Description of Case 

Ogaden is a historical name of the contemporary Ethiopian federal state of the Somali Region. Colonised by the Ethiopian Empire in the nineteenth century but with a predominantly Somali population, the region served as a buffer between Addis Ababa and the encroachments of European powers in the Horn of Africa for decades.[1] In the aftermath of the Second World War, Ogaden was formally handed over to the re-established Ethiopian state after its liberation from Italian rule by the British. The emergence of a unified and independent Somalia in 1960 inspired armed resistance to Ethiopian rule in Ogaden, and in 1977 this movement took full advantage of upheaval in Addis Ababa to seize large swathes of territory in the region. These efforts were supported by the Somali National Army, sparking the Ogaden War (1977-1978) between Ethiopia and Somalia, which ended with an Ethiopian victory. In this context, the failure of new governments to address demands for autonomy or self-determination in Ogaden during the 1990s (as neighbouring Somalia collapsed into conflict) inspired another armed rebellion, this time led by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). The conflict escalated considerably in 2007, after ONLF troops attacked an oil prospecting camp, leading to an increasingly harsh response from Ethiopian security forces and local Somali militias more opposed to the ONLF than Ethiopian rule.[2]

 In 2011, the Government of Ethiopia asked their Kenyan counterparts to facilitate peace talks with the ONLF. The following year, the parties met for the first time in Nairobi under the guidance of a team led by a Kenyan Somali minister (Kenya has historically been more successful in integrating its Somali population) and advised by the NGO Conciliation Resources.[3] After an initial round of dialogue resulted in a Declaration of Principles, ONLF leaders attended negotiations training in London with Conciliation Resources. However, progress stalled until, in 2015, Conciliation Resources advised the ONLF to begin talks with the regional administration of the Somali Regional State, which had grown in power and influence since 2010. After some initial overtures, these parties met for secret talks in Dubai in November 2017.[4] This set the tone for more conclusive talks to take place after the unexpected change of power which brought the current Abiy Ahmed administration to power in April 2018. The ONLF declared a ceasefire in June, before attending negotiations in Dubai, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, culminating with the Asmara Peace Declaration on 21 October 2018.[5]

[1] Tobias Hagmann. Talking Peace in the Ogaden: The Search for an end to conflict in the Somali Regional State in Ethiopia. (London, 2014) pp.13-4

[2] Ibid. p.26

[3] Aden Abdi. “Pathways to peace in Ogaden: Navigating symbolism in early peace talks.” Accord, Vol. 29. (2020) p.66

[4] Ibid. p.70

[5] Joint Declaration between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (The Asmara Declaration), 2018. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/2231 (Accessed 3/11/2021)

Description of Case 

After gaining independence from France in 1977, an authoritarian president ruled Djibouti. Increasing tensions between the regime and the political opposition throughout the 1980s inspired three predominantly Afar groups to form an armed group, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), in 1991. In November 1991, FRUD launched an insurgency in northern Djibouti and soon controlled several cities.[1] The conflict quickly escalated, with fighting spreading across the country and government forces committing atrocities against civilians.[2] At the end of November, the Government of France (which maintained a military presence in Djibouti) dispatched military observers to the north of the country to monitor events.[3] This marked the beginning of a lengthy French effort to end the conflict.

In February 1992, the French government dispatched a diplomatic mission to facilitate dialogue between the belligerents.[4] Within weeks, a ceasefire was negotiated, and French peacekeepers were deployed to verify compliance. Further talks led to the promulgation of a multiparty constitution in 1992. However, the incumbent administration refused to allow FRUD to run in elections, derailing the peace process and sparking a resumption of fighting in November 1992, leading to the withdrawal of French forces.[5] Fighting continued throughout 1993, with a large government offensive capturing much FRUD-held territory and driving 100,000 people from their homes. A split in FRUD in 1994 led to renewed efforts to resolve the conflict, with one faction entering into negotiations (again mediated by French diplomats) with the Government of Djibouti. The talks bore fruit in June 1994, with an agreement to cease hostilities and allow FRUD to participate in politics.[6] In December 1994, the Accord of Peace and National Reconciliation was signed, formalising the end of the conflict, revising the constitution, and incorporating FRUD representatives into a power-sharing government.[7] FRUC-C, the remaining faction of the group, elected to continue fighting until entering negotiations in 1999. These talks produced two more peace agreements in 2000-2001, which not only ended the fighting but also stipulated a comprehensive package of reforms focusing on constitutional reform, the electoral process, and decentralisation.[8]

