Description of Case 

In the Soviet Union, South Ossetia was an Autonomous Oblast within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. This status guaranteed its Ossetian population certain rights and protections. When Georgian leaders moved towards independence in the early 1990s, they introduced Georgian as the main language of the whole republic and limited the rights of formerly autonomous polities within Georgian territory. In response, South Ossetian leaders proclaimed the independence of their oblast (upgrading it to the status of a republic and asserting sovereignty) and expressed their desire to remain part of the Soviet Union. Following the failed August 1990 coup d’état in Moscow, Soviet troops began withdrawing from the territory of Georgia, allegedly arming the Ossetian population on their way.[1] In December 1990, the Georgian administration declared a state of emergency in South Ossetia and the following month sent armed police into the region to disarm Ossetian militia. This sparked a clash in Tskhinvali (the de facto capital of South Ossetia) which left the town divided, before the Georgians withdrew following the mediation of a ceasefire by Soviet authorities. The fighting escalated considerably in the spring of 1991, causing widespread destruction but changing little on the ground: Georgian forces were unable to make any ground into South Ossetia.[2]

With little progress on the battlefield, Georgian leaders chose to blockade and besiege South Ossetia as winter settled in 1991. Fighting took place again in 1992, but a change in Georgian leadership and the growing crisis in Abkhazia diminished the prospect of renewed offensives in the summer.[3] However, it was not until dozens of civilians were killed in May 1992 and South Ossetian forces were found to be using heavy weaponry (representing a potential escalation of the conflict) that the belligerents met for talks. In June, representatives of the Government of Georgia met with the regional leadership of North Ossetia (within Russia), agreeing to a ceasefire and the formation of a joint monitoring and peacekeeping force. These negotiations served as the basis for the Sochi Agreement, which was signed by Georgian and Russian leaders on 24 June 1992.[4] In addition to a formal ceasefire, the agreement established the Joint Control Commission and the Russian-led Joint Peacekeeping Force of approximately 2,000 personnel from the Russian, Georgian, and South Ossetian armed forces to uphold the peace.[5] This framework succeeded in keeping the peace in South Ossetia until 2008, when an interstate conflict erupted between Georgia and Russia. 

[1] John Mackinlay & Evgenii Sharov. “Russian peacekeeping operations in Georgia.” in John Mackinlay & Peter Cross. Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping. (Tokyo, 2003) p.75

[2] Christoph Zürcher. The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus. (New York, 2007) p.126

[3] Mackinlay & Sharov. “Russian peacekeeping operations in Georgia.” p.77

[4] Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian – Ossetian Conflict (Sochi Agreement), 1992. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/georgia-sochi-agreement92 (Accessed 10/11/2021)

[5] Mackinlay & Sharov. “Russian peacekeeping operations in Georgia.” p.79-80

Description of Case 

As Georgian leaders moved toward independence during the collapse of the Soviet Union, a series of armed clashes took place in the region of Abkhazia between the Abkhazian and Georgian populations. In 1992, a year after Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union, Abkhazian armed groups launched an insurgency against government security forces while the local administration declared Abkhazian independence.[1] The fighting continued for over a year, costing thousands of lives and driving 200,000 non-Abkhaz civilians from their homes in the area.[2] Despite providing extensive military support to the Abkhaz separatists, the Government of Russia hosted a series of peace talks during the war. A UN mediated ceasefire in December 1993 created a window for the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) to be deployed to verify compliance and facilitate dialogue.[3] However, despite the presence of UNOMIG, the fighting continued until 14 May 1994, when the Russian-brokered Moscow Agreement ended the conflict and established a The Confederation of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force to separate the belligerents.[4]

With CIS forces in place, the international effort to contain and ultimately resolve the conflict began immediately. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established its own mission in Georgia to support UN efforts to resolve the conflict.[5] A brief outbreak of fighting in 1998 was successfully contained in six days, resulting in another ceasefire and an agreement on confidence-building measures, while another eruption of violence in August 2008 was ended by EU-mediated talks.[6] However, Russian recognition of Abkhazian independence a few weeks later undermined the mandates of UNOMIG and the CIS and OSCE missions.[7] Many Russian troops remain in Abkhazia following this decision; however, they serve as bilateral partners rather than peacekeepers.[8] As a result, the European Union Monitoring Mission, which was deployed in September 2008 to monitor the latest agreement is the only international presence in the area.[9] Although the conflict remains unresolved, Abkhazia has been spared from war for almost three decades.

