Description of Case 

The Southern Sudan Autonomous Region held a referendum on independence in January 2011 as stipulated in the 2005 peace agreement. The result was overwhelmingly in favour, and the state of South Sudan was formally proclaimed on 9 July. However, relations between the former belligerents remained tense, with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) withdrawing from the Government of National Unity in 2007 (before re-joining the following year) and armed clashes taking place between government security forces and SPLM troops in the contested town of Abyei in 2008 and again in May 2011.[1] Furthermore, conflicts continued to rage in other parts of Sudan, highlighting the extreme fragility of the situation. Thus, when fighting erupted between the Government of Sudan and armed groups previously aligned with the SPLM in South Kordofan and Blue Nile at the same time that a major rebellion was launched in South Sudan immediately after independence, there was a great risk of another war (this time, an interstate conflict).[2] Understanding the risks involved (and perhaps concerned about the new conflicts both parties were facing), representatives of both states met for talks in Addis Ababa under AU auspices just weeks after South Sudan became independent. The negotiations culminated with an agreement to establish a Safe Demilitarised Border Zone 10km either side of the border and a Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), composed of security personnel from both states, to minimise the risk of further conflict.[3]

Little progress had been made towards establishing the border monitoring mechanisms by the end of 2011, leading the UN Security Council to task the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) with supporting the process.[4] The AU and UN continued pressuring the parties to demonstrate their commitment to the border issue. UNISFA began training monitors in December 2012, and the JBVMM conducted its first patrol alongside UN peacekeepers in March 2013.[5] For the most part, however, the respective Sudanese and South Sudanese components of the JVBMM were limited to their offices in the capitals of each state and most of the work on the ground was carried out by UNISFA personnel. Even in this limited format, the JVBMM served as a vital ‘hotline’ between the armed forces of each state, helping, for example, to prevent fighting within South Sudan from spilling over into Sudan in 2014.[6] Although implementation has not been perfect, the effort to stabilise the border has ended cross-border support for armed opposition groups and helped prevent conflict between Sudan and South Sudan.

[1] UCDP. Sudan: Abyei. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/11344 (Accessed 5/11/2021)

[2] UCDP. Government of Sudan – SPLM/A. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/663 (Accessed 5/11/2021)

[3] Agreement on the Border Monitoring Support Mission between the Government of the Sudan and the Government of South Sudan, 2011. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1372 (Accessed 5/11/2021)

[4] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2024. (UNSC, 2011) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2024 (Accessed 5/11/2021)

[5] United Nations. “UN mission verifies start of Sudan, South Sudan withdrawal from zone in Abyei.” UN News. (26 March 2013) Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/03/435502-un-mission-verifies-start-sudan-south-sudan-withdrawal-zone-abyei (Accessed 5/11/2021)

[6] Casie Copland & Ashish Pradhan. “Keeping the Hotline Open Between Sudan and South Sudan.” Crisis Group Commentary. (2018) p.2

Description of Case 

The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), jointly established by the Government of Sierra Leone and the UN, worked from 2002 until 2013 to bring the individuals most responsible for the worst crimes of the war to justice. Of the thirteen people indicted by the court, two died before their trial was complete and nine were convicted, including the RUF leader Foday Sankoh and the former president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, who had backed the RUF during the war.[1]  By removing figures who had actively undermined the peace process such as Sankoh (who was arrested in 2000) and Taylor (who fled to Nigeria in 2003 and was arrested in 2006) from the political environment of West Africa, the likelihood of a conflict relapse was greatly reduced. Indeed, both had repeatedly demonstrated their contempt for a negotiated solution to the conflicts they were involved in and had met international efforts to end the fighting with violence. Furthermore, by publicly documenting the atrocities and crimes committed by such individuals and sending them to serve lengthy sentences abroad (in many cases, for the rest of their lives), the SCSL demonstrated the end of impunity for such crimes in the region, providing a major deterrence to future armed conflicts.[2]

