Description of Case 

The outbreak of armed conflict in Central Sulawesi and Maluku after the fall of Suharto in 1998 served to heighten intercommunal tensions in other diverse provinces of Indonesia. In North Maluku, 85 per cent of the population was Muslim and 15 per cent were Christian, but divisions between indigenous tribes and migrant populations added many more layers of complexity to this dynamic. Despite a history of relatively peaceful coexistence, relations between these communities had worsened over preceding decades due to disputes over transmigration and the distribution of political power. In 1999, a scheduled programme of decentralisation began in North Maluku, altering administrative boundaries and changing the political structure of the province. These changes caused much uncertainty and inspired fierce competition between communities over the location of district capitals, allocations of resources, and administrative appointments.[1] On 18 August 1999, fighting erupted between the Kao (indigenous to the island) and Makianese (relocated in 1975 due to a feared volcanic eruption) ethnic groups in North Maluku on the same day that a new subdistrict was supposed to be inaugurated. For over a month, militia from these groups fought each other and burned down villages across the area, forcing 15,000 people from their homes. Violence rapidly spread across North Maluku, taking on increasingly religious overtones. For the most part, the conflict represented efforts by one militia or another to clear minority populations from towns and villages, but also featured massacres and forced conversions, particularly after a range of radical Islamic armed groups entered the fray on behalf of the Muslim communities of North Maluku.[2]

The Government of Indonesia attempted to prevent the conflict, deploying troops in an interpositionary location between the Kao and Makianese while prominent civil society leaders attempted to mediate a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Ongoing failures to end the fighting led the president to declare a state of emergency on 27 June 2000, deploy considerable numbers of troops, and impose a naval blockade on the entire region.[3] This succeeded in ending the fighting – there were no more documented incidents after the declaration – but shootings and bombings remained a feature of North Malukan life for years. Approximately 3,000 people were killed in the conflict and over 100,000 more were forced from their homes.[4]

[1] Christopher R. Duncan. “The Other Maluku: Chronologies of Conflict in North Maluku.” Indonesia, Vol 80. (2005) pp.59-60

[2] Christopher R. Duncan. Violence and Vengeance: Religious Conflict and its Aftermath in Eastern Indonesia. (Ithaca: Cornell, 2013) pp.90-9

[3] Ibid. p.102

[4] Smith Alhadar. “The forgotten war in North Maluku.” Inside Indonesia, No. 63. (2000) Available at: https://www.insideindonesia.org/The-forgotten-war-in-North-Maluku (Accessed 10/12/2021)

Description of Case 

The Maluku Islands are home to a diverse population, with their role as the centre of the Dutch spice trade in the colonial period leaving a distinct legacy and a sizeable Christian community. In the central islands such as Ambon, this Christian community constituted half of the population.[1] In the tense climate following the fall of Suharto and the violence in Poso, a minor dispute involving a bus driver sparked three days of riots in the city of Ambon in January 1999. Violence between migrants and indigenes, and Muslims and Christians, spread into the surrounding area. At least 48 people were killed and swathes of Ambon, including churches and mosques, were destroyed.[2] In February, the conflict spread to the rest of Ambon island, with much of the fighting involving attacks on villages and towns that were home to minority populations or violent clashes over control of mixed conurbations. The efforts of regional and national authorities to maintain stability floundered, with many local security personnel becoming embroiled in the conflict and poor infrastructure preventing the deployment of reinforcements. Fighting continued throughout 1999, devastating Ambon city and inspiring Laskar Jihad (a militant Islamic organisation with ties to some hard-line elements within the Indonesian security forces) to enter the fray in early 2000.[3] The introduction of modern weapons and trained militants changed the dynamic of the conflict, putting predominantly Christian “Red” forces on the backfoot and driving thousands of civilians from their homes.[4]

In June 2000, the Government of Indonesia declared a state of emergency and employed a new strategy to contain the conflict. A battalion of elite troops (Yon Gab) was formed and deployed to Maluku in place of units which had sided with one community or the other. While much of the intercommunal violence ended shortly after the state of emergency was declared, these troops gave government security forces the edge they needed to prevent intercommunal violence and stop Laskar Jihad from perpetuating the conflict.[5] This operation served to halt the fighting until the broader security situation in Indonesia improved. In February 2002, negotiations between Christian and Muslim community leaders from Maluku mediated by an Indonesian government minister culminated with the signing of an 11-point declaration in the town of Malino. Known as the Malino II Peace Accord, this agreement ended the conflict and created the framework for peace to return to the area.[6] Laskar Jihad laid down their arms after the October 2002 Bali Bombings.