[1] UCDP. Georgia: Abkhazia. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/392 (Accessed 24/11/2020)

[2] Lynch. Russian Peacekeeping in the CIS. p.129

[3] Memorandum of Understanding between the Georgian and the Abkhaz Sides at the Negotiations held in Geneva, 1993. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/georgia-mou-abkhazia93 (Accessed 24/11/2020); UN Peacekeeping. Georgia – UNOMIG – Background. (UN, 2009) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unomig/background.html (Accessed 24/11/2020)

[4] Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, 1994. Available at:

John Mackinlay & Evgenii Sharov. “Russian peacekeeping operations in Georgia.” in John Mackinlay & Peter Cross, eds. Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003) p.91

[5] OSCE. OSCE Mission to Georgia (Closed): The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: https://www.osce.org/georgia-closed/44629 (Accessed 24/11/2020)

[6] Protocol on Ceasefire, Separation of Armed Formations and Guarantees on Inadmissibility of Forcible Activities, 1998. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/georgia-protocol-ceasefire98 (Accessed 24/11/2020); Athens Meeting of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides on Confidence-Building Measures, 1998. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/georgia-athensmeeting98 (Accessed 24/11/2020); Carter Johnson. “Keeping the Peace After Partition: Ethnic Minorities, Civil Wars, and the Third Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma.” Civil Wars, Vol. 17, No. 1. (2015) p.33

[7] Implementation of the Plan of 12 August 2008, 2008. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/georgia-implementation-plan2008 (Accessed 24/11/2020)

[8] Vladimir Socor. “Russia Discards its “Peacekeeping” Operation in Abkhazia.” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 196. (2008) Available at: https://jamestown.org/program/russia-discards-its-peacekeeping-operation-in-abkhazia/ (Accessed 24/11/2020)

[9] EUMM. Our Mandate. (EUMM, 2020) Available at: https://eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/mandate (Accessed 24/11/2020)

Description of Case 

The twelfth-century Preah Vihear Temple lies on the contemporary border of Cambodia and Thailand. During the Second World War, the Thai government joined the Japanese after initially trying to remain neutral, seizing much territory from neighbouring colonies such as French Indochina, including the Preah Vihear Temple. An initial peace agreement with the French ceded this territory to Thailand, but this was later abrogated by the total surrender of Japanese forces at the end of the war. Thus, the Temple and its surrounds returned to French Indochina and were inherited by Cambodia upon its independence in 1953. Thailand retained its claim on the temple, and after bilateral talks failed to reach an agreement in 1953 and 1958, the case was sent to the ICJ for arbitration. In 1962, the ICJ concluded that the temple was indeed on Cambodian territory.[1] The issue remained largely dormant until 2008, when the Government of Cambodia took the seemingly innocuous decision to apply for UNESCO world heritage status for the site.[2] After initially cooperating on the application, the rise of a new administration in Thailand led to a major escalation of the crisis. Thai troops were deployed to the area, leading to armed clashes in October 2008 and throughout 2009. In 2011, the Thai military began deploying heavy weapons in the area and intense fighting took place, leading to dozens of deaths and the destruction of two tanks.[3] Further clashes took place at other points along the border, threatening to escalate into an interstate conflict.[4]

During the ASEAN conference in May 2011, the Government of Indonesia (as host nation) held talks with the parties. After initially agreeing to a ceasefire and the deployment of Indonesian observers to monitor withdrawals to end the conflict, the Thai government backtracked.[5] The fighting, however, did not resume, suggesting the talks were more productive than they appeared, and the dispute was again referred to the ICJ. While the case was being assessed, leading politicians from both countries played a friendly football match in Phnom Penh (Cambodia won 10-7) and declared that the era of unfriendly relations was over.[6] The ICJ issued its ruling in 2013, deciding that Cambodia has sovereignty over all the contested territory, requiring Thai troops to withdraw from the area, and a demilitarised zone be established along the international border.[7] Dozens of soldiers died in the conflict and 45,000 people forced from their homes, but dispute was resolved.

[1] ICJ. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand). (ICJ, 2021) Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/45 (Accessed 3/11/2021)

[2] BBC. “Tranquil temple at centre of a storm.” BBC News. (22 May 2008) Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7352333.stm (Accessed 3/11/2021)

[3] Geospatial Technologies Project. Monitoring Border Conflicts with Satellite Imagery: Cambodia and Thailand – 2008-2011. (Washington, DC, 2015) pp.3-4

[4] UCDP. Cambodia (Kampuchea) – Thailand. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/294 (Accessed 3/11/2021)

[5] International Crisis Group. “Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Thai-Cambodian Border Conflict.” Asia Report, No. 215. (2011) p.22

