Description of Case 

As the Soviet Union collapsed and much of the Caucasus descended into war, the diverse and economically poor Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Dagestan appeared at risk of following the path of its neighbours. Like all parts of the Caucasus, the population of Dagestan was affected by the withdrawal (and partial disintegration) of Soviet armed forces in the region and the return of populations, such as Chechens, who had been deported to central Asia in 1944. With over 30 recognised national groups within its borders (including Russians, Chechens, Lezgins, all of whom could seek unity with fraternal populations outside the republic) and a plurality of confessional outlooks within a society awash with small arms, Dagestan was viewed by outside observers as an area at great risk of armed conflict, particularly after the wars in nearby Abkhazia, Chechnya, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh erupted in the early 1990s.[1]

In contrast to most of the other political units established in the Caucasus during the Soviet period, the structures of government in Dagestan remained in place after 1991 and became the nucleus of the post-communist administration. Indeed, there was widespread support from across Dagestani society for the carefully balanced consociational political system that had developed over the centuries and eventually became formalised within the Soviet constitutional framework of the republic. This was manifested in three separate referenda on the shape of post-Soviet Dagestan’s political administration and the mobilisation of multiethnic Dagestani self-defence units in opposition to incursions by Chechen militants in 1999.[2] This system emerged from the djamaat; a traditional method of political organisation focused on territory rather than kinship which created administrative bodies that were inherently multiethnic. The Soviets institutionalised this practice, ensuring that power was always shared among the many groups in Dagestan. The 1994 Dagestan Constitution enshrined these consociational arrangements, with overlapping legislative bodies ensuring that, at the least, the major ethnic groups in the republic were represented in government. In practical terms, this framework makes it very difficult for political platforms premised on ethnic exclusivity to succeed and means that Dagestani leaders are forced to build their political support base on a multiplicity of ethnic groups.[3] By maintaining these mechanisms during times of great uncertainty, the people of Dagestan helped to prevent armed conflict in their republic.

[1] Christoph Zürcher. The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus. (New York, 2007) p.186

[2] Robert Ware & Enver Kisriev. “Ethnic Parity and Democratic Pluralism in Dagestan: A Consociational Approach.” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 1. (2001) pp.111;

[3] Ware & Kisriev. “Ethnic Parity and Democratic Pluralism in Dagestan.” pp.111-2; UCDP. Russia (Soviet Union) : Dagestan. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/414 (Accessed 11/11/2021)

Description of Case 

Prior to 2015, Nigeria had a troubled history with democracy. The 2011 elections sparked widespread violence in the north of the country in which 800 people died, while the contest four years earlier was judged dismally by international observers and also led to violence. Prior to this, the military had run the country for much of its post-colonial history.[1] The prospects of a peaceful election were reduced even further by ongoing political violence in Biafra and the Niger Delta, the fight against Boko Haram in the north of the country, concerns about the politicisation of the security services, and the extremely confrontational rhetoric and confessional divide between the two main Nigerian political parties.[2] Together, these factors served to create a perfect storm which observers predicted could push Africa’s most populous state into a devastating civil war during the 2015 elections.

Recognising the potential for calamity, personnel of the Office of the Presidency began hosting a series of consultations in June 2014 aimed at making the political parties aware of the danger that their rhetoric was placing Nigeria in.[3] These efforts culminated in January 2015 with the National Sensitization Workshop on Non-Violence in the 2015 Elections, in which all presidential candidates and political parties contesting the election signed a peace agreement, known as the Abuja Accord, in the presence of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and former Commonwealth Secretary-General Emeka Anyaoku, who chaired the event.[4] The Accord recommended establishing a National Peace Committee to monitor adherence to its principles. The Committee was established in weeks and was tasked with advising the government and electoral commission on the resolution of disputes and making itself available for national mediation and conciliation in the case of electoral violence or armed conflict.[5] The efforts of the Committee were abetted by logistical and financial support from the UN Development Programme and the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue, as well as the parallel efforts of the United Nations Office for West Africa to prevent conflict.[6] Upon election day, the defeated candidate conceded and called for his followers to accept the outcome, marking the conclusion of Nigeria’s first fair and peaceful elections.[7]