[1] Christopher R. Duncan. “The Other Maluku: Chronologies of Conflict in North Maluku.” Indonesia, Vol 80. (2005) p.57

[2] Jacques Bertrand. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia. (Cambridge: CUP, 2004) p.124

[3] UCDP. Christians (Indonesia) – Muslims (Indonesia). (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/nonstate/5513 (Accessed 11/12/2021)

[4] International Crisis Group. “Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku.” ICG Report, No. 31. (2002) Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/indonesia-search-peace-maluku (Accessed 11/12/2021)

[5] Bertrand. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia. p.132

[6] Moluccas Agreement in Malino (Malino II), 20004. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/indonesia-malinoII2002 (Accessed 11/12/2021)

Description of Case 

After three decades in power, the authoritarian leader of Indonesia, Suharto, was forced to resign on 21 May 1998 in the face of a severe economic crisis, widespread demonstrations, and growing opposition from within his administration. In this uncertain context, armed clashes took place across the country with growing frequency. In Poso, a district in the diverse province of Central Sulawesi on the Greater Sunda Islands, fighting between Christian and Muslim militia erupted on 24 December 1998.[1] In April 2000, a much larger bout of violence occurred, this time escalating into a conflict which led to the complete destruction of two towns, the eviction of swathes of the local Christian population from their homes, and the increasing polarisation of the diverse Sulawesi population into two camps: the predominantly Christian “Reds” and the majority-Muslim “Whites.” The conflict continued at a relatively low intensity, with regular clashes taking place between militia armed with machetes, bows, and homemade shotguns until July 2001, when a radical Islamic group known as Laskar Jihad entered the fray, bringing automatic weapons and an unprecedented level of organisation to the conflict.[2]

In July 2001, a change of administration in Jakarta had a significant impact on the conflict. Over 1,500 troops supported by 10 tanks and a wide range of police and paramilitary units were deployed to Poso, leading to some clashes with both Red and White forces. However, when the fighting threatened to spread into neighbouring districts in November 2001, these troops formed the core of a major operation to stop the fighting, disarm combatants, and restore the rule of law to Central Sulawesi. The urgency with which this operation took place compared with previous efforts is believed to have been directly influenced by the 11 September 2001 attacks on the USA. Within a month, Indonesian security forces succeeded in halting the conflict, creating the climate for negotiations to begin. A government minister from Sulawesi led the mediation team, which proceeded to invite a wide range of stakeholders to participate in the talks. The negotiations culminated on 20 December 2001 with the Malino Declaration for Poso, which called for the cessation of hostilities and the return of security and the rule of law.[3] The conflict in Poso cost the lives of around 1,000 people, and although the area was plagued by shootings and bombings mostly perpetrated by Laskar Jihad until 2007, the intercommunal violence was ended by a military deployment and the negotiation of the Malino Declaration for Poso.[4]

[1] Human Rights Watch. “Breakdown: Four Years of Communal Violence in Central Sulawesi.” HRW, Vol. 14, No. 9. (2002) p.15

[2] Dave McRae. A Few Poorly Organised Men: Interreligious Violence in Poso, Indonesia. (Brill, 2013) p.84

[3] Malino Declaration to End Conflict and Create Peace in Poso (Malino I), 2001. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/indonesia-malinoI2001 (Accessed 2/12/2021)

[4] Human Rights Watch. “Breakdown.” pp.38-9; For the post-Malino violence, see: International Crisis Group. “Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi.” ICG Asia Report, No. 74. (2004) p.28

