Description of Case

The 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal led to the abrupt end of the Portuguese Empire and the abandonment of its colonies, including Timor-Leste. Independence was short-lived, however, as neighbouring Indonesia occupied the territory within months, despite international condemnation. In response, pro-independence Timorese guerrillas launched an insurgency.[1] The ensuing conflict lasted for over two decades, devastating the region. The collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime in Jakarta in 1998 presented an opportunity for the conflict to be resolved and, encouraged by international calls for a plebiscite to decide Timor-Leste’s future, the new Indonesian administration requested that the UN organise a referendum for 30 August 1999. The UN Security Council established the United Nations Mission in East Timor to conduct the referendum.[2]

Almost 80 percent of the population favoured independence, however the result was contested by pro-integration militias backed by the Indonesian military. The militias launched a devastating offensive, displacing hundreds of thousands of people and sparking the most violent period of the conflict to date. The eruption of violence led to international condemnation, and on 15 September the UN Security Council called for a multinational force to restore peace and security in East Timor until a follow-on UN peacekeeping mission could be established.[3] Threats by the US Government to lever sanctions on Jakarta via the IMF and World Bank forced the Government of Indonesia to end its claim on the territory and acquiesce to the deployment of a UN-sanctioned international force.[4] The Australian government led the initiative, not only providing much of the logistical and organisational infrastructure for the operation but also contributing half of the 11,500 troops of International Force East Timor (InterFET).[5] Other significant contributions were made by New Zealand and Thailand. In the ensuing five months, InterFET took control of all Timorese territory and established a safe and secure environment across the country. With its mission accomplished and the follow-up UN mission in place, InterFET handed over authority to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor on 28 February 2000.[6]

[1] Moreen Doe. “‘Coalitions of the willing’ and humanitarian intervention: Australia’s involvement with INTERFET.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 8, No. 3. (2007) p.3

[2] Geoffrey Robinson. “With unamet in East Timor: A historian’s personal view.” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 32, No. 1. (2000)

[3] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1264. (UN, 1999) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1264 (Accessed 11/11/2020)

[4] Doe. “‘Coalitions of the willing’ and humanitarian intervention.” p.4

[5] Marianne Jago. “InterFET: An Account of Intervention with Consent in East Timor.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 17, No. 3. (2010) p.386

[6] UN Peacekeeping. East Timor – UNTAET: Background. (UN, 2002) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/etimor/UntaetB.htm (Accessed 31/11/2020)

Description of Case 

The Republic of Congo held its first multi-party elections in 1992. Although the election itself went ahead peacefully, the results were disputed, and the three main political parties in the country raised militias. Within months, a complex armed conflict was taking place between three sizeable armed groups and the Congolese armed forces. A ceasefire was reached in January 1994, allowing more comprehensive peace talks hosted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the governments of France and Gabon to begin.^[1] Efforts to resolve the conflict at this stage were ultimately unsuccessful and, in the months prior to the 1997 presidential election, the fighting erupted once again, devastating the capital, Brazzaville.^[2] An additional layer of complexity was added to the conflict when veterans of conflicts in Angola and Chad entered the fray, providing the necessary impetus to bring former president Denis Sassou-Nguessou back into power in Brazzaville.^[3]

The first steps towards peace were made in 1998, when the Government of Republic of Congo invited 1,420 delegates to hold a National Forum for Reconciliation. The Forum adopted an interim constitution and nominated a transitional administration to run the country until elections scheduled three years hence could produce an elected government. Before any more progress could be made, however, the fighting erupted again and by December 1998, much of the country was engulfed in conflict.^[4] Fresh peace talks were again led by the Government of Gabon in 1999, culminating with the Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo.^[5] The Agreement was comprehensive, stipulating far-reaching reforms, amnesty for combatants, and an extensive Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration programme, in addition to formally launching a fresh national dialogue to produce a new constitution.^[6] In March-April 2001, this nationwide consultation and dialogue process regarding the constitution was held and, once complete, the new document was promulgated by the Congolese parliament in September. Initial efforts to build stability were largely successful, returning 30,000 combatants to civilian life by September 2001 and integrating 8,000 more into the armed forces.^[7] These initiatives ended the intrastate conflict in Republic of Congo, but fighting erupted once again in March 2002 between government forces and a final armed group, which managed to retain control of the Pool region.^[8] Renewed clashes following the 2016 elections threatened a return to war until a final ceasefire was signed in 2017, bringing the Republic of the Congo a step closer to peace.^[9]