[1] BBC. “Nigeria profile – Timeline.” BBC News. (2019) Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13951696 (Accessed 02/12/2020)

[2] International Crisis Group. “Nigeria’s Dangerous 2015 Elections: Limiting the Violence.” Africa Report, No. 220. (2014) Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria-s-dangerous-2015-elections-limiting-violence (Accessed 02/12/2020); Martin Ewi. “Was the Nigerian 2015 presidential

election a victory for Boko Haram or for democracy?” African Security Review, Vol. 24, No. 2. (2015) p.208

[3] The Kukah Centre. 2015 General Elections: The Untold Story – National Peace Committee Report. (Abuja: The Kukah Centre, 2018) p.1

[4] Ibid. See Annex for the full agreement.

[5] Ibid. p.6

[6] The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Annual Report – The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in 2015. (Geneva: HD, 2015) p.10; Laurie Nathan. UN Preventive Diplomacy during the 2015 Nigerian Elections. (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2018)

[7] Ann Oden. “Nigeria Makes History with Peaceful 2015 Presidential Election.” Pyxera Global. (2015) Available at: https://www.pyxeraglobal.org/nigeria-makes-history-with-peaceful-2015-presidential-election/ (Accessed 02/12/2020)

Description of Case 

Moldavia was a republic within the Soviet Union. The area was home to a predominantly Moldovan population, some of whom advocated unity with Romania while others hoped for independence, along with a large Russian minority and the Gagauz – a Turkic speaking Orthodox community who live in the south of the country. When the leaders of the Moldovan nationalist movement rose to power in 1989, they introduced policies that were intended to empower Moldovans at the expense of the traditional Russian elite. This included discriminatory legislation on language, which threatened the position of other minorities, such as the Gagauz. In response, Gagauzian leaders proclaimed the formation of an independent republic in September 1989.[1] When the Soviet Union began collapsing in 1990, this range of political outlooks left newly independent Moldova in an extremely unstable situation. In September of that year, Russian leaders in Transnistria declared independence and fell into conflict with the Moldovan administration in Chișinău. This conflict distracted from the situation in Gagauzia, where the leaders of the unrecognised republic were mustering a local defence force with some assistance from their counterparts in Transnistria. Armed clashes between government security forces and Gagauz paramilitaries occurred intermittently while the conflict in Transnistria took place, setting the stage for another war on Moldovan soil should the situation escalate.[2]

After Moldovan forces failed to re-establish control of Transnistria with a major offensive in the summer of 1992, the incumbent administration resigned, creating an opportunity for a resolution of the incipient conflict with the Gagauz. The first formal talks were held in 1993, but the process gained traction when the February 1994 Moldovan elections brought yet another new government to power. By the end of the year, an accommodation with the Gagauz was negotiated and the Moldovan parliament approved a Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia, establishing a ‘national-territorial autonomous unit’ with Gagauz, Moldovan, and Russian as its official languages within Moldova.[3] Gagauz schools and a university were also supported. Membership of this polity was approved in a series of village-wide referenda, and once it was established, the local population elected a popular assembly and a governor.[4] These actions served to diffuse the crisis and prevent the eruption of another armed conflict in Moldova in the 1990s. Although the extent of autonomy enjoyed in Gagauzia is disputed, arguments over this issue remain peaceful.

[1] Steven Roper. “Regionalism in Moldova: The Case of Transnistria and Gagauzia.” Regional & Federal Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3. (2001) pp.104-5

[2] Oleh Protysk. “Gagauz Autonomy in Moldova: The Real and the Virtual in Post-Soviet State Design.” in Marc Weller & Katherine Nobbs, eds. Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts. (Philadelphia, 2010) p.233

[3] Johann Wolfschwenger & Kirsten Saxinger. “Federalism, National Identity and Overcoming

Frozen Conflicts: Moldova’s Experience.” Ethnopolitics, Vol. 19, No. 4. (2020) p.359

