Description of Case 

Albania emerged from an isolationist communist regime in 1991, with the country’s first elections taking place and economic reforms being introduced. Many Albanians invested in various pyramid schemes throughout the 1990s until, at the end of November 1996, they began to collapse. Over $1 billion (almost half of Albania’s GDP at the time) was lost, leading to mass protests and riots in January 1997.[1] In the unrest, thousands of weapons were looted from government stores and armed groups emerged across the country.[2] Violence soon followed, with some groups launching attacks on government infrastructure and others engaging each other for criminal or political reasons. By February 1997, the government had lost control of much of the country to the armed groups. In March, the government collapsed entirely, leading to a state of emergency being declared. However, the desertion of much of the police and military meant that this was unenforceable.[3]

With thousands dead and the violence increasing, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) appointed a Special Envoy to develop a solution with the political parties of Albania. The talks concluded with 10 political parties agreeing to form an interim administration and schedule elections to produce a new government.[4] The unrest across the country continued, leading the EU and OSCE to deploy a joint fact-finding mission to investigate. On 27 March 1997, the OSCE Permanent Council called for the deployment of an international protection force to stabilise the situation, and the following day the UN Security Council approved the response.[5] The Government of Italy took responsibility for establishing the Multinational Protection Force (MPF) and by the middle of April, over 7,000 military personnel were restoring order around the capital, Tirana.[6] This allowed a host of international organisations to begin supplying humanitarian assistance to the population and the Albanian government to recover its grip on the country. While the MPF fulfilled its objectives, the OSCE and EU coordinated their efforts to support the upcoming elections. When the Albanian people went to the polls in June 1997, it was in a safe environment and the contest was deemed credible by international observers.[7] The period of instability and armed conflict in Albania, which cost the lives of over 2,000 people, was ended by the deployment of the MPF and the effective diplomacy of the EU and OSCE.

[1] Christopher Jarvis. “The Rise and Fall of Albania’s Pyramid Schemes.” Finance Development, Vol. 37, No. 1. (2000) Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/03/jarvis.htm (Accessed 06/12/2020)

[2] Jane Perlez. “Bitter Albanians, Facing Anarchy, Arm Themselves.” The New York Times. (1997) Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/14/world/bitter-albanians-facing-anarchy-arm-themselves.html (Accessed 06/12/2020)

[3] Short & Lauenstein. Peace and Conflict Since 1991. p.13

[4] Everts. Peacekeeping in Albania and Kosovo. p.3

[5] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1101. (UN, 1997) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1101 (Accessed 06/12/2020)

[6] P. Tripodi. “Operation Alba: A Necessary and Successful Preventive Deployment.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, No. 4. (2010)

[7] Everts. Peacekeeping in Albania and Kosovo. p.11

Description of Case 

The uneasy peace established between Russia, Georgia, and the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early 1990s held with only relatively minor infractions (notably in 2004) until 2008.[1] A 2006 referendum on South Ossetian independence, Russian intrusions into Georgian airspace, and the collapse of talks under the auspices of the OSCE in October 2007 created a tense climate. This situation developed rapidly the following year when Georgia requested to join NATO and the Kosovan declaration of independence spurred a concerted South Ossetian effort for international recognition. In April 2008, Russia opened formal ties with both Abkhazia and South Ossetia and significantly increased the numbers of troops it had deployed in the area. Armed clashes took place near Tskhinvali in June, increasing in frequency and severity until 8 August, when the Georgian president declared a state of war.[2] At this stage, far more Russian troops were in the contested republics than the peace arrangements negotiated 15 years previously allowed and the Russian Air Force was bombing targets across Georgia. In a matter of days, Georgian forces were forced out of contested parts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by local militia backed by Russian troops. On 10 and 11 August, Russian forces pressed deep into Georgia, temporarily occupying the town of Gori while the Russian navy established a maritime blockade of the Georgian coast.[3] Up to 850 people were killed in the fighting, and almost 200,000 were forced from their homes. With 2,000 hardened Georgian troops returning from Iraq and reserve forces were being mobilised, the stage was set for a much less restrained – and potentially devastating – interstate confrontation.

