Description of Case 

In 2010, Kyrgyzstan was confronted with a series of major political crises that threatened to spark a civil war. The incumbent president was forced from office during violent street protests in April and his administration was quickly replaced with an interim government which pledged to implement a democratisation agenda.[1] After several incidents of violence throughout May, tensions between southern Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities quickly escalated. Fed by the ambitions of rival political elites vying for power in the region, these tensions came to a head in the city of Osh between 10 – 15 June. During riots and armed clashes, over 400 people were killed, up to 2,000 were injured, and 300,000 were forced to flee from their homes as much of the city was destroyed.[2]  

Both the Confederation of Independent States and UN considered deploying peacekeepers to Kyrgyzstan but ultimately left the resolution of the crisis in the hands of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which at the time was chaired by neighbouring Kazakhstan. A Kazakh OSCE Special Representative was dispatched to investigate events and begin facilitating dialogue between the belligerent parties. Meanwhile, diplomatic pressure to contain the violence mounted as the EU and UN called for a return to constitutional order and sent their own officials to support the OSCE. Further support was offered by the Russian and US governments, which both offered their full support to the Kazakh-led initiative in the country.[3] High-level actions taken by the OSCE were complemented by the tireless work of local peacebuilders, who successfully prevented the violence from escalating further in southern Kyrgyzstan. In the city of Aravan, for example, local leaders formed the Aravan Committee for Restoring Stability and implored gathering crowds to not resort to violence. In addition to preventing violence, the Committee also supported local traders and farmers, thus minimising the impact of the crises on the population. Although hundreds of people died as a result of the unrest, the escalation of the crises into an armed conflict was prevented thanks to the preventive diplomacy of the OSCE and the actions of local peacebuilders.[4]

[1] Franco Galdini. “The June 2010 ‘Events’ Four Years On: Past, Present, Future.” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Central Asia Security Policy Briefs, No. 15. (2014)

[2] Freedom House. A Chronicle of Violence: The events in the south of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 (Osh Region). (Freedom House, 2012)

[3] Center for Strategic Studies & International Studies and Institute for New Democracies. “The OSCE and the 2010 Crisis in Kyrgyzstan.” Policy Brief and Case Study. (2010) Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/policy-brief-case-study-osce-and-2010-crisis-kyrgyzstan (Accessed 22/10/2020)

[4] Alisher Khamidov, Nick Megoran, & John Heathershaw. “Bottom-up peacekeeping in southern Kyrgyzstan: how local actors managed to prevent the spread of violence from Osh/Jalal-Abad to Aravan, June 2010.” The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Vol. 45, No. 6. (2017)

Description of Case 

With its extensive history of political violence and coups d’état along with a succession of natural disasters in recent years, Haiti remains one of the most unstable countries in the western hemisphere. The deployment of a US-led operation in 1994 and three separate UN peacekeeping missions between 1993 and 2000 did little to improve the situation, and in 2004 Haitian politics was disrupted by another coup. In February 2004, an armed group known as the National Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Haiti launched an insurgency against the government, successfully capturing two of the largest cities in the country.[1] Just weeks later, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the Haitian president, was taken from the country by US military personnel, supposedly after resigning voluntarily, and left in exile in the Central African Republic.[2] With no legitimate government and an armed rebellion seizing territory, Haiti stood at the precipice of war.

In accordance with the Haitian constitution, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court took power as interim president following the unusual departure of Aristide. His first move was to invite the UN to deploy a peacekeeping mission to restore stability. Within a day, troops from the US arrived, soon followed by contingents from across the world. Brazil offered the largest contingent of the 7,000 soldiers and police who gathered under the banner of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).[3] Upon their arrival, MINUSTAH personnel worked to restore a ‘secure and stable environment’ and prevent the spread of armed conflict across the country.[4] While efforts in this regard were largely successful, Haiti was hit by a series of hurricanes in 2008 and an earthquake in 2010 which killed 300,000 people and devastated much of the country’s infrastructure. In response, MINUSTAH was heavily reinforced. In 2017, MINUSTAH completed its mandate and was replaced with a much smaller follow-up mission, the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, which focused on strengthening the rule of law.[5] For all its faults (sexual abuse scandals and a cholera outbreak), the fifteen-year UN presence in Haiti prevented an incipient armed conflict from erupting, restored order, and helped foster democracy.