[1] UCDP. Djibouti: Government. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/379 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[2] Jane Perlez. “Soldiers Fire Into Crowd in Djibouti Tribal Strife.” The New York Times. (1991) Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/20/world/soldiers-fire-into-crowd-in-djibouti-tribal-strife.html (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[3] Mohamed Kadamy. “Djibouti: Between War and Peace.” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 23, No. 7. (1996) p.518

[4] Minorities at Risk Project. Chronology of Afars in Djibouti. (Minorities at Risk Project, 2004) Available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f3882c.html (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[5] UCDP. Djibouti: Government.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Accord de paix et de reconciliation nationale, 1994. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/djibouti-accordpaix94 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[8] Accord cadre de réforme et de concorde civile, 2000. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/djibouti-cadrereforme2000 (Accessed 01/12/2020); Accord de réforme et de concorde civile, 2001. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/djibouti-concordecivile2001 (Accessed 01/12/2020)

Description of Case 

In August 1998, fifteen months after a broad opposition coalition backed by Rwanda and Uganda ousted Mobutu Sese Seko from power during the First Congo War, another major conflict erupted. Yet another broad opposition coalition, again backed by troops from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, launched offensives from Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with the goal of replacing Mobutu’s successor, Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The Government of Rwanda played a major role in the conflict, with senior Rwandan military officers commanding this coalition of armed groups. Just as victory seemed within reach for the opposition following a daring airborne operation to capture Kitona on the mouth of the Congo river to the west of Kinshasa, allies of the Government of Congo mobilised in support of Kabila. Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia deployed troops in support of the embattled administration, who were later joined by contingents from Sudan, Libya, and Chad.[1] Divisions between the governments of Uganda and Rwanda emerged, leading to further conflict and adding another dimension to the conflict. By 2001, the DRC was devastated by conflict, millions had died, and half the country was controlled by opposition groups backed by the governments of Uganda or Rwanda.[2] The extent of foreign involvement earned the Second Congo War the monikers “the Great African War” and “Africa’s World War.”

Efforts to end the armed conflict in DRC began in June 1999, when negotiations mediated by the Zambian president resulted in the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.[3] Although many aspects of the accord (the deployment of UN peacekeepers, for example) were later incorporated into the peace process, Lusaka itself failed to end the war. In January 2001, Kabila was assassinated, considerably changing the political dynamics of the situation. His son, Joseph, succeeded him and began preparing the ground for a comprehensive peace process and Inter-Congolese Dialogue to take place.[4] Combined with the belated arrival of UN peacekeepers and the backing that Western governments and institutions offered the younger Kabila, this led the foreign governments embroiled in the conflict to begin withdrawing their forces.[5] After several false starts, a breakthrough was finally made during negotiations hosted by the Government of South Africa in 2002, leading to further troop withdrawals from DRC and the de-escalation of the conflict.[6] The talks culminated on 2 April 2003 with the signing of the Sun City Agreement in South Africa, which formally ended the Second Congolese War.[7]

[1] Kris Berwouts. Congo’s Violent Peace: Conflict and Struggle Since the Great African War. (Zed Books: London, 2017) pp.19-20

[2] Jason K. Stearns. Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of Congo and the Great War of Africa. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012) p.188

[3] Ceasefire Agreement (Lusaka Agreement), 1999. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-lusaka-agreement99 (Accessed 05/01/2022)

[4] Acte d’Engagement Gaborone, 2001. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-engagementgaberone2001 (Accessed 05/01/2022)