The EU had developed a growing interest in the Caucasus over the preceding decade, making it ideally placed to facilitate talks to end the conflict and prevent a much larger war. On 12 August, French President Nicholas Sarkozy (in his capacity of chair of the EU) flew to Moscow for talks with the Russian administration. After successfully negotiating an agreement on the cessation of hostilities, Sarkozy took the agreement to the Georgian government, which duly accepted the terms.[4] The agreement also established an EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) to verify the withdrawal of Russian troops and monitor the new frontlines. Although the withdrawal of Russian forces took place slowly, the fighting was over. Just three days later, German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited both Georgia and Russia in support of the peace process.[5]

[1] UCDP. Georgia: South Ossetia. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/393 (Accessed 10/11/2021)

[2] Alexis Crow. “Georgia-Russia Conflict Timeline (includes South Ossetia and Abkhazia)” RUSI Commentary. (7 October 2015) Available at: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/georgia-russia-conflict-timeline-includes-south-ossetia-and-abkhazia (Accessed 10/11/2021)

[3] IWPR Georgia. “Russia’s War With Georgia: 2008 Timeline.” Institute for War & Peace Reporting. (4 August 2014) Available at: https://iwpr.net/global-voices/russias-war-georgia-2008-timeline (Accessed 10/11/2021)

[4] Protocol on Agreement (The Medvedev-Sarkozy-Saakashvili plan), 2008. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/724 (Accessed 11/11/2021)

[5] Richard Whitman & Stefan Wolff. “The EU as a Conflict Manager? The Case of Georgia and Its Implications.” International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 1. (2010) p.92

Description of Case 

The territory around the Ethiopia-Kenya border is home to a range of pastoralist and agropastoralist groups, many of whom traverse the frontier to access seasonal pastures. The Gabra and Borana are two such groups whose communities span both sides of the border. Historically, occasional cattle raiding was the only violent feature of otherwise peaceful relations between these groups. However, increasing pressure on water and pasture reserves in recent decades (combined with the proliferation of small arms) placed great strain on this dynamic. Recurrent droughts in the early 2000s devastated the Borama, who lost almost 80 per cent of their livestock and 98 per cent of their crops.[1] In this context, a dispute over an alleged murder quickly escalated into a raid by the Gabra on the diminished herds of the Borana in June 2002. Initial efforts to calm the situation succeeded in preventing any immediate escalation, and in 2005 local peace committees even mediated a formal peace agreement.[2] However, just a week later, more clashes and raids took place. Skirmishes continued until, on 12 July 2005, approximately 1,000 Gabra conducted a series of raids on the Barana, killing 95 people, destroying villages, and rustling over 10,000 head of livestock.[3] The raiders were eventually chased away by Kenyan security forces, but the shocking attack left the Gabra and Barana locked in a conflict that could have easily escalated into an international crisis had either Kenyan or Ethiopian security personnel become embroiled in the fighting.

Beginning in 2007, elders from both sides of the border began trying to broker a peace between the communities, combining traditional and innovative methods to contain small conflicts and forging local agreements to end feuds and disputes. After laying this foundation, the elders hosted peace conferences encompassing representatives from across society in 2009.[4] These conferences served to systematically end the fighting in each area they took place in, incrementally spreading peace. At an event hosted by the Kenyan National Steering Committee in August 2009, representatives from both communities signed the Dukana-Dillo-Maikona Declaration, pledging to share water and facilitate cross-border trade, while also agreeing to compensation rates for lost lives and livestock. In 2017, the Declaration was updated and reaffirmed.[5] While conflict between pastoralist groups remains a pervasive challenge to peace in the Horn of Africa, these measures ended the conflict between the Borama and the Gabra and reduced armed conflict on the Ethiopian-Kenyan border.