[4] Roper. “Regionalism in Moldova.” p.118

Description of Case 

In 2011, the people of Malawi took their frustration over rising taxes, fuel shortages, and the increasing authoritarianism of the government to the streets.[1] Beginning at the University of Malawi in February, the protests spread across the country, culminating in large public demonstrations in July. In response, the Government of Malawi ordered a crackdown on the protestors in which 20 civilians were killed and 58 injured by the police.[2] The crackdown inspired further unrest and violence, which in turn led the government to accuse the opposition of attempting a coup d’état. Civil society leaders then issued the government with an ultimatum, giving it a month to address the concerns outlined in a 20-point petition or face further street protests. Some militant opposition groups threatened violence should the demands for reform be ignored, while rumours that the government was hiring Zimbabwean mercenaries in preparation for a conflict served to heighten tensions even further.[3] The likelihood of further violence and an escalation into armed conflict was high.

The UN Secretary-General was quick to recognise and respond to the crisis, appointing a Special Envoy in July 2011 and tasking him with calming the situation and preventing a recurrence of the recent violence. The Envoy successfully brought the parties together and, on 16 August, they formally agreed to participate in a UN-facilitated National Dialogue in which the 20-point petition would serve as the agenda.[4] This provided a credible alternative to the protests, which under the circumstances remained a potential spark for armed conflict. Between September 2011 and March 2012, UN staff mediated talks between government officials and representatives from civil society. These efforts succeeded in reducing tensions and containing the immediate crisis, however much work remained to resolve the conflict. The UN Development Programme led efforts to prevent conflict and reduce tensions at the regional level, while other agencies worked to create a safe and secure environment in which the upcoming elections could be held.[5] By engaging with both parties and providing a mechanism for constructive dialogue between them, the UN effort helped to prevent the political crisis from escalating into armed conflict.

[1] Julius Agbor. “Averting Further Crisis in Malawi.” Brookings Op-Ed. (2011) Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/averting-further-crisis-in-malawi/ (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[2] Diana Cammack. “Malawi risk becoming ‘fragile state’.” The Guardian. (2011) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/nov/17/malawi-political-economic-crisis (Accessed 01/12/2020)

[3] Francesco Galtieri. What Works in UN Resident Coordinator-led Conflict Prevention: Lessons from the Field – Malawi 2011-17. (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2018) p.3

[4] Ibid. p.4

[5] Ibid. p.7

Description of Case 

In February 2009, opposition protests in Madagascar were met with a brutal crackdown by security forces. The response cost the lives of 135 people and led to mutinies in the army.[1] Opposition against President Marc Ravalomanana’s rule centred on a former mayor, Andry Rajoelina. In March 2009, military personnel supportive of Rajoelina removed the army Chief of Staff and Minister of Defence from office and deployed troops around the capital, Antananarivo, before forcing Ravalomanana to resign.[2] In the ensuing weeks, Rajoelina declared himself head of a High Transitional Authority with military support and disbanded parliament. The crisis continued, with Ravalomanana continuing to claim the presidency, appointing a prime minister (who was duly arrested by security forces), and receiving support from factions in the military.[3] With two rival governments, a divided military, and a paralysed state apparatus, Madagascar was on the verge of civil war.[4] 

The African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the UN made efforts to mediate the crisis, attempting to host talks between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana early in 2009. However, once Rajoelina seized power, Madagascar was suspended from the AU and SADC, while the EU and US withheld aid.[5] In June 2009, the SADC appointed the President of Mozambique to lead a mediation team to Madagascar along with representatives from the AU and l’Organisation de la Francophonie (OIF) to negotiate the formation of a power-sharing government.[6] These efforts culminated in September with the signing of the Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar, which affirmed commitments to free and fair elections, formed a transitional government, and invited the SADC to establish a mission to oversee implementation.[7] The elections stipulated in the Roadmap were postponed several times, but when they did finally go ahead in 2013, both Ravalomanana and Rajoelina were, under international pressure, prevented from standing. The UN provided funding and technical assistance for the election, while a host of international organisations deployed election monitors.[8] These efforts helped to ensure a peaceful outcome to the contest. Thanks to effective diplomatic pressure and mediation, the political crisis in Madagascar was prevented from escalating into armed conflict.

