Description of Case 

In March 2006, Tuareg soldiers recently integrated into the Malian army deserted their posts and began launching attacks on government outposts. This conflict was quickly resolved before it could escalate, with a restrained response from the Government of Mali and the mediation of the Algerian government producing a peace agreement in February 2007. Although this conflict was ended before much fighting took place, it served to inspire Tuareg in neighbouring Niger to create the Niger Movement for Justice (Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice, MNJ) and launch their own insurgency, citing the Government of Niger’s inability to deliver on wide-ranging commitments it had made to the Nigerien population.[1] The MNJ sabotaged power plants, transport infrastructure, and an airport. In response, the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency, deployed 4,000 troops to the northern region where the MNJ was based, and forcefully relocated thousands of civilians from the area. These events served to inspire yet another rebellion in Mali and raised concerns that the insurgencies could escalate into a conflict encompassing the entire Sahara.[2] The Government of Niger initially rejected the prospect of negotiations, casting the MNJ as criminals and seeking to destroy them militarily rather than entering into any kind of peace process. The situation continued to deteriorate in 2008, with additional Tuareg groups, other minorities (such as the Toubous and Fulani from the south), and deserters from the Nigerien military joining the rebellion.[3] With thousands of rebels up in arms, the prospect of a long and bloody war was high.

The conflict in Niger continued until early 2009, when splits in the MNJ and a series of diplomatic interventions set the stage for a negotiated settlement. The Government of Libya, which also served as Chairman of the African Union at the time, exerted most pressure. Muammar Gaddafi’s historic links to the Tuareg (through the Islamic Legion that he maintained from 1971 until 1987) provided him with enough credibility to bring both sides to the negotiating table, and talks began in April 2009.[4] After agreeing to a ceasefire, the rebels were promised amnesty if they disarmed. On 6 October 2009, a final peace agreement was signed encompassing both Nigerien and Malian Tuareg armed groups in the Libyan oasis city of Sabha.[5] Most of the rebels disarmed within a month, and the few remaining rebels came to terms with the government by the end of 2009. In January 2010, a formal disarmament ceremony was held in northern Niger attended by the country’s president and the various leaders of the armed groups, marking the end of the conflict.[6]

[1] UCDP. Niger: Government. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/430 (Accessed 9/12/2021)

[2] Stephen A. Emerson. “Desert insurgency: lessons from the third Tuareg rebellion.” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 22, No. 4. (2011) p.673-5

[3] Ibid. p.676

[4] Virginie Baudais, Amal Bourhrous, & Dylan O’Driscall. “Conflict Mediation and Peacebuilding in the Sahel: The Role of Maghreb Countries in an African Framework.” SIPRI Policy Paper, No. 58. (2021) p.15

[5] Staff and agencies. “Mali, Niger, Tuareg rebels pledge peace: Libya.” Reuters. (7 October 2009) Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-libya-tuareg-20091007-idAFJOE5960DB20091007 (Accessed 9/12/2021)

[6] UCDP. Niger: Government.

Description of Case 

The Sahel is a large geographical region spanning a range of African states located in the Sahara Desert. While many populations live on the desert periphery, the Tuareg live across the Sahel, with large populations in Niger and Mali and noteworthy communities in Burkina Faso, Algeria, and Libya. French troops consolidated control of the region in 1890, but an official colony was not formed until 1922. While this relatively brief colonial experience only lasted for 32 years, the French administration established the borders and political structures which were inherited by newly independent states such as Niger in 1960.[1] These borders disrupted the nomadic, pastoralist life of most Tuaregs. A series of droughts in the 1970s and 1980s devastated Tuareg communities, driving many to flee to Libya and join Muammar Gaddafi’s Islamic Legion. In 1991, the Government of Niger hosted a national conference to establish democratic institutions and a constitution before multi-party elections were held in 1992. It was in this context that a group of Tuareg former Islamic Legionnaires created the Front for the Liberation of Air and Azawad (FLAA) on 19 October 1991 and began an insurgency against the Nigerien government, demanding the introduction of a federal system, favourable recruitment quotas for the civil service and military, investment in northern Niger, and employment in the Arlit uranium mines.[2] The Government of France mediated secret talks in 1993, resulting in a peace agreement that met, on paper at least, many of the FLAA demands. Just a month later, however, the FLAA split into several groups due to differences over the agreement and the conflict resumed.[3]

