Description of Case 

Slovenia was a constituent republic of socialist Yugoslavia from its creation during the Second World War. Faced with ongoing constitutional crises and, from 1989, the efforts of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević to centralise power in Yugoslavia, Slovenian leaders prepared for independence throughout 1990. Their efforts included amending the Slovenian constitution to declare the republic to be a sovereign state and placing Slovenian components of the Yugoslav armed forces under the command of the Slovenian administration, rather than the federal authorities in Belgrade.[1] In a December 1990 referendum, almost 90 percent of the electorate favoured independence. Six months later, on 25 June 1991, the Slovenian and Croatian parliaments announced the independence of their respective republics from Yugoslavia. The following day, the Yugoslav authorities dismissed the declarations as illegal and deployed the Yugoslav military to secure Slovenia’s 137 international border posts in a show of force intended to make the Slovenian leadership back down.[2] On 27 June 1991, the Slovenian armed forces began launching attacks on Yugoslav units across Slovenia.[3]

International efforts to contain the crisis began immediately. The European Community (EC), which had previously declared that it would not recognise unilateral declarations of independence from the republics of Yugoslavia, began mediating negotiations on 28 June, the day after the fighting began.[4] An initial agreement to halt the fighting and suspend Slovenia’s independence declaration until a negotiated settlement could be found was partially successful, however fighting continued across the republic. On 3 July 1991, Yugoslav forces withdrew to their barracks and the ceasefire finally came into force. Four days later, the EC hosted delegations from Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, and Yugoslavia on the Adriatic island of Brioni. The talks culminated with a Joint Declaration which ended the conflict in Slovenia and created a framework for the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from the area.[5] The Declaration also established the European Community Monitoring Mission, which arrived in Slovenia on 15 July to supervise the disengagement process and the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Slovenia.[6] Although the rest of the Yugoslavia was subjected to years of war, the armed conflict in Slovenia was over.

[1] Laura Silber & Allan Little. The Death of Yugoslavia. (London: Penguin, 1996) p.77

[2] Ian Traynor. “Military alert as Slovenia goes it alone.” The Guardian. (1991) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/1991/jun/26/eu.politics (Accessed 10/12/2020); James Gow. The Serbian Project and its Adversaries. (London: Hurst, 2003) p.146

[3] Silber & Little. The Death of Yugoslavia. p.158

[4] Ibid. p.159

[5] Joint Declaration of the EC Troica and the Parties directly concerned with the Yugoslav Crisis (Brioni Accord), 1991. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/croatia-slovenia-serbia-brioni91 (Accessed 10/12/2020)

[6] Government of Canada. European Community Monitoring Mission in the Former Yugoslavia (ECMM). (Government of Canada, 2018) Available at: https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operations/europe/bolster.html (Accessed 10/12/2020)

Description of Case 

Sierra Leone endured over a decade of armed conflict after the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched an armed rebellion against the government in 1991. The conflict left the country deeply divided, and in 1997, armed rebel groups captured the capital, Freetown.[1] In response, regional leaders deployed the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to retake the city, however the intervention met with little progress elsewhere in the country.[2] The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) hosted negotiations between the belligerents in Togo in 1999, culminating with the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord.[3] Among many stipulations, the agreement invited the United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to deploy to Sierra Leone to keep the peace and disarm combatants.

UNAMSIL troops were confronted with major challenges in Sierra Leone, not least because RUF forces largely ignored the cease-fire. The position of the UN peacekeepers became untenable as disarmament locations were attacked and hundreds of personnel were taken prisoner by the RUF.[4] The situation worsened when, in May 2000, the RUF began another major push for Freetown. In response, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan invited the British government (as the former colonial power in Sierra Leone) to intervene in support UNAMSIL.[5] After initial reconnaissance teams completed their assessments, a force of over 1,200 British troops (supported by many more at sea) entered Sierra Leone, first securing the airport before helping UNAMSIL to rescue its imprisoned or besieged personnel.[6] In August 2000, the UN Security Council declared the RUF to be the cause of continuing conflict and issued UNAMSIL with a mandate to directly support the Sierra Leonean government in their campaign against the organisation rather than attempt to keep the peace.[7] Alongside British and UNAMSIL troops, newly trained units from the Sierra Leonean Army were soon able to force the RUF to the negotiating table.[8] A ceasefire between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF was signed in November 2000, with an additional agreement between the Civil Defence Force (a pro-government paramilitary group) and the RUF being signed in May 2001.[9] Following an extensive Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration process throughout 2001, the war was formally declared over by the Government of Sierra Leone in early 2002. Approximately 70,000 people were killed in the conflict and a further 20,000 were mutilated.