[5] Gérard Prunier. Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) pp.265-9

[6] Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Pretoria Agreement), 2002. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-agreementontransition2002 (Accessed 05/01/2022)

[7] Inter-Congolese Negotiations: The Final Act (Sun City Agreement), 2003. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-suncity-agreement2003 (Accessed 05/01/2022)

Description of Case 

Three years after the Congress for the Defence of the People (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple, CNDP) and the Congolese government ended the armed conflict between them in North Kivu, some disaffected former CNDP officers with support from the Rwandan government staged a mutiny in the aftermath of the contested 2011 general election. Citing the failure of the government to implement the terms of the 2009 agreement with the CNDP, the mutineers created a new armed group and named it the 23 March Movement (Mouvement du 23 mars, M23) before launching an insurgency against DRC security forces. By July 2012, M23 had raised a force of up to 2,000 troops and controlled territory in North Kivu along the border with Rwanda.[1] Like the CNDP before it, M23 created the basic structures of a state, collected revenue, and established a political wing. The M23 campaign relied on support from the governments of Rwanda and, to a lesser extent, Uganda. Both supplied military and logistical support despite their previous commitments to respect the Congolese border. In November 2012, M23 forces captured Goma, the capital city of North Kivu, in a large offensive that was supported (and possibly directed) by the Rwandan armed forces.[2] The inability of DRC security forces to defend Goma not only led to another humanitarian crisis as the civilian population fled the town, but also opened the door to more conflict, such as attacks on civilians by Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.[3]

The effort to end the rebellion began at the end of November 2012, when M23 forces withdrew from Goma to kick-start negotiations. Talks were subsequently held in Kampala, Uganda, under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and resulted in the signing of a framework agreement on 16 January 2013.[4] This failed to end the conflict and following a violent split of the M23 organisation in February, fighting between the movement and government security forces resumed in May 2013. By this point, international concern over the worsening situation in North Kivu began to manifest into action. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon mediated the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the Great Lakes, which revitalised earlier commitments to regional peace, while the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo created and deployed the Force Intervention Brigade to North Kivu to improve the security situation.[5] Alongside Congolese troops, this intervention ended external support for M23 and force its leaders to the negotiating table. In November-December 2013, the Government of Democratic Republic of Congo and M23 issued declarations which formally ended the conflict.[6]

[1] Jason Stearns. “From CNDP to M23: The evolution of an armed movement in eastern Congo.” Rift Valley Institute Usalama Project. (2012) p.45

[2] Kris Berwouts. Congo’s Violent Peace: Conflict and Struggle Since the Great African War. (Zed Books: London, 2017) p.120

[3] Ibid. p.121

[4] UCDP. Government of DR Congo (Zaire) – M23. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/11982 (Accessed 06/01/2022)

[5] Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, 2013. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-framework-agreement2013 (Accessed 06/01/2022); United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo. Background. (UN Peacekeeping, 2022) Available at: https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/background (Accessed 06/01/2022)

[6] BBC. “DR Congo government ‘signs deal with M23 in Kenya’.” BBC News. (12 December 2013) Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25357821 (Accessed 06/01/2022)

Description of Case 

The series of peace initiatives implemented in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 2002-2006 ended the Second Congo War, established mechanisms to prevent further interstate conflict in the region, and successfully prevented electoral violence during the 2006 general election from sparking renewed fighting. Despite such efforts, however, armed conflict continued to plague considerable areas of the DRC, such as the province of North Kivu on the international border with Rwanda and Uganda. Rather than joining the ongoing peace process, Congolese armed groups in Eastern DRC such as the National Congress for the Defence of the People (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple, CNDP), whose personnel had fought alongside Rwandan forces during the preceding decade, favoured maintaining their autonomy and operational links with the Government of Rwanda.[1] Beginning in 2004, the CNDP began launching attacks on DRC security forces in Eastern DRC and established itself as the de facto administration of a parallel state in territory along the border with Rwanda. In 2006, the CNDP ran as a political party in the DRC general election, but in the aftermath (after it and its allies failed to win many votes) the organisation continued its armed insurgency against the government. By 2008, the CNDP controlled approximately one third of North Kivu, commanded over 5,000 troops, and had created a civil service, police force, tax collection apparatus, radio station, and military hospital in the area they controlled.[2] With consistent support from Kigali, there was little incentive for CNDP leaders to give up the power and territory that they had accumulated during the recent turbulent history of the region.

