Description of Case 

Mozambique emerged from the Portuguese empire in 1975 after a decade of armed conflict between colonial forces and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). Following the Carnation Revolution, Portuguese forces were immediately withdrawn, and FRELIMO was formally given control of Mozambique.[1] The Soviet Union and East Germany provided initial diplomatic and military support to the new administration, which was also later supported by Zimbabwe. In 1977, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) launched an insurgency against newly established and FRELIMO-led Government of Mozambique with the support of the governments of neighbouring Rhodesia and, from 1980, South Africa. With external backers providing support to both sides, the conflict raged for over a decade without a decisive outcome.[2] A change of FRELIMO leadership in 1986 sparked renewed efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict, and two years later South Africa withdrew its support for RENAMO, providing some hope for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.[3]

Although the war appeared to be nearing its end, it proved difficult to find an intermediary to host negotiations which was satisfactory to both parties. FRELIMO distrusted the governments of the USA, South Africa, Kenya, the UK, and Malawi, while RENAMO refused to deal with the Zimbabwean administration, which had deployed thousands of troops in support of FRELIMO and the Mozambican military.[4] The first organised effort to end the war was led by church leaders in Mozambique, who utilised funds provided by the World Council of Churches to engage in Track II diplomacy between FRELIMO and RENAMO representatives in Kenya and the US.[5] These efforts created the conditions for dialogue to take place and, in 1989, talks jointly mediated by the governments of Kenya and Zimbabwe laid the groundwork for further dialogue, despite both parties refusing to meet face to face.[6] The following year, FRELIMO and RENAMO attended negotiations hosted by the Community of Sant’Egidio in Rome and, in December 1990, a partial ceasefire was reached.[7] A devastating drought in 1991-1992 severely impacted RENAMO’s ability to sustain the war and threatened the Mozambican people with famine, catalysing the peace process.[8] After 27 months of negotiations mediated by the Community of Sant’Egidio, the parties signed the General Peace Agreement in Rome on 4 October 1992, formally ending the war which had cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, and bringing peace to a country torn apart by three decades of armed conflict.[9]

[1] The Lusaka Agreement, 1974. Available at: https://www.africaportal.org/publications/frelimo-and-the-transitional-government-of-mozambique-the-lusaka-agreement/ (Accessed 20/11/2020)

[2] UCDP. Government of Mozambique – Renamo. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/722 (Accessed 20/11/2020)

[3] Martin Rupiya. “Historical Context: War and Peace in Mozambique.” in Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, & Alex Vines, eds. The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective. (London: Conciliation Resources, 1998) p.14

[4] Colin Darch. A Success Story Gone Wrong? The Mozambican Conflict and the Peace Process in Historical Perspective. (Maputo: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Mozambique, 2018) p.15

[5] Dínis S. Sengulane and Jaime Pedro Gonçalves. “A Calling for Peace: Christian Leaders and the Quest for Reconciliation in Mozambique.” in Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, & Alex Vines, eds. The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective. (London: Conciliation Resources, 1998) p.29

[6] Darch. A Success Story Gone Wrong? p.15

[7] Rupiya. “Historical Context.” p.15

[8] Jane Perlez. “Southern Africa Hit By Its Worst Drought of the 20^th Century.” The New York Times. (1992) Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/07/world/southern-africa-hit-by-its-worst-drought-of-the-20th-century.html (Accessed 23/11/2020)

[9] General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, 1992. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/mozambique-general-peace-agreement92 (Accessed 23/11/2020)

Description of Case 

In 1976, local leaders in the Indonesian province of Aceh launched an armed insurgency against the government in Jakarta with the goal of achieving independence. The conflict gradually escalated throughout the 1990s, with armed groups organised under the banner of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) making territorial gains and establishing alternative administrations in the areas it controlled. In 1998, the Indonesian military launched a sweeping offensive against GAM positions but was unable to achieve an outright victory.[1] In 1999, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue hosted the first talks between the Indonesian Government and GAM.[2] These led to further meetings in Geneva, which in turn produced a ceasefire that lasted from May 2000 until April 2001, when the Indonesian government launched another military offensive. Although unsuccessful, the 1999-2001 negotiations laid the groundwork for a lengthy peace process.[3]