1] UN Country Team. UN Plan: Together from the Ground Up – Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). (Brazzaville: UN, 2002) p.10

[2] UCDP. Congo: Government. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/408 (Accessed 23/11/2020)

[3] Howard W. French. “Rebels, Backed by Angola, Take Brazzaville and Oil Port.” The New York Times. (1997) Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/16/world/rebels-backed-by-angola-take-brazzaville-and-oil-port.html (Accessed 23/11/2020)

[4] UN Country Team. UN Plan. p.10

[5] Accord de cessation des hostilitiés en République du Congo, 1999. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/congo-cessationhostilities99 (Accessed 23/11/2020)

[6] Peace Accords Matrix. Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo. (University of Notre Dame, 2020) Available at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/agreement-on-ending-hostilities-in-the-republic-of-congo (Accessed 23/11/2020)

[7] UCDP. Congo: Government.

[8] Philip Kleinfeld. “UPDATED: Congo-Brazzaville’s hidden war.” The New Humanitarian. (2018) Available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/special-report/2018/06/18/updated-congo-brazzaville-s-hidden-war (Accessed 23/11/2020)

[9] Le Monde with AFP. “Au Congo-Brazzaville, un cessez-le-feu signé avec les rebelles de la région du Pool.” Le Monde. (2017) Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/12/23/rdc-un-cessez-le-feu-signe-avec-les-rebelles-de-la-region-du-pool_5233990_3212.html (Accessed 23/11/2020)

Description of Case 

Originating from some of the Philippine resistance movements that fought the Japanese during the Second World War, the Philippine Communist Party (Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, PKP) continued its armed struggle against the post-war administration in Manila with the aim of leading a Maoist revolution until 1954. In 1968, the PKP split, with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) emerging as the more powerful force and launching an insurgency against the Government of the Philippines across the country.[1] In the mountainous and relatively sparsely populated Cordillera Region (on the island of Luzon), the communist movement was heavily influenced by a spectrum of local indigenous communities with grievances of their own against the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos. A key point of contention was construction of a hydroelectric dam and the exploitation of natural resources in Cordillera, both of which threatened the livelihoods of the local population.[2] When  Marcos was forced to flee the country in the face of widespread political and military opposition to his rule in 1986, the CPP cadres in Cordillera rejected the decision of the Central Committee to continue the armed struggle against the new, elected Government of Philippines, and formally split from the organisation to form the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA).[3] Despite the name, the CPLA sought autonomy for Cordillera within a federal Philippine state rather than full independence.

The same day that the CPLA was established, it entered into a traditional sipat (ceasefire) agreement with the new government at a ceremony held at the Mount Data Hotel in Bauko. This ended the fighting between the CPLA and the Government of Philippines in Cordillera and laid the foundation for the creation of the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) by the administration of Corazon Aquino later that year. This polity was governed by a 200-strong Cordillera Regional Assembly and a 29-member Executive Board, providing a degree of political representation to the population.[4] Despite these gains, the CPLA refused to disarm, and the government failed to create a permanent autonomous status for Cordillera and stopped funding the CAR in 2000, leaving the conflict unresolved for decades. In 2011, the CPLA agreed to disarm in return for investment and autonomy for the region, and positions in the armed forces for some of its personnel. These arrangements were formalised with the signing a Memorandum of Agreement on 18 January 2011.[5] This was met with public celebrations of the Mount Data Accord on its 25^th anniversary in September 2011 in support of the peace process.[6] In 2019, the Government of Philippines created a Joint Evaluation and Monitoring Committee to track the implementation of the terms of the agreements and serve as a mechanism to prevent renewed conflict.[7]

[1] UCDP. Government of Philippines – CPP. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/411 (Accessed 28/01/2022)

[2] Miriam Coronel Ferrer. “The Moro and the Cordillera Conflicts in the Philippines.” In Kusuma Snitwongse & W. Scott Thompson, eds. Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005) p.118

[3] Ibid. p.120

[4] Ibid. p.131-2

[5] Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the CBA/CPLA towards the CPLA’s Final Disposition of Arms and Forces and its Transformation into a Potent Socio-Economic Unarmed Force (Closure Agreement), 2011. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/philippines-closure-agreement2011 (Accessed 28/01/2022)

[6] Karl de Mesa. “Cordillera celebrates 25th anniversary of peace accord.” GMA News Online. (20 September 2011) Available at: https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/regions/232874/cordillera-celebrates-25th-anniversary-of-peace-accord/story/ (Accessed 28/01/2022)