In October 1993, the various Tuareg armed groups in Niger merged to form the Coordination for Armed Resistance. After launching a series of attacks in 1994, this new organisation entered into negotiations with the Government of Niger in June 1994. These talks were mediated by the governments of Algeria, Burkina Faso, and France, and concluded with the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement on 9 October 1994. The Tuareg umbrella organisation collapsed again after the talks and yet another merger took place in early 1995, creating the Organisation of the Armed Resistance (ORA). The ORA negotiated another peace agreement in Niamey on 24 April 1995, this time formally ending the conflict.[4] Although some Tuareg groups initially dismissed the agreement, talks held in Algeria brought them into the peace process on 23 November 1997, ending the conflict. Niger enjoyed a decade of relative peace after the 1991-1997 Tuareg rebellion.

[1] Emizet Kisangani. “The Tuaregs’ Rebellions in Mali and Niger and the U.S. Global war on Terror.” International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 29, No. 1. (2012) p.69

[2] Ibid. p.75

[3] UCDP. FLAA. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/524 (Accessed 23/11/2021)

[4] Agreement Between the Republic Niger Government and the ORA, 1995. Available at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/agreement-between-the-republic-niger-government-and-the-ora (Accessed 23/11/2021)

Description of Case

In 1978, a coalition of revolutionary groups known as the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, FSLN) launched an insurgency against the US-backed military dictatorship that was governing Nicaragua. Initial efforts to negotiate a compromise by the Organisation of American States failed, and by June 1979 most of the country was under FSLN control. The former president fled to Honduras, while much of his defeated military formed the Counterrevolution (Contrarrevolución, Contra) movement with support from the Government of the USA. By 1981, the Contras were receiving arms directly from the US and the following year, they launched an insurgency against the FSLN administration. With extensive US support for the Contras and the Government of Cuba assisting the FSLN, Nicaragua became a battleground for foreign powers.[1]

The first efforts to find a solution to the armed conflicts plaguing Central America during the 1980s were led by the Government of Costa Rica, which proposed a plan to bring peace to the region in 1986. After the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua approved the plan in a series of agreements signed in Esquipulas in 1986-1987, the President of Costa Rica received the Nobel Peace Prize.[2] The agreements created a framework for stabilising the region but offered little in the way of direct solutions to the conflict in Nicaragua. Some progress was made towards peace in January 1988 when the FSLN administration came to terms with a relatively small indigenous armed group.[3] The real breakthrough, however, came a month later when growing international condemnation, the Iran-Contra scandal, and a 1986 International Court of Justice judgement against the USA regarding its involvement in the conflict forced the American government to cut its support for the Contras. The following month, the FSLN administration and the Contras agreed a ceasefire.[4] At a summit in February 1989, the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica approved a joint declaration in which the FSLN would introduce reforms and schedule early elections, while Contra forces would be disarmed.[5] An additional demobilisation agreement was signed in August 1989, mandating the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (Observadores de Naciones Unidas en Centroamérica, ONUCA) to verify and assist with its implementation.[6] ONUCA finished disarming the Contras in June 1990, marking the end of the peace process.[7] These agreements served to end the armed conflict in Nicaragua.

[1] UCDP. Government of Nicaragua – Contras. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/742 (Accessed 14/12/2020)

[2] Esquipulas Declaration (Esquipulas I), 1986. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/centralamerica-esquipulasI86 (Accessed 14/12/2020); Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America (Esquipulas II), 1987. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/centralamerica-esquipulasII87 (Accessed 14/12/2020)

[3] Basic Preliminary Accord between Government of Nicaragua and YATAMA, 1988. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/nicaragua-preliminaryaccordyatama88 (Accessed 14/12/2020); Agreement on the Functions of the Conciliation Commission between the Government of Nicaragua and YATAMA, 1988. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/nicaragua-conciliationcommission88 (Accessed 14/12/2020)

[4] John M. Goshko. “U.S. War by Proxy at an End.” The Washington Post. (1990) Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/02/27/us-war-by-proxy-at-an-end/770483d0-c355-4288-8819-9b0dcc928aee/ (Accessed 14/12/2020)

[5] Joint Declaration of the Central American Presidents (Costa del Sol Declaration), 1989. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/centralamerica-costadelsoldeclaration89 (Accessed 14/12/2020)