[1] Lauren Ploch. “Madagascar’s 2009 Political Crisis.” Congressional Research Service (R40448). (2009) p.1

[2] Ibid. p.3

[3] BBC. “Madagascar army split raises war fears.” BBC News. (2002) Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1857555.stm (Accessed 26/11/2020)

[4] Alex Duval Smith. “Madagascar on the verge of civil war, US ambassador warns.” The Guardian. (2009) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/12/madagascar-civil-war-rajoelina-ravalomanana (Accessed 26/11/2020)

[5] Ploch. “Madagascar’s 2009 Political Crisis.” p.4

[6] Lesley Connolly. “The troubled road to peace: Reflections on the complexities of resolving the political impasse in Madagascar.” ACCORD Policy and Practice Brief, No. 21. (2013) p.2

[7] Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar – Commitments by Malagasy Political Stakeholders, 2011. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/madagascar-roadmap2011 (Accessed 26/11/2020)

[8] The Carter Center. Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar: Final Report. (The Carter Center, 2013) p.4

Description of Case 

Lesotho, a small kingdom surrounded by South Africa, has had a troubled relationship with democracy since constitutional rule was re-established in 1993 after a period of military rule. A contested election in 1998 led to mass protests and a Southern African Development Committee (SADC) intervention, with further instability being averted with the introduction of some electoral reforms. However, politics in the 2000s continued to be marked by weak governing coalitions, contested elections, and attempted coups d’état by the armed forces.[1] In 2014, an attempted coup forced much of the government (including the prime minister) to flee to South Africa, where they requested international assistance to help restore order.[2] In the ensuing negotiations hosted by the Government of South Africa, new elections were scheduled for 2015, however these failed to produce a stable governing coalition and the chaos continued. A few months later, a former military chief was assassinated, sparking a SADC investigation. In their findings, the SADC officials recommended a host of political, constitutional, and security reforms which, they hoped, would bring some stability to Lesotho.[3] The proposals were, however, largely ignored by the Government of Lesotho and the country remained on the verge of collapse.

In September 2017, the SADC met to discuss the possibility of deploying an intervention force to prevent the collapse of law and order in Lesotho. After agreeing that such a move was necessary (and making use of the previous request for aid by the Government of Lesotho), the 269 personnel of the SADC Preventive Mission in Lesotho (SAPMIL) moved into Lesotho on 2 December 2017. They were tasked with creating a secure, stable, and peaceful environment, restoring the rule of law, and helping to implement certain Security Sector Reform programmes.[4] Almost immediately, the situation in Lesotho calmed and SAPMIL was able to focus on facilitating dialogue and leading confidence building patrols with the fractured Basotho security services. Just two months into their deployment, an African Union (AU) delegation assessed SAPMIL, recommending AU member states provide financial and logistical support to the mission.[5] Having helped to prevent the political deadlock from escalating into armed conflict, SAPMIL was withdrawn in November 2018.

[1] Roger Southall. “Why Lesotho’s in such a mess and what can be done about it.” The Conversation. (2017) Available at: https://theconversation.com/why-lesothos-in-such-a-mess-and-what-can-be-done-about-it-79678 (Accessed 07/12/2020)

[2] Christopher Williams. “South Africa’s efforts to stabilise Lesotho have failed. Less intervention may be more effective.” The Conversation. (2020) Available at: https://theconversation.com/south-africas-efforts-to-stabilise-lesotho-have-failed-less-intervention-may-be-more-effective-137499 (Accessed 07/12/2020)

[3] Peter Fabricius. “Is SADC at last flexing its muscles in Lesotho?” ISS Today. (2017) Available at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-sadc-at-last-flexing-its-muscles-in-lesotho (Accessed 07/12/2020)

[4] SADC. “SADC officially launches the SADC Preventive Mission in the Kingdom of Lesotho on December 2, 2017.” News. (2017) Available at: https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-officially-launches-sadc-preventive-mission-kingdom-lesotho-december-2-2017/ (Accessed 07/12/2020)

[5] SADC. “AU conducts an Assessment on the SADC Preventive Mission in Lesotho (SAPMIL).” News. (2018) Available at: https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/au-conducts-assessment-sadc-preventive-mission-lesotho-sapmil/ (Accessed 07/12/2020)