[6] AFP. “Cambodia PM scores in football diplomacy with Thailand.” Asia One. (24 September 2011) Available at: https://www.asiaone.com/News/Latest+News/Asia/Story/A1Story20110924-301309.html (Accessed 3/11/2021)

[7] ICJ. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand). (ICJ, 2021) Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/151 (Accessed 3/11/2021)

Description of Case 

The Hawar Islands, an archipelago in the Persian Gulf, have been the subject of a territorial dispute between the ruling families of Bahrain and Qatar since the eighteenth century. The British formally awarded the territory to Bahrain in the 1930s, however the islands remained contested after independence. Following the British withdrawal from the region, Saudi Arabia led efforts to mediate the dispute, eventually convincing both sides to take the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).[1] However, before the case made it to The Hague, the dispute almost sparked an interstate conflict. In 1986, the Government of Bahrain began constructing a coastguard station on the Hawar Islands, prompting the Government of Qatar government to dispatch helicopter gunships and soldiers to the area and arrest the construction workers. Bahrain responded by deploying its own troops to the Islands, and the two countries were on the cusp of war until the Saudi government intervened once again.[2]

Saudi-led efforts continued until 1991, and although they succeeded in defusing the immediate crisis, little progress was made in finding a resolution to the dispute. The Qatari government submitted its case to the ICJ in July 1991, although it took until November 1995 and some preliminary judgements from the ICJ for both parties to agree to the terms by which the case would be judged.[3] While the case was assessed in The Hague, the Saudi government continued its efforts to reconcile the Bahraini and Qatari administrations, mediating talks between both governments until diplomatic relations between them were re-established in 1997.[4] In 2001, the ICJ declared that the Hawar Islands were indeed the territory of Bahrain due to previous treaties with the British, although a smaller dispute over the town of Zubarah was settled in favour of Qatar.[5] Both states endorsed the ruling, closing the longest and most complex case in the history of the ICJ.[6] The concerted, two-decade mediation effort of the Saudi Arabian government helped to contain a major crisis and prevent a war between Bahrain and Qatar, however the territorial dispute between the two countries remained a potential source of armed conflict until the adjudication of the ICJ provided a permanent resolution to the conflict.

[1] Krista Wiegand. “Bahrain, Qatar, and the Hawar Islands: Resolution of a Gulf Territorial Dispute.” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 66, No. 1. (2012)

[2] Ramin Seddiq. “Border Disputes on the Arabian Peninsula.” The Washington Institute Policy Watch, No. 525. (2001) Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/border-disputes-on-the-arabian-peninsula (Accessed 26/11/2020)

[3] ICJ. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain). (ICJ, 2020) Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/87 (Accessed 26/11/2020)

[4] Wiegand. “Bahrain, Qatar, and the Hawar Islands.” p.14

[5] ICJ. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain).

[6] BBC. “Gulf islands row settled.” BBC News. (2001) Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1225398.stm (Accessed 26/11/2020)

Description of Case 

The region of South Kordofan became the southernmost frontier of Sudan following South Sudanese independence. In 2011, an armed group formed of veterans of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) launched an insurgency against the Sudanese government in Khartoum under the banner of the SPLM-North. By 2013, up to 70,000 government troops were engaged with 30,000 SPLM-North soldiers across South Kordofan.[1] As the fighting escalated, displacing populations and placing great strain on limited resources, the local population became increasingly affected by the conflict.

In response to the growing crisis, Peace Direct and Collaborative for Peace Sudan (CPS) supported the establishment of 11 Peace Committees formed of local residents in South Kordofan. The Committees have access to a Rapid Response Fund, which provides resources to facilitate interventions as they are required. In practice, the actions of such Committees are limited to promoting dialogue, raising awareness, and hosting talks if facilities are available.[2] For example, in 2017, the Peace Committee in Delenj was invited by local elites to intervene in a conflict between farmers and pastoralists over the destruction of crops. The previous year, ten people were killed in fighting between the communities, and growing tension had raised fears of a much worse conflict. After negotiations mediated by the Committee, the communities agreed to restore and enforce traditional codes of practice that had prevented conflict in the past, establish a joint committee to monitor the agreement, and to no longer carry small arms. In addition, the communities together lobbied the government in Khartoum to improve water distribution in the area.[3] Such actions have led to a meaningful reduction in armed conflict in South Kordofan. Peace Direct highlights that 80 percent of interventions successfully prevented or ended armed conflict, with no subsequent incidents connected to the resolved conflicts.[4] Many of the conflicts are recorded as being ‘at high risk of triggering mass atrocities’ and therefore could have easily escalated, including three cases which had already cost the lives of hundreds of people.[5]