[1] UCDP. Borana – Gabra. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/nonstate/5534 (Accessed 18/11/2021)

[2] Vincent Achuka. “How killing of Gabra man led to massacre in Turbi.” Nation. (9 June 2019) Available at: https://nation.africa/kenya/news/how-killing-of-gabra-man-led-to-massacre-in-turbi-175566?view=htmlamp (Accessed 18/11/2021)

[3] Oscar Gakuo Mwangi. “Kenya: Conflict in the ‘Badlands’: The Turbi Massacre in Marsabit District.” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 33, No. 107. (2006) p.81

[4] Pastoralist Communication Initiative. “The Long Conversation – Gabra-Borana Peace: A Summary of Findings from the research led by the Pastoralist Shade Initiative.” Pastoralists.org. (11 October 2011) Available at: http://www.pastoralists.org/key-findings-on-achieving-peace-released/ (Accessed 18/11/2021)

[5] Validation of the Reviews and Amendments on Dukana-Dillo-Maikona Declaration, 2017. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/1910/Validation%20of%20the%20Reviews%20and%20Amendments%20on%20Dukana-Dillo-Maikona%20Declaration (Accessed 18/11/2021)

Description of Case 

Increasing tensions between Northern Ireland’s Loyalist and Republican communities escalated into armed conflict in the late 1960s. Throughout the 1970s, a complex low-intensity conflict known as “The Troubles” took place between paramilitary groups, with ostensibly neutral British troops and police who were deployed to manage the conflict also becoming embroiled in the fighting. Efforts to end the conflict began as early as 1973, however it was not until the 1990s that meaningful progress was made.[1] A key figure in the lead-up to the negotiations was Northern Irish politician John Hume, whose consistent work for peace in the region earned him the 1998 Nobel Peace Prize along with David Trimble, leader of the dominant Loyalist political party, who also advocated for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.[2] Multi-party negotiations hosted by a representative of the Government of the USA began in Belfast in 1997 between the governments of Ireland and the UK, along with most of the political parties of Northern Ireland.[3] The talks culminated with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (also called the Belfast Agreement) on 10 April 1998.[4]

In addition to ending the armed conflict and laying out terms for disarmament, the Agreement contained comprehensive provisions regarding the future of Northern Ireland. These included the stipulation that although the territory would remain as part of the UK, unification with Ireland was possible if the populations of Ireland and Northern Ireland approved of such a development in referenda. Furthermore, the Agreement established a consociational political assembly in Northern Ireland, which required the approval of both Loyalists and Republicans to pass legislation.[5] A framework for cooperation and closer relations with Ireland was also established via the formation of the North South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference.[6] Northern Irish citizens were also guaranteed the right to identify as British, Irish, or both, and became entitled to enjoy full citizenship in Ireland and the UK. Although a few relatively minor Republican factions rejected the peace, Northern Ireland has largely been free from conflict since 1998.[7]

[1] Landon E. Hancock. “The Northern Irish Peace Process: From Top to Bottom.” International Studies review, Vol. 10, No. 2. (2008)

[2] The Nobel Prize. The Nobel Peace Prize 1998. (Nobel Prize, 2020) Available at: https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1998/press-release/ (Accessed 05/11/2020)

[3] United States Institute of Peace. “George Mitchell: Building Peace in Northern Ireland.” USIP. (2020) Available at: https://www.usip.org/public-education/educators/george-mitchell-building-peace-northern-ireland (Accessed 05/11/2020)

[4] The Belfast Agreement, 1998. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement (Accessed 05/11/2020)

[5] Northern Ireland Assembly. Evolution of Devolution. (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2020) Available at: https://education.niassembly.gov.uk/post_16/evolution_of_devolution (Accessed 05/11/2020)

[6] North South Ministerial Council. Areas of Co-Operation. (North South Ministerial Council, 2020) Available at: https://www.northsouthministerialcouncil.org/areas-of-cooperation (Accessed 05/11/2020); Conflict Archive on the Internet. Devolved Government British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIC). (CAIN, 2019) Available at: https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/politics/conference/ (Accessed 05/11/2020)

[7] Peace Accords Matrix. Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement. (Krox Institute for International Peace Studies, 2020) Available at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/northern-ireland-good-friday-agreement (Accessed 05/11/2020)