The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SLTRC) was mandated to create ‘an impartial, historical record of the conflict’, ‘address impunity; respond to the needs of victims; promote healing and reconciliation; and prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.’[3] The Commission documented the testimonies of 450 individuals, recorded over 40,000 human rights violations, and located 113 mass graves.[4]  All of its proceedings were broadcast across the country via radio, providing a population scarred by over a decade of war with a detailed account of what had happened and who was responsible. In its 2004 final report, the Commission offered a series of legally binding recommendations. These included confronting the endemic corruption which it diagnosed as the central cause of the war with a new Bill of Rights, increased independence for the judiciary, and the strengthening of parliament.[5] The SLTRC was followed, at its own recommendation, by a new permanent body which was tasked with continuing its work, the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone (HRCSL).[6] Linking transitional justice processes to direct reductions in armed conflict is somewhat problematic, but in the case of West Africa the prosecution of Sankoh and Taylor demonstrably helped to prevent conflict relapses in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

[1] Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone. The Special Court Trials. (2020) Available: http://www.rscsl.org/ (Accessed 22/10/2020)

[2] Gillian Wigglesworth. “The End of Impunity? Lessons from Sierra Leone.” International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 4. (2008); Owen Bowcott. “War criminal Charles Taylor to serve 50-year sentence in British prison.” The Guardian. (2013) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/former-liberian-president-charles-taylor-british-prison (Accessed 14/12/2020); Douglas Farah. “Foday Sankoh Dies.” The Washington Post. (2003) Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2003/07/31/foday-sankoh-dies/6e4d2d41-d756-412e-92f3-f802f9b6a91a/ (Accessed 14/12/2020)

[3] United States Institute of Peace. Truth Commission: Sierra Leone. (2002) Available at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2002/11/truth-commission-sierra-leone (Accessed 22/10/2020)

[4] International Center for Transitional Justice. Challenging the Conventional: Case Studies – Sierra Leone. (ICTJ) Available at: https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/subsites/challenging-conventional-truth-commissions-peace/sierra_leone.html#01/1 (Accessed 22/10/2020)

[5] United States Institute of Peace. Truth Commission: Sierra Leone. (2002)

[6] Human Rights Commission Sierra Leone. History of Human Rights Commission Sierra Leone. (HRC-SL, 2016) Available at: http://www.hrc-sl.org/History.aspx (Accessed 14/12/2020)

Description of Case 

The 2018 Revitalised Agreement ended the civil war in South Sudan after five years of fighting. The risk of a conflict relapse in such a setting was high, as the IGAD mediators were well aware. As a result, the Agreement re-established many of the mechanisms originally contained within the unsuccessful 2015 peace agreement, such as the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) and its agencies. Led by a former president of Botswana, the RJMEC was tasked with monitoring and overseeing the implementation of the Agreement and helping with the transition.[1] The military aspects of this work were carried by the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), which was led by an Ethiopian general but included representatives from the belligerent parties along with civil society and the international community, and the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC).[2] These bodies verified the withdrawal and cantonment of armed groups before creating the framework for the personnel of the formerly warring armies to be retrained and unified into the national armed forces in 2019.[3] Another IGAD-led agency that incorporated the former belligerents, the National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC), was charged with incorporating the peace agreement into the constitutional framework of South Sudan for the transitional period and preparing for the formation of a unity government. 

The RJMEC served to uphold the peace throughout 2019 as negotiations continued between the Government of South Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO). The discussions stalled on issues relating to the personal security of opposition leaders and the number of administrative states post-conflict South Sudan would have, leading to several delays in the formation of a unity government.[4] As the 2018 agreement specified that such an administration should be formed by 12 November 2019, the looming deadline led many observers to fear renewed fighting once it passed. Indeed, such was the level of concern that Pope Francis hosted the rival leaders in the Vatican and implored them to keep the peace.[5] IGAD extended the deadline by 100 days and hosted a final phase of talks alongside the South African vice-president. This final effort culminated on 22 February 2020 with the formation of the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity.[6] Thanks to its effective management of the situation, IGAD has helped prevent a conflict relapse in South Sudan.

[1] Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee. About RJEMC: Mandate. (RJMEC, 2021) Available at: https://www.jmecsouthsudan.com/index.php/about-rjmec (Accessed 17/11/2021)

[2] Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee. Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM). (RJMEC, 2021) Available at: https://www.jmecsouthsudan.com/index.php/institutions-and-boards/ctsamm (Accessed 17/11/2021)

[3] Li Xia. “South Sudan says unification of forces on course due to availability of cash.” Xinhua. (11/06/2019) Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/11/c_138134171.htm (Accessed 17/11/2021)

[4] UCDP. South Sudan: Government. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/11345 (Accessed 17/11/2021)