Further talks took place in 2002, resulting in the signing of another ceasefire and an invitation for a small monitoring mission composed of Thai and Philippine personnel to be deployed.[4] Some parts of this agreement were implemented, but in 2003 the Indonesian government imposed martial law and launched yet another major military operation against GAM. After this offensive failed to achieve its objectives, a new Indonesian was elected in April 2004. In November 2004, the former President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, and his Crisis Management Initiative began mediating a fresh round of talks between the new government and GAM.[5] These negotiations gained a greater sense of urgency the following month when an earthquake struck just off the Acehnese coast, devasting the area and costing the lives of 160,000 citizens of Aceh. This disaster understandably changed the dynamic of the conflict considerably and in January 2005, Ahtisaari hosted representatives of both parties in Helsinki to continue the peace process.[6] These talks culminated in August 2005 with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding, which ended the conflict and outlined a framework for increased autonomy for Aceh within Indonesia.[7] The terms of the Memorandum also stipulated that the EU and ASEAN (represented by Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei, Singapore, and Malaysia) should establish a mission to monitor implementation. After almost three decades of armed conflict which cost the lives of 15,000 people and a devastating tsunami, Aceh was at peace.

[1] Damien Kingsbury. “A Mechanism to End Conflict in Aceh.” Security Challenges, Vol. 1, No. 1. (2005) p.76

[2] Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Aceh, Indonesia. (CHD, 2020) Available at: https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/aceh-indonesia/ (Accessed 09/11/2020)

[3] UCDP. Indonesia: Aceh. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/366 (Accessed 25/01/2022)

[4] Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement Between Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, 2002. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/indonesia-cessationhostilities2002 (Accessed 25/01/2022)

[5] Pierre-Antoine Braud & Giovanni Grevi. “The EU mission in Aceh: implementing peace.” European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper, No. 61. (2005) p.20

[6] CMI. “Ten years since the Aceh peace agreement.” News. (2015) Available at: http://cmi.fi/2015/08/14/ten-years-since-the-aceh-peace-agreement/ (Accessed 09/11/2020)

[7] Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, 2005. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/indonesia-memorandumaceh2005 (Accessed 09/11/2020)

Description of Case 

The Guatemalan Civil War was fought between an authoritarian military government and a coalition of armed opposition groups gathered under the banner of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionario Nacional Guatemalteco, URNG). Beginning in 1960, the conflict went through myriad phases until the 1990s, when an emergent civilian administration was able to curtail the political power of the military after the US Government withdrew its support for that regime. Facing international and domestic pressure (led by individuals such as Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú) to end the conflict, the new Government of Guatemala entered into UN-mediated negotiations with URNG representatives in Oslo in March 1990.[1] The talks continued for many years, with the US Government and the Organisation of American States voicing their support for the process, but little progress was made. A series of attempted coups d’état and autocoups threatened to undermine both the democratisation and peace processes in Guatemala until 1993, when Ramiro de León Carpio was elected to the Presidency by the Guatemalan Congress after the incumbent fled the country, providing a level of stability to the situation.[2]

In cooperation with the Guatemalan Congress and the Catholic Church, de León developed a package of comprehensive reforms and injected new life into the UN-mediated talks.[3] In January 1994, the UN hosted a fresh round of negotiations in Mexico City, culminating with the signing of a Framework Agreement, which established a structure for the ongoing negotiations to take place.[4] Two months later, the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights was signed, strengthening the rule of law and inviting the UN to deploy a verification mission to Guatemala.[5] Additional agreements were signed in the ensuing months, with provisions addressing the plight of refugees, indigenous peoples, and victims of human rights violations. In 1996, a newly elected government took over from de León’s caretaker administration. Negotiations between the URNG and the new government proceeded rapidly, with additional agreements being signed throughout the year until, on 29 December 1996, the peace process culminated with the signing of the Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace.[6] The Accord re-iterated all previous agreements and provided a comprehensive roadmap for Guatemala’s post-conflict transition, formally ending the armed conflict. 