[1] UCDP. Sierra Leone: Government. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/382 (Accessed 14/12/2020)

[2] Cyril Obi. “Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte D’Ivoire.” African Security, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2009) p.125

[3] Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF (Lomé Peace Agreement), 1997. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sierraleone-lome-agreement99 (Accessed 22/10/2020)

[4] ’Funmi Olonisakin. Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008) p.3

[5] Michael Ellison, Richard Norton-Taylor, & Ewen MacAskill. “UN see British forces as only hope.” The Guardian. (2000) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/may/12/sierraleone.unitednations1 (Accessed 22/10/2020)

[6] Lucy Scott. “A Success Story? The British Intervention in Sierra Leone Revisited.” Oxford Research Group Blog. (2017) Available at: https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/a-success-story-the-british-intervention-in-sierra-leone-revisited (Accessed 14/12/2020); Paul Williams. “Fighting For Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone.” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 22, No. 3. (2001)

[7] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1313. (2000) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1313 (Accessed 22/10/2020)

[8] Janine di Giovanni. “Sierra Leone, 2000: A Case History in Successful Interventionism.” The New York Review. (2019) Available at: https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/06/07/sierra-leone-2000-a-case-history-in-successful-interventionism/ (Accessed 22/10/2020)

[9] Agreement of Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities between the Sierra Leone Government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 2000. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sierraleone-cessationhostilitiesruf2000 (Accessed 14/12/2020); Communiqué on the Cessation of Hostilities between the Civil Defense Force (CDF) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 2001. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sierraleone-cessation-hostilities2001 (Accessed 14/12/2020)

Description of Case 

The Casamance region of Senegal was subjected to over three decades of armed conflict between the Senegalese military and the secessionist Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) after the latter launched an insurgency in 1982.[1] In 1991, some factions within the MFDC signed a ceasefire with the Government of Senegal, limiting the extent of the conflict. Many groups within the MFDC initially rejected the ceasefire, and although increasing numbers came to terms with the government in the ensuing years, the peace process was dealt a serious blow by the escalation of violence in 1995.[2] The fighting continued until a new peace process began in 2000. While this process, like its predecessors, failed to resolve the conflict, the intensity of the fighting was once again reduced. Indeed, a truce signed in 2004 ended the fighting altogether for a few years, but Casamance soon fell back into conflict.[3] In 2012, a new president was elected on a ticket of ending the conflict and bringing peace to Senegal, leading to another revival of the peace process.[4]

Beginning in October 2012, the most powerful factions within the MFDC met with officials from the Government of Senegal at a meeting hosted by the Community of Sant’Egidio in Rome.[5] In 2014, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue was invited by the Senegalese government to re-launch the peace process after talks had stalled the previous year.[6] These renewed efforts proved fruitful, and in May 2014 the leader of the largest faction of the MFDC declared a unilateral ceasefire with government forces.[7] While a comprehensive resolution to the conflict encompassing every wing of the MFDC is yet to be found, the ceasefire heralded years of peace for Casamance. Indeed, since the ceasefire came into place only one outbreak of violence has occurred, when 13 people were killed in an attack in 2018. The prospects for peace were much strengthened in the first months of 2020, when representatives of both parties reiterated their intention to ‘resume regular negotiations’ and ‘give new impetus to the peace process’ at another meeting hosted by the Community of Sant’Egidio.[8]

[1] Aïssatou Fall. “Understanding The Casamance Conflict: A Background.” Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre Monograph, No. 7. (2010) p.1

[2] Ibid. p.20-5

[3] BBC. “Senegal’s Casamance MFDC rebels declare a ceasefire.” BBC News. (2014) Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-27221999 (Accessed 15/11/2020)

[4] Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia. Senegal. Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/375 (Accessed 22/10/2020)

[5] Community of Sant’Egidio. “Hostages freed in Casamance thanks to Community of Sant’Egidio.” Community of Sant’Egidio Press Release. (2012) Available at: https://archive.santegidio.org/pageID/3/langID/en/itemID/6137/Hostages-freed-in-Casamance-thanks-to-Community-of-Sant-Egidio.html (Accessed 15/11/2020)