[6] Joint Plan for the Voluntary Demobilisation, Repatriation or Relocation of the Members of the Nicaraguan Resistance and their Families, as well as Assistance in the Demobilisation of all those involved in Armed Actions in the Countries of the Region, 1989. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/centralamerica-jointplandemobilisation89 (Accessed 14/12/2020)

[7] UN Peacekeeping. United Nations Observer Group in Central America: ONUCA. Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onuca.htm (Accessed: 13/10/2020); Orlando J. Fernandez. “Nicaragua – the Role of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) in the Central American Peace Process.” Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol. 12, No. 2. (2004)

Description of Case 

The 1986-1990 peace process ended the war in Nicaragua and created the framework for a comprehensive disarmament programme to take place across the country. This task was carried out by the International Support and Verification Commission (Comisión Internacional de Apoyo y Verificación, CIAV), a newly formed organisation established by the secretary-generals of the UN and the Organisation of American States (OAS). Led by two Argentinians, the 700 staff of the CIAV were faced with the challenge of disarming and repatriating over 18,000 Contras and displaced civilians over the border in Costa Rica and Honduras as well as ensuring the peaceful reintegration of tens of thousands of combatants in Nicaraguan territory back into society.[1] The Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration programme ran into problems almost immediately thanks to the widespread instability and lawlessness in post-conflict Nicaragua. When it became apparent that the government had no intention of drawing down its forces in line with the Contras, recently disarmed Contra troops began to rearm in late 1990 and continued their insurgency, becoming known as Recontras. The CIAV estimated that by the spring of 1992, roughly 1,000 Recontras organised in 13 separate groups were operating in northern Nicaragua.[2] One such group, the Northern Front 3-80 (Frente Norte 3-80, FN 3-80), proved to be the most organised. In one 1993 attack, FN 3-80 took 41 government delegates hostage. This crisis was resolved by the mediation of a truce by the CIAV on 25 August, which led to the release of the hostages unharmed, but the conflict erupted again just a month later.

Progress was made in 1994 with the negotiation of an agreement which recognised FN 3-80 as a legal entity, provided its troops with provisions to sustain themselves during the peace process, and initiated a comprehensive reintegration process that guaranteed housing and assistance to demobilising combatants. While negotiations continued, 164 FN 3-80 personnel were accepted into the police academy while some leaders were incorporated into local government.[3] The talks culminated on 30 May 1997 with a peace agreement witnessed by representatives of the church and the CIAV.[4] The accord provided for the end of the conflict and the incremental disarmament of remaining FN 3-80 forces in line with the fulfilment of scheduled programmes by the Government of Nicaragua. With the framework built up over the previous years in place, this final agreement was implemented within two months, ending the conflict, and leaving FN 3-80 completely disarmed.

[1] Fernando Arocena. The International Commission for Support and Verification: Demobilizing and Integrating the Nicaraguan Resistance 1990-1997. (OAS, 1998) pp.22-4

[2] Ibid. pp.37-8

[3] Ibid. p.70

[4] Acuerdo de Paz entre Gobierno y Frente Norte 3-80 (Acuerdo de Managua), 1997. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/nicaragua-managua-accord97 (Accessed 22/11/2021)

Description of Case 

In 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) launched a “People’s War” against the Government of Nepal. Although the conflict was initially of a relatively low intensity, it rapidly escalated in 2001-2002 after the king assumed executive powers for himself and cancelled elections.[1] Early efforts to end the war were led by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, which mediated talks between the parties from 2000-2003. The UK Department for International Development joined the effort in 2001, facilitating consultations with the Community of Sant’Egidio and the Crisis Management Initiative. The UN Secretary-General also offered his good offices to facilitate talks, while the Carter Center also made its services available.[2] Such efforts were, however, unsuccessful or dismissed by the belligerents, and the conflict continued.