[1] Rachel Sieder & Richard Wilson. Negotiating Rights: The Guatemalan Peace Process. (London: Conciliation Resources, 1997)

[2] Fernando Orgambides. “’Human rights President’ tries to win over the army: Ramiro de Leon Carpio talks to Fernando Orgambides of El Pais about his hopes for Guatemalan democracy.” The Independent. (1993) Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/human-rights-president-tries-to-win-over-the-army-ramiro-de-leon-carpio-talks-to-fernando-orgambides-1490492.html (Accessed 10/11/2020)

[3] Burgerman. “Building the Peace by Mandating Reform: United Nations-Mediated Human Rights Agreements in El Salvador and Guatemala.” Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 27, No. 3. (2000) pp.75-6

[4] Framework Agreement for the Resumption of the Negotiating Process between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolutionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), 1994. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/guatemala-resumptionnegotiationsurng94 (Accessed 10/11/2020)

[5] Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, 1994. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/guatemala-humanrightsagreement94 (Accessed 10/11/2020)

[6] Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace, 1996. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/guatemala-firmlastingpeace96 (Accessed 10/11/2020)

Description of Case 

El Salvador collapsed into civil war following a military coup d’état in October 1979. For over 12 years, a coalition of left-wing armed groups united under the banner of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN) fought against the US-backed Salvadorian government. Regional efforts to reduce armed conflict culminated with the Esquipulas II Agreement in 1987, however the war in El Salvador continued.[1] Two years later, government officials began meeting with representatives of the FMLN and laid the groundwork for further negotiations to take place. An unsuccessful military offensive in November 1989 served to convince the Government of El Salvador to invite the UN to mediate a peace process between the belligerents.[2]

UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar dispatched Álvaro de Soto to mediate the peace process.[3] Progress was made within months, and on 4 April 1990, the Geneva Agreement was signed, establishing ‘a negotiation process for resolving the El Salvador conflict.’[4] In July, the Agreement on Human Rights was signed in Costa Rica in an effort to reduce the impact of the conflict on civilians.[5] By the end of the year, all Salvadorian political parties had voiced their support for an end to the war. However, the ongoing negotiations remained unable to find a compromise on the future of the military and it was not until a fresh round of talks were held in New York that the belligerents agreed to initial a settlement.[6] The peace process culminated with the signing of the 1992 Chapultepec Agreement, a comprehensive accord which provided the framework for a ceasefire and disarmament, as well as a programme of comprehensive government reforms.[7] The Agreement represents the first UN-brokered end to an armed conflict and was hailed as a ‘revolution’ by the Secretary-General.[8] The nine-month ceasefire stipulated in the Agreement held firm, and the FMLN began its transition from armed force to political party. In 1994, the former belligerents reiterated their commitment to implementing the terms agreed at Chapultepec and building peace.[9] While myriad problems continue to challenge the Salvadorian people, the country has been spared from war since February 1992.

[1] Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America (Esquipulas II), 1987. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/centralamerica-esquipulasII87 (Accessed 13/10/2020)

[2] UCDP. El Salvador. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/316 (Accessed 13/10/2020)

[3] Alvaro de Soto. “Harnessing incentives for peace: An interview with Alvaro de Soto.” Conciliation Resources. (2008) Available at: https://www.c-r.org/accord/incentives-sanctions-and-conditionality/harnessing-incentives-peace-interview-alvaro-de-soto (Accessed 13/10/2020)

[4] Geneva Agreement, 1990. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/elsalvador-genevaagreement90 (Accessed: 13/10/2020)

[5] Agreement on Human Rights (San Jose Agreement), 1990. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/elsalvador-sanjoseagreement90 (Accessed: 31/11/2020)

[6] Álvaro de Soto. “A Key United Nations Moment and its Lessons.” UN Chronicle. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/key-united-nations-moment-and-its-lessons (Accessed: 13/10/2020)

[7] Chapultepec Agreement, 1992. Available at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/chapultepec-peace-agreement (Accessed: 13/10/2020)

[8] David Holiday & William Stanley. “Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons from El Salvador.” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 2. (1993) pp.415-6

[9] Joint Declaration by the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, 1994. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/elsalvador-jointdeclarationfmln (Accessed: 13/10/2020)