Description of Case 

The Communist Party of Kampuchea (commonly referred to as the Khmer Rouge) seized power in Cambodia in 1975, as the lengthy conflict in neighbouring Vietnam was coming to an end. With Chinese backing, the new government embarked on an ambitious revolutionary programme which ultimately cost the lives of up to 2 million people (approximately 25 percent of the population).[1] Furthermore, just days after Saigon was captured by Vietnamese communists, Khmer Rouge leaders launched a brutal invasion of southern Vietnam. The attack sparked a long and bloody war in which Vietnamese forces, with support from the Soviet Union, occupied Cambodia, removed the Khmer Rouge from office, and placed a sympathetic government in power in Phnom Penh.[2] Between 1979 and 1989, a range of armed groups sponsored by the US fought the occupying Vietnamese forces (and each other) in a complex low-intensity armed conflict. The end of the Cold War led to a sharp decline in international interest in Cambodia. Vietnam began withdrawing its forces in 1989, leaving behind a Cambodian government in place to negotiate a formal end to the conflict.[3]

Efforts to end the armed conflict in Cambodia began in 1987, when the possibility of a power-sharing arrangement between the two main non-communist armed groups and the Vietnamese-backed government was explored during talks in France. This proposal was rejected by the Government of China as it excluded the Khmer Rouge and was also dismissed by the Government of the USA as it legitimised the Vietnamese-backed government.[4] Further talks were held in Jakarta in July 1988 and February 1989, and although little progress was made in the Indonesian capital, the role of an international control mechanism for supervising the implementation of a future agreement was introduced to the peace process.[5] With negotiations at a standstill, the UN Security Council proposed a framework for the resolution of the conflict in August 1989.[6] The four Cambodian parties to the peace process agreed to the UN framework in April 1991, and held additional talks in Thailand, before signing the Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict in Paris on 23 October 1991.[7] After decades of armed conflict, Cambodia was at peace.

[1] David Chandler. “Cambodia’s Historical Legacy.” in Dylan Hendrickson, ed. Safeguarding Peace: Cambodia’s Constitutional Challenge. (London: Conciliation Resources, 1998) p.12

[2] Stephen J. Morris. Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia.: Political Culture and the Causes of War. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) pp.219-229

[3] Simon Chesterman. You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) pp.73-4

[4] Chandler. “Cambodia’s Historical Legacy.” p.19

[5] Elaine Sciolino. “Cambodia Peace Talks End With Positions Unchanged.” The New York Times. (1988) Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/29/world/cambodia-peace-talks-end-with-positions-unchanged.html (Accessed 29/11/2020)

[6] Chandler. “Cambodia’s Historical Legacy.” p.19

[7] Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, 1991. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/cambodiaparisagreement91 (Accessed 01/11/2020)

Description of Case 

The territory of contemporary Western Sahara was administered as the Spanish Sahara by the Government of Spain until 1976, when a UN-assisted peaceful post-colonial transition was supposed to culminate in a popular referendum deciding the political future of the territory. Instead, when Spanish forces withdrew, the governments of Morocco and Mauritania partitioned the area, with Saguia el Hamra in the north becoming Moroccan territory and Rio de Oro in the south being annexed by Mauritania. An armed group from the area called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) contested their claims on the territory and launched an armed struggle for independence.^[1] The fighting in Rio de Oro was brought to an end following a coup d’état in Mauritania in 1978, however, the Government of Morocco then laid claim Rio de Oro in addition to Saguia el Hamra and the conflict between POLISARIO and the Moroccan government engulfed the entire territory.^[2] Efforts to resolve the conflict were initially led by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), but in 1985 the UN Secretary-General convinced the King of Morocco to participate in a UN-led peace process and allow the delayed referendum to go ahead.^[3] Further negotiations resulted in an informal ceasefire in 1989, allowing the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (Misión de las Naciones Unidas para la Organización de un Referéndum en el Sáhara Occidental, MINURSO) to be established in April 1991.^[4] The first MINURSO observers arrived in September of that year.[5]