[1] International Crisis Group. “Sudan’s Spreading Conflict (I): War in South Kordofan.” Africa Report, No. 198. (2013) p.i

[2] Phil Vernon. Local peacebuilding: What works and why. (Peace Direct & Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2019) p.11

[3] Ibid. p.18

[4] Ibid. p.13

[5] Peace Direct. Conflict Prevention in South and West Kordofan, Sudan. (Peace Direct, 2017) p.3

Description of Case 

Israel and Jordan were in state of war with each other from the day that Israel was established in 1948. This status continued unchanged regardless of whether there was any actual fighting, preventing bilateral dialogue or reconciliation between them despite the extensive international border that they share. This left a host of issues unresolved, ranging from disputed territorial claims over the West Bank and East Jerusalem to the use of water resources on the River Jordan. Further armed conflicts took place between Israel and Jordan in 1967 and 1974, demonstrating that the state of war was not only symbolic. Although informal communications channels were developed between the two states in the 1980s, the permanent state of war posed a constant risk of sparking an armed conflict which was likely engulf the entire region.

Recognising the threat to regional peace and security that was posed by the state of war between Israel and Jordan, the governments of the USA and Soviet Union came together in October 1991 to invite delegates from Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian community to a peace conference in Madrid. Talks at the conference were followed up in Washington, DC in December 1991, where a lengthy peace process between the governments of Israel and Jordan began.[1] After two years of negotiations mediated by US officials, the belligerents agreed to the Common Agenda in September 1993, which provided a framework for wide-ranging negotiations on improving the security situation, sharing water, returning refugees, resolving territorial disputes, and even future bilateral cooperation.[2] Talks continued, with King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel holding their first public meeting in Washington, DC in July 1994. This round of negotiations culminated in July 1994 with the Washington Declaration, mediated by US President William Clinton, whereby the war was formally ended, bilateral relations were established, and areas of cooperation were introduced.[3] In October 1994, the talks concluded with the signing of the Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace, which formalised many aspects of the Washington Declaration.[4] This peace process greatly reduced the likelihood of armed conflict between the two states, which remain at peace to this day. 

[1] Jewish Virtual Library. Israel-Jordan Relations: Overview of Peace Negotiations. (Jewish Virtual Library, 2020) Available at: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/overview-of-israel-jordan-peace-negotiations (Accessed 08/12/2020)

[2] Agreed Common Agenda, 1993. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/israeljordan-commonagenda93 (Accessed 08/12/2020)

[3] Washington Declaration, 1994. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/israeljordan-washingtondeclaration94 (Accessed 08/12/2020)

[4] Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1994. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/israeljordan-peacetreaty94 (Accessed 08/12/2020)

Description of Case 

In February 2008, Colombian troops raided a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) camp situated in Ecuador without informing the Ecuadorian government. Dozens were killed in the attack, including citizens of Ecuador and Mexico.[1] In response, the Government of Ecuador severed relations with Colombia and called for an international investigation. The Government of Venezuela offered its support to Ecuador, denouncing the attack as a war crime, closing its border with Colombia, and mobilising thousands of troops along the frontier.[2] Intelligence acquired during the raid linked the Government of Venezuela with FARC, leading the Government of Colombia to ask the International Criminal Court to charge the Venezuelan president with genocide.[3] With troops gathering on the border, suspicion in the air, and relations at a historic low, the crisis presented a significant risk of sparking an interstate conflict.    

In response to the crisis, the Organisation of American States (OAS) convened its Permanent Council and published a declaration condemning breaches of sovereignty and acts of aggression, committing the Organisation to ensuring the pacific settlement of the dispute, and activating mechanisms to bring the two conflicting nations together.[4] This resulted in the formation of a Commission, led by the OAS Secretary-General, which was dispatched to the region to investigate the crisis and propose formulas for its resolution. These quick and decisive actions helped to diffuse the standoff.[5] While the Commission conducted its investigation, heads of state from across Latin America (including Colombia and Ecuador) were attending the 20^th Summit of the Rio Group. The meeting served to facilitate dialogue and provided a forum for representatives from across the region to encourage a peaceful resolution to the crisis.[6] The President of Dominica, for example, engineered a face-to-face meeting between his counterparts from Colombia and Ecuador which culminated with the Colombian president issuing a formal apology.[7] The summit concluded with a joint-statement condemning the breach of Ecuadorian sovereignty and endorsing the previous OAS declaration and investigation.[8] Thanks to the presence of effective regional intergovernmental fora and the diplomatic efforts of member states, a potentially devastating interstate conflict was prevented from taking place.