Description of Case 

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) launched an insurgency against the Government of Colombia in 1964. The ensuing armed conflict raged for over five decades, with a host of guerrilla groups and paramilitary formations developing across the country. By the 1970s, the armed groups were employing the sale of narcotics to fund their activities.[1] By the 1990s, most had transitioned to the political arena, but FARC remained in conflict with the government in Bogotá. On 26 August 2012, negotiations held in Cuba resulted in the creation of a framework for resolving the conflict, formalised in the General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace.[2] Among its provisions, the General Agreement scheduled further talks, focusing on political participation (2013), illegal drugs (2014), and agrarian development (2014).[3]

Between 2012 and 2016, the peace process was hosted by the Government of Cuba, which served as a guarantor to the accords alongside the Norwegian government. In addition, the governments of Venezuela and Chile served as observers to the negotiations, while the Union of South American Nations, EU, UN, Vatican, and American and German governments appointed special envoys to the peace process. Significant progress was made in 2015, when the former belligerents agreed to establish the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, which provided a mechanism for the investigation and prosecution of crimes related to the conflict.[4] In June 2016, the parties to the conflict agreed to a definitive ceasefire.[5] In September, the former belligerents signed a peace treaty at a public ceremony in Cartagena which was attended by representatives from across the world, including UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon.[6] Just a week later, however, the Colombian people rejected the agreement in a referendum. Rather than return to conflict, a new deal was agreed on 24 November 2016 and ratified by the Colombian parliament on 30 November.[7] For his efforts in bringing peace to the country, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016.[8] The international effort to facilitate an end to the fighting helped to bring an end to one of the longest intrastate armed conflicts in the world.

[1] UCDP. Government of Colombia – FARC. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/623 (Accessed 13/12/2020)

[2] General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace, 2012. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/colombia-generalaccordendconflict2012 (Accessed 13/12/2020)

[3] Participación política: Apertura democrática para construir la paz, 2013. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/colombia-politicalparticipation2013 (Accessed 13/12/2020); Solución al Problema de las Drogas Ilícitas, 2014. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/colombia-drogasilicitas2014 (Accessed 13/12/2020); Hacia un Nuevo Campo Colombiano: Reforma Rural Integral, 2014. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/colombia-reformarural2014 (Accessed 13/12/2020)

[4] Marta Valiñas. “The Colombian Special Jurisdiction for Peace: A Few Issues for Consideration When Investigating and Adjudicating Sexual and Gender-based Crimes.” Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 18, No. 2. (2020) p.449

[5] Agreement on the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities, and the Laydown of Weapons between the National Government and the FARC-EP, 2016. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/ceasefire-colombia-2016 (Accessed 13/12/2020)

[6] BBC. “Colombia peace deal: Historic agreement is signed.” BBC News. (2016) Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-37477202 (Accessed 13/12/2020)

[7] Sibylla Brodzinsky. “Colombia signs historic peace deal with Farc.” The Guardian. (2016) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/24/colombia-signs-historic-peace-deal-with-farc-rebels (Accessed 13/12/2020); Acuerdo Final Para La Terminación Del Conflicto y La Construcción De Una Paz Estable y Duradera, 2016. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/node/2924 (Accessed 13/12/2020)

[8] The Nobel Prize. Juan Manuel Santos: Facts. (Nobel Prize, 2020) Available at: https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2016/santos/lecture/ (Accessed 13/12/2020)

Description of Case 

The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence from Yugoslavia on 1 March 1992, following the secession of Slovenia and Croatia the previous year. Much like the those former Yugoslav republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina soon fell into armed conflict as the President of Serbia and de facto leader of rump Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević, orchestrated a campaign with parts of the Serb communities in Croatia and Bosnia to seize as much territory as was possible and ultimately build a “Greater Serbia” from the ashes of Yugoslavia.[1] A complex conflict ensued, initially between Bosnian Serb forces backed by Yugoslavia and a broad coalition of armed groups serving under the banner of the Bosnian government. In 1993, this coalition fractured, with a predominantly Croat armed group, the Croat Defence Council, coming into conflict with the Bosnian government, making the war a three-sided struggle.[2]