The UN operation was intended to keep the peace for a transitional period, during which time a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General would have complete authority over all matters relating to the referendum. Initially, the referendum was scheduled for January 1992. However, disputes over the criteria for eligibility (the Government of Morocco has moved 350,000 people into the region, thus complicating any election) have prevented it from taking place. Instead, the peace process remains deadlocked and MINURSO’s activities are restricted to monitoring compliance with the ceasefire. In 1996, with little progress being made on the terms of the referendum, the civilian and police staff of MINURSO were withdrawn. The military observers remain in place to this day, continuing their work maintaining the ceasefire and facilitating dialogue between the belligerents.^[6] Although a resolution to the conflict remains unlikely, MINURSO has successfully helped to keep the peace and prevent a conflict relapse in Western Sahara for almost thirty years.^[7]

[1] UCDP. Morocco: Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara). (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/331 (Accessed 03/12/2020)

[2] UCDP. Government of Mauritania – POLISARIO. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/893 (Accessed 03/12/2020)

[3] Anna Theofilopoulou. “The United Nations and Western Sahara: A Never-ending Affair.” USIP Special Report, No. 166. (2006) p.3

[4] UCDP. Morocco: Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara).

[5] MINURSO. Chronology of Events. (UN, 2022) Available at: https://minurso.unmissions.org/chronology-events (Accessed 16/01/2022)

[6] MINURSO. Background. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://minurso.unmissions.org/background (Accessed 03/12/2020)

[7] UCDP. Morocco: Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara).

Description of Case 

The February 2014 Maidan Revolution in Ukraine culminated with the removal of the pro-Russian administration and its replacement with a pro-Western government. In the aftermath of the revolution, the new Ukrainian administration abolished many of the rights and privileges enjoyed by the country’s sizeable Russian population, many former officials fled to Russia, the Government of Russia declared the transition to be a fascist coup, and Russian armed forces annexed Crimea.[1] The deteriorating situation led to the emergence of several pro-Russian armed groups which, in April 2014, declared the formation of independent republics on territory in the eastern oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk (bordering Russia) and began receiving support directly from the Government of Russia. By May, the Ukrainian military and a range of militias were engaged with the pro-Russian separatists across eastern Ukraine. With the US and European governments offering varying degrees of support to Ukraine and the Russian military deploying thousands of troops in Ukrainian territory (and stationing many more just across the border), the fighting threatened to escalate into a much greater conflict.[2]

The international response to the conflict was led by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As early as March 2014, an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission was operating across Ukraine, observing events and promoting dialogue.[3] The OSCE also facilitated lengthy talks between Ukraine and Russia in Belarus in August-September 2014.[4] The negotiations concluded with the signing of the Minsk Agreement, which called for a ceasefire, continued dialogue, and certain reforms.[5] Although Minsk provided a clear framework for the resolution of the conflict, its key provision, a ceasefire, collapsed within days. In February 2015, the belligerents met again, approving a new package of measures known as Minsk II.[6] The agreements failed to end the fighting, leading to fresh talks in September 2016, again hosted by the OSCE. The negotiations resulted in an agreement on disengagement and contributed to a reduction in fighting in certain areas, however by 2018 these areas were once again in conflict.[7] Efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the war have failed. However, the OSCE has maintained dialogue between the belligerents throughout the conflict and has overseen the development of a framework for ending the fighting, should a ceasefire manage to hold.[8]

Authors note: As I update this case on 19 January 2022, the armed conflict in Ukraine remains contained to Donetsk and Luhansk, but Russian troops are massing on the Ukrainian border and recent diplomatic efforts have failed to offer much hope of de-escalation and resolution anytime soon.

[1] UCDP. Ukraine: Donetsk. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/13246 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[2] Ibid.