[7] Isabela Gamu. “CPLA elders, AFP, OPAPP join peace month celebration.” Philippine News Agency. (17 September 2019) Available at: https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1080654 (Accessed 28/01/2022)

Description of Case 

Tajikistan emerged from the Soviet Union in September 1991. Multi-party elections were held peacefully in November of that year; however, the result was disputed by a host of opposition parties. In 1992, demonstrations against the new government turned violent as the president began raising militias and elements of the opposition turned to the Taliban in Afghanistan for support.[1] Tensions among these groups continued to heighten until May 1992, when armed conflict erupted between them. In September 1992, the president was ambushed by opposition troops and forced to resign.[2] His replacement continued the war against an array of Islamic and Democrat opposition groups, which formed up under the banner of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). By December, approximately 50,000 people had been killed in the fighting and 700,000 had been displaced from their homes.[3] By early 1993, the UTO had been largely defeated by Russian-backed government forces, however a low intensity conflict continued across swathes of the country.[4] 

The international effort to bring an end to the war began in the spring of 1993 with the appointment of a UN Special Envoy for Tajikistan, who was tasked with forging a ceasefire, and the creation of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue (ITD), which was led by Russia and the US and began hosting negotiations in 1993.[5] In September 1993, the Confederation of Independent States established the Collective Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan to monitor Tajikistan’s borders (particularly the frontier with Afghanistan), promote dialogue, and deliver humanitarian aid.[6] After several rounds of UN-mediated talks, the belligerents agreed to a temporary ceasefire in September 1994. In December 1994, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan to monitor the ceasefire.[7] In addition, both the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference established missions to support the peace process.[8] Although these initiatives succeeded in stopping the fighting for more than a year, Tajikistan relapsed back into war in 1996. The intervention of CIS peacekeepers and the ongoing Track II diplomatic efforts of the ITD brought the belligerents back to the negotiating table by the end of the year, paving the way for a series of comprehensive peace agreements in 1997.[9] The talks, once again hosted by the UN, culminated on 27 June 1997 with the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan.[10] After five years of war, the armed conflict in Tajikistan was over.

[1] Don Lynch. “The Tajik civil war and peace process.” Civil Wars, Vol. 4, No. 4. (2001) pp.52-4

[2] Steven Erlanger. “After Week of Turmoil, Tajik President Is Forced Out.” The New York Times. (1992) Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/08/world/after-week-of-turmoil-tajik-president-is-forced-out.html (Accessed 17/11/2020)

[3] Shirin Akiner & Catherine Barnes. “The Tajik Civil War: Causes and Dynamics.” in Kamoludin Abdullaev & Catherine Barnes. Politics of compromise: The Tajikistan peace process. (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001) p.16 Available at: https://www.c-r.org/accord/tajikistan/tajik-civil-war-causes-and-dynamics (Accessed 17/11/2020)

[4] Dov Lynch. Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) p.159

[5] Anna Matveeva. “Tajikistan: Peace Secured, but the State of our Dreams?” in Michael Lund & Steve McDonald. Across the Lines of Conflict: Facilitating Cooperation to Build Peace. (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2015) p.154

[6] Valdimir Goryayev. “Architecture of international involvement in the Tajik peace process.” in Kamoludin Abdullaev & Catherine Barnes. Politics of compromise. p.36

[7] UN Peacekeeping. Tajikistan – UNMOT: Background. (UN, 2000) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unmot/UnmotB.htm (Accessed 17/11/2020)

[8] Goryayev. “Architecture of international involvement in the Tajik peace process.” pp.35-6

[9] Matveeva. “Tajikistan.” pp.142-3; Elena Rigacci Hay. “Methodology of the inter-Tajik negotiation process.” in Kamoludin Abdullaev & Catherine Barnes. Politics of compromise. p.38-40

[10] General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, 1997. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/tajikistan-general-agreement97 (Accessed 17/11/2020)

Description of Case 

Suriname became independent from the Netherlands in 1975. Five years later, the civilian government was overthrown in a coup d’état and the country was governed by an increasingly authoritarian military junta. The collapse of constitutional rule led the American and Dutch governments to suspend all development assistance to Suriname, adding to the instability.[1] In July 1986, an armed group known as the Suriname Liberation Army (SLA) launched an armed struggle to restore democracy. The fighting escalated from hit-and-run attacks to much larger offensives on towns and infrastructure, and by November 1986, the SLA had captured the second largest city in the country.[2] Amidst growing domestic and international pressure, the military junta agreed to hold elections in November 1987. The incumbent government lost the election, however the military junta retained authority over the armed forces. A ceasefire was declared after the elections but collapsed within weeks.