[6] Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Mediation and support for the peace process in Casamance – Senegal. (CHD, 2020) Available at: https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/mediation-of-the-casamance-conflict-in-senegal/ (Accessed 22/10/2020)

[7] BBC. “Senegal’s Casamance MFDC rebels declare a ceasefire.” BBC News. (2014) Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-27221999 (Accessed 22/10/2020)

[8] Community of Sant’Egidio. “Senegal: Peace Negotiations Resumed in Casamance.” News. (2020) Available at: https://www.santegidio.org/pageID/30284/langID/en/itemID/34828/Senegal-peace-negotiations-resumed-in-Casamance.html (Accessed 22/10/2020)

Description of Case 

As the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Chechen leaders proclaimed the formation of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Initial Russian efforts to re-establish control in the area were repulsed, but factions within the independence movement soon fell into conflict with each other. A major Russian offensive in 1994 sparked the First Chechen War, which ended in 1996 with a peace agreement. Fighting resumed in 1999 and Russian forces quickly established control over much of Chechnya. However, they faced a determined insurgency from an increasingly radical (and international) resistance movement: In addition to local separatists, Arab Mujahideen and radical Turkish groups fought to establish the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.[1] Many Chechen leaders who had risen to prominence in the First Chechen War such as Akhmad Kadyrov switched sides in 1999-2000. Upon the Russian victory, Kadyrov was appointed as interim leader of a Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation as part of ‘backroom deal’ which established a ‘special relationship’ between Grozny and Moscow.[2] In 2003 he was elected president of the republic. His victory coincided with the promulgation of a Russian peace plan, which outlined a new constitution offering considerable autonomy for Chechnya within the Russian Federation. It was subsequently approved in a referendum.[3] Kadyrov was assassinated the following year, but his son Ramzan was appointed deputy prime minister the following day and was elevated to lead Chechnya in 2007.

Through policies to co-opt former resistance leaders (often referred to as “Chechenisation”) and offer meaningful autonomy to the population (or at least the elites), the Government of Russia was able whittle away support for the independence movement until it was isolated from much of the population. Thus, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (which at this point was little more than an idea carried in the minds of exiles and insurgents) that had inspired the First Chechen War became increasingly the preserve of extremists, becoming part of the Caucasus Emirate (affiliated to Al-Qaeda) in 2007 and the Vilayat Kavkaz (affiliated to ISIS) in 2015. As the conflict receded, the Russian government ended its military operation in 2002, and had pulled out most security forces by 2009. The withdrawal was met with an announcement from exiled resistance leaders that Chechen security forces, even those of the pro-Moscow administration, should not be targeted.[4] A low-level insurgency continued until 2017, by which point most fighters had departed to Syria.

[1] UCDP. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/352 (Accessed 28/10/2021)

[2] Vadim Dubnov. “Chechnya’s New Contract With the Kremlin.” Carnegie Moscow Center. (27 October 2016) Available at: https://carnegiemoscow.org/2016/10/27/chechnya-s-new-contract-with-kremlin-pub-64955 (Accessed 28/10/2021)

[3] Nick Paton Walsh. “Weary Chechens turn out to vote for Russian peace plan.” The Guardian. (24 March 2003) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/24/chechnya.russia (Accessed 28/10/2021)

[4] David Hearst. “Chechnya leaders and rebels to meet for peace talks.” The Guardian. (12 August 2009) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/12/chechnya-rebels-talks-russia (Accessed 28/10/2021)

Description of Case 

The implementation of the peace agreements that ended the 1997-1999 war in the Republic of Congo was impeded by frequent armed clashes between 2002 and 2007. By 2010, the situation was improving, and the country was at peace for several years.[1] However, this fragile calm was threatened once again in the run-up to the March 2016 presidential election. Following a widely criticised referendum to extend presidential term limits, the election went ahead amidst a government-enforced media blackout and the incumbent administration claimed victory. The opposition dismissed the results as fraudulent and launched a campaign of civil disobedience. In this fraught climate, armed groups centred on former militants of the Ntsiloulou faction of the Ninja militias (which fought in the civil war) launched an attack on police, military, and administration compounds in the capital, Brazzaville, in April 2016.[2] In response, government security forces launched a major assault on suspected Ninja hideouts in the forests of the Pool region, killing many civilians, and driving 200,000 people from their homes in the process.[3]