[3] OSCE. OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[4] International Crisis Group. “Peace in Ukraine (II): A New Approach to Disengagement.” Europe Report No. 260. (2020) p.1

[5] Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group (Minsk Agreement), 2014. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/ua-ceasefire-2014 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[6] Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, 2015. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/ukraine-minsk-implementation15 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[7] Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware, 2016. Available at: https://www.osce.org/cio/266266 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[8] Cindy Wittke. “The Minsk Agreements – more than “scraps of paper?” East European Politics, Vol. 35, No. 3. (2019) p.264

Description of Case 

Within the framework of the Soviet Union, the Prigorodny District was initially part of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. After the Ingush and Chechen populations were forcibly deported to central Asia and the Chechen-Ingush Republic was disbanded on the orders of Stalin in 1944, Prigorodny was absorbed into the neighbouring North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. When the deported populations returned to their homelands and the Chechen-Ingush Republic was re-established in 1957, the area had been settled by Ossetians and Russians and Prigorodny remained as part of North Ossetia rather than returning to the Chechen-Ingush Republic.[1] As the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was established on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic, the Ingush chose to join the newly created Russian Federation. In the midst of this period of uncertainty, the fate of Prigorodny and its population became a major point of contention for political leaders in the region. For the Ingush, particularly those who had struggled to re-establish themselves in Prigorodny despite the protests of the Ossetian and Russian settlers, the territory should have been ‘returned’ to the newly established Russian Federal Republic of Ingushetia. For Ossetians, Prigorodny had been part of their home since 1944. It was in this context that fighting erupted in East Prigorodny on 31 October 1992, sparking the first armed conflict on Russian territory since the collapse of the Soviet Union. With support from some Russian security forces, North Ossetian security personnel and paramilitaries expelled most of the Ingush population (up to 64,000 people) in the Republic of North Ossetia in a week.[2]

Although Russian forces had participated in the conflict, it was the Government of Russia that held the key to ending the fighting and preventing an inter-republic conflict within the Federation. A sizeable contingent of the Russian Army, exercising emergency powers decreed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, brought stability to the situation and ended the fighting (after about 600 deaths) on 6 November 1992. A Temporary Administration, also established by the emergency powers and answering directly to Yeltsin, ruled by decree in both North Ossetia and Ingushetia until February 1995. Displaced Ingush were allowed to return to select villages in East Prigorodny and some hostages were returned.[3] Although the territory remains contested, the conflict has been contained since 1992.

[1] Olga Osipova. “North Ossetia and Ingushetia: The First Clash.” In Alexei Arbatov, Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes, & Lara Olsen, eds. Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) pp.40-2

[2] Human Rights Watch. The Ingush-Ossetian Conflict in the Prigorodny Region. (HRW, 1996) Available at: https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Russia.htm (Accessed 27/10/2021)

[3] Osipova. “North Ossetia and Ingushetia.” p.57-61

Description of Case 

Nagorno-Karabakh is a region that has been a de jure part of Azerbaijan since the 1920s but retains a majority Armenian population. In February 1988, the provincial government of the region voted to join Armenia. In November 1989, as the Soviet Union began to collapse, the Armenian administration declared Nagorno-Karabakh to be part of a unified Armenia. When Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent from the Soviet Union in 1991, the administration in Nagorno-Karabakh proclaimed the establishment of the independent Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.[1] The dispute had become increasingly violent since 1990, with reports of intercommunal strife across the area. In the first months of 1992, the Government of Azerbaijan launched a large offensive to assert its control of the area. For the rest of the year, bitter fighting took place across the region between the Azerbaijani military and the forces of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, which received support from the Government of Armenia.[2] Efforts to halt the fighting were first led by the Government of Iran, before the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) took over in June 1992 and formed the Minsk Group (France, Russia, and the USA) to mediate the resolution of the conflict.[3] It was not, however, until 1994 when the fighting was finally ended by a ceasefire unilaterally mediated by the Government of Russia.[4]

The ceasefire established a 175km Line of Control to separate the belligerents while further talks were held, and although both parties agreed in principle to the creation of an international peacekeeping mission to patrol it, no such force was deployed.[5] As a result, the only factors preventing further conflict (other than the restraint of each party) was the influence of the Government of Russia and the ongoing mediation of the Minsk Group. In a relatively unique example of long-term international cooperation, the Minsk Group has maintained an ongoing dialogue between the parties to the conflict for over 25 years.[6] Through regular engagement, the Group successfully prevented the dispute from sparking a repeat of the early 1990s or a direct confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan.[7] At the time of writing, the eruption of fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh in October 2020 has ended following another intervention by the Government of Russia. The armed conflict has again been contained, although this time the deployment of peacekeepers were required. 