Efforts to end the conflict began in early 1988, with representatives of the Government of Suriname and the Committee of Christian Churches holding talks with SLA leaders in January. Further negotiations were held in neighbouring French Guiana at the end of June, resulting in a ceasefire and the agreement of a framework for further dialogue. Further clashes threatened to derail the peace process, however, talks in French Guiana the following year culminated in the signing of a peace agreement in July 1989.[3] The gradual progress towards peace was disrupted in December 1990, when the military seized power in another coup d’état. The Organisation of American States (OAS) and the governments of the USA, Netherlands, and France condemned the development and called for the restoration of constitutional rule, pressuring the military junta to again hold elections. In May 1991, a new government came to power and passed laws banning military involvement in politics. In 1992, the OAS hosted negotiations between the new government and the SLA, culminating with the signing of the Lelydorp Accord on 1 August 1992.[4] The Accord ended the conflict, invited the OAS to monitor the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration process, offered an amnesty to combatants, and provided for the integration of some SLA troops into the Surinamese security forces. OAS personnel remained in Suriname until 1994, monitoring compliance, collecting weapons, and removing land mines.[5]

[1] Human Rights Watch. Suriname. (HRW, 1992) Available at: https://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/AMW2-07.htm (Accessed 06/12/2020)

[2] UCDP. Suriname: Government. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/357 (Accessed 06/12/2020)

[3] Paul Verschuur. “Truce Signed in Guerrilla War in Suriname.” AP News. (1989) Available at: https://apnews.com/article/8f70a750b8c992390baf03042aae2932 (Accessed 06/12/2020)

[4] UCDP. Suriname: Government.

[5] Monica Herz. “Does the Organisation of American States Matter?” Crisis States Working Papers Series, No. 2. (2008) p.22

Description of Case

Faced with violent repression from the Franco regime (1939-1975) in Spain, the passive resistance campaign of the historically dominant Basque separatist political party began losing ground to more radical movements in the 1950s. In 1959, Basque Nation and Liberty (Euskadi ta azkatasuna, ETA) was established. Renouncing the peaceful strategy of its forebears, ETA launched an armed insurrection against the Spanish state in the 1960s with the goal of achieving independence for the Basque Country. After initially targeting politicians and security services, ETA launched increasingly indiscriminate attacks in the 1980s. Peace talks were held in Algeria in 1989 but proved fruitless. In 1992, several key ETA leaders were arrested, signalling a significant decline in the conflict: the number of battle-related deaths has not reached 25 since. However, attacks continued throughout the 1990s up until 2006, when ETA bombed Madrid airport.[1]

Despite several ceasefires holding for a year or two, a lasting settlement proved impossible thanks to the irreconcilable positions of the belligerents. Successive Spanish governments refused to negotiate until ETA disarmed, while ETA insisted on disarming as part of a negotiated peace process. This changed in 2011, when the ETA leadership announced a unilateral ceasefire and renounced violence. Later that year, an international conference on ways to advance the peace process was held in San Sebastian. Although neither the Spanish government nor representatives of ETA attended, the conference served to set the agenda for the resolution of the conflict. Following the conference, ETA issued a public statement expressing its wish for negotiations and willingness to disarm. To the surprise of observers, the Spanish government rebuffed the opportunity entirely and refused to enter into any kind of dialogue. In response, regional governments in Spain took it upon themselves to open talks and facilitate the peace process (as far as they legally could), while Basque political parties and international NGOs stepped up to discuss the options with ETA. The DAG, a Dutch NGO, played a leading role in these talks and subsequently developed the International Verification Mechanism (IVM) to facilitate the disarmament of ETA. With the Spanish government still refusing to participate, ETA gave the location of its cached weapons to French Basque activists, who in turn gave them to the IVM, who then offered this information to French authorities. This process was completed on 8 April 2017, and a year later ETA formally dissolved itself as an organisation.[2]

[1] UCDP. Government of Spain – ETA. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/763 (Accessed 26/10/2021)

[2] Vlad Corbu. “From ceasefire to disarmament without states: Lessons from the Basque Country.” Accord, Vol. 29. (2020) pp.99-102