In 2008, a UN panel of experts published a long-awaited report on conflict in the DRC.[3] For the first time, the extent of the Rwandan government’s ongoing support of the CNDP was revealed, leading to widespread condemnation and the suspension of aid from some donors.[4] Anticipating such developments, the DRC and Rwandan governments had already held talks on the issue and, in January 2009, launched a joint operation to arrest the leader of the CNDP (Laurent Nkunda) and end the conflict in North Kivu.[5] Two months later, on 23 March 2009, the groups’ new leader signed a peace treaty with the Government of DRC and integrated their troops into the national armed forces.[6] Nkunda remains under house arrest in Rwanda, but a faction of the CNDP rejected the peace process and launched a fresh insurgency, leaving the conflict not entirely resolved.

[1] UCDP. DR Congo (Zaire): Government. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/283 (Accessed 06/01/2022)

[2] UCDP. CNDP. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/426 (Accessed 06/01/2022)

[3] Group of Experts on the DRC. Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC submitted in accordance with paragraph 18(d) of Security Council resolution 1807. (UN, 2008) Available at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1533/panel-of-experts/expert-reports (Accessed 06/01/2022)

[4] Ben Shepherd. “Congo, Rwanda and the National Congress for the Defence of the People.” Accord, Vol. 22. (2011) p.45

[5] Kris Berwouts. Congo’s Violent Peace: Conflict and Struggle Since the Great African War. (Zed Books: London, 2017) p.74

[6] Peace Agreement between the Government and the CNDP (and the Implementation Plan), 2009. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-peace-agreement-cndp2009 (Accessed 06/01/2022); Jason Stearns. “From CNDP to M23: The evolution of an armed movement in eastern Congo.” Rift Valley Institute Usalama Project. (2012) p.35

Description of Case 

Croatia emerged from socialist Yugoslavia as an independent state in October 1991 after the result of a referendum held in May of that year was implemented following a three-month moratorium on the decision, as advised by the European Community (EC) in the hope of a peaceful outcome to the crisis. Many Croatian Serbs (who represented 12 percent of the population) rejected independence and sought to forcibly prevent Croatia from leaving Yugoslavia. When this strategy failed, Croatian Serb leaders proclaimed the formation of a new state, Republika Srpska Krajina (RS), on the territory (around one third) of Croatia that they held and declared their intention to remain a part of Yugoslavia in December 1991.[1] Ongoing talks mediated by the UN secured a series of ceasefire agreements between November 1991 and January 1992, allowing peacekeepers of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to deploy in interpositionary locations and contain the fighting. This lasted until January 1993, when the armed conflict erupted again.[2]

The effort to end the war in Croatia was led by an informal Contact Group composed of the EC and the UN, and the governments of Russia and the USA. In March 1994, Russian officials brokered another ceasefire between the belligerents, paving the way for further dialogue.[3] The Contact Group then drafted the Z-4 Plan, an agreement which was intended to bring an end to the fighting and establish a framework for a lengthier peace process. The Croatian Government agreed to use Z-4 as the basis for negotiations, but the Croatian Serb leadership (backed by Slobodan Milošević) rejected it as it did not recognise RSK as an independent state.[4] As 1995 progressed, the military situation of RSK significantly deteriorated.[5] By August, Milošević and many within the Croatian Serb leadership were calling for the initiation of a peace process based on the Z-4 Plan. At this point in the war, however, they had been resoundingly defeated on the battlefield in Croatia, thus losing much of the leverage they had held just months earlier.[6] The Contact Group renewed its efforts on 16 August. Just two weeks later, representatives of RSK and the Croatian government met for the first and only face-to-face negotiations of the war.[7] The talks culminated with the signing of the Basic Agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium in the village of Erdut on 12 November 1995. The Agreement stipulated that Serb-held territory would remain within Croatia but would enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy, while also offering provisions for the protection of minority rights and local elections. [8] In addition, it called for the UN to administer former RSK territory during the first two years of the post-conflict transition.[9]