[1] Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Haiti. Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/816 (Accessed 22/10/2020)

[2] The events remain somewhat unclear, but this article presents documentary evidence and concise analysis: Larry Rousseau. “Revisiting the Haitian Coup 10 Years Later.” HuffPost. (2014) Available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/larry-rousseau/haitian-coup_b_4860630.html (Accessed 22/10/2020)

[3] John Miller Beauvoir. “In Post-Conflict Haiti, Brazil Consolidates Its Status as Regional Actor.” Stimson Center. (2017)

[4] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1542. (2004) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1542 (Accessed 22/10/2020)

[5] MINUJUSTH. Home. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://minujusth.unmissions.org/en (Accessed 22/10/2020)

Description of Case 

Slobodan Milošević withdrew Yugoslav forces from Kosovo in early June, marking the end of the war.[1] On 10 June, the UN Security Council gave NATO the go-ahead to send personnel into Kosovo as stipulated in the technical agreement with Milošević, and, two days later, 42,000 troops of the international Kosovo Force (KFOR) moved into Kosovo, where they were tasked with maintaining a safe and secure environment and preventing renewed war.[2] Although the conflict was over, tensions between Kosovo’s Albanian and Serb communities threatened to spark a conflict relapse which could have escalated into a regional war. Furthermore, with the Kosovar Albanian population now enjoying the benefits of political power, the plight of the Serb population that remained in Kosovo became a humanitarian concern. Kosovo also lacked the most basic structures of governance in the aftermath of the conflict and the Yugoslav withdrawal from the area. Cognisant of these risks, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) to coordinate the international efforts in Kosovo and govern the territory until the institutions for self-rule could be built.[3]

UNMIK provided many basic services to the population between 1999 and 2002, when it took up a more supervisory role following the election of local representatives to administrative bodies.[4] UNMIK was supported by parallel missions from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which focused on democratisation, elections, and institution building, and the EU, which led the economic recovery.[5] Furthermore, KFOR remained in Kosovo to provide security and ensure stability.[6] It continues to maintain a force of 3,800 personnel at the time of writing. Following the declaration of Kosovan independence in 2008, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo was established to support the development of the Kosovan police force and judiciary.[7] Ongoing talks between Serbian and Kosovan authorities have been mediated by the UN Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo since 2005.[8] Although the status of Kosovo remains contested and progress with regard to building state institutions has been undeniably slow, the array of international efforts to stabilise the area have helped prevent a conflict relapse in Kosovo for over two decades.  

[1] Patrick Wintour, Ian Traynor, & Ed Vulliamy. “Why Milosevic blinked first.” The Guardian. (1999) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jun/06/balkans (Accessed 23/11/2020)

[2] NATO. NATO’s role in Kosovo. (NATO, 2020) Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (Accessed 24/11/2020)

[3] UN Security Council. Resolution 1244. (UN, 1999) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1244 (Accessed 24/11/2020)

[4] Daan W. Everts. Peacekeeping in Albania and Kosovo: Conflict Response and International Intervention in the Western Balkans, 1997-2002. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2020) p.198-9

[5] OSCE. OSCE Mission in Kosovo: Mandate. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: https://www.osce.org/mission-in-kosovo/mandate (Accessed 24/11/2020); Marcus Brand. The Development of Kosovo Institutions and the Transition of Authority from UNMIK to Local Self-Government. (Geneva: Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations, 2003) p.10

[6] NATO. NATO’s role in Kosovo.