The fighting continued until 23 December 2017, when talks between government and Ninja representatives culminated in a ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities agreement. The deal entailed Ninja withdrawals from key strategic points (such as the Congo-Ocean railway) and an arms-for-cash Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programme focused on the Pool region.[4] Fears that the agreement would collapse were allayed somewhat on 31 August 2018, when a follow-up agreement was signed with UN support committing considerable financial resources to incentivise ex-Ninja combatants to disarm and stabilise the area. Approximately 7,500 former rebels surrendered their weapons in exchange for cash payments, while additional aspects of the programme focused on helping displaced people return to their homes.[5] The government-led efforts to resolve the conflict quickly succeeded in ending the fighting and prevented a much larger war in the Republic of Congo. 

[1] UCDP. Government of Congo – Ninjas. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/861 (Accessed 26/10/2021)

[2] Reuters and AP. “Heavy gunfire in Congo-Brazzaville capital as police battle militia.” The Guardian. (4 April 2016) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/04/heavy-gunfire-in-congo-brazzaville-capital-as-police-battle-militia (Accessed 26/10/2021)

[3] Philip Kleinfeld. “Updated: Congo-Brazzaville’s hidden war.” The New Humanitarian. (18 June 2018) Available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/2018/06/18/updated-congo-brazzaville-s-hidden-war (Accessed 26/10/2021)

[4] Reuters Staff. “Congo Republic signs peace accord with ‘Ninja’ rebels.” Reuters. (23 December 2017) Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-congorepublic-security/congo-republic-signs-peace-accord-with-ninja-rebels-idUKKBN1EH0HT?edition-redirect=uk (Accessed 26/10/2021) 

[5] Firmin Oyé. “Le programme DDR sera élargi à la population civile.” Les Dépêches de Brazzaville, No. 3309. (3 September 2018) p.2

Description of Case 

The Revolutionary Workers’ Party (RWP) emerged from the long-standing Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in September 1994 during a period of upheaval within that organisation known as the Second Great Rectification Movement. The key point of contention was the CPP leadership’s determination to continue the armed struggle it had launched in 1968. Following the split, the RWP soon began negotiations with the Government of the Philippines, but divisions within the movement over the talks led to another fracture and the emergence of the Revolutionary Workers’ Party – Mindanao (RWP-M) as an independent organisation in 2001. With 14 of the Philippines’ 20 poorest provinces in Mindanao and sizeable marginalised population of landless agricultural labourers, the RWP-M still enjoyed significant support and had decades of experience conducting insurgencies against security forces. As a result, despite its relative isolation, it remained a potent force in Mindanao and was more than capable of perpetuating armed conflict.

In 2002, RWP-M leaders reached out to the mayor of Iligan City in Mindanao to explore the possibility of initiating a peace process with the Government of Philippines. Informal talks between the RWP-M and the mayor took place with help from a local NGO working to reduce armed conflict in Mindanao, Balay Mindanaw (BM). In 2003, the Philippine government established a panel to conduct negotiations and talks mediated by BM began on 22 September 2003. A second round of talks resulted in the signing of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities on 28 October 2005, formally ending the fighting. The following year, additional agreements were signed on implementation and continuing the peace process. Dialogue between the parties continues at the time of writing, and although a final peace agreement is yet to be negotiated, investment in Mindanao and the work of local communities and organisations such as BM in support of the peace process has prevented further conflict between the RWP-M and the Government of Philippines.[1]

[1] Authors note: I could only find the following source for this case. Balay Mindanaw. GRP-RPM-M Peace Process. (BM, 2022) Available at: https://balaymindanaw.org/bmfi/grp-rpm-m-peace-process/ (Accessed 28/01/2022)

Description of Case

Mindanao, the second largest island in the Philippines, is home to a diverse population, 20 percent of whom are Muslims and identify as Moro (also referred to as Bangsamoro). Owing to the nature and longevity of the post-war authoritarian regimes that ruled the country, this community was marginalised for decades and lacked anything but token political representation.[1] During the widespread armed conflict between the Government of the Philippines and a series of communist groups that began immediately after the Second World War and continues to this day, displaced communities from across the Philippines were encouraged by the administration in Manila to settle in Mindanao. This process isolated the Moro community even further and, after some Muslim recruits in the Philippine military were killed by their officers in 1968, intercommunal clashes erupted across the island. Later that year, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was established and began training in nearby Malaysia. In 1972, the MNLF launched an insurgency against the Government of the Philippines with the goal of achieving total independence for Mindanao. When this objective was reduced to autonomy within the Philippines, the movement fractured, with the hard-line element adopting the name the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). MILF halted its insurgency during the MNLF peace process and entered into talks with the government 1999, only for conflict to erupt again the following year.[2]