Description of Case 

A decades-long armed struggle culminated with the independence of South Sudan in July 2011. The newly established state was plagued by violence and instability, with an insurgency supported by the Sudanese government already underway when the Government of South Sudan took power.[1] As a result, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was deployed on the day of South Sudan’s independence in an effort to end the fighting and create the conditions for the country to develop peacefully.[2] The armed groups in conflict with the government were gradually incorporated into the administration and security forces, only for additional armed groups to emerge. In December 2013, fighting broke out between factions of the security forces in the capital, Juba. The conflict spread quickly, and by 2014, the entire country was engulfed.[3] The outbreak of war resulted in the Security Council changing the mandate of UNMISS to focus on the protection of civilians and the provision of humanitarian aid.[4]

Efforts to end the fighting began in 2015 with a series of negotiations mediated first by IGAD, and later the Government of China. Although several peace agreements were signed, the fighting continued until the end of 2017, when the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) successfully brokered a ceasefire. The newly elected administration in Ethiopia hosted further talks in the first months of 2018, before handing over responsibility to a joint Sudanese-Ugandan effort.[5] This round of talks concluded in September 2018 with the signing of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict, witnessed by IGAD and the African Union. The Agreement halted the fighting, established the framework for the creation of a power-sharing administration within two years, and established the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) as an agency of IGAD to oversee implementation.[6] As the deadline to form an administration neared, the failure to form a unity government led many observers to fear a conflict relapse would occur. Indeed, such was the concern that the peace process would collapse that Pope Francis hosted the rival leaders of South Sudan (in which Catholicism is the largest church) to implore them to refrain from more conflict.[7] In February 2020, after two years of relative stability and peace, the unity government was formed.[8] This marked the formal end of the conflict. The RJMEC remains operational and continues to support the peace in South Sudan.[9]

[1] UCDP. South Sudan: Government. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/11345 (Accessed 08/12/2020)

[2] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1996. (2011) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1996 (Accessed 08/12/2020)

[3] UCDP. South Sudan: Government. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/11345 (Accessed 08/12/2020)

[4] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2155. (2011) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2155 (Accessed 08/12/2020)

[5] UCDP. South Sudan: Government.

[6] Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), 2018. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/2112/Revitalised%20Agreement%20on%20the%20Resolution%20of%20the%20Conflict%20in%20the%20Republic%20of%20South%20Sudan%20(R-ARCSS) (Accessed 08/12/2020)

[7] BBC. “Pope Francis kisses feet of rival South Sudan leaders.” BBC News. (2019) Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-47903916 (Accessed 08/12/2020)

[8] International Crisis Group. “A Major Step Toward Ending South Sudan’s Civil War.” International Crisis Group Statement / Africa. (2020) Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/major-step-toward-ending-south-sudans-civil-war (Accessed 08/12/2020)

[9] Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission. Welcome to RJMEC, South Sudan. (RJMEC, 2022) Available at: https://jmecsouthsudan.org/ (Accessed 08/12/2020)

Description of Case 

In 1981, the main opposition group to apartheid in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC), launched an insurgency against the state.[1] The conflict escalated until 1986, when the government imposed a state of emergency after large parts of the country became ungovernable due to the preponderance of armed groups.[2] In 1988, South Africa ended its involvement in the Border War in present-day Namibia, and the following year the hard-line state president resigned after a stroke. These events heralded a seismic change in circumstances, and both the Organisation of African Unity and UN General Assembly recognised the moment and called for dialogue and a transition to democracy.[3] In 1990, the new South African administration released ANC leader Nelson Mandela, legalised several opposition groups (including the ANC), and entered into talks with the opposition.[4] However, despite progress on these fronts, the peace process was almost derailed entirely by a surge of political violence that erupted in 1990-1991 and threatened to spark a civil war.[5]

It was in this uncertain context that South African church organisations met in November 1990, agreeing in the Rustenburg Declaration to establish a committee to help the country navigate a peaceful path through the crisis.[6] In September 1991, these church organisations worked with business groups and trades unions to host talks attended by a spectrum of South African political interests. This event resulted in the National Peace Accord, which took the unprecedented step of establishing a code of conduct, agreed to by all parties involved, to keep the peace.[7] It set out a vision for a democratic and peaceful country and provided for the establishment of peace committees to end the violence and create the conditions for elections. This infrastructure was funded by the South African government (before becoming independent in 1993) and supported by the UK and Denmark. In December 1991, these commitments were formally endorsed at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), which was attended by most political parties. The CODESA mechanism served as a framework for debates on the democratic transition to take place peacefully and, together with the efforts of civil society, helped to reduce armed conflict in South Africa.[8] In December 1993, this process culminated with the formation of the Transitional Executive Council (essentially a consociational power-sharing administration) to govern the country until free and fair elections could be held the following year.[9]