[7] EULEX. About EULEX. (EU, 2020) Available at: https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,60 (Accessed 24/11/2020)

[8] UNOSEK. Origins of UNOSEK. (UNOSEK, 2020) Available at: https://www.unosek.org/origins-of-unosek/ (Accessed 24/11/2020)

Description of Case 

The initial deployment of the Multinational Protection Force (MPF) restored order in much of Albania. However, many challenges remained which posed a threat to the fragile peace. The looting of military equipment during the fighting had left up to a million firearms circulating in Albanian society, which not only threatened to disrupt the peace but became a cause for concern when allegations of arms shipments into Kosovo heightened tensions with the Government of Serbia. Furthermore, although the elections that were held following the conflict produced a new government, the ousted president contested the result. Determining these factors to amount to a threat to peace and security in the region, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the MPF for an additional 45 days to consolidate the peace.[1] With its mandate complete, MPF was withdrawn on 11 August 1997 and responsibility for upholding the rule of law was handed over to the reorganised Albanian police.[2]

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) led the international effort to build stability in Albania after the departure of the MNF. The outbreak of war in neighbouring Kosovo in 1998 threatened Albania with renewed instability, particularly as the administration in Belgrade suspected that Kosovo Liberation Army combatants had logistics and training bases on Albanian territory. Fearing an outbreak of violence on the border could have sparked an interstate conflict, the OSCE carried out an assessment of the frontier, deployed more teams to the area, and brought in equipment to build the capacity of Albanian border patrols.[3] The reassertion of state authority over parts of southern Albania also risked sparking conflict in 1998, with government security forces meeting resistance from armed groups. The OSCE teams helped to ensure this process went relatively peacefully, mediating many such disputes as the primary representatives of the international community.[4] The greatest challenge to peace in Albania came in September 1998. Protests organised by the party which lost the 1997 elections escalated, with government buildings being attacked and many officials fleeing Tirana. In the chaos, an armed group (equipped with stolen tanks) attempted to seize power. Their bid was unsuccessful, and thanks to OSCE mediation, the leaders of the coup surrendered peacefully within hours.[5] Another armed conflict in Albania was averted.

[1] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1114. (UN, 1997) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1114 (Accessed 06/12/2020)

[2] UN. “Security Council Marks Withdrawal of Multinational Force from Albania; Need for Continuting Global Support is Needed.” UN Security Council Press Release SC/6410. (1997) Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/1997/19970814.SC6410.html (Accessed 06/12/2020)

[3] Everts. Peacekeeping in Albania and Kosovo. p.14-5

[4] Ibid. p.17

[5] Ibid. pp.22-3

Description of Case 

Originating from some of the Philippine resistance movements that fought the Japanese during the Second World War, the Philippine Communist Party (Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, PKP) continued its armed struggle against the post-war administration in Manila with the aim of leading a Maoist revolution until 1954. In 1968, the PKP split, with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) emerging as the more powerful force and launching an insurgency against the Government of the Philippines across the country.[1] The fall of the regime of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 heralded an opportunity for a negotiated settlement to ongoing conflict, but although some talks were held with the Government of the Philippines, now led by newly elected Corazon Aquino, the parties failed to come to terms. In January 1987, Philippine security forces fired on a crowd of protesters (killing thirteen and injuring hundreds), leading the CPP to withdraw from the talks and return to armed struggle. The scale of the armed conflict intensified for the ensuing three years, only to recede again in the early 1990s.[2]

In this context, many communities caught in the crossfire between the CPP armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), and the Philippine military and police developed a relatively effective method of mitigating the impact of the ongoing conflict on their lives. Inspired by the local community of Hungduan, who successfully negotiated ad hoc arrangements for the NPA to withdraw from the locality and for government forces to remain outside the area in 1986, preventing the destruction of their homes and businesses, people in other areas worked to implement similar arrangements in their localities.[3] In 1988, the population of Sagada (in Cordillera) issued a 12-point declaration signed by municipal leaders, the clergy, civil society, and tribal elders which banned military operations (and alcohol) in the entire municipality and called for tribal customs to be respected and sanctuary for the wounded to be offered. This declaration met with widespread public support and was endorsed by the Government of the Philippines in 1989. Similar frameworks were applied in Sitio Cantmanyog in the Western Visayas, Tulunan (Barangay Bituan) on Mindanao, and Tabuk, near Sagada, over 1989 and 1990. With committees established to represent the zones in negotiations, local communities had access to a mechanism to consistently engage in delicate talks, make adjustments to certain arrangements with one party to the conflict or the other, and ultimately try and keep the armed conflict away from their homes and businesses.[4] By creating and maintaining these zones of peace, local people and organisations reduced the impact of armed conflict on the civilian population.