Description of Case 

A disputed election in December 2007 led to outbreaks of spontaneous violence, organised attacks by militias, and a violent crackdown by security forces in Kenya.[1] With the prospect of a civil war becoming increasingly likely, Kenyan citizens mobilised to monitor the violence while international organisations took action to facilitate the peaceful resolution of the crisis. Recognising the potential for armed conflict to emerge from the disputed election, five Kenyans met the day after the polls to discuss how to prevent such an outcome.[2] They acted rapidly to mobilise a network of volunteers from across Kenyan society, which they named Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP), and began broadcasting their appeals for violence to be avoided. On 9 January 2008, CCP published the Citizens’ Agenda for Peace, which outlined strategies for ending the crisis, including the formation of a power-sharing coalition government. Other groups within the network mobilised prominent personalities and the religious community to voice their opposition to violence and provide their time, resources, and good offices to facilitate dialogue.[3] The CCP later became a key actor in the peace process and played a pivotal role in resolving the crisis.

At the diplomatic level, the African Union (AU) provided a mandate for a diplomatic intervention to help resolve the crisis and dispatched its Panel of Eminent Personalities (led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan) to mediate the peace process.[4] Within a week of the Panel’s arrival, the parties to the dispute agreed to enter into dialogue and appointed representatives for the negotiations. On 1 February, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon arrived in Nairobi to offer his support to the peace process. Two weeks later, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived to declare US support for the process.[5] With mounting diplomatic pressure to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict, negotiations culminated on 28 February 2008 with the signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act, which provided the framework for the formation of a power-sharing government (as outlined in the Citizen’s Agenda for Peace).[6] Following the agreement, the Government of National Unity was formed. Although subsequent Kenyan elections were held without similar levels of violence, local analysts highlight the need for the preventive measures that were successful in 2008 to become permanent and embedded.[7]

[1] Monica Kathina Juma. “African mediation of the Kenyan post-2007 election crisis.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3. (2009) p.410

[2] George Wachira with Thomas Arendshorst and Simon M. Charles. Citizens in Actions: Making Peace in the Post-Election Crisis in Kenya – 2008. (Nairobi: Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa, 2010) p.x1

[3] George Wachira with Thomas Arendshorst and Simon M. Charles. Citizens in Actions: Making Peace in the Post-Election Crisis in Kenya – 2008. (Nairobi: Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa, 2010)

[4] Juma. “African mediation of the Kenyan post-2007 election crisis.” p.407

[5] Elisabeth Lindenmayer & Josie Lianna Kaye. A Choice for Peace? The Story of Forty-One Days of Mediation in Kenya. (International Peace Institute, 2009)

[6] National Accord and Reconciliation Act, 2008. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/kenya-national-accord-act2008 (Accessed 14/10/2020)

[7] Claire Elder, Susan Stigant, & Jonas Claes. Elections and Violent Conflict in Kenya: Making Prevention Stick. (Washington, DC: Peaceworks, 2014) Available at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2014/11/elections-and-violent-conflict-kenya-making-prevention-stick (Accessed 14/10/2020)

Description of Case 

Highly contested national elections held in 2001 resulted in widespread violence in the Guyanese capital of Georgetown and the surrounding countryside, in a sequence of events almost identical what had followed contests in 1997 and 1992.[1] Although escalation into armed conflict was avoided in those instances, the crises highlighted the fragility of the Guyanese state and its vulnerability to election violence. Such concerns only grew when post-election analysis of the events of 2001 warned of an ‘increase in violence’ and ‘heightened acrimony’ compared with previous contests.[2] The efforts of the Commonwealth to facilitate a dialogue between the two main political parties in Guyana collapsed in 2002, leading the opposition to boycott Parliament. The ongoing unrest culminated in July 2002 with an attack on the presidential building in which two people were killed.[3] In response, a range of international organisations began operating with the shared goal of reducing the likelihood of similar violence during the next election cycle and ultimately preventing an armed conflict from erupting in Guyana. 