Description of Case 

Of all the states in Northeast India, Tripura was most affected by the influx of people fleeing East Pakistan during partition in 1947 and the war which created Bangladesh in 1971. Indeed, the coming of these predominantly Bengali migrants more than doubled the population of the state and the indigenous Tripuri community was relegated from being the local majority to representing just a third of the population. These changes were accompanied by the loss of swathes of Tripuri land and contributed to the broader marginalisation of the community.[1] In 1978, the first Tripuri armed groups emerged and launched a violent campaign against migrant communities and Indian security forces, calling for a ban on more immigration, increased tribal rights, and autonomy (or full independence) for Tripura.[2] After a decade of conflict, the Indian government came to terms with the main Tripuri armed group in 1988, promising to reorganise the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (TTAADC) and limit migration in exchange for peace and the surrender of armed cadres.[3] This Memorandum of Understanding bought a few years of peace in Tripura, but by 1992 two powerful Tripuri armed groups had emerged in opposition to the settlement: the All Tripura Tribal Force (later the All Tripura Tiger Force, ATTF) and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), both of which called for the deportation of all people who had entered from East Pakistan/Bangladesh since 1949 and the complete independence of Tripura.[4]

Talks were held between the ATTF and the regional administration of Tripura in 1993, resulting in the Memorandum of Settlement.[5] This agreement invested further powers in the TTAADC and offered more protections to the Tripuri community. This caused a split in the ATTF, with one faction abiding by the agreement and the other opting to continue the armed struggle alongside the NLFT.[6] Despite the commitment of these two groups to achieving their goals though armed conflict continued, overall levels of violence in Tripura continued to decline, thanks in part to joint security operations to remove rear bases over the international border in Bangladesh and Myanmar and a well-funded government disarmament programme – by 2010, approximately 8,000 former militants had surrendered in exchange for cash payments.[7] In 2004, a faction of the NLFT signed a Memorandum of Settlement with the government and the ATTF reduced its activities and indicated its desire to join the peace process.[8] These declarations ended the fighting in Tripura for all intents and purposes. A complex peace process ensued with no firm resolution of the conflict, but in 2019 the remaining faction of the NLFT signed a peace agreement with the Government of India, formally ending the conflict in Tripura.[9] Although a final settlement still needs to be negotiated, the fighting has ended.

[1] Jayanta Bhattacharya. “Ramification of Conflicts in Tripura and Mizoram.” in Sanjoy Hazarika & V.R. Raghavan, eds. Conflicts in the Northeast: Internal and External Effects. (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2011) pp.78-9

[2] UCDP. India: Tripura. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/335 (Accessed 11/12/2020)

[3] Memorandum of Understanding with the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV), 1988. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/india-mou-TNV88 (Accessed 11/12/2020)

[4] UCDP. India: Tripura.

[5] Memorandum of Settlement between the Tripura State Government and All Tripura Tribal Force (ATTF), 1993. Available: https://peacemaker.un.org/india-memorandum-settlement-tripura93 (Accessed 11/12/2020)

[6] Swarna Rajagopalan. “Peace Accords in Northeast India: Journey over Milestones.” East-West Center Policy Studies, No. 46. (2008) pp.27-8

[7] Bhattacharya. “Ramification of Conflicts in Tripura and Mizoram.” p.84

[8] UCDP. India: Tripura.

[9] Bharti Jain. “National Liberation Front of Tripura signs peace pact to join mainstream.” The Times of India. (10 August 2019) Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/national-liberation-front-of-tripura-signs-peace-pact-to-join-mainstream/articleshow/70621676.cms (Accessed 11/12/2020)

Description of Case 

Naga is a generic term for a group of over 30 tribes that inhabit some hilly areas of Northeast India. During British rule, this population was offered certain protections. Upon the independence of India in 1947, the area was incorporated into the province of Assam. After decades of campaigning (both peaceful and militant) by Naga groups, Nagaland was established as a federal state of India in the 1960s. Not all were satisfied with this outcome, with several armed groups committed to complete Naga independence from India emerging in the 1970s and launching insurgencies against security forces and violently forcing non-Naga populations from the territory they claimed.[1] Despite some noteworthy efforts at negotiating a peaceful end to the conflict, such as the 1975 Shillong Accord, certain cadres consistently splintered from such processes, formed new armed groups such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), and continued to employ violence in pursuit of their goals.[2] While much of the fighting has taken place within Nagaland State, the NSCN vision for a “greater Nagaland” has inspired violent campaigns against non-Naga populations in claimed territory across Northeast India. Pakistani intelligence is alleged to have armed Naga militants at various stages, while the armed groups themselves regularly used rear bases in Bangladesh and Myanmar, adding layers of complexity to a conflict which is estimated to have cost the lives of 40,000 people.[3]