[1] James Gow. The Serbian Project and its Adversaries. (London: Hurst, 2003) pp.145-171

[2] Ceasefire Agreement of 23 November 1991, 1991. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/croatia-ceasefire91 (Accessed 16/11/2020)

[3] Ceasefire Agreement of 29 March 1994, 1994. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/croatia-ceasefire94 (Accessed 16/11/2020)

[4] Peter W. Galbraith. “Washington, Erdut and Dayton: Negotiating and Implementing Peace in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 30, No. 3. (1997) p.646

[5] Gow. The Serbian Project and its Adversaries. p.192

[6] Peter Galbraith. “Negotiating peace in Croatia.” in Brad K. Blitz. War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) p.127

[7] Ibid. p.128

[8] Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (Erdut Agreement), 1995. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/croatia-erdutagreement95 (Accessed 16/11/2020)

[9] UN Peacekeeping. Croatia – UNTAES: United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Salvonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium. (Backgrounder). (UN, 1997) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/untaes_b.htm#MANDATE (Accessed 16/11/2020)

Description of Case 

An armed conflict erupted in Côte d’Ivoire in September 2002 following a mutiny by contingents of the armed forces based in the north of the country. After some initial clashes, the country was soon divided between the government-held south and the north, which was held by an armed group that emerged from the mutinying soldiers and political opposition, the Forces Nouvelles Côte d’Ivoire (FNCI). French troops permanently based in Côte d’Ivoire served as makeshift peacekeepers, separating the belligerents and limiting the fighting as far as their resources allowed.[1] Significant diplomatic pressure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Government of France convinced the belligerents to sign the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accord in January 2003, which provided for a cease-fire and the formation of a transitional administration.[2] In support of the Accord, the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) and the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (Mission des Nations unies en Côte d’Ivoire, MINUCI) were deployed alongside the French troops already in the country. In April 2004, ECOMICI and MINUI were merged to form the 7,000-strong United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).[3]

With UNOCI containing the fighting, much of Côte d’Ivoire was spared from armed conflict during the peace process. Ongoing negotiations hosted by ECOWAS and the African Union (AU) resulted in the signing of several peace agreements between 2003 and 2005 (Accra II, Accra III, Pretoria, and Ouagadougou), however the transitional government and elections stipulated in the accords failed to materialise, leaving Côte d’Ivoire divided and the conflict unresolved.[4] When elections finally took place in 2011, the disputed result led to an eruption of violence. The international community, including the AU and UN, recognised the decision of the Ivorian Electoral Commission and supported the opposition candidate, Alassane Ouattara. However, the incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo, claimed victory himself and refused to step down. With the conflict nearing its tenth year, UNOCI supported an offensive by Frenched-backed FNCI forces to oust Gbagbo and install Ouattara.[5] The war came to an end with the arrest of Gbagbo on 11 April 2011.[6] UNOCI remained in Côte d’Ivoire until 2017, supporting the reconstruction of the Ivorian state, supervising the 2015 elections, providing border security, and assisting Ouattara’s administration with extensive Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform programmes.[7]

[1] Short. “Assessing International Statebuilding Initiative Effectiveness at Preventing Armed Conflict Recurrence.” pp.63-8

[2] Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, 2003. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/cotedivoire-linasmarcousis2003 (Accessed 11/11/2020)

[3] Obi. “Economic Community of West African States on the Ground.” p.129

[4] Ibid. p.131

[5] David Smith. “Ivory Coast: UN’s intervention broke the impasse.” The Guardian. (2011) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/05/ivory-coast-un-intervention (Accessed 11/11/2020)