[5] BBC. “Pope Francis kisses feet of rival South Sudan leaders.” BBC News. (11 April 2019) Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-47903916 (Accessed 17/11/2021)

[6] Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu. “The Formation of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity in South Sudan Key Priorities, Tasks and Challenges Ahead.” Accord Conflict Trends, No. 2. (2020) Available at: https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-formation-of-the-revitalized-transitional-government-of-national-unity-in-south-sudan/ (Accessed 17/11/2021)

Description of Case 

After being overwhelmed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) stood in a precarious position once the war ended. To improve the Mission’s credibility, the Security Council greatly increased the number of peacekeepers from a wartime limit of 6,000 to over 17,000 in 2002.^[1] UNAMSIL was also fashioned with more robust capabilities, including helicopter gunships and much-improved intelligence capabilities.^[2] With this new strength and a mandate to respond ‘robustly’ to any threat of attack, the Mission’s commanders embarked on much more ambitious operations to improve the overall security situation and the Government of Sierra Leone’s control of the country.^[3]

Following the December 2000 cease-fire, UNAMSIL played a key role in developing the “Kambia Formula.” This entailed disarming both RUF and pro-government militias in strategic locations across the country, such as the border region with Guinea after which the strategy was named.^[4] This step-by-step approach not only served to strengthen the ongoing peace process, but also greatly reduced the likelihood of the conflict resuming. By mid-2001, UNAMSIL contingents were (using their own resources) rebuilding infrastructure across the country in an organic development that ’Funmi Olonisakin argues helped to greatly strengthen the UN’s credibility in Sierra Leone, despite the criticisms such actions drew at the time.^[5] With UNAMSIL transformed, its efforts to build peace in post-war Sierra Leone were much more fruitful. Its first triumph was the successful disarmament of 72,490 combatants, paving the way for a highly successful Security Sector Reform process led by the UK.^[6] Elections were held peacefully in May 2002 (with the assistance and supervision of the UN and observed by the Commonwealth, EU, and the Carter Center), resulting in the incumbent government winning an overwhelming majority. UNAMSIL continued to work on police reform, military integration, election support, and a wide range of other activities until December 2005, when it was replaced with the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL).[7] The ongoing UN and British effort helped to ensure that Sierra Leone did not experience a conflict relapse after December 2000.

[1] Short & Lauenstein. Peace and Conflict Since 1991. p.123

[2] Olonisakin. Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone. p.98-9

[3] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1313. (2000) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1313 (Accessed 22/10/2020)

[4] Olonisakin. Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone. p.103

[5] Ibid. p.108

[6] United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel. “The SSR experience of Sierra Leone, a shining model in West Africa and beyond.” News. (2017) Available at: https://unowas.unmissions.org/ssr-experience-sierra-leone-shining-model-west-africa-and-beyond (Accessed 22/10/2020); Adrian Horn, Funmi Olonisakin, & Gordon Peake. “United Kingdom-led Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone.” GSDRC. (2006) Available at: https://gsdrc.org/document-library/united-kingdom-led-security-sector-reform-in-sierra-leone/ (Accessed 22/10/2020)

[7] UN Peacekeeping. Sierra Leone – UNAMSIL – Mandate. (United Nations, 2005) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/mandate.html (Accessed 15/12/2020)

Description of Case 

The Bougainville Peace Agreement ended the fighting, but with a complete lack of state institutions and a society awash with weapons and separatist leaders, the risk of a conflict relapse remained high in the immediate post-war period. In addition, the referendum on Bougainvillean independence promised within 15-20 years in the Agreement and the introduction of autonomous governance on the islands remained sources of contention and potential sparks of conflict between Bougainvillean leaders and the Government of Papua New Guinea in far-off Port Moresby.[1] As a result, the international presence that had been deployed to Bougainville during the conflict remained in place, with the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) teams assisting with weapon disposal and verification of the ceasefire until 2003, when they were replaced with the much smaller Bougainville Transition Team.[2] The United Nations Political Office in Bougainville continued its work until 2004, when it was replaced by the United Nations Observer Mission for Bougainville (UNOMB), which was tasked with monitoring Bougainville’s autonomous status, facilitating the disposal of weapons, and organising the referendum.[3]