Contemporary efforts to end the conflict in Nagaland began in 1995, when the Indian government met with the leaders of one NSCN faction in Paris. In 1997, these talks resulted in a ceasefire and further talks.[4] In 2001, a ceasefire with another NSCN faction was negotiated in Bangkok. That year, the Indian prime minister established a ceasefire monitoring group of retired Indian police servicemen in support of the peace process.[5] These efforts allowed for more comprehensive talks, which were reliant on regular reiterations of the ceasefire agreements and ongoing dialogue, to begin in 2003.[6] These mechanisms effectively contained the armed conflict until June 2015, when an NSCN faction ambushed and killed 19 Indian soldiers. After declaring that faction a terrorist organisation, the Indian government signed a framework peace agreement with other NSCN groups in August 2015 and the remaining factions have since joined the peace process.[7] The framework agreement was initially kept secret, but included provisions to establish a Naga regional council, integrate NSCN troops into the military, and offer the Naga population with other constitutional protections.[8] A key aspect of the accord was its stipulation that Naga political institutions would share sovereignty with the Indian government, satisfying the demands of both parties involved.[9]

[1] H. Srikanth & C.J. Thomas. “Naga Resistance Movement and the Peace Process in Northeast India.” Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Vol. 1, No. 2. (2005) pp.58-64

[2] Shillong Agreement between the Government of India and the Underground Nagas, 1975. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/india-shillong-agreement75 (Accessed 11/01/2022)

[3] UCDP. India: Nagaland. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/251 (Accessed 11/01/2022)

[4] Extension of Ceasefire with the NSCN-IM, 2001. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/india-extension-ceasefire-NSCNIM2001 (Accessed 11/01/2022)

[5] Namrata Biji Ahuja. “The secret deal: Exclusive details of the framework agreement with the Nagas.” The Week (India). (23 April 2017) Available at: https://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/the-secret-deal.html (Accessed 11/01/2022)

[6] Joint Statement of the Government of India and the NSCN-IM, 2004. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/india-joint-statement-NSCN (Accessed 11/01/2022)

[7] Polstrat. “Where are the Naga peace talks headed after the recent ceasefire?” Medium. (14 September 2021) Available at: https://polstrat.medium.com/where-are-the-naga-peace-talks-headed-after-the-recent-ceasefire-bada408df18c (Accessed 11/01/2022)

[8] Ahuja. “The secret deal.”

[9] Sanjib Baruah. In the Name of the Nation: India and its Northeast. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020) p.108

Description of Case 

Mizoram is a predominantly Christian state located in Northeast India which is home to a diverse range of communities, many of which are identified under the collective name Mizo. After initially being governed as an integral part of Assam, the federal state of Mizoram was established in 1987 after a lengthy insurgency by an armed group, the Mizo National Front, was brought to an end by the signing of the Mizoram Accord with the Indian government.[1] That agreement remains widely hailed as a success, preventing the state from experiencing the same level of conflict as many of its neighbours in the region and accommodating many legitimate concerns of some of the local population.[2] However, many communities in Mizoram remained unsatisfied with these developments. In 1986, armed groups representing the Hmar people began launching attacks in the north of the state, starting a relatively low-intensity conflict which continued until another Memorandum of Settlement was reached after talks in 1992-1994.[3] The key provision of the agreement was the creation of an autonomous Development Council for the community within the administrative framework of Mizoram. This left the Bru, historically a small community in Mizoram, but one that swelled in the 1970s after unrest in Tripura (itself a result of displacement from East Pakistan/Bangladesh) and the construction of the Dumboor hydroelectric dam forced much of the Bru population in that state from their homes and into Mizoram. In 1995 and 1997, the Bru community in Mizoram was subjected to violence by the majority Mizo population and were again forced from their homes, this time to refugee camps in Tripura.[4] Several armed groups emerged during this period, including the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF), and launched an insurgency against the state.

Talks between representatives of the BNLF, Mizoram state, and the Indian government began in 1998. After 13 rounds of talks, the parties agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding in which the BNLF agreed to end its insurgency and state authorities committed to providing the Bru with constitutional protections and development support.[5] This ended the fighting for all intents and purposes, although one armed Bru group remained outside the peace process. Furthermore, although some Bru returned to Mizoram from 2009 onwards, the majority remained in a highly uncertain situation in refugee camps in Tripura for decades. Talks between Bru representatives and various layers of the Indian government continued until 16 January 2020, when a landmark agreement was signed in New Delhi offering the Bru refugees the choice of being settled with government support in Tripura or returning to Mizoram.[6] This agreement resolved the conflicts in Mizoram.