Beginning in 2003, the UN Development Program implemented the Social Cohesion Program in collaboration with a range of other multilateral organisations and the Guyanese government. The objective was to build social cohesion, enhance security, and make progress with constitutional reform. This entailed efforts to promote dialogue by establishing Multi-Stakeholder Forums, as well as initiatives to build Guyanese capacity to manage conflict through the provision of training to police and civil society groups. In addition, the Program sponsored research and discussion on the subject of armed conflict among Guyanese academics, the media, and youth.[4] Further efforts were implemented by the British Government, which focused on the judiciary.[5] When the time came for the 2006 elections to be held, coordinated election observation missions from the Organisation of American States, Carter Center, and the Commonwealth were well prepared. In addition to their usual duties regarding the electoral process itself, these observers also spent weeks meeting with a host of influential figures from across Guyanese society prior to the contest, playing an important role in ensuring that all stakeholders were prepared to support a peaceful election. On election day, observers deployed at polling stations across the country were able to verify the integrity of the electoral process, thus reassuring Guyanese society that the result was genuine.[6] These efforts helped to prevent armed conflict in Guyana and served to help stabilise the fragile democratic process in the country.

[1] Wendy MacClinchy. What Works in UN Resident Coordinator-led Conflict Prevention: Lessons from the Field – Guyana 2003-15. (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2018)

[2] Ibid. p.4

[3] Michael Lund. “Can Dialogues Change the Course of a Small Nation? The Social Cohesion Program in Guyana.” in Michael Lund & Steve McDonald. Across the Lines of Conflict: Facilitating Cooperation to Build Peace. (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2015) pp.85-94

[4] MacClinchy. What Works in UN Resident Coordinator-led Conflict Prevention. p.6

[5] Lund. “Can Dialogues Change the Course of a Small Nation?” p.97

[6] The Carter Center. Final Report to the Guyana Elections Commission on the 2006 General and Regional Elections. (Atlanta: The Carter Center, 2007) p.5

Description of Case 

Guinea-Bissau was subjected to a civil war, three coups d’état, an army mutiny, the assassination of the president, and an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military intervention in the decade or so prior to the 2012 elections.[1] In April of that year, just weeks before the population was scheduled to go to the polls, the military took power in yet another coup d’état. This chronic instability not only threatened to trigger a return to civil war, but also aggravated the Casamance Conflict in neighbouring Senegal and provided a haven for drug traffickers on their way to Europe.[2] In response, a range of international organisations worked to prevent armed conflict and foster stability in Guinea-Bissau.

ECOWAS began by demanding that the military junta reinstate civilian rule and acquiesce to the deployment of a peacekeeping mission.[3] The following month, a transitional government took power and over 600 troops of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) were deployed to the capital, Bissau. They were tasked with re-asserting government control across the country, guarding senior politicians, and beginning a Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration process.[4] The 2012 elections cancelled by the military junta were re-scheduled for 2014, and although they went ahead peacefully, disputes within the victorious party led to another political crisis which once again threatened destabilise the country.[5] In August 2015, ECOWAS dispatched a Special Envoy to mediate an end to the crisis, while ECOMIB personnel maintained law and order. The EU provided support to the Mission, covering the cost of the entire operation until the crisis was resolved.[6] Additional support was provided by the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office for Guinea-Bissau, which focused on strengthening state institutions.[7] In October 2016, President Alpha Conde of Guinea hosted negotiations between Bissau-Guinean politicians and civil society organisations. The talks culminated on 14 October 2016 with the Conakry Accord, which created the framework for constitutional rule and an ECOWAS monitoring process to ensure its implementation.[8] In 2019, the President of Guinea completed his constitutionally mandated term of office for the first time in history.[9]

[1] BBC. “Guinea-Bissau profile – Timeline.” BBC News. (2018) Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13579838 (Accessed 10/11/2020)

[2] Davin O’Regan & Peter Thompson. Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: Lessons from Africa’s First Narco-State. (Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2013)

[3] BBC. “Guinea-Bissau: First Ecowas peacekeeping troops arrive.” BBC News. (2012) Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18110585 (Accessed 10/11/2020)

[4] The Africa-EU Partnership. Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) – ECOMIB I & II. (EU, 2019) Available at: https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/projects/mission-guinea-bissau-ecomib-ecomib-i-ii (Accessed 10/11/2020)