[6] Xan Rice & Nicholas Watt. “Ivory Coast’s Laurent Gbagbo arrested – four months on.” The Guardian. (2011) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/11/ivory-coast-former-leader-arrested (Accessed 11/11/2020)

[7] UN Peacekeeping. UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Côte D’Ivoire. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unoci.shtml (Accessed 11/11/2020)

Description of Case 

Comoros is a small archipelago in the Indian Ocean composed of three main islands. Since becoming independent from France in 1975, Comorian politics has been disrupted by over 20 coup d’états. In 1995, one such coup took place, but a French intervention restored constitutional order, and a new president was elected the following year.^[1] The new administration promulgated a new constitution centralising the fragmented political structure of Comoros at the expense of the autonomy of smaller islands such as Moheli and Anjouan. In August 1997, the regional administrations of these islands responded by announcing their secession from Comoros and declaring their intention to re-join France or become independent.^[2] The government on the main island, Grand Comore (also known as Ngazidja), dispatched troops to Anjouan with the intention of reasserting control over the island, sparking an armed conflict. Government forces were initially driven off the island. In the aftermath of the offensive, fighting broke out between the separatists, further complicating the crisis.^[3]

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) led the international response to the conflict, appointing a Special Envoy and tasking him with mediating a settlement which preserved the territorial integrity of Comoros.^[4] After making some initial progress with shuttle diplomacy, the OAU Observer Mission to Comoros (OMIC) was deployed to monitor the situation and build confidence. In December 1997, the OAU hosted negotiations in Ethiopia which resulted in the Addis Ababa Agreement.^[5] The Agreement represented little more than a commitment to finding a solution to the conflict and continued fighting on Anjouan soon undermined the progress it had represented. In response, the OAU appointed South African President Nelson Mandela to coordinate the effort to find a resolution to the conflict.^[6] In April 1999, the belligerents met under OAU auspices in Madagascar, with negotiations culminating with the Antananarivo Accords, which established a framework for the islands of Comoros to enjoy greater autonomy.^[7] This effort was derailed by a coup d’état that came almost immediately after the Accords were signed.^[8] The coup led to the withdrawal of OAU observers, however fresh rounds of dialogue in August 2000 and February 2001 (hosted by the OAU, l’Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, and the Arab League) culminated with the Famboni Agreements, which ended the conflict and created the framework for the establishment of a federal Comorian state upon approval by the population in a referendum.^[9]

[1] World Peace Foundation. “Comoros Short Brief.” African Politics, African Peace. (2017) p.1

[2] UCDP. Comoros: Anjouan. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/407 (Accessed 02/12/2020)

[3] Ibid.

[4] World Peace Foundation. “Comoros Short Brief.” p.2

[5] Addis Ababa Agreement, 1997. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/comoros-addisababa97 (Accessed 02/12/2020)

[6] Bruce Baker. “Comoros: The Search for Viability.” Civil Wars, Vol. 11, No. 3. (2009) p.217

[7] Accords d’Antananarivo, 1999. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/comoros-accordantananarivo99 (Accessed 02/12/2020)

[8] IRIN News. “OAU military group withdraws.” The New Humanitarian. (1999) Available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/6559/comoros-oau-military-group-withdraws (Accessed 02/12/2020)

[9] Accord cadre pour la reconciliation aux Comores (Accord de Fomboni), 2001. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/comoros-accordfomboni2001 (Accessed 02/12/2020)

Description of Case 

In response to growing international condemnation of government-sanctioned violence against civilians, the Government of Burundi (which had come to power in coup d’état) agreed to hold elections in 1993. The elections resulted in a victory for the opposition, however the new president was assassinated by army officers, and the country rapidly descended into civil war. By 1996, the military had retaken control of the government.[1] In 1998, representatives from the military government and one of the main opposition groups met in Tanzania for peace talks. The negotiations culminated in August 2000 with the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, which formed a transitional administration and invited international observers from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to monitor the process.[2] The success in Tanzania encouraged South Africa to deploy 700 troops to provide security to Burundian politicians as they participated in the peace process, however a more inclusive agreement was needed before a multilateral peacekeeping mission arrived.[3]

