accessed 03/12/2020)

[3] Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism. Home. (CEWARN, 2020) Available at: https://www.cewarn.org/index.php (Accessed 03/12/2020)

[4] Ibid.

[5] David Nyheim. Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse: The Future of Conflict Early Warning and Response. (OECD, 2009) p.76

[6] Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism. Brochure. (CEWARN, 2019) p.10 Available at: https://www.cewarn.org/index.php/about-cewarn (Accessed 03/12/2020)

[7] Ibid. p.14

[8] IGAD. “IGAD commemorates International Peace Day highlighting on its role in promoting peace and security for sustainable development in the region.” Articles. (2016) Available at: https://www.igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1345:djibouti-ethiopia-and-somalia-identified-priority-areas-and-develop-draft-binding-agreements-on-animal-health-and-livestock-trade-&catid=95:icpald (Accessed 03/12/2020)

Description of Case 

In January 1991 the President of Somalia fled the country in the face of widespread rebellion. In his absence, rival armed groups competed for dominance and much of southern Somalia, along with the capital, Mogadishu, descended into armed conflict.[1] Faced with the prospect of state collapse and increasing levels of violence, leaders from across north-west Somalia gathered in the city of Berbera for to attend a traditional form of inter-clan conference to develop a response. The talks in Berbera culminated with the resolution that all clans should restrain their respective militias and aim to end the cycle of violence that was plaguing the region.[2] In May 1991, an even larger event, the Grand Conference of the Northern Peoples, was convened in Burao to consolidate the peace and discuss the future of the region. On 18 May 1991, the gathered leaders announced the withdrawal of Somaliland from Somalia and formed an interim government.[3]

In the first months of 1993, more than 2,000 people gathered in Borama for the Conference of Elders of the Communities of Somaliland. At the Conference, which culminated in May 1993, a council of elders known as a Guurti developed two key documents, the Somaliland Peace Charter and the Transitional National Charter.[4] The former outlined the terms for a comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration programme encompassing the militias in Somaliland, while the latter established the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Government of Somaliland.[5] Peace talks continued until 1997, when a final peace conference was held in Hargeisa. More militias agreed to disarm at the event and an interim constitution was adopted, a roadmap to multi-party elections was agreed, and a national flag for Somaliland was adopted by the gathered representatives.[6] This marked the beginning of a succession of relatively free, fair, and peaceful elections. In 2001, amidst a backdrop of increasing security and growing prosperity, 98 percent of voters approved a new constitution (and with it, formal independence) for Somaliland.[7] A key aspect of the success of the peace process in Somaliland was the use of traditional methods and local resources.[8] Disputes were settled via an unwritten code known as Xeer, while traditional forms of ‘pastoral democracy’ were employed via the traditional conferences to find consensus among the various clan interests and political agendas.[9] Through their efforts, the people of Somaliland were able to end armed conflicts, consolidate peace, and build stability in a region mired in violence.

[1] T. A. Ridout. “Building Peace and the State in Somaliland: The Factors of Success.” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, Vol. 3, No. 2. (2012) p.141

[2] Academy for Peace and Development. Peace in Somaliland: An Indigenous Approach to State-Building. (Interpeace, 2008) p.12

[3] Ridout. “Building Peace and the State in Somaliland.” p.143

[4] Republic of Somaliland. The National Charter: Preamble. (Republic of Somaliland, 1993) Available at: https://www.govsomaliland.org/article/preamble (Accessed 16/01/2022)

[5] Africa Research Institute. “After Borama: Consensus, representation and parliament in Somaliland.” Policy Voice Series. (2013) pp.8-9

[6] Ridout. “Building Peace and the State in Somaliland.” p.146

[7] Ibid. p.149

[8] Ahmed Farah & Ioan Lewis. “Making Peace in Somaliland.” Cahiers d d’Études Africaines, Vol. 146. (1997)

[9] Academy for Peace and Development. Peace in Somaliland. p.13

Description of Case 

Plateau State is located in central Nigeria, in the “Middle Belt” of the country which divides the majority Muslim north with the predominantly Christian south. These divisions have occasionally been the cause of conflict when translated into the political arena (such as during the electoral violence that followed the 2011 presidential elections), but it is periodical competition for resources between farmers and pastoralists, and the historic grievances associated with such competition, that drove an ongoing low-intensity conflict between communities in southern Plateau State, focused in the local government areas of Langtang North, Langtang South, Mikang, Shendam, Qua’an-Pan, and Wase. These districts, richly endowed in land and natural resources, attract significant numbers of pastoralist groups not just from southern Plateau State, but also from neighbouring states such as Nassarawa, Taraba, and Bauchi in times of conflict, political upheaval, or drought.[1] Eight investigations were carried out on the violence in southern Plateau State between 2001 and 2006, and in 2010 the Nigerian military launched Operation Safe Haven in an effort to reduce armed conflict across the area. These efforts did bring relative stability to some areas, such as Jos, the largest city in the state, but failed to end armed conflict in Plateau State.