[1] UCDP. Government of Philippines – CPP. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/411 (Accessed 28/01/2022)

[2] Kevin Avruch & Roberto S. Jose. “Peace Zones in the Philippines.” in Landon E. Hancock & Pushpa Iyer. Zones of Peace. (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 2007) p.53

[3] Ibid. p.55

[4] Ibid. p.65

Description of Case 

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established on 19 March 1978 in response to the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon following attacks on Tel Aviv by Palestinian militants from bases in the area. UNIFIL was initially tasked with confirming Israeli withdrawals, restoring peace and security to the area, and helping the Government of Lebanon re-establish its authority across the country.[1] Owing to the complex geopolitical situation, the peacekeepers were initially limited to providing humanitarian assistance rather than pursuing their mandate. In 1985, the gradual Israeli withdrawal began, continuing until 2000, when it was finally completed.[2] UNIFIL filled the gap left by their departure, with peacekeepers working to maintain the ceasefire through joint patrols and regular consultations with both the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and the Lebanese Army. In this period, UNIFIL played a key role in supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces (which were still in recovery from the 1975-1989 civil war) as they asserted state authority in southern Lebanon and disarmed militias, while also providing vital basic services to the population.[3] Although quantifying the impact of UNIFIL during these years is difficult, the fragility of the Lebanese state and the preponderance of armed groups in the area of operation made renewed conflict a real possibility.

The 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (in response to Hezbollah attacks on Israel from Lebanese territory) cost the lives of many peacekeepers and presented many challenges to UNIFIL. After a month of fighting, a ceasefire was agreed on 14 August. In the aftermath of the conflict, the parameters of the UNIFIL mission changed considerably.[4] The strength of the operation was increased considerably, both in terms of overall numbers and heavy weapons, and a naval component was added to help the Lebanese Armed Forces monitor their maritime borders and limit the flow of weapons to Hezbollah. Once again, UNIFIL was positioned between the withdrawing IDF troops and unoccupied Lebanese territory to assure both sides, monitor the ceasefire, deliver basic services, and accompany Lebanese security forces as they returned to the area.[5] This complex task was completed without incident, and relative stability was once again established in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL continues contributing to peace and stability in the region at the time of writing.

[1] United Nations Security Council. Resolutions 425 & 426. (1978) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/425 (Accessed 27/10/2021)

[2] Suzanne Goldenberg. “Chaos and humiliation as Israel pulls out of Lebanon.” The Guardian. (24 May 2000) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/may/24/israelandthepalestinians.lebanon (Accessed 27/10/2021)

[3] UNIFIL. UNIFIL Background. (UN, 2021) Available at: https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-background (Accessed 27/10/2021)

[4] Jeffrey Feltman. “Debating UN peacekeeping in Lebanon.” Brookings. (15 June 2020) Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/15/debating-un-peacekeeping-in-lebanon/ (Accessed 27/10/2021)

[5] UNIFIL. UNIFIL Background.

Description of Case 

Cyprus emerged from the British Empire in 1960. Prior to independence, a series of treaties established a consociational democracy in which power was shared between the island’s Greek and Turkish communities and provided a mandate for military personnel from Greece, Turkey, and the UK to be stationed in certain areas of Cyprus.[1] However, following independence, leaders from each community began to clash over constitutional reform and representation in state institutions. By December 1963, armed confrontations were erupting between militias. To prevent the conflict from escalating further, the British, Greek, and Turkish troops formed a joint peacekeeping force and patrolled the disengagement line once a ceasefire was negotiated at the end of the month, however the ensuing talks in London failed to resolve the crisis.[2] As a result, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established in March 1964.[3] Led by the British troops already in Cyprus, UNFICYP was deployed as an interpositionary force, physically separating the two communities while talks were held between the respective political leaderships.[4]

Efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict failed. Following an attempted coup d’état in Greek Cyprus in July 1974, the Government of Turkey occupied the north of the island in a major military operation. The UN Security Council called for a ceasefire following the initial offensive, and although clashes continued in certain areas, UNFICYP was able to gradually reduce the fighting until, on 16 August 1974, the ceasefire finally came into force.[5] This allowed UNFICYP to document the positions held by each military as it verified the ceasefire. In the absence of a negotiated boundary, the intelligence gathered by the peacekeepers at this time serves as the basis for demarcation to this day.[6] Since 1974, the Mission has patrolled the ceasefire line, monitored the military situation, and facilitated dialogue between the belligerents. In 1989, UNFICYP personnel convinced both sides to withdraw their forces from the frontlines in a significant act of de-escalation.[7] UNFICYP has been gradually reduced in size since the 1980s but remains active at the time of writing. The Mission played a key role in limiting the 1974 conflict and has ensured that intercommunal violence has not been repeated on the island for 56 years.

[1] UNFICYP. History: Tripartite Conference & Geneva Declaration. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://unficyp.unmissions.org/tripartite-conference-geneva-declaration (Accessed 02/12/2020)

[2] United Nations. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping. (New York: United Nations, 1990) pp.283-4

[3] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 186. (1964) Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/186 (Accessed 02/12/2020)

[4] Norrie Macqueen. The United Nations Since 1945: Peacekeeping and the Cold War. (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999) p.48

[5] United Nations. The Blue Helmets. p.302

[6] Ibid. p.305

[7] Ibid. p.309

Description of Case 

The Kurdish population of Iraq faced a renewed armed conflict with Baghdad almost immediately after the Gulf War ended in 1991. However, a no-fly zone over the area which was enforced by US and allied armed forces provided a considerable degree of protection to Iraqi Kurdistan and prevented Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from re-establishing control of the area. Elections held in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1992 resulted in a 50-50 split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the formation of a unity administration to govern the de facto Kurdish state. Within two years, however, the coalition between the two rival parties (which had a history of violent competition dating back to 1975) collapsed and, on 1 May 1994, an armed conflict erupted over exclusive control of Iraqi Kurdistan, with the PDK allegedly being supported by the Iranian government and the KDP briefly allying itself with the Iraqi government.[1] A key source of contention was control of the border with Turkey, which offered a major source of revenue to whomever administered it.[2]

In August 1995, the belligerents agreed to attend US-sponsored talks in Dublin, Ireland. The negotiations were marred by a resumption of fighting in Kurdistan and were quickly abandoned. A few months later, the Government of Iran mediated another round of talks, however they also failed to end the conflict. US efforts, given a renewed sense of urgency following the Iranian initiative, continued, with fresh talks taking place in November 1995 and April 1996. The Government of Turkey hosted yet another round of talks in 1996, resulting in the Ankara Declaration and the deployment of a short-lived Peace Monitoring Force (April-October 1997).[3] The fighting resumed in October 1997, continuing at a significant scale despite further talks being held. In the first months of 1998, the Kurdish leaders began a bilateral peace process which entailed bi-monthly meetings alternately held in each other’s territory known as the Koya/Shaqlawa Process. These meetings included confidence-building measures and led to the formation of a joint committee to manage the newly introduced UN Oil for Food Programme.[4] In July 1998, the US government invited the leaderships of both parties to Washington, DC, for talks mediated by a host of senior officials, including the Secretary of State. After over two weeks of negotiations, the parties signed the Washington Agreement on 17 September 1998, finally bringing an end to the conflict.[5]

[1] Johannes Jüde. “Contesting borders? The formation of Iraqi Kurdistan’s de facto state.” International Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 4. (2017) p.856

[2] Ibid. p.855

[3] Karwan Salih Waisy. “The Roots of the Iraqi Kurdish Internal Rivalries, Conflicts and Peace Process 1964-2000.” American International Journal of Research in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, Vol. 10, No. 3. (2015) pp.226-7

[4] Brigitte E. Hugh Perpetuating Peace: Context Versus Contents of the Power-Sharing Agreements