[1] Memorandum of Settlement (Mizoram Accord), 1986. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/india-mizoram-accord86 (Accessed 11/01/2022)

[2] Swarna Rajagopalan. “Peace Accords in Northeast India: Journey over Milestones.” East-West Center Policy Studies, No. 46. (2008) pp.24-5

[3] Memorandum of Settlement Between The Government of Mizoram and the Hmar People’s Convention (HPC), 1994. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1837 (Accessed 11/01/2022

[4] Rahul Karmakar. “Who are the Brus, and what are the implications of settling them in Tripura?” The Hindu. (20 January 2020) Available at: https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/who-are-the-brus-and-what-are-the-implications-of-settling-them-in-tripura/article30600913.ece (Accessed 11/01/2022)

[5] Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Mizoram and the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF), 2005. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1836 (Accessed 11/01/2022)

[6] Debrajk Deb. “Explained: What is the agreement to settle Bru refugees in Tripura?” The Indian Express. (20 January 2020) Available at: https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/understanding-the-bru-refugees-settlement-mizoram-tripura-6224956/ (Accessed 11/01/2022)

Description of Case 

Northeast India is a diverse region geographically isolated from the rest of the country. Under British rule, states such as Assam became centres for the production of tea, leading to high levels of migration from other parts of India. Further demographic took place when considerable numbers of people fled East Pakistan during the war which led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.[1]  Amidst this upheaval, the predominantly Christian Bodo people (who are indigenous to Assam) were left with very little representation in state institutions, which were dominated locally by Assamese leaders, and faced constant struggles to protect their historic lands.[2] In 1986, the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) formed a militant organisation with the express intention of reversing the imposition of Assamese culture and language, displacing migrants, and creating a Bodo homeland within India.[3] After a series of armed clashes led to the deaths of over 300 people in the early 1990s, the regional government of Assam held talks with ABSU leaders in 1993. The negotiations culminated with the Memorandum of Settlement, which established the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) to govern the Bodo people. The Memorandum failed to identify the territorial jurisdiction of the BAC and the agreement itself was rejected my many Bodo groups, such as the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), which launched its own armed insurgency.[4] By 2003, up to 3,500 NDFB militants armed with weapons allegedly supplied by Pakistani intelligence services were operating out of bases in Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Myanmar in pursuit of Bodo self-determination. A joint military operation between Bhutan and India dealt this movement a serious blow in 2003, opening the door to further negotiations.[5]

Thee 2003 negotiations created the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) in place of the BAC, this time delineating a Bodo district within the state of Assam and enshrining the protection of the Bodo language.[6] Over the ensuing years, several other armed Bodo groups agreed to ceasefires (or strengthened existing ones) and began to disarm. Progress stalled once again in 2009, when some NDFB personnel split from the organisation and returned to insurgency. This faction split even further in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in 2008 and 2012, leaving a complex web of small armed groups which rejected the peace process. In 2020, after years of talks, all four factions of the NDFB signed a revitalised peace agreement with the Government of India and the regional administration of Assam. This accord ended the conflict, established the Bodoland Territorial Region within Assam, and provided the BTC with increased autonomy and revenue.[7]

[1] UCDP. India: Bodoland. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/421 (Accessed 11/01/2022)

[2] Suryasikha Pathak. “Ethnic Violence in Bodoland.” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 47, No. 34. (2012) p.20

[3] Anuradha M. Chenoy & Kamal A. Mitra Chenoy. Maoist and Other Armed Conflicts. (Haryana: Penguin, 2010) p.42

[4] Swarna Rajagopalan. “Peace Accords in Northeast India: Journey over Milestones.” East-West Center Policy Studies, No. 46. (2008) pp.19-20

[5] E.N. Rammohan. “The Insurgent Northeast.” in Sanjoy Hazarika & V.R. Raghavan, eds. Conflicts in the Northeast: Internal and External Effects. (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2011) p.98

[6] Memorandum of Settlement on Bodoland Territorial Council, 2003. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/india-memorandum-settlement-bodoland2003 (Accessed 11/01/2022)