Faced with increasingly draconian policies from the Royal Palace and a lack of progress on the battlefield, the side-lined political parties of Nepal met with the Maoists in November 2005. These talks culminated with a 12-Point Understanding which, among its provisions, called for an end to autocratic rule and the formation of a constituent assembly to produce a new constitution.[3] The unlikely alliance between some traditionally conservative political parties and the Maoist movement gained widespread support among the Nepalese population and inspired widespread protests against the monarchy in April 2006. In the face of these popular demonstrations, the king relinquished power to Nepal’s last elected parliament, which immediately renewed talks with the Maoists. The following month, a formal ceasefire was negotiated, in June, the parties agreed to an Eight-Point Understanding regarding the peace process, and in August, a formal request was sent to the UN Secretary-General for assistance.[4] This succession of accords culminated on 21 November 2006 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which formally ended the war and created a framework for the formation of a transitional government and the promulgation of an interim constitution.[5] A month later, the parties signed the Agreement on the Monitoring of Management of Arms and Armies, which outlined an extensive UN-supervised Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration and military integration process.[6] The negotiations that ended the war in Nepal were conducted without external mediators or facilitators, although the efforts of a host of international organisations helped to open dialogue between the parties.

[1] Elliot Short. “Assessing International Statebuilding Initiative Effectiveness at Preventing Armed Conflict Recurrence.” pp.84-92

[2] Teresa Whitfield. “Nepal’s Masala Peacemaking.” in Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan. Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) p.158-9

[3] 12-Point Understanding between the Seven Political Parties and Nepal Communist Party (Maoists), 2005. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/nepal-12pointunderstanding2005 (Accessed 09/11/2020)

[4] Whitfield. “Nepal’s Masala Peacemaking.” p.158

[5] Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 2006. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/nepal-comprehensiveagreement2006 (Accessed 09/11/2020)

[6] Agreement on the Monitoring of Arms and Armies, 2006. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/nepal-monitoringarmies2006 (Accessed 29/11/2020)

.

Description of Case 

Mali emerged as an independent state in 1960. The subtropical south of the country is home to 90 percent of the population, including the Bambara social group who have dominated Malian institutions for centuries. To the north, swathes of sparsely populated desert with a handful of urban centres are home to Arabs and the Tuareg, many of whom are semi-nomadic. Upon independence, the newly empowered Malian administration sought to make these populations sedentary and consolidate control from traditional elites. These policies represented a reversal from French rule, where the north enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy. In 1963, several armed groups emerged from the aggrieved Tuareg population and launched an insurgency against the Government of Mali in Bamoko.[1] This rebellion was crushed militarily, leaving lasting antagonisms between the northern population and the government. A series of droughts in the ensuing decades worsened the plight of these communities, forcing many to leave Mali and join Muammar Qadhafi’s Islamic Legion in Libya. In 1990, some veterans of the Islamic Legion launched another insurgency in northern Mali which enjoyed a broad base of support among both the Arab and Tuareg communities of the area.[2] Four major armed groups and an array of smaller ones gathered under the banner of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l’Azaouad, MPLA) and joined the rebellion.

The government responded to the rebellion by declaring a state of emergency and launching security operations, this time to no avail. Ongoing military failures (including some major defeats) and growing domestic opposition to the administration forced the Government of Mali to accept an Algerian offer to mediate talks.[3] The negotiations culminated on 6 January 1991 with the signing of the Tamanrasset Accords, which included provisions for a ceasefire, disengagement of forces and prisoner exchanges, and a commitment to provide the north with more investment and autonomy.[4] A coup d’état later in the year threatened to derail the peace process, but fresh elections produced a new government, which continued dialogue. On 11 April 1992, ongoing talks encompassing a broad range of Malian communities and political stakeholders culminated with the signing of a more comprehensive peace agreement, the National Pact.[5] Although this agreement caused several splinters in the MPLA (which itself dropped the “liberation” from its name during this period) that led to renewed fighting, those factions initially opposed to the peace process were gradually incorporated into it until 1996, when the last groups laid down their arms and a Flame of Peace ceremony was held in Timbuktu.[6] A comprehensive military integration programme (involving thousands of Tuareg troops and supported by the UN), ongoing efforts by local people and organisations (supported by Norwegian Church Aid), and the implementation of the relevant provisions of the National Pact by the government helped to consolidate the peace.[7]

[1] Jean Sebastian Lecocq. The Desert is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali. (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2002) p.97

[2] Stephanie Pezard & Michael Shurkin. Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for a Durable Settlement. (Santa Monica: RAND, 2015) p.12

[3] Kalifa Keita. “Conflict and conflict resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg insurgency in Mali.” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 9, No. 3. (1998) p.112

[4] Accord sur la cessation des hostilités, 1991. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/mali-accordcessationhostilites91 (Accessed 26/01/2022)