Until an appropriate Bougainvillean government could be formed, the UN and PMG teams worked alongside the Peace Process Consultative Council, which was chaired by UNOMB and served to facilitate an inclusive dialogue on the peace process with the parties to the ceasefire.[4] By May 2004, the peacekeepers had supervised the destruction of 81 percent of the arsenals of the two largest Bougainvillean armed groups as well as the lead formation of a separatist leader who had remained largely outside of the peace process.[5] Progress with disarmament and ongoing compliance from the parties to the Agreement prompted UNOMB to determine that the security situation was conducive to holding the planned elections in May-June 2005.[6] After preparing the elections and supervising their conduct alongside teams of international electoral observers, UNOMB was withdrawn and responsibility for administering the Autonomous Region was handed over to the elected Bougainvillean government.[7] Although the peace built in Bougainville was disrupted by several outbreaks of violence after 2005, the international effort had prevented a conflict relapse and laid the foundations for stable governance in Bougainville.

[1] Peter Jennings & Karl Claxton. “A Stitch in time: Preserving peace on Bougainville.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute Special Report. (2013) p.6

[2] John Gordon & Jason H. Campbell. Organising for Peace Operations: Lessons Learned from Bougainville, East Timor, and the Solomon Islands. (Santa Monica: RAND, 2016) p.26

[3] UNDP Papua New Guinea. Peace building in Bougainville: Background. (UNDP, 2020) Available at: https://www.pg.undp.org/content/papua_new_guinea/en/home/operations/projects/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/peace-building-in-bougainville.html (Accessed 31/11/2020)

[4] Australian Civil-Military Centre. Partnering for Peace: Australia’s peacekeeping and peacebuilding experiences in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, and in Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste. (Canberra: Australian Civil-Military Centre, 2012) p.22

[5] UN. “Post-conflict Bougainville’s disarmament process is progressing well, UN says.” UN News. (2004) Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2004/05/102662-post-conflict-bougainvilles-disarmament-process-progressing-well-un-says (Accessed 31/11/2020)

[6] UN. “UN official says with autonomous government in place in Bougainville, UN mandate complete.” UN News. (2005) Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2005/07/143972-un-official-says-autonomous-government-place-bougainville-un-mandate-complete (Accessed 31/11/2020)

[7] UN Security Council. “Following 15 June Inauguration of Bougainville’s Autonomous Government, United Nations Mandate Fully Implemented, Security Council Told.” UNSCR Press Release, SC/8437. (2005) Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8437.doc.htm (Accessed 31/11/2020)

Description of Case 

The series of peace agreements signed between November 2005 and December 2006 brought an end to the armed conflict in Nepal. Although the fighting had stopped, the Maoists retained de facto control of 70 percent of the country and maintained a large armed force.[1] Furthermore, the political consensus that had driven the peace process threatened to collapse as the ties that bound the diverse array of political parties and interest groups began to unravel. Indeed, less than a year after the war ended, Madhesi militants in the Terai region launched an insurgency in the hope of achieving greater participation in the re-negotiation of Nepal’s social contract.[2] These factors served to make the dual transition from war to peace and autocracy to democracy all the more challenging, greatly increasing the risk of a conflict relapse.

In January 2007, the UN deployed the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) to monitor and assist with the implementation of the peace agreements.[3] These accords were exceptional to the extent that they were negotiated with extremely limited international assistance, and although a UN presence was requested to assist with implementation, the Nepalese architects of the peace process required a unique international presence.[4] As a result, UNMIN remained a political rather than a peacekeeping mission and was tasked with completing a much more focused mandate than many contemporary UN operations. Its main task was supervising the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration programme. This began in 2007 and by the end of the year over 30,000 former Maoist combatants had been processed. The reluctance of the Nepalese parties to allow armed peacekeepers into the country led to the formation of a neutral security force, the Interim Task Force, which was formed of Nepalese veterans of the Indian Army (of which there are many) and served to monitor the cantonment sites.[5] UNMIN’s other main task was facilitating the military integration and Security Sector Reform process. To this end, it successfully navigated several crises and delays, ensuring that reforms were implemented, and the Nepalese military was ready to integrate former Maoist troops following the Mission’s departure in 2011.[6] The limited UN presence in post-war Nepal proved vital in facilitating the first steps toward peace and preventing a conflict relapse after a decade of war.