[7] Sushanto Talukdar. “The third Bodo accord: A new deal.” Frontline. (28 February 2020) Available at: https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/article30800941.ece (Accessed 11/01/2022)

Description of Case 

Northeast India is a diverse region geographically isolated from the rest of the country. Under British rule, states such as Assam became centres for the production of tea, leading to high levels of migration from other parts of India. Further demographic changes were driven when considerable numbers of people fled East Pakistan during the war which led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. This situation came to a head during the 1970s and 1980s, when a range of Assamese groups began blockading oil pipelines, damaging state property, and harassing and killing people who they deemed foreign. A horrific massacre of civilians in 1983 spurred the Indian government into action, and in 1985 the Assam Accord was negotiated.[1] This agreement focused on the issue of migration into Assam, but also guaranteed the Assamese population with certain protections and established the Assam People’s Council to provide them with an additional layer of political representation. Although the Assam Accord ended the immediate crisis and established a framework for increased Assamese representation, it was rejected armed groups such as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), who continued to pursue the stated goal of achieving complete independence for Assam through armed struggle during the 1980s.[2] In 1991, talks with the Indian government resulted in the surrender of approximately 4,000 ULFA personnel, however some hardliners remained committed to insurgency and the conflict continued at a relatively low intensity throughout the 1990s.[3]

Progress towards a negotiated settlement to this conflict in Assam began in 2004, when a tentative dialogue preceded talks between ULFA, the Indian government, and representatives of Assamese civil society. A ceasefire held during the talks, but ultimately the negotiations reached a stalemate.[4] ULFA was dealt a blow (along with other armed opposition groups) when the governments of Bhutan and Bangladesh conducted military operations in the late 2000s to put an end to the organisation’s use of rear bases on their territory. After several senior ULFA leaders surrendered to Bangladeshi security forces in 2009, the organisation split into two factions.[5] In 2011, the largest faction began unconditional talks with the Indian government. Negotiations continued for over a decade with the faction known as the Surrendered ULFA in a peaceful climate but failed to reach a final settlement. Hopes for peace were given a boost in May 2021, when the hard-line ULFA faction declared a unilateral ceasefire and joined the peace process. At the time of writing, these ceasefires remain in place while negotiations between both ULFA factions, the Indian government, the state administration of Assam, and Assamese civil society representatives are taking place.[6]

[1] Assam Accord, 1985. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/india-assam-accord85 (Accessed 11/01/2022)

[2] Swarna Rajagopalan. “Peace Accords in Northeast India: Journey over Milestones.” East-West Center Policy Studies, No. 46. (2008) pp.18-19

[3] UCDP. India: Assam. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/365 (Accessed 11/01/2022)

[4] Ibid.

[5] Anuradha M. Chenoy & Kamal A. Mitra Chenoy. Maoist and Other Armed Conflicts. (Haryana: Penguin, 2010) p.41

[6] Rajib Dutta. “Assam: Ulfa-I extends unilateral ceasefire again by 3 months.” The Times of India. (15 November 2021) Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/assam-ulfa-i-extends-unilateral-ceasefire-again-by-3-months/articleshow/87713177.cms (Accessed 11/01/2022)

Description of Case 

In January 1998, troops of the Bissau-Guinean armed forces discovered that some of their colleagues had been covertly supplying the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC) with arms and munitions to support their campaign for independence from Senegal. Under pressure from the governments of Senegal and France to identify the culprits, the president of Guinea-Bissau placed the blame on his Chief of Staff, who was subsequently removed from his position despite his remonstrations of innocence. After failing to assassinate the president, the disgraced head of the military gathered significant portions of the army along with an array of opposition groups behind him and launched a coup d’état in May 1998.[1] The rebels quickly established control of much of the country but faced resistance from elements of the armed forces that remained loyal to the president. In June, Senegal and Guinea dispatched a total of 1,700 troops to support the embattled administration, leading to heavy fighting across the country and sparking the conflict known as the Seventh of June War.