[5] Pacte national conclu entre le gouvernement de la République du Mali et les mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l’Azawad consacrant le statut particulier du nord au Mali, 1992. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/mali-pacte-reconciliation-national92 (Accessed 26/01/2022)

[6] UCDP. Mali: Azawad. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/372 (Accessed 26/01/2022)

[7] Pezard & Michael Shurkin. Achieving Peace in Northern Mali. pp.15-6

Description of Case 

After over a decade of relative peace, northern Mali was subjected to another armed conflict in 2006. A breakaway faction of the Tuareg movement known as the Alliance of 23 May for Democratic Change (Alliance démocratique du 23 Mai pour le changement, ADC) launched a series of attacks in the Kidal Region of northern Mali, demanding the full implementation of the National Pact that had been agreed in 1992.[1] Building on its success during the previous Tuareg rebellion in Mali, the Government of Algeria mediated fresh negotiations almost as soon as the fighting started. The talks culminated on 4 July 2006 (just three months after the fighting began) with the signing of the Algiers Accord for the Restoration of Peace, Security, and Development in the Kidal Region.[2] The terms of the agreement began to be implemented in 2007, inspiring large numbers of ADC personnel to lay down their arms and end their rebellion.[3] The prospect of ending this conflict before it gathered pace (UCDP did not record 25 battle-related deaths in 2006) was, however, terminated when the ADC split in May 2007, with one faction electing to continue the armed struggle.[4] This faction changed its name to the North Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change (Alliance Touareg Nord Mali pour le Changement, ATNMC) and forged bonds with armed groups in neighbouring Niger, threatening to add an interstate dimension to the conflict.

Talks between the ATNMC and the Government of Mali took place in December 2007, again with Algerian mediation. Although some progress was made (such as a prisoner exchange), this peace process was derailed entirely when the ATNMC launched a series of offensives against the Malian armed forces, in some cases far to the south of the country. Aware of the limitations of military operations against the Tuareg, the Malian government continued to choose dialogue and negotiation, taking up an offer from the Government of Libya (which still enjoyed strong links with Tuareg communities) to mediate further talks. A brief ceasefire and another prisoner exchange took place in September 2008 because of these negotiations, but a final battle between the Malian armed forces (this time supported by considerable numbers of Tuareg personnel) and the ATNMC took place on 21 January 2009 in which the latter was defeated. Two days later, the remaining ATNMC cadres ended their insurgency after talks mediated by local politicians, ending the Third Tuareg Rebellion in Mali.[5] In the aftermath of the conflict, disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration programmes were implemented across Kidal and investment to the area did increase, but armed conflict erupted in Northern Mali once again in 2012.[6]

[1] Stephanie Pezard & Michael Shurkin. Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for a Durable Settlement. (Santa Monica: RAND, 2015) p.16-7

[2] Accord d’Alger pour la Restauration de la Paix, de la Sécurité et du Développement dans la région de Kidal, 2006. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/mali-accordalger2006 (Accessed 26/01/2022)

[3] Jean Sebastian Lecocq. The Desert is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali. (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2002) p.335

[4] UCDP. Mali: Azawad. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/372 (Accessed 26/01/2022)

[5] Lecocq. The Desert is Our Country. p.337-9

[6] Pezard & Shurkin. Achieving Peace in Northern Mali. p.19-20

Description of Case 

The war in Liberia began in 1989, when a former government official, Charles Taylor, launched an insurgency against government security forces. By August 1990, the Liberian armed forces had largely been defeated and Taylor’s troops were besieging the capital, Monrovia.[1] In August 1990, governments in the region agreed to deploy the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in an effort to contain the crisis.[2] They were later supported by UN observers, however the fighting continued until, after more than a dozen failed attempts to forge a peace, the 1996 Abuja II Agreement succeeded in halting the fighting.[3] The following year, elections were held, resulting in a resounding victory for Taylor, whose forces controlled most of the country.[4] Although much of Liberia enjoyed some semblance of peace following the election, fighting continued in parts of the country throughout the period and in 2001, the country descended into war once again.