[1] Global Peace Operations Review. “Nepal.” Mission Notes, No. 4.15. (2008) p.1

[2] Sebastian von Einsiedel & Cale Salih. “Conflict Prevention in Nepal.” United Nations University Centre for Policy Research Conflict Prevention Series, No. 1. (2017) p.5

[3] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1740. (2007) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1740 (Accessed 31/11/2020)

[4] Ian Martin. “The United Nations and Support to Nepal’s Peace Process: The Role of the UN Mission in Nepal.” in in Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan. Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) p.201

[5] Ibid. p.209

[6] Short. “Assessing International Statebuilding Initiative Effectiveness at Preventing Armed Conflict Recurrence.” p.94

Description of Case 

The 1992 General Peace Agreement and the contributions of the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (Opérations des Nations Unies au Mozambique, ONUMOZ) helped to usher in over two decades of peace in Mozambique. The post-conflict transition was largely successful, with economic recovery boosted by relatively generous aid imbursements and the development of considerable oil and gas resources. Furthermore, approximately 92,000 soldiers – 71,000 from the Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, FRELIMO) and 21,000 of the Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, RENAMO) had been disarmed and reintegrated into society within a few years of the Agreement.[1] However, disputes over bias in the demobilisation process and the provision of pensions to former soldiers served to keep relations between the two parties tense and hindered any chance of genuine reconciliation. This was compounded by RENAMO’s failure to access political office via the ballot box, and with it, a share of the wealth and influence enjoyed by the FRELIMO administration.[2] In April 2013, the RENAMO leadership declared the 1992 Agreement to be void and launched a fresh insurgency against the FRELIMO administration, mainly targeting police stations and commercially important transport routes.[3] Although limited in scope, the attacks threatened to spark a renewed war in Mozambique. 

Bilateral negotiations began immediately after the first attacks began and concluded in August 2015 after 114 rounds of talks between FRELIMO and RENAMO representatives. This peace process was mediated by five academic and religious figures from Mozambique who received professional support from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.[4] Initial progress was made in early 2014, when sweeping electoral reforms were agreed, and in September the parties signed the Declaration on the Cessation of Military Hostilities in the capital, Maputo.[5] Further talks were held in 2015, however ongoing disputes and occasional armed clashes led RENAMO leaders to formally end negotiations with the government. The renewed conflict continued to grow throughout 2016, prompting several international efforts to mediate dialogue. An initial committee failed to make much progress, but an initiative led by the Swiss government resulted in a ceasefire in early 2017. A small monitoring team was established to verify the ceasefire, and further talks helped to consolidate the peace.[6] In August 2018, the parties signed a memorandum of understanding on military issues, and the following year, the Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement was signed, bringing a formal end to decades-old conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO and preventing renewed war in Mozambique.[7]

[1] Alex Vines. “Prospects for a Sustainable Elite Bargain in Mozambique: Third Time Lucky?” Chatham House Research Paper. (2019) Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/08/prospects-sustainable-elite-bargain-mozambique-third-time-lucky-0/2-key-features-past-elite (Accessed 31/11/2020)

[2] Ibid.

[3] BBC. “‘Renamo attack’ on Mozambique’s Maringue police station.” BBC News. (2013) Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24625718 (Accessed 31/11/2020)

[4] The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Annual Report – The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in 2015. (Geneva: HD, 2015) p.10

[5] Declaração de Cessação das Hostilidades Militares, 2014. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/mozambique-ceasefire-2014 (Accessed 31/11/2020)

[6] Vines. “Prospects for a Sustainable Elite Bargain in Mozambique.”

[7] AP. “Mozambique Peace Accord Is Signed, Paving Way for Elections.” The New York Times. (2019) Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/world/africa/mozambique-peace-accord-signed-paves-way-for-elections.html (Accessed 31/11/2020)

Description of Case 

Prior to the signing of the General Peace Agreement in 1992, Mozambique had been in a state of armed conflict for 28 years (with a brief pause in 1974-1975). The struggle between FRELIMO and RENAMO left over 100,000 armed combatants in Mozambican society, state institutions were extremely fragile, up to six million people were displaced from their homes, and landmines littered the landscape.[1] In addition, the transition to democracy stipulated in the Agreement required the country to hold its first ever multi-party elections within a year.[2] These challenges were compounded by the impact of a major drought that hit the region in 1991-1992. Together, these factors posed a major hurdle to efforts to consolidate the hard-earned peace and posed a severe risk of sparking renewed armed conflict.