The most powerful opposition group, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie, CNDD–FDD), came to terms with the transitional administration in 2003, following negotiations mediated by South African President Nelson Mandela which culminated with the Global Ceasefire Agreement.[4] With the worst of the fighting over, the international community dispatched peacekeepers to monitor the cease-fire and consolidate the peace. The initial effort was led by the first peacekeeping mission deployed by the AU, the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB).[5] A year later, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi, ONUB) took over from AMIB with a much broader mandate, including carrying out Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration programmes, monitoring Burundi’s international borders, and helping to strengthen the Burundian electoral process.[6] In March 2005, a transitional administration promulgated a new constitution and a few months later, under UN supervision, nationwide elections were successfully and peacefully held. The following year, the newly elected government came to terms with a handful of armed groups that had hitherto remained outside of the peace process, bringing a formal end to the armed conflict.[7] In December 2006, ONUB left the country. After thirteen years, the war in Burundi was over.

[1] Elliot Short. “Assessing International Statebuilding Initiative Effectiveness at Preventing Armed Conflict Recurrence: The Cases of Burundi, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, and Nepal.” The Better Evidence Project. (2020)

[2] Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/node/1207 (Accessed 09/11/2020)

[3] Annemarie Peen Rodt. “The African Union Mission in Burundi.” Civil Wars, Vol. 14, No. 3. (2012) p.378

[4] The Global Ceasefire Agreement, 2003. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/node/163 (Accessed 09/11/2020)

[5] Rodt. “The African Union Mission in Burundi.”  pp.378-9

[6] UN Peacekeeping. Unityed Nations Operation in Burundi. (UN, 2009) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onub/ (Accessed 09/11/2020)

[7] Short. “Assessing International Statebuilding Initiative Effectiveness at Preventing Armed Conflict Recurrence.”

Description of Case 

The armed conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), Bangladesh, began in 1972. The CHT had enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy under British rule, however this status was revoked when the region became part of Pakistan in 1947. Following Bangladeshi independence from Pakistan in 1971, state-sponsored migration into the CHT increased, inspiring the indigenous population of the region to launch an insurgency against migrant communities and government security forces. In 1982, the Bangladeshi military seized power in a coup d’état. After meeting continuing resistance from the population of the CHT, the military government entered into dialogue with CHT representatives in 1985. While some armed groups agreed to put down their weapons in exchange for increased autonomy, the peace process ultimately collapsed, and the fighting continued.[1]

In 1992, the first democratically elected government of Bangladesh came into office.[2] Almost immediately, the new administration worked to resolve the conflict in the CHT. Agreements were made with India regarding refugees from the conflict, a parliamentary committee was established to investigate the issue, and fresh talks were held with representatives from the CHT.[3] On 11 August 1992, a ceasefire was signed which essentially ended the conflict. As talks continued over the ensuing five years, fighting between the former belligerents remained extremely limited. On 2 December 1997, the negotiations culminated with the signing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord.[4] In addition to ending the conflict, the Accord established an autonomous administration (known as the Regional Council) for the CHT along with a central government Ministry for CHT Affairs, which would be led by an individual from the CHT.[5] The Accord has succeeded in ending the armed conflict, despite opposition from hard-line groups within CHT communities and certain Bangladeshi political parties, as well as the recalcitrance of the military to withdraw from the area.

[1] Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia. Bangladesh: Chittagong Hill Tracts. Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/322 (Accessed 01/11/2020)

[2] S. M. Shamsul Alam. “Democratic politics and the fall of the military regime in Bangladesh.” Bulleting of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 27, No. 3. (1995)

[3] Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia. Bangladesh: Chittagong Hill Tracts.

[4] Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord, 1997. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/node/1449 (Accessed 01/11/2020)

[5] M. Rashiduzzaman. “Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord: Institutional Features and Strategic Concerns.” Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 7. (1998)