Efforts to find a negotiated settlement to the conflict between MILF and the Government of the Philippines took place throughout the 2000s, with a ceasefire negotiated in 2003 and monitored by an International Monitoring Team (IMT) organised by the Organisation of Islamic Conference observation mission (composed of members from Brunei, Libya, and Malaysia) holding for most of 2004-2006.[3] In 2009, the IMT was supported by EU and Norwegian personnel, along with three local organisations. With these foundations in place, an International Contact Group (composed of the governments of the UK, Japan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, and the NGOs Conciliation Resources, the Community of Sant’Egidio the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and Muhammadiyah) was created to observe and advise on the peace process.[4] In this framework, the belligerents negotiated agreements on ending the conflict, wealth and power sharing, and normalising relations, before finally signing the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro on 27 March 2014.[5] This accord created a new autonomous polity called Bangsamoro to replace the Autonomous Region created in 1996 and established a Transitional Authority led by the MILF leadership to govern the region for a limited period. Implementation was supported by a Japanese monitoring mission, the Mindanao Task Force, and a Third-Party Monitoring Team, composed of local and international NGO staff, in addition to a Joint MILF-Government of Philippines committee (encompassing local monitoring teams across 13 provinces) and the Bangsamoro Development Authority, with which MILF could access development funds.[6]

[1] Miriam Coronel Ferrer. Costly Wars, Elusive Peace. (Quezon: University of the Philippines Press, 2013) p.140

[2] UCDP. Philippines: Mindanao. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/308 (Accessed 28/01/2022)

[3] Ferrer. Costly Wars, Elusive Peace. pp.301-2

[4] Kristian Herbolzheimer. “The peace process in Mindanao, the Philippines: evolution and lessons learned.” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre Report. (2015) pp.2-3 Available at: https://www.c-r.org/resource/peace-process-mindanao-philippines# (Accessed 28/01/2022)

[5] Dato’ Tengku Abdul Ghafar. Beyond the Peace Table: Reflections on The GPH-MILF Peace Process. (Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 2017) Available at: https://www.centrepeaceconflictstudies.org/beyond-the-peace-table-reflections-on-the-gph-milf-peace-process/ (Accessed 28/01/2022); The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, 2014. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/philippines-comprehensiveagreement2014 (Accessed 28/01/2022)

[6] Ferrer. Costly Wars, Elusive Peace. p.303; Herbolzheimer. “The peace process in Mindanao, the Philippines.” p.3

Description of Case 

Mindanao, the second largest island in the Philippines, is home to a diverse population, 20 percent of whom are Muslims and identify as Moro (also referred to as Bangsamoro). Owing to the nature and longevity of the post-war authoritarian regimes that ruled the country, this community was marginalised for decades and lacked anything but token political representation.[1] During the widespread armed conflict between the Government of the Philippines and a series of communist groups that began immediately after the Second World War and continues to this day, displaced communities from across the Philippines were encouraged by the administration in Manila to settle in Mindanao. This process isolated the Moro community even further and, after some Muslim recruits in the Philippine military were killed by their officers in 1968, intercommunal clashes erupted across the island. Later that year, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was established and began training in nearby Malaysia. In 1972, the MNLF launched an insurgency against the Government of the Philippines, initially with the goal of achieving total independence (this changed in 1978, when increased autonomy was formally adopted as the objective, leading to a split in the organisation). A devastating armed conflict followed, peaking in the 1970s before pausing altogether after the regime of Ferdinand Marcos was toppled in 1986, only to resume in February 1988.[2]

The situation in Mindanao gained increasing international attention in the early 1990s. By this stage, the MNLF had splintered multiple times and many of its cadres had signed up to government disarmament programmes, leaving it weakened.[3] A change in government in the 1992 elections brought Fidel Ramos to power, who promptly created the National Unification Commission (NUC) and tasked it with finding solutions to the conflicts across the Philippines. Recognising an opportunity to come to a negotiated settlement, the MNLF began talks with the government via the NUC in 1992, and the following year signed a Statement of Understanding for formal negotiations to take place and agreed to a ceasefire.[4] The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) worked with representatives of both parties to establish a Joint Committee to oversee implementation and adherence while further talks took place. After four years of negotiations mediated by the governments of Indonesia, Libya, and the OIC, the talks culminated on 2 September 1996 with the Final Peace Agreement.[5] The key provision of the accord was the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (first proposed in 1976), which offered constitutional protections and political representation to the Muslim community. This ended the conflict between the Philippine government and the MNLF, but not every faction of the movement endorsed the Agreement and continued the armed struggle.