Following the signing of the Agreement, the UN led efforts to prevent a conflict relapse in Mozambique. A Special Representative was immediately dispatched to the country with a team of 21 military observers to monitor and verify the ceasefire, and in December 1992, the Security Council approved the formation of the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (Opérations des Nations Unies au Mozambique, ONUMOZ). The Mission was tasked with supporting the peace process, leading the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) process, building a new Mozambican military, and monitoring elections.[3] Logistical problems impeded the deployment of ONUMOZ, delaying both the disarmament process and the scheduled elections, however by May 1993 it was up to strength.[4] In October 1993, a year after the war ended, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali visited Mozambique and hosted wide-ranging talks, fostering consensus to move ahead with DDR and elections and introducing a police component to ONUMOZ.[5] By August 1994, approximately 90,000 combatants had been disarmed and inducted into UN Development Programme reintegration programmes, while 10,000 troops of the new armed forces had been trained.[6] This allowed the October elections, which were supported by 2,300 international electoral observers, to take place peacefully and in free and fair conditions.[7] FRELIMO won the elections and remained in power, but with a democratic mandate to govern the country. With an elected government in place and the DDR process complete, ONUMOZ was drawn down throughout 1994, before the final personnel left in January 1995.[8] Although many challenges remained in Mozambique, a return to armed conflict was prevented. 

[1] Rupiya. “Historical Context.” p.15

[2] General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, 1992.

[3] UN Peacekeeping. Mozambique – ONUMOZ: Mandate. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onumozM.htm (Accessed 23/11/2020)

[4] UN Peacekeeping. Mozambique – ONUMOZ: Background. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onumozFT.htm#Setting (Accessed 23/11/2020)

[5] Chris Alden. “The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1. (1995) p.113

[6] Ibid. pp.113-121

[7] UN Peacekeeping. Mozambique – ONUMOZ: Background.

[8] Richard Synge. Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997) pp.145-167

Description of Case 

Six months after the Al Fateh Declaration, a new local governor (known as a District Commissioner) was appointed to Wajir. They faced the immediate challenge of consolidating the peace that had been achieved through the mediation of the inter-clan council and the hard work of local civil society groups. In 1994, a rapid response team was established with members from local government and civil society. This team continued to employ traditional Somali methods such as xeer and diya to resolve disputes and prevent wider conflicts rather than relying on Kenyan law, thereby accommodating their efforts with the needs and perspectives of the local population.[1] In 1995, the various civil society groups working for peace in Wajir were united as a District Development Committee within the local government administration, formalising the links between the state and civil society that had developed in the search for peace. In addition, in May 1995, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) was established as a permanent organisation with support from the Kenyan government and international donors.[2] The WPDC was led by the District Commissioner and included representatives from the military and security services, government departments, NGOs, elders, women, youth, religious leaders, the business community, and Wajir’s four members of parliament. By encompassing such an array of stakeholders, the WPDC entrenched collaboration between local government and society as the means to address crises and provided a administrative framework for the use of customary law and traditional methods of peacemaking to prevent or resolve conflicts. In this period, the WPDC also helped form a Council of Elders, composed of 10 clan leaders, to facilitate communication and dialogue between the clans in Wajir and the Kenyan government adjusted local constituency boundaries to ensure each clan had a seat in parliament.[3]

The measures taken in response to the violence of the early 1990s succeeded in reducing armed conflict in Wajir. The Ajuran and Degodia clans have not fought since, and although occasional armed clashes do still occur in the area, these often involve cross-border incidents that are beyond the remit of the WPDC and are considerably smaller than previous conflicts: an uptick in violence in July 2000, for example, resulted in 30 deaths.[4] When the rest of Kenya verged on the brink of civil war during 2007-2008 election violence, Wajir remained one of the most peaceful districts in the entire country, demonstrating the effectiveness of the peace infrastructure that was developed. In 2010, Interpol listed a city in Wajir as the safest in East and Central Africa.[5]

[1] Menkhaus. “The rise of a mediated state in northern Kenya.” p.26

[2] Aden Abdi & Jeremy Lind. “Kenya: The changing nature of local peacebuilding in Kenya’s north-eastern borderlands.” Accord Insight, Vol. 4. (2018) p.29

[3] Menkhaus. “The rise of a mediated state in northern Kenya.” p.27

[4] Ibid. p.28

[5] Abdi & Lind. “Kenya.” p.29