In June 2003, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the International Contact Group on Liberia (which included the African Union, ECOWAS, World Bank, and UN along with a range of national governments) hosted negotiations in Accra, Ghana. Following his indictment by the Special Court in Sierra Leone, Taylor fled back to his stronghold in Monrovia.[5] Representatives of the Government of Liberia remained, however, and the talks continued.[6] A wide range of civil society actors, such as the Mano River Women Peace Network, the Women in Peacebuilding Program, the Liberian Bar Association, and the Inter-Religious Council for Liberia, took part in the 76-day process at Accra and ultimately helped to shape the post-conflict transition.[7] By June 2003, an array of armed groups had pushed Taylor’s forces back to Monrovia. Taylor relinquished power on 11 August, fleeing to Nigeria. Within a week, what remained of his administration negotiated an end to the conflict during negotiations hosted by ECOWAS in Ghana, culminating on 18 August with the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement.[8] In addition to ending the conflict, the Agreement created the framework for a two-year transitional government which was tasked with administering the country until nationwide elections could be held in October 2005. Over 200,000 people (approximately ten percent of the entire Liberian population) were killed during the war.[9]    

[1] UCDP. Liberia: Government. (UCDP: 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/341 (Accessed 14/12/2020)

[2] Human Rights Watch. “Waging War to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights.” HRW Reports, Vol. 5, No. 6. (1993)

[3] Supplement to the Abuja Accord, 1996. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/liberia-supplementabuja96 (Accessed 25/10/2020)

[4] Lansana Gberie. “Liberia’s War and Peace process: A Historical Overview.” in Festus Aboagye and Alhaji M S Bah, eds. A Tortuous Road to Peace: The Dynamics of Regional, UN, and International Humanitarian Interventions in Liberia. (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005) p.61

[5] Paul Welsh. “Liberian leader’s strange day in Ghana.” BCC News. (2003) Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2965110.stm (Accessed 25/10/2020)

[6] Priscilla Hayner. “Negotiating peace in Liberia: Preserving the possibility for Justice.” Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue November Report. (2007)

[7] Desirée Nilsson. Crafting a Secure Peace – Evaluating Liberia’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2003. (Uppsala University and the UN Mediation Support Unit, 2009) p.22

[8] Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement of Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political Parties, 2003. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/liberia-peaceagreementlurdmodel2003 (Accessed 25/10/2020)

[9] Gberie. “Liberia’s War and Peace process.” p.51

Description of Case 

As Yugoslavia collapsed in the 1990s, a Kosovar Albanian armed group known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) launched an insurgency against federal security forces in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo. After the KLA acquired significant quantities of weapons during the armed conflict in neighbouring Albania in 1997, the fighting in Kosovo escalated in 1998.[1] Amidst reports of atrocities against civilians in March 1998, the Contact Group (composed of the EU, US, and Russia) imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia and the administration of Slobodan Milošević and the UN approved an arms embargo. Talks hosted by the Government of Russia resulted in the deployment of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission in July, and another agreement in October allowed the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) to deploy 2,000 unarmed international observers of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) to monitor implementation.[2] These efforts, however, had little impact on the conflict. By the end of 1998, the KLA had spread their insurgency across Kosovo, forcing Milošević to order large military operations across the province which consistently resulted in atrocities against Kosovar Albanian civilians.  This resulted in increasingly harsh international condemnation, along with threats of a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) military intervention.

In February 1999, the representatives of the KLA and the Government of Yugoslavia met for peace talks mediated by NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana in Rambouillet, France. The terms offered to the Yugoslav party were that Kosovo would remain an Autonomous Province of Yugoslavia and 5,000 Yugoslav personnel could remain in the area, but that overall responsibility for security in the area would be taken up by 30,000 NATO troops for a period of three years until the final status of Kosovo could be determined.[3] These terms proved unacceptable to Milošević, and his counter-offer of allowing an unarmed UN mission to deploy to Kosovo was rejected by the KLA and NATO. The failure of these talks led to the withdrawal of the KVM on 22 March 1999, a day prior to the announcement that NATO would commence a military campaign against Yugoslavia. On 24 March, NATO launched an extensive bombing campaign across Yugoslavia.[4] This culminated at the beginning of June, when Milošević finally acquiesced to a joint Finnish-Russian overture on 9 June 1999 and signed a technical military agreement which provided for the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and the deployment of an international presence under UN auspices.[5] The following day, NATO suspended its air operations and on 12 June, Norwegian special forces led the NATO troops of the Kosovo Force into the area. These developments, spurred by the NATO military intervention, ended the war.[6] Over 90 percent of the Kosovar Albanian population was forced from their homes during the conflict, which cost the lives of 13,500 people. Although decisive, the NATO bombing campaign cost the lives of approximately 500 civilians in Yugoslavia.[7]