A succession of peace processes led by the European Community failed to halt the fighting or resolve the conflict.[3] In 1994, the US government took the lead in efforts to bring peace to Western Balkans. Its first success was mediating talks between the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its former ally turned adversary, the Croat Defence Council. In March 1994, this initiative culminated with the Washington Framework Agreement for the Federation, which not only ended one facet of the war, but also renewed the former alliance between them.[4] The war continued into 1995, when atrocities and acts of genocide carried out by Bosnian Serb forces inspired a much more forceful response from the international community. Following an extensive bombing campaign by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and a Croatian offensive into the Bosnian theatre, Milošević attended peace talks hosted by the Government of the USA in Dayton, Ohio.[5] Richard Holbrook led negotiations alongside representatives from the US, EU, and Russia.[6] After three weeks of talks, Milošević agreed to sign the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the presidents of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.[7] A formal ceremony was held in Paris on 14 December 1995, marking the official end to a conflict in which 100,000 people were killed and millions were displaced from their homes.

[1] James Gow. The Serbian Project and its Adversaries. (London: Hurst, 2003)

[2] UCDP. Bosnia-Herzegovina: Serb. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/389 (Accessed 13/12/2020)

[3] The Vance-Owen Plan, 1993. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/606/The%20Vance-Owen%20Plan (Accessed 13/12/2020)

[4] Framework Agreement for the Federation (Washington Agreement), 1994. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/bosniawashingtonagreement94 (Accessed 27/10/2020)

[5] Gow. The Serbian Project and its Adversaries. p.192

[6] Richard Holbrooke. To End A War. (New York: Modern Library, 1999)

[7]  General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995. Available at: https://www.osce.org/bih/126173 (Accessed 27/10/2020)

Description of Case 

The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the first domestic armed group formed in opposition to the Barre regime, was centred on army officers hailing from the north-eastern region of Somalia. After some initial success, the SSDF collapsed in 1985. After the fall of the regime in January 1991, former members of the SSDF held a conference in the city of Galkayo and agreed to re-establish the organisation to defend the people and interests of the north-east. Just two weeks later, militia from former opposition groups attacked and seized control of the city. With the situation across Somalia rapidly descending into a complex armed conflict that created widespread famine and displaced swathes of the population, there was every likelihood that the north-east would follow suit.[1] Faced with a growing spectrum of threats, SSDF leaders and local clan elders held another conference in the city of Garowe in June 1991 to address the rapidly evolving situation. The delegates agreed to form an interim administration to provide basic services and vowed to defend the vital logistical lifeline for northern Somalia: the port of Bosaso and the road leading from it to Galkayo.[2]

In the ensuing years, armed conflict continued in the north-east, largely between the SSDF and the armed groups from the south trying to assert their authority across the country. The 1993 Mudug Peace Agreement ended this conflict, allowing trade between north and south Somalia to resume.[3] By the end of December 1993, the SSDF and its supporters had disarmed, integrated, or come to terms with all other armed groups in the region. In this context, another conference was held on “Peace and Life” in the north-east incorporating delegates from across what later became Puntland. Between 1993 and 1995, several provincial administrations were established across the region with the endorsement of large conferences of local elders, who also employed traditional peacemaking practices to resolve conflicts. Faced with ongoing failures to find a national solution to the situation and cognisant of the relative security that these bottom-up processes had provided to the region (not to mention the apparent success of neighbouring Somaliland), the 460 delegates of another major clan conference taking place over the summer of 1998 elected to establish the Puntland State of Somalia to guarantee security in the region.[4] By providing basic services to the population, consulting the clans, and employing traditional peacemaking methods, the people of the north-east were spared the conflict that tore through southern Somalia throughout the 1990s.

[1] Human Rights Watch. “Somalia – Beyond the Warlords: The Need for a Verdict on Human Rights Abuses.” HRW World Report, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1993) Available at: https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/somalia/ (Accessed 28/10/2021)

[2] Pat Johnson, ed. The Puntland Experience: A Bottom-up Approach to Peace and State Building. Peace Initiatives in Puntland, 1991-2007. (Interpeace, 2008) p.16

[3] Conciliation and Peace Conference of the Regions of Bari Nugal and Mudug, SNA, SNDU, SSDF Peace Agreement (Mudug Peace Agreement), 1993. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1710 (Accessed 28/10/2021)

[4] Johnson, ed. The Puntland Experience. p.25