[1] UCDP. South Africa: Government. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/345 (Accessed 11/12/2020)

[2] Ian Van Der Waag. A Military History of Modern South Africa. (Oxford, 2018) pp.279-80

[3] Harare Declaration, 1989. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/node/2074 (Accessed 11/12/2020); United Nations General Assembly. Resolution A/RES/44/27B. (2019) Available at: https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/44 (Accessed 11/12/2020)

[4] Groote Schuur Minute, 1990. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/southafrica-grooteshuur90 (Accessed 11/12/2020); Pretoria Minute, 1990. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/southafrica-pretoria-minute1990 (Accessed 11/12/2020)

[5] Muna Ndulo. “United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA): Security Council Resolutions 772 (1992) and 894 (1994) and the South African Transition: Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping.” Cornell Law Faculty Publications, No. 61. (1995) p.211

[6] Peter Gastrow. Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the National Peace Accord. (Washington, DC, 1995) p.16

[7] National Peace Accord, 1991. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/southafrica-national-peace-accord91 (Accessed 11/12/2020)

[8] CODESA Declaration of Intent, 1991. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/southafrica-codesa-intent1991 (Accessed 11/12/2020)

[9] Gastrow. Bargaining for Peace. p.97

Description of Case 

The African National Congress (ANC) was the dominant opposition force in apartheid South Africa, but it was not the only one. In the KwaZulu Homeland in Natal, the Inkatha (from 1990 Inkatha Freedom Party, IFP) rose from the mid-1970s to become a powerful force in South African politics. In contrast to the militant campaign of the ANC, the IFP chose a path of reform to end apartheid. The IFP governed KwaZulu Homeland during the apartheid era, while the ANC was officially banned. This allowed it to develop a considerable support base, organise its own security forces, and entrench its position as a rival to the aspirations of the ANC leadership.[1] As the ANC stepped up its military campaign in the 1980s, clashes began taking place with armed IFP supporters in Natal. In 1990, elements within the South African security forces (often referred to as a “Third Force”) started covertly supporting the IFP in its struggle against the ANC, arming its members and providing funds and military training.[2] Further weapons could be easily acquired from neighbouring Mozambique after decades of war. This transformed the conflict, sparking an eruption of fighting around Pietermaritzburg in March that became known as the Seven Days War. Over 200 people were killed and 20,000 were forced from their homes. In July, the violence spread to the surrounds of Johannesburg, and in 1991 a battle involving 2,000 ANC and IFP personnel took place at Umgababa in Natal.[3]

Efforts to end the conflict between the ANC and IFP began in January 1991 with talks in Durban. These culminated with a formal ceasefire and an agreement which recognised that the conflict between the two organisations had already cost more than 8,000 lives, and that they should work together to end apartheid rather than fight each other.[4] Despite these pledges, clashes continued between ANC and IFP supporters as South Africa began its transition to democracy. The 1994 elections were rejected by the KwaZulu leadership, who sought to retain the autonomy they enjoyed under the Homelands system. This sparked another surge in armed clashes in Natal between ANC and IFP supporters, which in turn led to the declaration of another state of emergency.[5] Just days before the elections were scheduled to go ahead, mediation by US and UK diplomats helped to convince the IFP to participate in the elections, calming a potentially volatile situation.[6] The IFP joined the ANC in a coalition government for a decade after the election, marking the formal end of the conflict, although clashes between supporters continued in Natal until 1996.

[1] UCDP. IFP. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/1117 (Accessed 16/11/2021)

[2] Stephen Ellis. “The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force.” Journal of South African Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2. (1998) p.284

[3] Gastrow. Bargaining for Peace. p.14

[4] African National Congress/ Inkatha Freedom Party Agreement, 1991. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/220 (Accessed 16/11/2021)

[5] Bob Drogin. “S. Africa Declares State of Emergency in Natal Province: Violence: De Klerk sends troops into Zulu-dominated region, where Chief Buthelezi opposes this month’s national all-race elections. Mandela applauds crackdown.” Los Angeles Times. (1 April 1994) Available at: https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-04-01-mn-41016-story.html (Accessed 16/11/2021)

[6] Richard Carver. “Kwazulu-Natal – Continued Violence and Displacement.” WRITENET. (1 July 1996) Available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6bc4.html (Accessed 16/11/2021)