[1] Gabriel Marcella. War Without Borders: The Colombia-Ecuador Crisis of 2008. (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008) pp.5-6

[2] Rory Carroll & Sibylla Brodzinsky. “Threat of war as Venezuela and Ecuador order troops to Colombian border.” The Guardian. (2008) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/05/colombia.venezuela (Accessed 25/11/2020)

[3] BBC. “Colombia calls for Chavez charges.” BBC News. (2008) Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7277313.stm (Accessed 25/11/2020)

[4] Resolution of the March 2008 Meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS). OEA/SER.G: CP/RES.930 (1632/08) (2008) in Committee on Foreign Relations. Playing with Fire: Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2008)

[5] MercoPress. “OAS resolution eases tension between Colombia and Ecuador.” MercoPress News. (2008) Available at: https://en.mercopress.com/2008/03/05/oas-resolution-eases-tension-between-colombia-and-ecuador (Accessed 25/11/2020)

[6] Ray Walser. “The Crisis in the Andes: Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela.” Heritage Lectures, No. 1080. (2008) p.10

[7] BBC. “Ecuador seeks to censure Colombia.” BBC News. (2008) Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7278484.stm (Accessed 25/11/2020)

[8] Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Rio Groupon the Recent Events Between Ecuador and Colombia, 2008. in Committee on Foreign Relations. Playing with Fire: Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2008)

Description of Case 

The peace agreement that ended the War in Croatia called for the UN to administer the territory that had been held by the Republika Srpska Krajina until it could be peacefully incorporated into the administrative framework of the Croatian state.[i] Initially, peacekeepers of the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) monitored the situation while the Security Council developed and planned a more focussed operation.[ii] In January 1996, the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) replaced UNCRO, and by May 1996 it was up to its full strength of 5,000 peacekeepers, 450 police, and 650 civilian administrators.[iii] UNTAES was tasked with demilitarising the areas under its control and peacefully bringing them under the jurisdiction of the Croatian government, retaining the multiethnic character of the region, assisting with reconstruction and refugee return, and organising local elections.[iv] Another UN operation, the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP), was deployed to the Prevlaka Peninsula to support UNCRO and prevent a conflict relapse in that region.[v] 

The most urgent task faced by UNTAES was implementing a Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration program. Within thirty days, all heavy weaponry was removed from the area and small arms belonging to the local Serb population were purchased by UNTAES through a buy-back program funded by the Croatian government.[vi] By the end of June 1996, UNTAES was the only military organisation in the region, severely limiting the prospects of renewed conflict. Stability was enhanced further by the establishment of a multiethnic Transitional Police Force in July 1996.[vii] With the post-conflict transition progressing well, UNTAES conducted local elections in the region under its jurisdiction in April 1997. Voter turnout exceeded expectations, no evidence of fraud was found, and there were no eruptions of election violence.[viii]  UNTAES began downsizing its operations and handing over responsibilities to local institutions in July 1997 and concluded its mandate in January 1998. The United Nations Civilian Police Support Group remained in the area until October 1998 to ensure the transition continued smoothly, and UNMOP completed its operation in 2002.[ix] An international presence remained in Croatia to monitor developments until 2007, when the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Croatia was closed.[x] These efforts helped to ensure that Croatia did not experience a conflict relapse

[i] Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (Erdut Agreement), 1995.

[ii] UN Peacekeeping. Croatia: United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation – UNCRO. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/uncro.htm (Accessed 16/11/2020)

[iii] UN Peacekeeping. Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium: Brief Chronology. (UN, 2020 Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/untaes_e.htm (Accessed 16/11/2020)

[iv] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1037. (1996) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1037 (Accessed 16/11/2020)

[v] UN Peacekeeping. UNMOP: United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka. (UN, 2002) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unmop/index.html (Accessed 16/11/2020)

[vi] Jacques Paul Klein. “The United Nations and Administration of Territory: Lessons from the Front Line.” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol. 97. (2003) p.206

[vii] Derek Boothby. “The Political Challenges of Administering Eastern Slavonia.” Global Governance, Vol. 10, No. 1. (2004) p.43

[viii] UN Peacekeeping. Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium: Brief Chronology.

[ix] UN Peacekeeping. Croatia – Danube Region: United Nations Civilian Police Support Group – UNPSG. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/cropol.htm (Accessed 16/11/2020)

[x] OSCE. OSCE Mission to Croatia / OSCE Office in Zagreb (closed). (OSCE, 2020) Available at: https://www.osce.org/croatia-closed (Accessed 16/11/2020)