Following its successes in Kaduna and another part of Plateau State, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) facilitated a lengthy inter-communal dialogue process between 56 communities from the affected areas of Langtang North, Langtang South, Mikang, Shendam, Qua’an-Pan, and Wase.[2] Each community contributed six delegates (representing a development/cultural association, traditional council, youth, women, religion, and a prominent figure) to the process. These delegates then served in joint working groups facilitated by HD and attended by local, state, and federal government representatives. The dialogue culminated with the signing of the Southern Plateau Peace Declaration in December 2016 at a ceremony attended by the German and US ambassadors, traditional elders, and a range of public officials.[3] The wide range of communities signing up to the declaration committed to resolving any disputes between them peacefully and improving the security situation together. A monitoring committee formed from signatories to the declaration, the Plateau Peace Dialogue Forum, and the Plateau Peace Building Agency worked to ensure implementation and monitor adherence to its terms.[4] Although conflict and violence continue in parts of Plateau State, the low intensity conflicts between communities in the areas covered in the Peace Declaration have ended.

[1] The Southern Plateau Peace Declaration, 2016. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/lview/1958/Southern%20Plateau%20Peace%20Declaration (Accessed 27/01/1990)

[2] Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Nigeria. (HD, 2022) Available at: https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/jos-plateau-state-nigeria/ (Accessed 27/01/1990)

[3] Seriki Adinoyi. “US, German Envoys Superintend Peace Pact in 30 Plateau Communities.” This Day. (24 December 2016) Available at: https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/12/24/us-german-envoys-superintend-peace-pact-in-30-plateau-communities/ (Accessed 27/01/1990)

[4] Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Nigeria. (HD, 2022) Available at: https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/jos-plateau-state-nigeria/ (Accessed 27/01/1990)

Description of Case 

In 2012, another armed conflict erupted between armed groups in northern Mali and the administration in Bamako. This time, the predominantly Tuareg opposition forces coordinated themselves through the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad, MNLA) and sought complete independence from Mali. The MNLA rapidly wrested control of much of the north from the Malian armed forces. Citing the president’s poor handling of the crisis, senior officers in the military staged a coup d’état in March 2012, leading to further instability. The situation continued to worsen for government forces, and in April the MNLA proclaimed the formation of the Independent State of Azawad after driving all Government of Mali forces from region. Within months, the short-lived state of Azawad was overrun by militants of Ansar Dine and several other radical Islamic groups who had gained a foothold in the region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.[1] In this chaotic and uncertain context, intercommunal violence and low-intensity armed conflicts between social groups, either competing for resources or reigniting old grievances, became a prevalent and pervasive issue across Mali. Although the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement represents progress towards a peaceful solution to the war between the MNLA and the Malian government, implementation remains limited, radical Islamic groups still pose a major threat in the north, and low-intensity armed conflict continues to plague significant portions of country.[2]

In this context, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) has been operating in Mali (with a mandate from the Government of Mali beginning in 2011) in support of the national peace process and in an effort to reduce armed conflict in the regions of Kidal, Gao, Ménaka, Timbuktu, Taoudéni, Mopti, and Ségou. By working with local communities and other stakeholders affected by conflict along with the armed groups involved, HD has successfully mediated a series of peace agreements and continues to advise on the development of mechanisms to prevent conflict relapses, including local peace infrastructure such as monitoring commissions. These successes include a peace agreement between two Tuareg communities, the Dawsahak and Imajgan, another between the Idourfane and Ibogolitane communities from the regions of Gao and Ménaka, another accord between farmers and pastoralists in the municipality of Djenné, and a fourth agreement between the Dogon and Fulani communities Mopti – all of which were signed in 2018.[3] The following year, HD mediated the negotiation of a humanitarian agreement in Djenné between Bambara and Bozo farmers, Fulani pastorialists, and an armed group that had emerged from the hunting community in the area.[4] These efforts have demonstrably reduced armed conflict in Mali.