The international effort to mediate an end to the conflict began on 26 July 1998, when the CPLP negotiated a temporary truce between the belligerents. This was followed by talks hosted by the CPLP and ECOWAS in nearby Cape Verde, which culminated at the end of August with a ceasefire. Talks continued in Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, and Nigeria, with the belligerents eventually signing the Abuja Peace Agreement on 1 November.[2] A key provision of the agreement was the withdrawal of Senegalese and Guinean troops and the deployment of an ECOWAS peacekeeping force. The peace process was dealt a major blow in January 1999 when the fighting resumed, but a fresh ceasefire was signed on 9 February, this time bringing an end to fighting. The ECOWAS mission remained in place for a few months until all Senegalese and Guinean troops had withdrawn, but it was a relatively short-lived deployment. Although the November 1999 elections went ahead relatively peacefully and re-established constitutional rule in Guinea-Bissau, the country continued to be plagued by frequent coups d’état in the years (and decades) following the conflict.[3] The mediation efforts of the CPLP and ECOWAS ended the Seventh of June War, but Guinea-Bissau remained highly unstable following the conflict.

[1] Vincent Foucher. “Wade’s Senegal and its Relations with Guinea-Bissau: Brother, Patron or Regional Hegemon?” South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme Occasional Paper, No. 132. (2013) p.7

[2] The Abuja Peace Agreement, 1998. Available at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/abuja-peace-agreement (Accessed 25/10/2021)

[3] Mesfin Gebremichael, ed. “Guinea Bissau Conflict Insight.” Peace & Security Report, Vol. 1. (2019) pp.16-8

Description of Case 

The Northern Region is a large and relatively poor administrative region of Ghana that is home to a diverse population. Some groups live within chiefly communities (with chiefs, paramount chiefs, and sometimes kings), while others live an acephalous lifestyle without such hierarchies. During the colonial period, the British invested a range of decentralised “indirect rule” powers to the chiefs.[1] This resulted in an imbalance in political influence and land access which, after Ghanaian independence in 1957, increasingly became a source of conflict. Beginning in 1981, the Northern Region was wracked by a series of increasingly severe armed clashes between militia mobilised by the various communities in the area. It was in this context that a dispute on 3 February 1994, supposedly over the price of a guinea fowl in the village of Nakpachei, rapidly escalated into an armed conflict between three chiefly groups – the Dagomba, Gonja, and Nanumba – and four traditionally acephalus groups – the Nawuri, Nchumburu, Bassare, and Konkomba.[2] Within three days, the fighting had spread across 7 districts. Armed with bows, shotguns, and some assault rifles, armed groups pillaged and destroyed at least 442 villages, displacing 160,000 people, and killing up to 15,000.[3] In response to the crisis, the Government of Ghana issued a state of emergency on 10 February and deployed troops across the region to deter further violence. While the immediate fighting was ended by this operation, allowing peace talks to commence and the state of emergency to be lifted, another eruption of violence in March 1995 highlighted the need for a more lasting solution.[4]

The effort to end the conflict was multi-faceted. Initially, a government agency established in response to the conflict (the Permanent Peace Negotiation Team) mediated talks between the belligerents. This team succeeded in negotiating a ceasefire in June 1994, but it was not until a consortium of Ghanaian NGOs supported by a team from the Nairobi Peace Initiative began hosting talks in May 1995 that meaningful progress was made. At a series of meetings held in the city of Kumasi, these organisations painstakingly mediated negotiations for nearly a year that culminated on 30 March 1996 with the signing of the Kumasi Accord for Peace and Reconciliation Between the Ethnic Groups of Northern Ghana.[5] Several organisations were established to oversee peace in the area, with a focus on equitable development. In December 1995 and May 1996, leaders involved in the conflict attended reconciliation ceremonies witnessed by the President of Ghana.[6]

[1] Hizkias Assefa. “Coexistence and Reconciliation in the Northern Region of Ghana.” In Muhammed Abu-Nimer, ed. Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice. (Lexington Books: Lanham, 2001) p.165

[2] Julie Kaye. “Ethno-Politicization in the 1994-1995 Case of Conflict in Northern Ghana: The Role of You Associations and Faith-Based Organizations.” Chieftain: The Journal of Traditional Governance, Vol. 1, No. 1. (2004) p.5

[3] Ada van der Linde & Rachel Naylor. Building Sustainable Peace: Conflict, Conciliation, and Civil Society in Northern Ghana. (Oxfam: London, 1999) pp.27-8

[4] Ibid. p.30

[5] Assefa. “Coexistence and Reconciliation in the Northern Region of Ghana.” p.177-8

[6] Linde & Naylor. Building Sustainable Peace. p.34