Between the KDP and PUK of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 1992 and 1998 (Utah State University: All Graduate Theses and Dissertations 7821, 2020) p.53

[5] Alan Makovsky. “Kurdish Agreement Signals New U.S. Commitment.” The Washington Institute. (1998) Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/kurdish-agreement-signals-new-u.s.-commitment (Accessed 26/11/2020)

Description of Case 

Tajikistan emerged from the Soviet Union in September 1991. Multi-party elections were held peacefully in November of that year; however, the result was disputed by a host of opposition parties. In 1992, demonstrations against the new government turned violent as the president began raising militias and elements of the opposition turned to the Taliban in Afghanistan for support.[1] Tensions among these groups continued to heighten until May 1992, when armed conflict erupted between them. In September 1992, the president was ambushed by opposition troops and forced to resign.[2] His replacement continued the war against an array of Islamic and Democrat opposition groups, which formed up under the banner of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). By December, approximately 50,000 people had been killed in the fighting and 700,000 had been displaced from their homes.[3] By early 1993, the UTO had been largely defeated by Russian-backed government forces, however a low intensity conflict continued across swathes of the country.[4] 

The international effort to bring an end to the war began in the spring of 1993 with the appointment of a UN Special Envoy for Tajikistan, who was tasked with forging a ceasefire, and the creation of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue (ITD), which was led by Russia and the US and began hosting negotiations in 1993.[5] In September 1993, the Confederation of Independent States established the Collective Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan to monitor Tajikistan’s borders (particularly the frontier with Afghanistan), promote dialogue, and deliver humanitarian aid.[6] After several rounds of UN-mediated talks, the belligerents agreed to a temporary ceasefire in September 1994. In December 1994, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan to monitor the ceasefire.[7] In addition, both the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference established missions to support the peace process.[8] Although these initiatives succeeded in stopping the fighting for more than a year, Tajikistan relapsed back into war in 1996. The intervention of CIS peacekeepers and the ongoing Track II diplomatic efforts of the ITD brought the belligerents back to the negotiating table by the end of the year, paving the way for a series of comprehensive peace agreements in 1997.[9] The talks, once again hosted by the UN, culminated on 27 June 1997 with the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan.[10] After five years of war, the armed conflict in Tajikistan was over.

[1] Don Lynch. “The Tajik civil war and peace process.” Civil Wars, Vol. 4, No. 4. (2001) pp.52-4

[2] Steven Erlanger. “After Week of Turmoil, Tajik President Is Forced Out.” The New York Times. (1992) Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/08/world/after-week-of-turmoil-tajik-president-is-forced-out.html (Accessed 17/11/2020)

[3] Shirin Akiner & Catherine Barnes. “The Tajik Civil War: Causes and Dynamics.” in Kamoludin Abdullaev & Catherine Barnes. Politics of compromise: The Tajikistan peace process. (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001) p.16 Available at: https://www.c-r.org/accord/tajikistan/tajik-civil-war-causes-and-dynamics (Accessed 17/11/2020)

[4] Dov Lynch. Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) p.159

[5] Anna Matveeva. “Tajikistan: Peace Secured, but the State of our Dreams?” in Michael Lund & Steve McDonald. Across the Lines of Conflict: Facilitating Cooperation to Build Peace. (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2015) p.154

[6] Valdimir Goryayev. “Architecture of international involvement in the Tajik peace process.” in Kamoludin Abdullaev & Catherine Barnes. Politics of compromise. p.36

[7] UN Peacekeeping. Tajikistan – UNMOT: Background. (UN, 2000) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unmot/UnmotB.htm (Accessed 17/11/2020)

[8] Goryayev. “Architecture of international involvement in the Tajik peace process.” pp.35-6

[9] Matveeva. “Tajikistan.” pp.142-3; Elena Rigacci Hay. “Methodology of the inter-Tajik negotiation process.” in Kamoludin Abdullaev & Catherine Barnes. Politics of compromise. p.38-40

[10] General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, 1997. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/tajikistan-general-agreement97 (Accessed 17/11/2020)