[1] Lionel Beehner. “Nagorno-Karabakh: The Crisis in the Caucasus.” Council on Foreign Relations. (2005) Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/nagorno-karabakh-crisis-caucasus (Accessed 09/12/2020)

[2] UCDP. Azerbaijan: Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/388 (Accessed 09/12/2020)

[3] OSCE. Minsk Group: What we do. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: https://www.osce.org/mg/108305 (Accessed 09/12/2020)

[4] Bishkek Protocol, 1994. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/armeniaazerbaijan-bishkekprotocol94 (Accessed 09/12/2020)

[5] Conciliation Resources. “Securing an Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement: the roles of international and local security providers.” Discussion Paper. (2015) p.5

[6] For example: Joint Declaration between the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation, 2008. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/azerbaijanarmeniarussia-declaration2008 (Accessed 09/12/2020)

[7] Carey Cavanaugh. “OSCE and the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process.” Security and Human Rights, Vol. 27, No. 3. (2016)

Description of Case 

As the Soviet Union began to collapse in 1989, the Moldovan population was divided on the question of independence. An increasingly tense political climate led pro-Soviet groups along the border with Ukraine to announce the formation of a new Republic, Transnistria, which they declared would remain in the Soviet Union. The unfolding crisis continued to escalate, despite Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev dismissing the declaration as void.[1] Following the attempted coup in Moscow in 1991, independence was proclaimed by Moldovan leaders in the capital, Chișinău. A few months later, leaders in Transnistria declared independence from Moldova. Fighting began when Moldovan police (an army was yet to be established) attempted to gain control of government buildings in Transnistria from paramilitary forces.[2] The conflict continued to escalate until June 1992, when a Russian military intervention in support of the separatists drove back a Moldovan offensive.

Efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict began in April 1992, but it was not until June that progress was made. The Agreement on Principles, signed in July 1992, formally ended the conflict and provided for the establishment of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) to keep the peace in Transnistria.[3] The JCC, a 5,500-strong peacekeeping mission formed of Moldovan, Transnistrian, and Russian military personnel, was tasked with monitoring the ceasefire and separating the belligerents.[4] The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has served as an observer on the JCC since its formation, gathering information on the conflict, the activities of the erstwhile belligerents, and the work of the peacekeeping mission. In addition, the OSCE has maintained dialogue between the parties to the conflict, shuttling between leaders in Chișinău and Transnistria while also convening international talks on the issue at the highest levels.[5] These efforts made noteworthy progress in recent years, with the Berlin, Vienna, and Rome protocols demonstrating some promise for finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict.[6] Since 2005, the EU has also been working to maintain stability in the area through the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine.[7] Although the conflict remains unresolved, decades of work by the JCC and OSCE have prevented another eruption of fighting.

[1] Cristian Urse. “Solving Transnistria: Any Optimists Left?” Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, Vol. 7, No. 1. (2008) p.58

[2] UCDP. Moldova: Dniestr. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/394 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[3] Agreement on the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Dniester Region of the Republic of Moldova, 1992. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/moldova-peacefullsettlementdniestr92 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[4] Short & Lauenstein. Peace and Conflict Since 1991. p.131

[5] OSCE. “Conflict prevention and resolution.” OSCE Mission to Moldova. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova/104529 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[6] Protocol of the Official Meeting of the Permanent Conference for Political Questions in the Framework of the Negotiating Process on the Transdniestrian Settlement, 2018. Available at: https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/382885 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[7] EUBAM. What we do? Conflict Resolution. (EUBAM, 2020) Available at: http://eubam.org/what-we-do/conflict-resolution/ (Accessed 01/12/2020)