[1] UCDP. Serbia (Yugoslavia): Kosovo. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/412 (Accessed 23/11/2020)

[2] Staff and Agencies. “Yugoslavia: OSCE Signs Kosovo Verification Accord.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. (16 October 1998) Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/yugoslavia-osce-signs-kosovo-verification-accord (Accessed 25/01/2022)

[3] Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (Rambouillet Accords), 1999. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/kosovo-rambouilletagreement99 (Accessed 25/01/2022)

[4] James Gow. The Serbian Project and its Adversaries. (London: Hurst, 2003) p.286

[5] Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 1999. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/kosovoserbia-militarytechnicalagreement99 (Accessed 25/01/2022)

[6] Patrick Wintour, Ian Traynor, & Ed Vulliamy. “Why Milosevic blinked first.” The Guardian. (1999) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jun/06/balkans (Accessed 23/11/2020)

[7] Human Rights Watch. The Crisis in Kosovo. (HRW, 2001) Available at: https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-01.htm (Accessed 25/01/2022)

Description of Case 

Wajir is a county located in Kenya’s North Eastern Province bordering Somalia and Ethiopia. This frontier region is remote, home to a large Somali population, and was essentially lawless during the 1980s and 1990s, particularly after collapse of the Barré regime in Somalia in 1991. Home to three pastoralist Somali clans, the Ajuran, Degodia, and Ogaden, Wajir has a long history of low-intensity conflicts over resources.[1] When arms proliferated across the region and substantial numbers of Somalians fled over the border in 1991, considerable strain was placed on resources in the area. It was in this context that North Eastern Province prepared for the December 1992 Kenyan general election – the first multi-party contest since independence. In Wajir District, the election came to be viewed as a competition between the clans for territorial dominance, with contested constituencies becoming the targets of violent campaigns to manipulate demographics through forced evictions. In Wajir-West, for example, Degodia leaders allegedly won the election by bringing in clan members from outside the constituency to outnumber the local Ajuran population.[2] After the election, the Degodia administration exclusively distributed government positions within the clan, leaving the Ajuran fearful of the complete loss of their lands and influence. In June 1993, clashes erupted into an open conflict which quickly spread across north-eastern Kenya, costing the lives of 1,200 people.[3]

Efforts to end the conflict began when Dekha Ibrahim Abdi and another woman intervened to stop violence taking place at a market in Wajir. Following the event, they formed Wajir Women for Peace Group and were soon joined by other civil society groups to form the Wajir Peace Group. These local organisations engaged with clan elders and managed to convene a peace conference with the help of the local member of parliament. The talks concluded with the creation of a 36-person cross-clan council which was mandated to bring an end to the conflict.[4] By employing some traditional Somali peacemaking methods (xeer and diya) and incorporating a broad range of stakeholders, this council was able to oversee the end of hostilities and succeeded in mediating the Al Fatah Peace Declaration, which was signed on 29 September 1993.[5] The declaration essentially represented a code of conduct for relations between the clans in Wajir, but it also called for the creation of peace committees encompassing elders, government officials, security personnel, and NGOs to prevent further conflicts.[6]

[1] National Cohesion and Integration Commission & Interpeace. Voices of the People: Impediments to Peace and Community and Resilience in Wajir County. (Nairobi, 2021) p.2

[2] Ken Menkhaus. “The rise of a mediated state in northern Kenya: the Wajir story and its implications for state-building.” Afrika Focus, Vol. 21, No. 2. (2008) p.25

[3] Richard Carver. “Kenya Since the Elections.” WRITENET. (1 January 1994) Available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6c2c.html (Accessed 22/11/2021)

[4] Rashid Abdi. “A Dying Breed of Peacemakers in Kenya’s North East.” International Crisis Group. (18 November 2015) Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/dying-breed-peacemakers-kenya-s-north-east (Accessed 22/11/2021)

[5] Al-Fatah Peace Declaration, 1993. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/1916/Al-Fatah%20Peace%20Declaration (Accessed 22/11/2021)

[6] Paul van Tongeren. “Potential cornerstone of infrastructures for peace? How local peace committees can make a difference.” Peacebuilding, Vol. 1, No. 1. (2013) pp.41-2