Description of Case 

In 1988, a dispute over the construction of a large copper mine erupted into violence in the Bougainville region of Papua New Guinea. The local population saw little benefit from the mining operation (the profits were split between an Australian company and the Government of Papua New Guinea) and resented the environmental destruction caused by the mine. As a result, some locals sabotaged equipment and facilities. In response, the Government of Papua New Guinea launched a violent military crackdown. By 1989, the mine had ceased operating due to the pervasive instability and the area was subject to an armed conflict between the newly formed Bougainville Revolutionary Army and Papua New Guinean security forces.[1] The election of a new Papua New Guinean prime minister in 1994 opened a window for peace talks to take place. To facilitate the talks, a pan-Pacific initiative led by the Government of Australia and including the Papua New Guinean administration agreed to establish a peacekeeping mission.[2] The South Pacific Peacekeeping Force operated in Bougainville for a month while the negotiations took place.[3] While some progress was made in establishing an interim government for Bougainville, the peace process ultimately collapsed, and the fighting continued.

Negotiations between rival Bougainvillean groups were held in Canberra in 1995, but it was not until talks were held in New Zealand in 1997 between the Bougainville Interim Government and the Government of Papua New Guinea that the fighting finally abated. The talks culminated in a cease-fire and the deployment of the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG), a New Zealand-led unarmed peacekeeping mission tasked with employing the “Pacific Way” to verify that the terms of the truce were followed.[4] The peace process continued into 1998, with talks held in Australia and New Zealand culminating in additional agreements.[5] One such accord, the Lincoln Agreement, called for the formation of the Peace Monitoring Group to continue the work of the TMG.[6] In addition, the United Nations Political Office Bougainville was established to serve as another observer of the ongoing peace process.[7] Negotiations continued for many years, with a series of agreements gradually consolidating the peace. These efforts concluded in August 2001 with the signing of the Bougainville Peace Agreement, which brought a permanent end to the conflict.[8]

[1] Mary-Louise O’Callaghan. “The origins of the conflict.” in Andy Carl & Sr. Lorraine Garasu. Weaving consensus: The Papua New Guinea – Bougainville peace process. (London: Conciliation Resources, 2002) p.9 Available at: https://www.c-r.org/accord/papua-new-guinea%E2%80%93bougainville/origins-conflict (Accessed 17/11/2020)

[2] Agreement between Papua New Guinea and Fiji, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Australia and New Zealand, concerning the Status of Elements of the Defence Forces of those countries deployed in the North Solomons Province of Papua New Guinea as part of the South Pacific Peacekeeping Force, 1994. Available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/232 (Accessed 17/11/2020)

[3] Bob Breen. Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of Military Action and Diplomacy. (Canberra: Australian National University, 2001)

[4] Burnham Declaration by Bougainville Leaders on the Re-establishment of a Process for Lasting Peace and Justice on Bougainville, 1997. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/png-burnham-declaration97 (Accessed 17/11/2020); Rebecca Adams, ed. Peace on Bougainville – Truce Monitoring Group – Gudpela Nius Bilong Peace. (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2001); Jim Rolfe. “Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 8, No. 4. (2001) 

[5] Robert Tapi. “From Burnham to Buin.” in Andy Carl & Sr. Lorraine Garasu. Weaving consensus: The Papua New Guinea – Bougainville peace process. (London: Conciliation Resources, 2002) p.27

[6] Lincoln Agreement on Peace Security and Development on Bougainville, 1998. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/png-lincolnagreement98 (Accessed 17/11/2020); Richard Gehrmann, Matt Grant, & Samantha Rose. “Australian Unarmed Peacekeepers on Bougainville, 1997-2003.” Peace Review, Vol. 27, No. 1. (2015)

[7] Scott S. Smith. “The role of the United Nations Observer Mission.” in Andy Carl & Sr. Lorraine Garasu. Weaving consensus: The Papua New Guinea – Bougainville peace process. (London: Conciliation Resources, 2002) p.54

[8] Bougainville Peace Agreement, 2001. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/png-bougainville-agreement2001 (Accessed 17/11/2020)