[1] UCDP. Mali: Azawad. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/372 (Accessed 27/01/2022)

[2] Mathieu Pellerin. “Mali’s Algiers Peace Agreement, Five Years On: An Uneasy Calm.” International Crisis Group Q&A. (2020) Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/laccord-dalger-cinq-ans-apres-un-calme-precaire-dont-il-ne-faut-pas-se-satisfaire (Accessed 27/01/2022)

[3] Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. “Mediation and support for the peace process in Mali.” Activities. (HD, 2022) Available at: https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/mediation-in-northern-and-central-mali/ (Accessed 27/01/2022); Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. “Two rival Tuareg communities from Mali sign a cessation of hostilities agreement.” Updates. (HD, 2022) Available at: https://www.hdcentre.org/updates/two-rival-tuareg-communities-from-mali-sign-a-cessation-of-hostilities-agreement/ (Accessed 27/01/2022); Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. “Central Mali: The Dan Nan Ambassagou Armed Group Declares a Unilateral Ceasefire.” Updates. (HD, 2022) Available at: https://www.hdcentre.org/updates/central-mali-the-dan-nan-ambassagou-armed-group-declares-a-unilateral-ceasefire/ (Accessed 27/01/2022)

[4] Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. “Signing of a humanitarian agreement between farmer and herder communities as well as hunters from the area of Djenné in Mali.” Updates. (HD, 2022) Available at: https://www.hdcentre.org/updates/signing-of-a-humanitarian-agreement-between-farmer-and-herder-communities-as-well-as-hunters-from-the-area-of-djenne-in-mali/ (Accessed 27/01/2022)

Description of Case 

Located in the Northeast of India on the border of Myanmar, the state of Manipur is one of the most diverse in the country. The Meitei people make up around half of the population of the state, while the rest is composed of an array of relatively small communities, most of whom speak Sino-Tibetan languages. This unique polity enjoyed a high degree of self-determination for much of its history, including under British rule. However, upon integration with the Indian Union in 1949, Manipur was placed under the jurisdiction of the governing administration of Assam. In 1964, armed groups committed to Manipuri independence began launching insurgencies against Indian security forces.[1] The location of Manipur (at the crossroads of ongoing armed conflicts in Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram, and Myanmar) and the presence of groups who advocated union with neighbouring territories (such as Naga seeking the creation of a “greater Nagaland”) combined to make the state particularly unstable.[2] Throughout the 1970s, more armed groups emerged in Manipur, with the most powerful being composed primarily of Meitei people and advocating complete independence for the state. These groups included the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), and the People’s Liberation Army of Manipur (PLAM).[3] After being brought to the verge of defeat during Indian military operations during the 1980s, these groups were back in action during the early 1990s, thanks in part to alliances that were forged with other armed groups in the Northeast and Myanmar. Since then, dozens more armed groups pursuing a variety of objectives have emerged.

The Government of India attempted to bring the main opposition groups to the negotiating table in 1996, 1998, and 2001 to no avail. However, in 2005, several groups agreed to a Suspension of Operations Agreement with the Indian army and three years later formalised this accord with civilian authorities. Over 30 separate armed groups have since joined this peace process, although little headway has been made in finding a resolution to the conflict.[4] In the context of ongoing setbacks on the battlefield and the loss of rear bases in neighbouring states, many of the original armed groups such as the PLAM have ceased to operate. Coupled with the various ceasefires, which have been renewed annually since 2008, this has reduced the level of armed conflict in Manipur. A resolution to the pervasive conflict in the state hinges in many ways on developments in the peace process in neighbouring Nagaland, which has recently showed signs of promise. 

[1] UCDP. India: Manipur. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/347 (Accessed 11/01/2022)

[2] Swarna Rajagopalan. “Peace Accords in Northeast India: Journey over Milestones.” East-West Center Policy Studies, No. 46. (2008) p.33

[3] E.N. Rammohan. “The Insurgent Northeast.” in Sanjoy Hazarika & V.R. Raghavan, eds. Conflicts in the Northeast: Internal and External Effects. (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2011) p.104

[4] Chitra Ahanthem. “Peace Audit Northeast: The Road to Peace in Manipur.” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Special Report, No. 156. (2014) pp.5-6