[1] Miriam Coronel Ferrer. Costly Wars, Elusive Peace. (Quezon: University of the Philippines Press, 2013) p.140

[2] UCDP. Philippines: Mindanao. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/308 (Accessed 28/01/2022)

[3] Ferrer. Costly Wars, Elusive Peace. p.141

[4] Statement of Understanding on the Second Round of Exploratory Talks between the GRP and the MNLF, 1993. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/philippines-2ndroundexploratory93 (Accessed 28/01/2022); Interim Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front with the Participation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 1992. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/philippines-interimceasefire93 (Accessed 28/01/2022)

[5] Final agreement on the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front, 1996. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/philippines-implementingtripoli96 (Accessed 28/01/2022)

Description of Case 

Plateau State is located in central Nigeria, in the “Middle Belt” of the country which divides the majority Muslim north with the predominantly Christian south. The largest city in the state, Jos, was engulfed in a vicious riot in 2001, largely fought between communities classified in the constitution as “indigenes” and “settlers”  over legal privileges and protections and political representation in local and provincial institutions.[1] Over the course of six days, groups armed with bows and arrows, spears, petrol bombs, and homemade firearms fought each other for control of the city until a military intervention by the Nigerian armed forces finally ended the violence. Approximately 1,000 people died in the unrest. Conflicts such as this took place again in 2002 and in 2008, when 700 people were killed.[2] In response to the pervasive eruptions of violence, the Government of Nigeria established the Operation Safe Haven taskforce in 2010. The taskforce incorporated agencies and departments spanning the entire Nigerian security establishment and was tasked with managing and ultimately ending the conflicts in Jos and Plateau State. This served to contain some of the violence (although over one hundred people were killed during unrest in 2012) but failed to develop a more lasting solution to the problem.

Since 2013, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) has been working to encourage communities across the Middle Belt to employ dialogue as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. In August 2013, HD began facilitating an intercommunal dialogue process in Jos involving eight local communities (the Afizere, Anaguta, Berom, Fulani, Hausa, Igbo, South-South, Yoruba, and Women), traditional and religious leaders, representatives of the regional administration of Plateau State as well as the federal government, and observers from the relevant Nigerian security agencies. These talks culminated in June 2014 with the signing of the Joint Declaration of Commitment to Peace and Cooperation, which included provisions to end the fighting and bring communities together to rebuild a more peaceful city.[3] This served to end the conflict and created a climate in which, at the least, destroyed infrastructure has been rebuilt and basic services can be delivered. To prevent a conflict relapse, HD established a Conflict Early Warning Response System and supported the formation of the Plateau Peace Dialogue Forum, which was tasked with keeping the peace process on track.[4] In 2016, the Plateau Peace Building Agency (PPBA) took responsibility for maintaining peace in the area and, two years later, published the Plateau State Road Map for Peace which serves as a guide for coordinating efforts to reduce armed conflict.[5] In 2020, the PPBA worked with its counterpart in Kaduna State to end a conflict between communities on the border. These efforts have reduced armed conflict in Plateau State.[6]

[1] Kingsley L. Madueke. “Towards a Sequence of Ethnic Riots: Stages, Processes and Interactions in the Production of Communal Violence in Jos, Nigeria.” Civil Wars, Vol. 23, No.2. (2021) p.236

[2] Kingsley L. Madueke & Floris F. Vermeulen. “Frontiers of Ethnic Burtality in an African City: Explaining the Spread and Recurrence of Violent Conflict in Jos, Nigeria.” Africa Spectrum, Vol. 53, No. 2. (2018) p.46

[3] HD Jos Forum Inter-communal Dialogue Process Joint Declaration of Commitment to Peace and Cooperation, 2014. Available at: https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/jos-plateau-state-nigeria/ (Accessed 27/01/2022)