[5] Brown Odigie. “ECOWAS’s efforts at resolving Guinea-Bissau’s protracted political crisis, 2015-2019.” ACCORD Conflict Trends 2019, No. 2. (2019) Available at: https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/ecowass-efforts-at-resolving-guinea-bissaus-protracted-political-crisis-2015-2019/ (Accessed 10/11/2020)

[6] African Peace Facility. ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB): Factsheet. (EU, 2018)

[7] Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. UNIOGBIS: UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/uniogbis (Accessed 10/11/2020)

[8] United Nations Secretary-General. “Capitalize on Conakry Accord as Important First Step to Ending Institutional Crisis, Secretary-General Urges Political Stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau.” UN Press Release. (2016) Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sgsm18371.doc.htm (Accessed 10/11/2020)

[9] Odigie. “ECOWAS’s efforts at resolving Guinea-Bissau’s protracted political crisis, 2015-2019.”

Description of Case 

Following the death of the long-serving President of Guinea in December 2008, officers in the army launched a coup d’état and formed a military junta to govern the country. Protests against the coup were increasingly met with force and in September 2009, 156 civilians were killed and thousands more injured when security forces launched a violent crackdown.^[1] Concerns were raised further when it was discovered that the military junta was hiring South African mercenaries and raising a militia to consolidate its grip on power.^[2] Fearing the crisis could escalate into armed conflict, the UN dispatched a commission to investigate the massacre, the Economic Community of West African States instated an arms embargo on Guinea and sent an envoy to mediate between the junta and the opposition, and the African Union froze the assets of junta members.^[3] On 21 December, the UN commission concluded that the military junta was responsible for the attacks and recommended that the International Criminal Court pursue an investigation.^[4] The publication of the UN report also led a wide range of national governments (such as France and the US) to cut aid to Guinea and place their own sanctions on members of the junta.^[5]

Faced with growing international attention and condemnation, the military junta agreed to an elections timetable proposed by a broad range of Guinean political parties in March 2009, inspiring donors from across the world to support the process and help Guinea conduct its first credible elections.^[6] Growing international pressure also led to negotiations between the belligerents in Burkina Faso. The talks culminated with the signing of the Ouagadougou Joint Declaration on 15 January 2010, which called for the restoration of constitutional rule and the formation of a transitional government.^[7] In addition, the perpetrators of the coup agreed to remain outside of Guinea. The transitional government successfully calmed the crisis and organised elections for June 2010. Although irregularities forced a second round in December, the disputes were settled in court and the fresh elections went ahead peacefully with the help of a significant contingent of international observers.^[8] Two years after the coup, Guinea’s first democratically elected leader came to power. Aside from some relatively minor outbreaks of violence in 2013 and 2015, Guinea has remained at peace.

[1] BBC. “Guinea massacre toll put at 157.” BBC News. (2009) Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8280603.stm (Accessed 05/11/2020)

[2] International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect. Crisis in Guinea. (ICRtoP, 2010) Available at: http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-guinea (Accessed 05/11/2020)

[3] Sascha Pichler Fong & Adam Day. “UN Preventive Diplomacy in the 2008-10 Crisis in Guinea.” in Laurie Nathan, Adam Day, João Honwana, & Rebecca Brubaker. Capturing UN Preventive Diplomacy Success: How and Why Does It Work? (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2018) Available at: https://cpr.unu.edu/capturing-un-preventive-diplomacy-success-how-and-why-does-it-work.html (Accessed 05/11/2020)

[4] International Commission of Inquiry. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry mandated to establish the facts and circumstances of the events of 28 September 2009 in Guinea, S/2009/693. (UN Security Council, 2010)

[5] Alexis Arieff & Nicolas Cook. “Guinea’s 2008 Military Coup and Relations with the United States.” Congressional Research Service (R40703). (2009) p.1

[6] Ibid. p.19

[7] Ouagadougou Joint Declaration, 2010. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/guinea-ouagadougou-declaration2010 (Accessed 05/11/2020)

[8] Fong & Day. “UN Preventive Diplomacy in the 2008-10 Crisis in Guinea.” p.29