[4] Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. “Nigeria.” Activities. (HD, 2022) Available at: https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/jos-plateau-state-nigeria/ (Accessed 27/01/2022)

[5] Darren Kew. “How to calm violent crises? Nigeria has an idea.” United States Institute of Peace Analysis and Commentary. (4 June 2021) Available at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/06/how-calm-violent-crises-nigeria-has-idea (Accessed 27/01/2022)

[6] Maurice Ogbonnaya. “Peacebuilding Agencies and Farmer-Herder Conflicts in Nigeria’s Middle Belt Region: Successes and Policy Challenges.” African Peacebuilding Network Briefing Note, No. 31. (2021) p.2

Description of Case 

Kaduna State is located in northern Nigeria. Much like the country as a whole, northern Kaduna is predominantly Muslim and the south is mostly Christian. While these divisions have occasionally been the cause of conflict when translated into the political arena (such as during the electoral violence that followed the 2011 presidential elections), it is periodical competition for resources between farmers and pastoralists, and the historic grievances associated with such competition, that is the key driver of low-intensity conflict in Kaduna State.[1] A series of 20 initiatives to end the cycle of violence dating back to 1979 have attempted but ultimately failed to achieve their aims.

The 2015 presidential election proceeded peacefully thanks to a concerted and widespread effort to ensure that it was the first peaceful and constitutional transition of power in Nigerian history. During the contest, the issue of armed conflict rose to the fore of domestic politics. In Kaduna State, the newly elected governor established a committee under the chairmanship of a retired general to investigate the cause of the conflict upon taking office after pledging to address the issue in his campaign. Building on this framework, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) facilitated a six-month inter-communal dialogue process, bringing in representatives of 29 communities from 5 local government areas identified as potential conflict flashpoints. Each community contributed six delegates (representing a development/cultural association, traditional council, youth, women, religious groups, and a prominent public figure) to the process. These delegates served in joint working groups facilitated by HD and attended by local, state, and federal government representatives.[2] The inter-communal dialogue culminated on 23 March 2016 with the signing of the Kafanchan Peace Declaration and the Kafanchan Women Peace Declaration.[3] The documents committed the farmers and pastoralists to resolving any future disputes between them peacefully, called for resources to be shared, and committed the communities to cooperate on the economic development of the area. A further provision established a monitoring committee to oversee implementation and adherence. HD supported the establishment of a Conflict Early Warning Response System for southern Kaduna, as well as a local institution known as the Kafanchan Peace Development Initiative, which was tasked with building a lasting peace in the area.[4] In 2017, the ongoing effort to reduce armed conflict across Kaduna was taken up by the Kaduna State Peace Commission.[5] Although armed conflict continues (in 2021, Kaduna suffered the most political violence of any Nigerian state other than Borno, the epicentre of the Boko Haram insurgency), the efforts of local people and organisations supported by HD demonstrably reduced armed conflict between communities in southern Kaduna State.[6]

[1] Aniete Ewang. “Multiple Killings in Nigeria’s Kaduna State: Authorities Should End Cycle of Impunity.” Human Rights Watch. (31 July 2020) Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/31/multiple-killings-nigerias-kaduna-state (Accessed 27/01/2022)

[2] Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. “Inter-communal Dialogue Process in Five Flashpoint Local Government Areas in Southern Kaduna, Kaduna State, Nigeria.” Roadmap/Agenda for Discussion. (16 November 2015)

[3] Kafanchan Peace Declaration between Grazers and Farmers, 2016. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/lview/1921/Kafanchan%20Peace%20Declaration%20between%20Grazers%20and%20Farmers (Accessed 27/01/2022); Kafanchan Women Peace Declaration, 2016. Available at: https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/jos-plateau-state-nigeria/ (Accessed 27/01/2022)

[4] Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. “Nigeria.” Activities. (HD, 2022) Available at: https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/jos-plateau-state-nigeria/ (Accessed 27/01/2022)

[5] Kaduna State Comission. About KAPECOM. (KSC, 2022) Available at: https://kadunapeacecommission.org/# (Accessed 27/01/2022)

[6] Olajumoke Ayandele. “Confronting Nigeria’s Kaduna Crisis.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2 February 2021) Available at: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/confronting-nigerias-kaduna-crisis/ (Accessed 27/01/2022)